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This thesis is the outcome of years of research on the complex aspects of military spending 
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deepest gratitude is owed to Professor Jaime Reis, whose intellectual challenges and individual 
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theoretical and empirical premises of this thesis, as well as for his kind assistance during my 
recent stay at the University o f Warwick. In addition, Professor Alan Milward’s comments and 
scholarly challenges have greatly influenced my stay here in Florence. Of the rest of the faculty 
here, I would also like to mention Professor Giovanni Federico's and Professor Arfon Rees' 
insightful seminars and intellectual companionship. The friendship and scientific challenges 
posed by certain of my fellow researchers have been invaluable: Gerben Bakker, Marc Prat, 
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thank you should also be directed towards the staff of the Department of History and 
Civilisation during these years, especially Rita Peero and Angela Schenk. The EUI library has 
offered good facilities for this comparative effort, for which also Dr. Serge Noiret should be 
thanked.
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Florence and developed in constant interaction with my Finnish and Swedish colleagues. Thus, 
my licentiate thesis examiners Professors Ilkka Nummela and Antti Kuustera were certainly 
supportive in this respect. Also, the University of Jyvaskylà and the Department of History, and 
Professor Toivo Nygârd in particular, were encouraging in my early research and offered 
facilities for its implementation. However, my continuous intellectual relationship with 
Professor Riitta Hjerppe has been the most influential connection to Finland. Furthermore, the 
active interaction and cooperation with Docents Juha-Antti Lamberg and Jari Ojala has been 
absolutely invaluable for me. Professor Petri Karonen's early inspiration for me to become a 
researcher is also duly acknowledged. Friendship and camaraderie were offered by Dr. Marko 
Lamberg, Dr. Olli Matikainen, and Phil. lie. Jari Eilola as well. I would also like to express my 
gratitude to the active research group at the Department of Economic History in Umeâ,
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especially Professor Olle Kranz, Dr. Sven Nordlund, and Dr. Magnus Lindmark. In the same 
token, Professors Kersti Ullenhag and the research seminar at the University o f Uppsala should 
also be thanked. Some of the research efforts discussed in the winter of 2000—2001 will be 
coming out as Eloranta 2002a (in the Scandinavian Economic History Review), and they are 
also partially featured in this thesis. Moreover, the help o f numerous librarians and archivists 
should be acknowledged, without whom these kinds of studies would not be possible: especially 
the personnel in the Military Archive (Sota-arkisto, Finland), Industrihuset (Infocenter, 
Sweden), the National Archive (Riksarkivet, Sweden), and the Public Records Office (UK).
In conclusion, to  say the least, this would not have been possible without the continuing support 
of my family. The biggest thank you goes to my wife, Charlene, who — besides running the 
household and putting up with my quirks —  also read the entire manuscript and introduced a 
number of grammatical corrections. The span of this research has seen the arrival o f two new 
persons in my life, my wonderful children Rebekka and Robert. Their patience in seeing Daddy 
crouched for hours on end in front of the computer has been remarkable. My mother Tamara's 
financial help and love has been crucial as well. The support o f my entire family (especially my 
aunts), in particular during my stays in Helsinki, has been wonderful. Finally, I would like to  
dedicate this study to the memory of two great men, my father Jorma and my grandfather 
Lennart, who both fought in the Second W orld War. Their stories and sacrifices made a lasting 
impression on me, also to feed my curiosity on the impacts of such conflicts both during times 
of crisis and times of peace.
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11. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Aims o f the Study
This thesis provides an analysis of the demand for military spending as an impure public good 
among eleven European states (European Great Powers: France, UK; transitional democracies: 
Portugal, Spain; “weak” implying limited political and economic status in a given system, 
states: Belgium, Denm ark, Finland, the  N etherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). 
The aim of this thesis is to ask what the factors were that determined the demand fo r military 
spending in a European democracy or a nation that behaved similar to a democracy in its 
military spending choices during the interwar period. I argue in this thesis that one must 
account for a complex set of forces arising from the level of an international system, the level of 
an alliance(s), the level of a state, as well as within a particular state to understand the demand 
for military spending comprehensively. The theory of public goods offers certain tools for the 
analysis of military spending behavior among a group of countries. Nonetheless, the theoretical 
and empirical studies utilizing the theory of public goods have usually failed to analyze the 
underlying economic system and possible changes in i t  It is also argued here that, with the 
exception of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1949— 1966, economic systems and 
alliances relying on conventional weapons and forces will always yield impurely public benefits 
(with purely public benefits being nested within these benefits) at the various levels of 
interaction, such as within the states for the relevant interest groups. Thus, the analysis must 
therefore encompass impure public good variables and proxies at all levels, both in the 
quantitative and qualitative senses.
This dissertation consists of several complementary parts. Chapter 1 will feature details on the 
relevant research traditions concerning the various aspects of military spending as well as 
discussion of the data sources, relevant data problems, and proposed solutions. I will then conclude 
this chapter with an overview of the key research questions pursued in the thesis. Chapter 2 will 
form the theoretical nexus of the thesis, where I will first present the basic tenets behind the theory 
pure public goods, especially in terms of military spending analysis. The focus is then shifted 
towards challenges arising from the analysis of economic systems and impure public goods, both at 
the macro- and micro-levels. The chapter is concluded with a detailed presentation of the 
hypotheses pursued in the thesis, thereby complementing the key research questions presented in 
Chapter 1. Chapter 3 will outline the essential points of consideration regarding the economic 
performance and security policy behavior of the selected countries, with emphasis on the League of
2Nations and the failure of disarmament. Additionally, I will present broad comparisons of military 
spending, relative of other indicators to ascertain what kinds of patterns existed, if any, by using the 
different kinds of measures of military spending —  for example, the percentage share of military 
expenditures in central government expenditures. This section will include both an aggregate 
overview of the various military spending characteristics of the period, as well as discussion of the  
military spending behavior of the selected eleven countries, and at times in comparisons with other 
nations. Chapter 4 will feature discussion of the so-called democratic peace argument, the 
hegemonic competition framework, and other systemic features of military spending in a system o f 
seventeen countries in the interwar period. More specifically, I aim to explore the impact of the 
international system (proxied by the said 17-country system) on the demand for military spending 
among the selected eleven European states. Additionally, certain individual country characteristics, 
the impact o f regime type on military spending, and the interrelationship between economic growth 
and military expenditures in particular, will be analyzed to provide insights on which variables 
might be crucial for the specific demand functions.
Chapter 5 endeavors to analyze the “alliance” impacts, or the lack o f such influences, as well as the 
importance o f pure public good variables in explaining the individual countries* military spending. 
Here it will be shown that, for example, the League of Nations was not able to provide a  pure 
public good in terms of collective security. The demand for military spending among the selected 
eleven countries was influenced by impurely public benefits, thus including also pure public good 
influences, arising from the various external and domestic forces in the budgetary process. The 
individual country demand patterns (often entailing also joint responses to certain variables) are 
analyzed in more detail in Section 5.2, including discussion of the various domestic political market 
proxies introduced into the analysis. Chapter 6 provides new insights into the military spending 
choices of Small and Medium “powers”, via the study of the interwar arms trade, by utilizing the 
concept of “weak” state in the analysis. This chapter will also attempt to contrast the military 
spending environments of the “weak” states respective o f the Great Powers. Were they in fact as 
“weak*’ as they are often portrayed as being?
Chapter 7 will focus the analysis further on two “weak” states: Sweden and Finland. It brings forth 
discussion and analysis on the political economy of military spending and budgets in Sweden and 
Finland, taking into account the success of various interest groups in the decision-making 
processes, focusing especially on industrial federations. A combination of quantitative investigation 
and the previously largely ignored interest group approach, employing rarely utilized archival data, 
will provide a fresh outlook on the formation of the demand for military spending. Moreover, I will
3attempt to outline specific “paths” (i.e., whether path dependence, to be defined later in detail, 
existed in terms o f institutional constraints and opportunities) for these two countries. This chapter 
will bring forth new insights into the analysis, chiefly the relevant actors in the political economy of 
a “weak” state, and an evaluation of the weakness and strengths of the preceding quantitative 
analyses. As Beth A. Simmons has expressed in the introduction of a similar study on the domestic 
sources of foreign economic policy in the interwar period: ‘The most convincing conclusions will 
ultimately be those on which the regressions agree with the archives”.1 This is certainly the 
objective here as well. The thesis will be concluded on contemplations of these very issues, as well 
as the key findings.
1.2. Research Traditions and Mildary Spending Analysis
Here in this section I will highlight some the most important research traditions and approaches 
that have been used in the various parts of this thesis, both recognizing the important 
contributions available to someone willing to embrace an interdisciplinary approach to the 
questions at hand, as well as outlining a critique of the lack of interaction among the disciplines 
needed to tackle such a complex issue as the demand for military spending, notably in a 
comparative setting. For example, the study of military history, perhaps the most traditional 
research orientation in the study of crises and military issues, has been changing ever since the 
Second World War, especially in the last few decades. This applies specifically to the 
international interests in this field. Emphasis has been placed on a new set of problems, 
primarily concerning the ties between war —  as well as the military establishment itself —  and 
society. The traditional view, involving strategic and tactical considerations, of many past 
historians has gradually been complemented with studies of more complex interrelationships. 
These newer approaches and studies on the effects of wars and military establishments on 
societies as a whole, whether concentrating on political, economic, social, or cultural aspects, 
are aimed at creating more comprehensive or "total" (in Braudel's terms) accounts of military 
history.2
These newer approaches include the so-called ”New Military History” -school, which originated 
in the United States.3 There the study of wars found itself in crisis by the 1950s, and it was 
shrinking into the margins of mainstream historiography in academic institutions. The reasons 
for this decline included the debilitating impact —  as far as academic prestige was concerned —
1 Simmons 1994,14.
2 Howard 1972,9— 11; Anderson 1988,8; Milward 1977, xii.
4of “big” government and various military history projects, the distrustful attitude o f Cold W ar 
scholars towards war as a research topic (with wars seen as exceptional ’’perversions” of the  
ordinary political and foreign policy processes, usually squared away with the realist perception 
of competition among self-interested states), and the lack of analytical framework to be found in 
most o f the studies. Some of the military historians of the time continued to study war in a more 
’’traditional” way, whereas others tried to incorporate a broader view into explaining conflicts. 
Another solution adopted by some military historians, for example by Walter Millis in his 1956 
study titled Arms and Men, was to try to popularize military history and incorporate a wider 
range of elements, such as political institutions, into the explanation of wars. The emphasis on 
nonmilitary characteristics began to challenge and add to the traditional military history 
framework in the United States during the 1960s, which Peter Paret refers to as the ’’nadir o f  
American military history in this century”.3 4
The New M ilitary History was greatly influenced by such similar movements as the New Social 
History, New Economic History and New Cultural History. The term ’’new” military history is 
in fact somewhat misleading, because this research orientation has also embraced the traditional 
military history sphere. The main idea behind the New Military History seems to be that there 
are numerous approaches available for a researcher o f wars and conflicts, which may not 
necessarily produce identical results. Another characteristic of this research orientation is that it 
has not become a dominant part of the field of military history rather than a complementary, yet 
often vague set of interdisciplinary approaches. The viewpoints and methods involved have 
differed greatly, but this variety may prove vital in order to understand the different structures 
and elements o f war and peace comprehensively. In the United States, as well as in certain parts 
of Europe, this approach has helped to  invigorate interdisciplinary efforts in the study o f war to  
a great degree. In Europe this type of “military” history has claimed the most successes in Great 
Britain, especially in connection with economics and economic history, yet almost solely in  
terms of explaining the societal impacts o f  crisis periods.5
However, curiously enough, neither military nor economic historians have dedicated much 
effort into studying the civil-military relations or socioeconomic impacts of military outlays 
during periods o f peace. Quite frequently, as emerging from the classic studies of A.J.P. Taylor
3 Paret 1992,220—221.
4 Paret 1992,214—220; Millis 1956.
5 Paret 1992, 221. See also Howard 1972; Milward 1977. On the latest British military economics, see 
Harrison 1996. On the German military history traditions, see Showalter 1984. On the so-called new 
histories, see Olâbarri 1995, 10— 12, 17—24; Iggers 1984; on cliometrics, see McCloskey 1987. On the
5and many of the more current works in diplomatic history, historians have tended to be more 
interested in the impact of foreign policy decision-making and alliances —  in addition to 
resolving the issue of “blame” on the road towards major conflicts6 —  rather than investigating 
how reliable quantitative evidence could be mustered to support or disprove macro- and micro­
level hypotheses. Economic historians, in turn, have not been particularly interested in the long­
term economic impacts of military spending. Usually the interest of economic historians has 
centered on the economics of global conflicts and the immediate short-term economic impacts 
of wartime mobilization.7
Nonetheless, some historical and interdisciplinary studies on war and societies have taken the 
form of explaining developments at a macro-level, yet often without a great deal of elaboration 
on the quantitative evidence behind the assumptions on the effects of military spending. For 
example, Paul Kennedy’s at times elusive The Rise and Fall o f  the Great Powers. Economic 
Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (1989), as criticized by many economists, 
lacks the quantitative evidence and precise testing of hypotheses to support his notion of 
interaction between military spending and economic growth.8 Other examples of large-scale 
comparisons encompassing a ‘longue duree\ which include analysis of the interwar period as 
well, comprise Caroly Webber and Aaron Wildavsky’s, A History o f Taxation and Expenditure 
in the Western World (1986), William H. McNeill’s, The Pursuit o f  Power. Technology, Armed 
Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (1982), and Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson’s, 
War and State Making. The Shaping o f  the Global Powers (1989), to name a few.9 Although 
they discuss sources and other details behind the figures to varying degrees, they nonetheless do 
not provide comprehensive analysis of the interwar period, above all in terms of discussing the 
problems with the data and the various types of quantitative options available in the testing of 
specific hypotheses. They do, however, offer meta-level explanations of various aspects of 
military spending demand formation and the competition for power by different types of states.
emphasis of cultural constraints, see Keegan 1993.
6 The two classic studies on the origins of the world wars are Taylor 1954 and Taylor 1961. See also e.g. 
Watt 1977 for just one review of Taylor’s works. On “typical” historical literature on the origins (as 
historians are rightly wary of using the word cause) of these conflicts, see especially Kaiser 1983 (on 
Germany’s role), Gordon 1974 (on German and British cases), and on the issue of balance of power see 
e.g. Kraehe 1992.
7 See The economics of World War 111998. Classic studies of this type are Alan Milward’s works on the 
European war economies; see e.g. Mil ward 1965, Mil ward 1970, Mil ward 1977.
8 See Kennedy 1989. Kennedy calls this type of approach, following David Landes, “large history”; see 
Kennedy 1994, 7, 26. On criticism of Kennedy’s “theory”, see especially Sandler-Hartley 1995 and the 
studies listed in it, particularly Gold-Adams 1990. Other examples of long-run descriptions of war, 
society, and the economy can be found in e.g. Pearton 1982 and McNeill 1982.
9 Webber-Wildawsky 1986; McNeill 1982; Rasler-Thorapson 1989.
6Overall, there have been few studies offering analytical treatment (or presenting relevant d a ta )  
of the military spending of the Great Powers and smaller states in the interwar period, neither in  
the military historiography or among the social sciences in general. Some of the earliest 
accounts were actually written by contemporaries, such as Armaments. The Race and the Crisis 
(1937) by Francis W. Hirst. These accounts, however, cannot offer reliable statistical 
information, especially for the 1930s.10 A good example o f recent work combining th e  
theoretical aspects of economics with historical case studies and offering new data in a  
comparative fashion is The Economics o f World War II (1998), a compilation edited by M a rk  
Harrison.11 This compilation, however, does not offer analysis or data for the 1920s. Historical 
studies relating to military spending in the interwar period are often heavily focused on th e  
1930s and the rearmament “experience” in particular. Robert Frankenstein’s (1982) Le prix d u  
réarmement français 1935— 1939 and G.C. Peden’s (1979) British rearmament and the  
Treasury, 1932-1939 are fine examples o f such efforts, often providing comparative data and/or 
time series on the military spending o f various states for the entire period.12 Studies focusing o n  
the military spending of a single state during the whole period are also quite rare. Finnish 
historian Vilho Tervasmaki’s (1964) Eduskuntaryhmat ja  maanpuolustus (valtiopàivillà 1917—  
1939) study on Finnish military spending and the Finnish Diet is one of the few welcome 
exceptions in this regard. Business historians, in turn, have studied some o f the large arm s 
producing and trading companies of this period, yet even in those studies the focus has been o n  
the 1930s and, by and large, on the Great Powers.13 Thus, in general these studies have n o t 
analyzed the individual countries’ military spending as a uniform phenomenon nor have they  
undertaken very far-reaching, consistent comparisons between the various states in the interwar 
period.
On the aggregate, Charles Tilly’s division of the available approaches in the analysis of war and  
power is perhaps enlightening as a broad simplification of the state of the art among the social 
sciences, which include: 1) the statist; 2) the geopolitical; 3) the world system; 4) the mode o f  
production approaches. The statist approach presents war, international relations, and sta te  
formation chiefly as a consequence o f events within particular states. The geopolitical analysis 
is rooted on the argument that state formation responds strongly to the current system o f  
relations among states. The world system approach, a la Wallerstein, is mainly centered around
10 See e.g. Hirst 1937; also,Tiffen 1938.
11 See The Economics of World War n  1998.
12 Nonetheless, there are few quantitatively oriented studies attempting to assess the impact of the 1930s 
rearmament. For examples of good efforts in this regard, see Thomas 1983 (the British case) and Ritschl 
2000.
7the idea that the different paths of state formation are influenced by the division of resources in 
the world system In the mode of production framework the way that production is organized 
determines the outcome of state formation. None of these approaches, as Tilly points out, are 
adequate in their purest form in explaining state formation, international power relations, and 
economic growth as a whole.13 4
Of the more specific research traditions among the social sciences dedicated to  military 
spending analysis, the study of defense economics and military spending patterns as such is 
related to the immense expansion of military budgets and military establishments in the Cold 
War era. It involves the application of the methods and tools o f economics to the study of issues 
arising from such a huge expansion. One could perhaps distinguish at least three aspects in 
defense economics that sets it apart from other fields of economics: 1) the actors (both private 
and public spheres of influence, for example in contracting); 2) the theoretical challenges 
introduced by the interaction o f different institutional and organizational arrangements, both in 
the budgeting and the allocation procedures; 3) the nature of military spending as a  tool of 
destruction as well as providing security.15 One of the aspects missing in the study of defense 
economics has been, at least so far, research focusing on other periods besides the post- Second 
World War era.16 The tools offered by defense economists provide a useful starting point in the 
study of military spending and crises, yet the historical/institutional variations often impose 
their own constraints on the researcher.
Within peace sciences (sometimes also referred to as conflict studies) —  a broader yet 
overlapping school o f thought in relation to defense economics17 —  one of the most significant 
of the interdisciplinary efforts has been the Correlates o f War (COW) project. This project, 
which started in 1963, has become the largest research program to trace ’’the intellectual history 
of the ‘peace research movement”’ as well as to try to discover some explanatory models 
relating to the birth of conflicts. This project and the researchers loosely associated with it have 
had a strong impact on the study of conflicts, not to mention CO W ’s importance in producing
13 See Eloranta 2002a for details.
14 Tilly 1990,6—14. For an overview of Tilly’s arguments in a concise framework, see Tilly 1985.
15 Sandler-Hartley 1995, xi; Eloranta 1998. On British defense economics and history, see Harrison 1996. 
See also Howard 1972.
16 One of the few exceptions is e.g. Conybeare-Sandler 1990, which analyzes the period before the First 
World War. Rasler-Thompson 1989, especially with its theoretical and quantitative emphasis, is perhaps 
another. On importance of time-specific frameworks, see Singer 1979, xvi—xix; McCloskey 1987, 14— 
15, 24; Komlos 1992. On Nordic studies on military expenditures, covering the 20th century, see e.g. 
Hagelin-Wallensteen 1992; Gleditsch etal. 1992.
17 Among the key earlier works are Wright 1942 and Richardson 1960. For an evaluation of Wright’s
8comparative statistics.18 As Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer have noted in an overview o f  
the results achieved in conflict studies, the number of territorial states in the global system h a s  
ranged from fewer than 30 after the Napoleonic Wars to nearly 200 at the end of the tw entie th  
century, and it is essential to test the various indicators collected by peace scientists against t h e  
“historical record” of these states until theoretical premises can be confirmed or rejected.19 Y e t, 
a typical feature in most studies o f this type is that they are keen on finding those sets o f  
variables that might predict major wars and other conflicts, in a way similar to the historians’ 
obsession on the origins of wars, whereas studies investigating the military spending behavior o f  
specific monads (single states), dyads (pairs of states), or systems are quite rare.
How have theories of state behavior at the system level been linked to the analysis o f m ilitary  
spending, especially in terms of economic development? According to George Modelski a n d  
William R. Thompson, who are proponents of Kondratieff waves and long cycles as explanatory 
forces in the development of world leadership patterns, it is possible to ascertain fourteen 
approaches to analyze the relationship between war and long-term economic growth, in terms o f  
relationship between wars, economic upswings, and economic downswings.20 Most of them p u t 
forward the connotation, either implicitly or explicitly, that military spending is an im portant 
component o f competition for resources in a system and that engaging in such expenditures 
represents a tradeoff between the benefits gained by military spending and the dom estic 
consumption costs involved. Obviously, although often overlooked, all of these patterns em body 
different implications and theoretical models in order to explain the military spending of a s ta te  
or a  group o f states as a system. Furthermore, military spending may be a crucial variable in  
explaining hegemonic competition between states in general. The actual operationalization o f  
such models in  a  consistent way is indeed one of the key challenges of any empirical study.
Another type o f literature, mainly stemming from defense economics, institutional economics, 
as well public choice21 theoretical models, views the actors involved in the budgeting process a s  
well as the procurement side o f military contracts as crucial elements in the analysis of m ilitary 
spending. This type of analysis has not been undertaken before in the context of the interwar 
period.22 For example, a variant of choice-theoretic model o f defense, closely related to th e
contributions, see Davis 1996. See also Geller-Singer 1998,2—3.
18 Singer 1979, xi—xviii; Singer 1990.
19 Geller-Singer 1998, e.g. 1—7.
20 Modelski-Thompson 1996,14—40,
21 See e.g. Hartley 1991; Sandler-Hartley 1995. For details on these paradigms, see e.g. Eloranta 1998; 
Lamberg et al. 1997; and the subsequent chapters of this thesis (especially Chapters 2 and 7).
22 See the few rudimentary efforts by this author, e.g. Eloranta 1997c and Eloranta 1999.
9premises of most public choice literature, views government bureaucrats as making the military 
expenditure recommendation based on their own desire to maximize their bureau and prestige. 
Another variant emphasizes the role played by defense lobbies and other types of interest groups 
in order for them to achieve various benefits from the government’s provision of defense.23 Here 
in this thesis I will rely on both the systemic approaches and the models developed by the 
various schools of thought in the study of economic impacts o f military spending at the state 
level as well as adopt other complementary hypotheses, arising from institutional economics 
and public choice frameworks in particular, in order to incorporate the actors in the political 
markets o f military spending in the analysis of the said countries. These arguments will be 
explored more fully in connection with the theoretical framework in Chapter 2.
Overall, one can distinguish perhaps at least five key questions arising from the various 
theoretical and empirical frameworks reviewed here briefly: 1) How significant is the 
interaction between the “civil” and the “military” spheres during peacetime? 2) What are, and 
how important, the domestic determinants of foreign and security policy? 3) How can military 
might and perceptions of it be measured? 4) What kind of quantitative models can be derived 
from the various theoretical frameworks and what are the limits of such inquiries? 5) How can 
we measure the role of the various actors in the formation and distribution of public goods in the 
political markets? Obviously, all of these questions are relevant and should be incorporated into 
the analysis of military spending. In the context of the demand for military spending one could 
ask, for example: 1) Do the armed forces form an interest group in the political markets, and is it 
indeed possible to separate the “civil” and the “military” spheres, especially at the level of 
budgetary politics? 2) How important are the external factors, such as arising from the 
development of the surrounding “system” or alliance(s), compared with the internal factors, 
such as the behavior and strength of the relevant interest groups, in forming a state’s external 
security needs? 3) How well does military spending reflect the military strengths of a nation, 
especially in relation to the stock of armaments and limited availability of information? 4) How 
well do the quantitative variables arising from the various levels of decision-making (system, 
alliance, state, within state) explain the demand for military spending? What is the relevance of 
the residual in the quantitative analyses? 5) What is the importance of the institutional 
framework, offering both opportunities as well as instigating constraints, and the “players” in 
determining the military spending behavior of individual states? These questions will be put in 
the context of the thesis in Section 1.4, and the specific hypotheses relating to the theoretical 
points will be brought forth in Chapter 2. Yet, among the key issues to be resolved first are: 1)
23 Sandler-Hartley 1995, 57—58.
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What kind o f data should one use in comparing military expenditures in this period? 2) Are th e  
data, in fact, comparable? 3) Which polities could be compared in a meaningful fashion?
1.3. Data Problems and Solutions
In short, the aim  in this thesis is to utilize the tools offered by the various research traditions in  
order to explain the complex phenomenon of the demand for military spending among th e  
selected eleven European nations in the interwar period, which was a relatively short period o f  
few conflicts between the two world wars (see Table 1 below). For this purpose, the criteria fo r 
country selection need to be defined. Only European countries were selected for th e  
comparisons here as trade, history, geography, and threat scenarios, among other factors, closely 
connected them. The availability of data also endorsed this choice. Moreover, this limited th e  
size o f the sample in a convenient fashion. The following limitations were taken as starting 
points for the selection of countries within Europe, spanning the entire period under 
observation: 1) They had to have at least several years o f parliamentary, democratic24 rule in th e  
time period, and the periods of authoritarian rule had embody the characteristics outlined in th e  
subsequent chapters, namely only limited centralized decision-making and inability to  ignore 
the opposing groups in determining the level of military expenditures;25; 2) There had to  b e  
relevant statistical sources available for the required estimation of demand (mainly: data o n  
GDP or GNP, military expenditures, total central government expenditures), preferably in th e  
form of encompassing and comparable historical growth studies26; 3) The military spending o f  a  
country selected here had to  respond to  common economic indicators (especially econom ic
24 For a more theoretical discussion of the different models of democracy, both in a historical and current 
context, see Held 1991. For discussion of the notion of democracy, see also Chapter 4 of this thesis.
25 Ireland formed an exception here and is excluded from the selection. Ireland would have been a 
problematic choice due to its only relative independence from Great Britain, especially in terms of foreign 
policy, during this time period; see e.g. Murphy 1989.
"  Thus, e.g. Austria and Czechoslovakia were excluded as no relevant data beyond the League of Nations 
or the other data sources listed shortly was found for their military expenditures. The Czechoslovak GDP 
data, however, seems to be of fairly good quality; see Maddison 1995. Czechoslovakia was included, 
however, despite its poorer quality data in Chapter 6, since it was a crucial player in the interwar small 
and medium size armaments trade. On the Czechoslovak economy, see also Teichova 1988. For an 
example of the use of the League of Nations figures, relating to Eastern Europe, see Hauner 1973. Most 
Easton European countries would have qualified for the analyses here if reliable military spending data 
(beyond the additional databases utilized for the excluded states) were found. The problem of finding 
relevant economic indicators, such as reliable GDP figures, was also an obstacle in the case of Eastern 
European countries, i.e., the Baltic nations. See van Ark 1995 for an overview. The same argument o f 
inadequate statistical data applies also to the Balkan states. For a good overview, see again Maddison 
1995. Many of these states were, however, utilized in, e.g., the cross-section estimations explained in 
Section 4.1 of this thesis. See also Appendices, Appendix 2 for further details.
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development acting as a constraint) and not exhibit complex forms o f structural changes due to 
periods o f non-democratic rule.27
Table 1. Inter-state (=Between Recognized States) and Extra-State Wars (=Within States, 
Between the Core State and Its Extensions), 1920—1938
A. B. C. D. E.
Lithuanian-Polish 1920 1920 140 1000
Sino-Soviet 1929 1929 109 3200
Mancharían 1931 1933 505 60000
Chaco 1932 1935 1093 92661
Saudi-Yemeni 1934 1934 55 2100
Italo-Ethiopian 1935 1936 220 20000
Sino-Japanese 1937 1941 1615 1000000
Changkufeng 1938 1938 14 1726
F. G. H. I. J.
Franco-Syrian 1920 1920 Syrians ..
Iraqi-British 1920 1921 Arabs-Iraq ..
Italo-Ubyan 1920 1932 Libya 40000
Riff Rébellion 1921 1926 Riffs 40000
Moplah Rébellion 1921 1922 Muslim Moplah 2474
Franco-Druze 1925 1927 Druze 8000
Saya San's Rébellion 1930 1932 Peasant Rebels
British-Palestinian 1936 1939 Palestinians ..
Sources: Correlates of War Inter-State War Data 2000; Correlates of War Extra-State War Data 2000. A— E  refer to 
inter-state wars, whereas F—J  refer to extra-state wars. A=names of the warring states; B=begiruling year of the 
war; C=end year of the war, D=duration of the war, in days; E=number of battle deaths; F=name of the warring state 
and the non-state actor; G=beginning year of the war; H=end year of the war; I=definition of the non-state actor; 
J=number of battle deaths.
The countries selected thus consist only o f European democracies —  namely, countries that had 
experienced a democratic transition or were fluctuating between democratic and autocratic rule, 
yet exhibited similar military spending behavior as democracies — which here refers to 
democratic political institutions instead of clearly totalitarian rule (such as Nazi Germany in the 
1930s). There were three key arguments recommending this choice: 1) For example, like in the 
case of Germany, there are only limited sources available on the military spending, namely 
’’uncontested” statistical data, of authoritarian nations28; 2) The interaction of the political 
system and the economy in a large totalitarian nation differs in certain ways, although often
27 See Section 4.1 of this thesis for details.
28 See especially Abelshauser 1998,133—138 — Abelshauser’s article emphasizes the deficiencies of the 
source materials of the time period. See also Ritschl 2000; Showalter 1984. On the problems with 
German GDP estimates, i.e. the hyperinflation years, see especially Fremdling 1995, e.g. 94— 95. For 
tentative details on Soviet national accounts, see Kudrov 1995. On research into interwar Soviet defense, 
see e.g. Davies 1993; Simonov 1996; Stone 1996; Harrison-Davies 1997— for a more biased view yet 
useful, see Tyushkevich 1978.
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similar to an elite-ruled “democracy”, from that of a parliamentary democracy;29 3) T he  
estimation o f the demand for military spending usually does not entail a response to the sam e 
variables, such as threat and income, in dictatorships as in democratic societies, thus making 
this estimation more difficult.30 Totalitarian states as well as certain other states not entirely 
consistent w ith the rather stringent selection criteria adopted here will, however, be made use o f  
in the estimations o f threats and in calculating systemic changes, as well as in some o f  the other 
comparisons in this thesis.
The hypotheses o f responsiveness to economic growth and the notion of structural breaks being 
introduced during periods of totalitarian rule will also be tested in Section 4.1 with data on th e  
military spending o f various authoritarian and totalitarian nations respective of the nations 
selected for the thesis; namely, whether the relationship between military spending and  
economic development changed according to either regime type or the level of democracy. 
Equally, in-depth testing was carried out regarding whether the “softer” dictatorships o f  
Portugal and Spain31 exhibited similar characteristics to the other countries in the sample. As 
was discovered, Portugal and Spain clearly exhibited rather similar traits in their military 
spending as the “pure” democracies. Thus, they could not be rejected from the sample. These 
findings were also complemented with a broader cross-section analysis, which enabled th e  
inclusion of more countries in order to  verify the various hypotheses.
The choice o f countries reflects well the spectrum o f European democracies and transitional 
regimes32 in the period, as seen in Figure 1. They range from the relatively poor countries such
29 On wages in the German totalitarian economy, see e.g. Temin 1990. See also Mbaku 1990 for an 
important discussion on the differences in rent-seeking structures for military expenditures between 
democracies and dictatorships.
30 The inclusion of different types of countries, or clusters, would be indeed beneficial for understanding 
the overall military spending patterns in the interwar period. However, here I will take the initial step o f  
overcoming the obstacles by first analyzing comprehensively the demand for military spending among 
democracies and transitional regimes with adequate data, which also has been lacking so far in the 
historiography of the period. Additionally, I will also bring forth aspects of the military spending by many 
states beyond the focus group of eleven in the thesis.
31 E.g. Austria would be similar to Spain and Portugal in the interwar period as the Austrian parliamentary 
democracy ended in 1933, due to difficult societal conflicts between the right-wing and left-wing 
paramilitary groups. See e.g. Carsten 1986. Yet, similar to Germany, relevant data is difficult to find. 
Implications of the limitations set in the Versailles Treaty would also have to be accounted for. In the case 
of Greece, only limited sources were found for its military spending except the League of Nations data 
and the other data listed in Appendices, Appendix 2. Indicators of Greek economic performance can be 
found in Kostelenos 1995. Greece would be an interesting choice because the Greek interwar history is 
filled with numerous coup d’etats (even more so than for e.g. Portugal or Spain), difficulties with the 
public debt, social unrest, and deep depression, which were all nevertheless likely to induce structural 
changes in the time series. See e.g. Kofas 1983, vii-31.
32 Discussion of the definitions of democracies and other regimes is undertaken in Section 4.1.
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as Finland, Portugal, and Spain to the richer Scandinavian countries as well as Belgium and 
Netherlands. Switzerland and the UK can perhaps be classified as high-income countries in 
terms of real GDP per capita in this comparison. Thus, the comparisons in the thesis will have 
implications for the demand for military spending among countries with varying economic 
resources, yet they are mostly representative of either purely democratic or semi-democratic 
decision-making systems. This argument will be explored further in connection with the 
democratic peace argument in Section 4.1.
Figure 1. GDP per capita for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the UK: 1920,1929,1938
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Source: Maddiscm 1995.
Note: the GDP per capita figures are not modified in the manner described later in this chapter. See Appendices, 
Appendix 2 for details.
The countries selected for the comparisons were assumed to be, with their foreign policy threat 
scenarios to be defined more clearly in the later chapters, relatively threatened (both of the 
conditions below apply) or only moderately threatened (only one of the conditions below apply) 
on the basis of: 1) a disadvantageous geographic location (relative of historically known 
aggressors; 2) aggression encountered during the First World W ar (for example, the success of 
their neutrality policy). Thus, both of the Great Powers selected here, Great Britain and France, 
could be qualified as relatively threatened (=both conditions 1 and 2 apply) countries, since their 
rivals were only temporarily weakened. Equally, Belgium and Finland would also belong to  this
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group. For example, Finland can be viewed as a relatively and continuously "threatened" (by the 
Soviet Union) country during these two decades, at least according to the views o f its major 
decision-makers. The rest of the sample countries could be characterized as only moderately 
threatened. For example, in the Swiss case the success of its neutrality policy during the First 
World War, despite the geographic proximity of Germany, Austria, and Italy, would qualify her 
into the latter group, similar to the Danish and Dutch cases. In the Swedish and Norwegian 
cases, their geographic location was less of a threat than in the former cases. In the Spanish 
case, the F irst World War had been a time of neutrality, yet some degree of “threat”, or at least 
distrust, existed between Spain and Portugal, especially in terms of Spain’s latent desire to be 
one o f the G reat Powers at all cost in the interwar period. Portugal had a long-lasting defensive 
alliance with Great Britain in 1899— 1949, a tradition that was established already centuries 
ago, that gave it some guarantees against its neighbor.33 All could nevertheless be defined to  
have experienced at least some degree o f threat, based on the above conditions, albeit 
accumulating fast during the course o f  the 1930s. A  more detailed review of the individual 
countries’ foreign policy stances, as well as an evaluation of the value of the assumptions made 
above, will be undertaken in connection with the individual military spending analyses in 
Chapters 3 and 5.
The comparisons in this thesis have been set to begin in 1920, since the years 1918— 1919 were 
still times o f reorganization for both the military establishments and the respective countries due 
to the First W orld War. Nevertheless, the Great W ar, as it was called, and the subsequent 
demobilization had an impact on the military spending patterns of the first years of the 1920s as 
well. The effect of the Great Depression on the military expenditures, emerging through the 
demand models, should become apparent from the comparisons for the first years o f  the 1930s, 
although it must be remembered that in the case of the United States (excluded from the detailed 
analyses), for example, the depression lasted for most of the decade. The different kinds o f 
comparisons in this thesis will extend to year 1938, which was the last year of peace before the 
Second W orld War, although certain acts of aggression not yet resulting in an all out war did 
occur before this, mainly undertaken by the authoritarian states.
Do comparable data exist for this period? W hat must a  researcher of military spending take into 
account in the comparisons? Firstly, one must provide a definition for the term  military 
expenditure. There have been numerous definitions for military spending as a concept34. The
33 On alliances, see the sources listed in Appendices, Appendix 2.
34 The term military expenditures is preferred here instead of defense expenditures (cf. Pryor 1968) for
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OECD definition, based on modem statistical data, includes ’’all the material and human 
resources devoted by a state to its defence and intended to guarantee its national independence, 
the integrity of its territory and, where appropriate, the respect of the international treaties 
binding the country to foreign states” and deems it also necessary ”to extend the concept of 
military expenditure to include all or part of the resources employed by a state to maintain 
internal security and public order” as well. The OECD also makes an important distinction 
between the term military expenditure and defense budget:” ...the  field of application o f military 
expenditure goes beyond the simple vision of external defence guaranteed by the state through 
public financing, to constitute a statistical aggregate covering the whole of the resources 
devoted to the national defence effort understood in the broad sense.”35
The definition o f military expenditures (=ME) utilized in this thesis abides mostly by Frederick 
L. Pryor’s (1968) definition, with certain minor differences. Military expenditures by his 
definition include all expenditures for the recruiting, training, and maintenance of an army, 
navy, air and rocket forces, and national security troops. Pryor also excludes, on the basis of his 
selection of nations, such items as expenditures on civil defense, veterans, military research and 
development, interest payments on war debts, reparations, military assistance abroad, and 
military construction. Here I have also included civil defense measures and military 
construction if they have been reported separately, as well as excluded colonial military 
spending for all but the United Kingdom.36 In certain isolated cases it has been possible to 
employ an economically more precise definition, arising out of national accounting procedures. 
Using the expenditure approach in classifying the GNP, military consumption includes all 
elements of military expenditure: wages and government pensions (not war pensions), the 
purchases of nondurable goods and services (such as heat, lighting, food, clothes), and the 
purchases of durable military goods (such as armaments). However, studies providing a 
breakdown of government consumption are not available for most countries concerning, for 
example, the interwar period.37 Here I will refer to as military consumption expenditures that 
part of the military expenditures that include the wage component and the nondurable goods and 
services purchased, whereas military capital expenditures are used as a reference to the 
purchases of durable military goods. All in all, comparisons have to be performed with
wanting to avoid value judgment on the purpose of these outlays. On the offensive and defensive aspects, 
as well as the public good aspect of military spending, see Pryor 1968, 86—88.
35 Herrera 1994,13— 14.
36 Pryor 1968, 85—86.
37 Ota classifications of government consumption, see Clement 2000, 22—35. Detailed studies on 
government consumption, including disaggregated figures, concerning the states selected exist only for 
Sweden and Belgium. On further time series data concerns, see Eloranta 2000a.
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aggregate spending figures in most cases. Statistical sources, however, do not always l i s t  
precisely what has been included under the heading military expenditures, which makes t h e  
figures difficult to assess.38 Thus, the aim  in this study is to evaluate central government m ilitary  
spending —  since no military appropriations were generally found for the local government o r  
the municipal sectors — based on the specifications listed above. The various possible sources 
of such expenditure data, including specific studies on either the military budgets or the p u b lic  
sector in general, historical statistical publications, as well as the various historical national 
accounting projects, enable us to arrive at the series preferred for the individual countries in th is  
thesis.
Table 2. Characteristics of World Armies in the Interwar Period, by the League of Nations
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Source: Images scanned from the League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book 1927.
38 On detailed data on public finances, offering details on military expenditures, see e.g. Clement 2000 in 
the Belgian case; Tervasmaki 1964, Taimio 1986 in the Finnish case; and Krantz 1987 in the Swedish 
case.
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Nonetheless, two factors make the figures for the United Kingdom less comparable here: 1) The 
inclusion of colonial military spending; 2) The fact that it was the only country in the sample of 
eleven that did not rely on conscription (see Table 2 above). Firstly, what implications does the 
inclusion of colonial military spending carry for the comparisons here? How high was the 
British colonial military spending compared to the overall total? As seen in Table 3 below, the 
share of colonial military spending was surprisingly small; for example, in 1923 only 5,7 per 
cent of the total ME. In 1925— 1927, comparatively, colonial M E formed only circa 2,6— 3,7 
per cent of the total British ME.39 The reason for this relatively low share was that the colonies 
usually paid for their own defense, out of the revenue collected therein. The colonial spending 
figures in the British case represented thus only small supplementary payments made to  sustain 
certain specific military efforts pertaining to the colonies. The same applied, by and large, to the 
other colonial powers as well.40
Table 3. Summary of British Military Expenditures in 1923, by the League of Nations
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39 Calculated from the League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book 1927—1928; Eloranta 1998,
Appendices.
40 See League of Nations, Armaments Year-Books 1924— 1940.
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Nonetheless, the inclusion o f colonial ME in the British case increased its military spending 
totals. Additionally, the fact that the other states in this sample relied on conscription tended to  
undervalue the “true” economic burden of these expenditures. Countries that relied o n  
conscription, as discussed by John M. Hobson for the period before the First World War, did n o t  
pay the true opportunity costs for their military manpower.41 Thus, in the comparisons th e  
British military burden (=percentage share of ME to GDP) is likely to be higher than it should . 
The use of GNP as a denominator for the UK alleviates this problem somewhat. However, a  
correction o f some sort, advocated by some for conscription for example, would always b e  
artificial and debatable. Furthermore, most of the British colonial ME included here w a s  
administrative by nature, thus not necessarily incompatible with the other series.42 The possib le  
distortion caused by this is nevertheless duly acknowledged here.
Besides collecting the latest statistical data, are there other sources of data available? H o w  
reliable are they? O f the newer accounts, for example Peter Flora’s (1983) State, Economy, a n d  
Society in Western Europe 1815—1975 is based on outdated economic indicators and offers n o  
documentation on its sources.43 Another source of comparable figures is Arthur S, B anks’ 
Cross-Polity Time-Series Data (1976), advocated by some social scientists44 as suitable data.45 
Banks lists as his primary source the Stateman’s Yearbooks, comparable to the League o f  
Nations Armaments Year-Books. The Armaments Year-Books, in turn, are also v e ry  
comprehensive indeed, containing data not just on the military expenditures but also on nava l 
armaments, tonnages and so on. Other League of Nations documents, especially the Statistical 
Year-Book o f the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements o f War, have additional 
information on the military spending and the arms trade.46 Yet another source of long-term  
military spending figures in particular, in fact the most comprehensive comparative database 
available, is the National Capabilities database (=Singer-Small 1993, which forms a part o f th e  
Correlates of W ar project).47 Can these figures be utilized in military spending comparisons fo r  
the interwar period, as has been suggested?
41 Hobson 1993, especially on the British case. See also Sandler-Hartley 1999, e.g. 42.
42 See Eloranta 1998, Appendices.
43 See Flora 1983. Flora’s figures are not utilized in any of the comparisons in this thesis, because they are  
simply not verifiable. See for example Eloranta 1998.
44 See e.g. Vayrynen 1990.
45 See Banks 1971.
46 See League of Nations, Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements o f  
War 1924— 1938. See also Appendices, Appendix 2 for details on the early 1920s military expenditure 
sources.
47 One of the problems with the National Capabilities database (Singer-Small 1993) is the lack o f  
specifics on the sources used for a country, although for example Singer-Small 1982 contains an 
overview. A general outline of the sources used can be found in Singer 1988.
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Compared to the newer figures based on the specific studies on national accounts and public 
sectors utilized here (=preferred series)48, the Banks series display the most problems, due to the 
single source used. Here I converted all o f the series, including the preferred series used in this 
thesis, with some of them listed in USD, for the selected countries into their respective national 
currencies, using annual exchange rates.49 In general, the Banks series seem to: 1) either 
overemphasize (for example, Norway, Denmark, Portugal) or underestimate (for example, UK) 
the early 1920s* military spending; and 2) there seems to be much more volatility present in the 
Banks-series (for example, Switzerland, the Netherlands) for the entire time period. In the 
Belgian and the French cases, the Banks figures were found to contain serious discrepancies in 
comparison with other existing statistical data. A good example o f the differences between the 
data can be seen in the Dutch case, in Figure 2.50
Figure 2, Dutch ME Data in Comparison, 1920—1938
Year
ME nom, preferred series 
— ■—  ME nom, National Capabilities database
------- ME nom, League of Nations
--------ME nom, Banks____________________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
The more detailed statistical analysis between the time series preferred in this thesis and the 
three others (National Capabilities database, League of Nations, and Banks) underscored these
48 See the Appendices, Appendix 2.
49 Banks 1971, especially xviii-xix. See Appendices, Appendix 2 for details on the sources and exchange 
rate data.
50 For the rest of the figures, see the Appendices, Appendix 4
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conclusions. As seen in Table 4, five tests on the equality of the medians ( in d ic a tin g  
approximately the same medians) and further five tests on the variances ( in d ic a tin g  
approximately the same volatility) o f  the time series, under the null hypothesis of same m e d ia n  
and same variance respectively, confirmed the visual inspection of the differences between t h e  
series (see Appendices, Appendix 4). The acceptance o f one of the three others b e in g  
statistically the same as our preferred series was here deemed to require more than tw o out o f  
five tests indicating the acceptance of the null hypothesis. The Banks series seemed to be  t h e  
same only for Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, whereas the League of Nations a n d  
National Capabilities series fared m uch better. The League figures were statistically d if fe re n t 
only in the cases of Belgium, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands, whereas the N a tio n a l 
Capabilities seemed to be different from  the chosen series only for Denmark, Portugal, a n d  
Sweden. Thus, since the preferred series are based on the latest sources, with d e ta ile d  
documentation on the origins of the figures, and specific research surrounding the topic, t h e y  
were chosen here to represent the “actual” military expenditures of these nations.
Table 4. Comparison of the Preferred Nominal Military Expenditure (=ME) D ata o f  
Eleven Countries and Three Other Sources, 1920—1938s1
A. B. C. D. E. F. G.
BEL 5/5 4/5 0/5 4/5 0/5 0/5
D EN 5/5 5/5 5/5 4/5 5/5 5/5
FIN 5/5 2/5 0/5 0/5 0/5 0/5
FRA 0/5 3/5 1/5 5/5 0/5 0/5
NED 5/5 4/5 5/5 1/5 0/5 0/5
NO R 1/5 4/5 0/5 0/5 0/5 0/5
POR 0/5 0/5 0/5 0/5 3/5 0/5
SPA 0/5 1/5 0/5 0/5 2/5 0/5
SW E 0/5 0/5 0/5 0/5 3/5 0/5
SW I 1/5 1/5 0/5 0/5 0/5 0/5
UK 3/5 3/5 0/5 1/5 0/5 0/5
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2. A=country abbreviation (see Appendices, Appendix 1A for details on th e  
abbreviations used in this thesis in general); B=five median tests between the prefeired series and Banks 1 9 7 6  
nominal ME series; C=five variance tests between the preferred series and Banks 1976 nominal ME series; D = fiv e  
median tests between the preferred series and the League of Nations nominal ME series; E=five variance te s ts  
between the preferred series and the League of Nations nominal ME series; F=five median tests between th e  
preferred series and the National Capabilities database (Singer-Small 1993) nominal ME series; G=five variance te s ts  
between the preferred series and the National Capabilities database (Singer-Small 1993) nominal ME series.
Note: here are shown the number of tests that reject the null hypothesis at 10 per cent level of significance. N u ll 
hypotheses = same median; same variance. See Appendices, Appendix IB for details on the statistical tests.
The League o f Nations figures, nonetheless, were surprisingly similar to the “actual” fig u res , 
which increases their value as a secondary source o f information to be utilized in this thesis, f o r  
example concerning naval tonnages and arms trade. Both the League of Nations and t h e  51
51 See die Appendices, Appendix IB, 2, and 4 for further details.
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National Capabilities series seem to be useful even in broader comparisons, such as in various 
parts of this thesis, yet they are not substitutable for the preferred series in the strictest sense.
In this thesis, the aim will also be to utilize the latest statistical information available in the 
measurement of economic development. The breakthroughs that have taken place in national 
accounting are of great significance in macro-level comparisons of economic development. The 
advances made in Sweden and in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s as well as during the 
Second World W ar (especially by Simon Kuznets) made it possible, for example, to measure the 
development of the American economy through production and income accounts by the mid- 
1940s. After this —  and related to the steps the United Nations took in the adaptation of System 
of National Accounts (SNA) in the 1950s —  the development in national accounting has been 
extremely fast. The application o f aggregate measures of economic growth reached also smaller, 
newly independent states. National accounting has been able to produce more homogenous and 
reliable data in most of the countries in the world from the 1970s onwards, although enormous 
gaps still exist for some nations, providing more accurate figures for general comparative 
purposes. Various historical national accounting projects have made it possible to collect GDP 
(or GNP for the UK) figures for all of the eleven states chosen for the in-depth analyses in this 
thesis.52
The progress made in national accounting has, however, not decreased the amount of debate on 
the subject. Thus, an economic historian must make an effort to discuss the basis of the figures 
to be employed in macro-level comparisons. Estimates of the American GNP, for example, for 
1920— 1939 have been under scrutiny for the last decade or so. Christina Romer, for example, 
has criticized the older GNP estimates o f the time before 1929 rather severely. She claims to 
have calculated more accurate aggregate GNP figures than both the Kuznets' and U.S. 
Department of Commerce figures. She has in turn been criticized for both placing too much 
importance on such revised figures and for the methods used in obtaining the figures.53 In the 
context of the European states to be compared here, the most comprehensive and reliable GDP 
dataset (in a common currency) can be found in Angus Maddison's works (especially Maddison 
1995). Furthermore, he has criticized severely the earlier GDP estimates of Paul Bairoch. In the 
case of most of the countries selected here, especially the Nordic countries, the extensive growth
52 Mannermaa 1982,43; Gronlund-Niitamo 1968,11—14; Hjerppe 1988,23—25.
53 See Romer 1986, 341—342; Romer 1992, 773—781. Also see Weir 1986, 353—354; and Lebergott 
1986. There is some truth in Weir's criticism of Romer, since her figures do not alter the picture of 
cyclical variations in the 1920s to a great degree.
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studies efforts» combined with the Maddison data, provide a reasonably comfortable s ta r tin g  
point for comparisons, since the Maddison figures are far from contentious either.54 i
In order to  first posit the military spending efforts of the selected countries in relative terms, o n e  
needs to  utilize other indicators to construct: 1) military burdens (=nominal M E as a share  o f  
nominal GDP55, at market prices, preferred option, or at factor cost as a percentage); and  2 )  
defense shares (=nominal ME as a share of nominal central government expenditures, CGE, a s  a  
percentage). These two will also form the dependent variables for most o f  the s ta tis tica l 
exercises in the thesis. These indicators can be obtained from similar sources as described a b o v e  
(see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details), although I have had to resort to indirect estimation o f  
GDP for some of the out-of-sample countries (for example: in the early 1920s). As advised b y  
many previously, one needs to exercise caution in order to keep the numerators a n d  
denominators as close to being the same as possible for all o f the sample countries.56 The d a ta  
for the selected eleven countries can be deemed quite reliable. However, since other states a r e  
employed (Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia/USSR, USA) as well in the comparisons —  
to provide more comprehensive insights, both in the individual comparisons as well as at t h e  
level o f a  17-country system (=the eleven plus the six listed above) —  I have had to d e v ise  
various solutions in order to make the data as comparable as possible (see A ppendices, 
Appendix 2 for details). On the whole, the data is considerably less reliable for A ustria , 
Germany, and Russia in the interwar period. ^
Additionally, the nominal MEs and nominal GDPs have been converted to real terms to d e riv e  
country shares in the 17-country system. As stated above, for the real GDP I have relied m ain ly  
on Angus Maddison’s (1995) dataset, with a few exceptions. However, the method w h ich  
Maddison has used to come up with the real GDP series in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars can a ls o  
be criticized for distorting the results, as PPPs (=Purchasing Power Parities) arising from th e  
actual period in question would o f course be preferable. These are, however, currently 
impossible to  come across for a large set of countries. Here I have, instead, “corrected” the
54 See Maddison 1982; Maddison 1991; Maddison 1995; Hjerppe 1988. Maddison’s critique can be found
for example in Maddison 1990, 104. As indicated before, e.g. Paul Kennedy does not employ the latest 
figures on GNP or GDP, or military expenditures. See Kennedy 1989. On the development of e.g. 
Swedish historical national accounts, see Christensen et al. 1995, 32—44. See also Krantz-Nilsson 1975. 
E.g., the data on the Swedish GDP for the thesis can be obtained from Krantz 1997. On criticism o f  
Maddison’s method of arriving at common currency figures, see e.g. Prados de la Escosura 2000. 
ss In the British case, GNP figures are utilized, as discussed before. See also Appendices, Appendix 2. 
Percentages in this thesis always, unless otherwise mentioned, calculated with current price variables.
56 See e.g. Singer 1990; Kennedy 1983; Hawke 1980, e.g. 27—36; Cullis-Jones 1987,64—73.
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Maddison figures, or some of the national estimates, with the indirect PPPs calculated by 
Leandro Prados de la Escosura (2000) by using his 1929 benchmarks for the interwar real GDPs 
(per capita).57
The deflation (i.e., turning nominal figures into real value series) and conversion o f military 
expenditures into a common currency (i.e., using exchange rates and/or PPPs to arrive at 
common currency figures) is an equally challenging and controversial task. One way is to adopt 
the method used by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). The steps include 
at first deflating the currencies respective of certain year, and then converting them all to a 
common currency for that year.58 Yet, the choice of deflator is important in conversions to real 
terms. As for example Riitta Hjerppe has emphasized, it is essential that the price index is both 
’’correct” and that it suits the commodity in question.59 In this study the deflator used in the 
conversions to real terms for the military expenditures has been an arithmetic average of the 
wholesale price and the consumer price indices, despite their obvious weaknesses. Yet, in order 
to keep the error inherent in the approach for every country the same, especially in systemic 
terms, this approach seems to be the least problematic solution. The error in using the consumer 
price or the wholesale price indices becomes more pronounced in long-run comparisons.60 
Furthermore, two problems have emerged concerning the use of the SIPRI method in 
conversions to a common currency: 1) The lack of a comprehensive set of PPPs for the interwar 
years or older periods; 2) Military expenditures do not necessarily comply to the price trends of 
other goods; thus, one would need to construct PPPs specific to  military expenditures.61 Here I 
have, nonetheless, employed a PPP-correction on the military expenditures, again utilizing the 
indirect income PPPs calculated by Prados de la Escosura. However, in estimating the demand 
for military spending I will utilize the two relative spending shares, military burden and defense 
share, as primary indicators of military spending behavior instead, as the comparisons in real 
terms might distort the results.62
In order to see whether the “simple” deflator, the combination of the wholesale and consumer 
price indices, has any basis in the actual deflation of the military expenditures, I will also
37 See Prados de la Escosura 2000 and Appendices, Appendix 2 here. The “dollar” values converted in 
such a way will be referred to as 1929 quasi-USD in this thesis. On a recent analysis of PPPs since the 
late 19th century, see especially Taylor 2000.
58 See Cars 1987, 78—82; Blackaby-Ohlson 1987, 3—24.
59 Krantz 1988, 166— 173; Hjerppe 1996, 11-12, 86. See also Ljungberg 1996.
“ Hirvilahti 1993.
61 See e.g. Herrera 1994,18; West 1993.
62 Herrera 1994.
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construct an alternative deflator for the eleven countries analyzed in detail here. The o p t im a l  
way o f converting the military expenditures would be to deflate the individual components o f  
the military expenditures with the corresponding indices, like Charles Feinstein explains in  h i s  
1972 study:63 ”For military expenditure, a series at 1938 values built up from five e le m e n ts :  
average annual numbers o f in the armed forces at average 1938 rates of pay; civilians o n  
defence votes at average 1938 rates of pay; purchase of land and buildings deflated by the i n d e x  
of building costs; purchase of military equipment deflated by the general index of m ac h in e ry  
costs; and other military expenditure deflated by the average value index for consumers’ g o o d s  
and services.”. O f these, the military wage and the military equipment cost indices are p e rh a p s  
the hardest to come by for the interwar period in a comparative sample of countries. Indeed, a s  
shown below, it is difficult to even get adequate data on the disaggregated components o f  
military expenditures, let alone suitable sub-deflators. For many of these, it is possible to b r e a k  
down the military spending figures only according to function or the branch of armed forces.
Figure 3. Unweighted Mean Shares of Military Consumption Expenditures (=CONSM E) 
and Military Capital Expenditures (=CAPME) in the Aggregate ME for Five E u ro p ean  
States, 1920—1938
_______________________ Year____________________
----- Average (5 Countries) CONSME
-----Average (5 Countries) CAPME
A Average (5 Countries) CONSME, Five-year Average 
x  Average (5 Countries) CAPME, Five-year Average
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Note: countries included: Belgium, Finland, France, Sweden, and the UK.
63 Feinstein 1972,79.
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As seen in Figure 3, it is possible to come up with figures for the breakdown between 
consumption and capital military expenditures for five out of the eleven European states 
included in this thesis. The level of consumption ME was still over 80 per cent for Belgium and 
France, and near 70 per cent for Finland in 1930. From thereon, these levels began to  decrease 
for even these countries. The Swedish current ME was the most immobile of these five, 
fluctuating more or less between 55 and 60 per cent for the whole period. In the British case, the 
consumption M E declined rapidly already in the 1920s, to bottom out at 23,5 per cent in 1938. 
All in all, the trend seems to be clear: a move toward more capital-intensive military spending, 
especially during the 1930s. As far as the disaggregation o f military expenditures is concerned, 
it is possible to use the exact figures for the five countries listed in Figure 3 and apply the 
average ratio between the consumption and the capital ME represented here for the rest of the 
countries.
To arrive at an alternative deflator, the nominal military expenditures of a country will be 
deflated according to use in this thesis. As such, the consumption ME included the wages and 
other types of monetary compensation of officers and other military personnel, as well as the 
purchases of non-durable goods and services, as described above. The type of indices 
recommended by Feinstein for the deflation of this component —  with the same procedure and 
deflators to be applied to all countries in order to enhance comparability —  would include an 
index of military personnel wages and pensions and another for non-durable goods and services. 
It is not possible to find these for all of the eleven countries in this sample. Nonetheless, we can 
approximate the deflation of this component by use. For these countries, I will utilize the 
breakdown between the component to be directed toward consumption by the military personnel 
(to be deflated by the consumer price index) and the other to be directed toward supporting 
these forces by purchases o f non-durable goods and services (to be deflated with the wholesale 
price index) with the Belgian case, which coincidently is the only one that this type of data 
disaggregation can be found. For Belgium, the wage component in consumption ME increased 
from a little over 74 per cent in the early 1920s to circa 84 per cent in 1938. The Belgian ratio 
will be utilized for each country, with the respective consumer price (for wages) and wholesale 
price (for purchases of non-durables) indices, to arrive at real consumption ME deflators.
The deflation of capital military expenditures (=purchases of durable military goods) is equally 
problematic. Even without data on this, one would have to make the assumption here that a 
majority of these durable goods were bought from the domestic markets. Thus, either the price 
index o f capital goods in the country, analyzed recently comparatively in the long run by for
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example William Collins and Jeffrey Williamson (2001), or the price index o f m a n u fa c tu re d  
goods might be the appropriate choice for a deflator. Here we have preferred to use the p r ic e  o f  
capital goods if possible. However, they represent only the price development o f these g o o d s  i n  
the domestic economy as a whole. Here the capital M E deflators were weighted with m i l i t a r y  
unit prices (inclusive of only small and medium size armaments) arising out o f inter war m i l i t a r y  
trade statistics. These unit prices will complement the price data on domestic capital g o o d s - 
Here 1 will adhere to the assumption, with the absence o f real data, that in 1925 one-third o f  t h e  
capital military expenditures would have gone for purchases from the world markets. T h i s  
percentage was extrapolated, due to their incomplete military trade statistics, for the UK a n d  
Denmark according to the combined average population-weighted military import (only s m a l l  
and medium size armaments) share of ME (see Figure 4) for this period. For the others, t h e  
individual country shares were utilized. The remaining part (two-thirds in 1925) of the c a p i t a l  
ME was deflated with the capital goods price index (or a  close substitute) for those that it w a s  
found.64 The comparison between the “simple” deflators and the ones explained above w ill b e  
undertaken in Section 3.3 in connection with the review of common currency M E patterns.
F igure 4. Development o f the Population-weighted M ilitary Im port Share as a  P e rc e n ta g e  
o f Nom inal ME for Nine “ W eak”  States, 1920—1937
%
------Population-weighted Average o f M IL1M POFM E
Sources: see Eoranta 2002a for details.
Note: countries included: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland. MILIMPOFME=military imports as a share of ME, percentage.
64 For further discussion of the solutions that were adopted, see Appendices, Appendix 2.
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One important conceptual issue still remains to be discussed in this section, namely the debate 
on whether to measure the flow or the stock of a public good. One of the most prominent 
models in this field, introduced in 1960 by Lewis F. Richardson65, is quite illustrative in this 
respect. Richardson created essentially a two-actor model: increases in armaments spending 
were positively related to increases in threats and negatively related to increases in military 
burden. This could be represented by the following equation in its purest form:
^ k y - m  + g
^  =  1x - f y + h
where the time derivatives of x  and y  signify the rate of increase in the military spending (here 
assumed to be the flow of military expenditures) of two different countries; k and l represent the 
sensitivity of each state to the threat posed by the other; a  and p represent the economic burden 
coefficients, assumed to be negative; and g and h are the so-called grievance terms summarizing 
the relations between the states. The Richardson equation, and its many variants, essentially 
attempts to capture the effects of both internal (how to reduce the burden imposed by national 
defense efforts) and external (how to respond to threats) factors. The arms race responding to 
this equation can have an equilibrium that is either stable or unstable. A stable arms race is one 
in which the military burden effectively controls the military build-up in both countries, whereas 
a “run-away” race is created when the threat factor (or perception of it) dominates the 
equation.66 A significant question still remains: how should we measure military spending? Is it 
adequate to use a flow variable, such as military burden? Is it, in fact, more meaningful to 
compare the relative military stocks? O r both?
Since Richardson’s contribution, there have been several improved versions of this original 
equation, of which the most important is perhaps the stock-adjustment model. In adaptations of 
this model the perceived threat of the other is sometimes judged by the desired stock advantage 
or ratio compared to the other state. Another variant is a model in which the past military 
expenditures are assumed to depreciate at a certain rate, enabling the calculation of a “military 
spending” stock. There has also been considerable debate over the choice of the correct 
dependent variable, be it a flow variable such as military expenditures or stocks of armaments
65 Richardson 1960. See more especially Maddock 1990, 1—21; Wiberg 1990, 31—38. Another early 
seminal contribution can be found in Olson-Zeckhauser 1966.
66 Gleditsch 1990; Wiberg 1990; Eloranta 1998 and the studies listed in it.
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(usually represented by the missile stocks in the Cold W ar period). The correct deflation, o r  
conversely depreciation, o f these variables has equally been debated.67 Here we have decided t o  
analyze the flow  of military expenditures, such as the military burden, and include the s to c k  
adjustment element in the construction of the threat and spillover variables (discussed in l a t e r  
chapters in detail). Thus, the demand for military spending as a flow can be expected to  b e  
influenced by the relative position o f a state in an international system, an alliance, as well as b y  
other impure public goods characteristics.
In conclusion, the primary sources in the thesis as a whole will consist of materials and d a ta  
from the League of Nations, as well as archival sources relating to the cases o f Finland a n d  
Sweden). The Armament Year-Books and other materials produced by the League of N a tio n s  
will complement the statistical basis of the analysis. For example, the Finnish archival sou rces 
consist o f parliamentary documents, documents relating to  the functions o f the State Council68 69
on military matters, material of the Ministry of Defense, papers of the Defense R ev ision  
committee (puolustusrevisionikomitea), material of the Board o f Acquisitions (hankinta-asiain 
neuvottelukuntaf* and the papers of the Federation of Finnish Industries.70 These sources w ill  
provide a deeper understanding of the decision-making system  relating to the military ou tlays 
—  in this case, interwar Finland —  although the characteristics o f the functioning o f  
bureaucracies could be understood as similar among these parliamentary democracies. T h e  
Swedish political economy of military spending will be analyzed with similar materials as in th e  
Finnish case: the various defense committees, parliamentary minutes, and papers of th e  
Federation o f Swedish Industries (Industriforbundet). The archival materials will be  subjected to  
source-critical treatment in the following chapters, in connection with the pertinent literature.
1.4. Key Research Questions in the Thesis
In this thesis I aim  to explain an individual country’s demand for military spending based o n  
influences arising from four different, yet intricately linked explanatory levels: 1) International 
system; 2) Alliance (with for example League of Nations serving as an example o f a failed 
alliance); 3) State; 4) Within state. The main question can be formulated as: What determines 
the demand for military spending in a European democratic nation or a nation (i.e., only sem i- 
autocratic) that behaves similarly in the period between the two World W ars? The answer
67 Gleditsch 1990,7—9. See also Eloranta 2000a for further details.
68 The State Council is roughly the Finnish equivalent of the term Cabinet.
69 This archive covers only the years 1919— 1926.
70 See the Bibliography of this diesis for details.
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expounded in this thesis both theoretically and empirically is that military spending was an 
impurely public good» implying a combination of both public and private benefits, in this 
period, both at the level of an “alliance” and the individual states. The impurely public benefits 
were linked to the actions of the domestic players in complex international and domestic 
settings. Furthermore, an absence of systemic and foreign policy stability was underlined by the 
absence of central leadership by and within the League o f Nations, leading to the return of 
“power politics” in the 1930s.
Thus, at the first level, the international system, this thesis aims to explain the impacts of 
systemic changes —  the importance of balance of power, the democratic peace argument, as 
well as systemic leadership (or the lack of it) —  on individual country’s military spending. In 
regards to balance of power, I aim to test whether increased systemic threats, especially 
aggregate military spending, and an increased dispersion of resources (indicating a shift in the 
balance) had a growth impact on the military spending of individual states. Secondly, I aspire to 
see whether the democratic peace argument would hold at the systemic level, and for example 
an increase in the total resources held by democracies would be perceived as increasing 
systemic stability, thus reducing individual country military spending. I will also test the 
“peacefulness” of democracies against authoritarian regimes at the level of individual states, —  
i.e., whether for example a higher level o f democratization, measured by an aggregate index, 
invoked lower military spending. Systemic leadership and military-economic development 
interaction will also be tested as determining factors both at the level of a system and an 
individual state. Did individual states respond to changes in the total resources held by systemic 
leaders? Or, at the level of a state, were military spending and economic growth interlinked, as 
proposed by many hegemonic theorists?
At the level of an alliance, there are a plethora of hypotheses to  be pursued. Here in this I will 
use the selected eleven European states to proxy the significance of the League of Nations as a 
failed “alliance”. As pointed out in Chapter 2, there are many tools developed chiefly by 
defense economists to distinguish between alliances providing pure and/or impurely public 
benefits. For example, did the League o f Nations provide collective security as a public good? 
Or, did the League of Nations provide centralized authority required in such an alliance? To be 
more precise, did the cost and benefits for the individual states indicate free-rider behavior 
(=alliance as a public good) or approximate balance (=alliance as an impure public good)? The 
pure and impure public good hypotheses will also be tested at the level of an individual state —  
i.e., how important were such pure public good variables as price, income, threats, and
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spillovers (defined in more detail in subsequent chapters) in explaining the demand for m i l i t a r y  
spending? Or, in terms of impurely public benefits, did the political market p r o x ie s ,  
incorporating the actors in the political markets into the analysis, help explain the demand f o r  
military spending especially among the “weak” states?
In Chapters 6 and 7 the analysis will focus primarily on “weak” states as actors in t h e  
international system as well as individual polities, both in terms of their military trade a n d  
military spending behavior. Were “weak” states actually weak actors in the system, h a v in g  
simply to adapt to the actions o f the Great Powers? Are, for example, “weak” states d ep en d en t 
on their military trade? Furthermore, concepts such as rent seeking, interest-group co llu s io n , 
and competition in the political markets will be explored for these “weak” states, Sweden a n d  
Finland in particular. Key proxies used in the aggregate quantitative analyses are t h e  
performance of domestic industries (^industries as an interest group), lagged military sp en d in g  
(=path dependence or budgetary stability), parliamentary fragmentation (=preferences o f  
legislators), election cycle dummies (=re-election maximization by the legislators), as well a s  
other dummies. Did the various groups involved in the budgetary process engage in rent se e k in g  
behavior (maximizing their profits) or more complex forms of utility maximization? H o w  
effective was the “rent seeking” in the cases of Sweden and Finland, especially by the dom estic  
market industries? The concepts and questions will be explored with the extensive qualitative 
materials analyzed for both countries. Additionally, the role of the key actors will come in to  
focus more clearly, as well as the possibilities o f  actually being able to  influence the level o f  
military expenditures. What part of the military expenditures, the consumption or capital M E , 
was influenced by the budgetary game for a particular public good, namely the national 
defense? As argued in this thesis, it is also essential to account for the institutional framework in  
the analysis to provide a comprehensive analysis of the demand for military spending.
31
2. M ILITARY SPENDING AS AN IMPURE PUBLIC GOOD: Combining M acro­
level Influences with Micro-level Analysis of Domestic Political M arkets
2.1. Theory o f Pure Public Goods
This chapter will feature discussion o f the theoretical aspects o f the thesis, especially in terms of 
the public goods theory. W hat is a public good? Does military spending or, more accurately, 
national defense qualify as a pure public good? One of the first more comprehensive definitions 
of a public good can be found in Paul Samuelson’s seminal works on the topic in the 1960s. He 
defined ’’collective consumption goods” as goods whose consumption by an individual leads to 
no subtraction o f that good from another individual. Individuals also consume these goods 
according to their own preferences.71 This definition of a public good has been modified and 
improved upon by public sector economists over the years. For example James Buchanan 
(1968) in his well-known study The Demand and Supply o f Public Goods described pure public 
goods in the following manner:72
”By the orthodox definition of a pure public good or service is equally available to all members of 
the relevant community. A single unit of the good, as produced, provides a multiplicity of 
consumption units, all of which are somehow identical. Once produced, it will not be efficient to 
exclude any person from the enjoyment (positive or negative) of its availability.”
Buchanan also defined this nonexclusion principle as such that additional consumers may be 
added at zero marginal cost. This kind of polarized definition, in fact acknowledged by him, 
seems quite restrictive and has attracted plenty of criticism. Actually, no good or service can fit 
this definition of a public good, although Buchanan cites national defense as coming close ”to 
the descriptive purity”.73
Indeed, Samuelson’s ideas are the centerpieces of the neoclassical approach to public goods 
analysis. The so-called Samuelson Rule states that in order for optimal supply of public goods to 
be reached, the sum of marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the private 
good must be equal to the marginal rates of transformation between the two goods. Accordingly, 
a social planner could then, if  the good is purely public, sum up the benefits across individuals. 
By and large, the neoclassical treatment of public goods has been characterized as “largely a 
technical one”, which relies on the ideas of optimum distribution by a social planner and the
71 Samuelson 1966a, 1223. See also Samuelson 1966b.
72 Buchanan 1968,49.
73 Idem.
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pure publicness o f such goods.74 In fact, one of the most important criticisms leveled against 
Samuelson’s, or Buchanan’s, definition of public good is that no such good has actually
existed.75
Following the Samuelsonian tradition, in current research pure public goods are usually defined 
as having tw o essential features: 1) Nonexcludability of benefits; 2) Nonrivalry of benefits. 
Nonexcludability refers to the aspect that the good is available to all once provided and its  
benefits cannot be restricted. Nonrivaliy means that a  unit of the said good can be consumed b y  
one individual without detracting from further consumption o f the good by someone else.76 
Furthermore, there are also different types of ’’publicness” among public goods, depending o n  
the extent of congestion in consumption and the costs of excluding the good from others. T h is  
means that they can perhaps be distinguished further into pure public goods, quasi-public goods 
(exclusion is feasible, yet there are strong social externalities and incentives governing its public  
provision), and merit goods (goods about which individuals are not sufficiently informed to  
assess the true private benefits which can be derived from their consumption or for w hich  
individuals have defective preferences), all produced in the ’’political markets”.77
Thus, a more precise definition of a public good, contrary to Samuelson’s early contributions, 
reflects the fact that goods may possess merely elements of publicness, to varying degrees, a n d  
may therefore possess characteristics of nonprice exclusiveness or nonrival ness in  
consumption.78 79These goods that stand in-between, whose benefits are partially rival and/or 
partially excludable, are often referred to as impure public goods, which is the term preferred in  
this thesis. One important sub-class o f such goods, for which benefits are excludable b u t 
partially nonrival, is called club goods. Activity by individuals and/or groups to pursue such  
goods may give rise to multiple outputs —  private, public, and impure public —  that are here  
defined as joint products™
Why are public goods produced in the first place? A common explanation has been to equate 
them with market failure. The private provision of public goods can be deemed inefficient o r  
inadequate, thus making an alternative mode of provision more feasible. Numerous public
74 Drazen 2000,375—379.
75 Cullis-Jones 1987,20.
76 Sandler-Hartley 1995, 4; Hummel-Lavoie 1990, 38. Origins of these distinctions can be found in 
Olson-Zeckhauser 1966.
^Hjerppe 1997,14— 15.
78 Cullis-Jones 1987, 20-21.
79 Comes-Sandler 1996,9; Sandler-Hartley 1999. See also Olson-Zeckhauser 1966.
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choice theorists have countered this argument by presenting instances of government failure.80 
Nevertheless, some goods are produced publicly in modem societies. Individuals demand some 
goods publicly, usually through certain types of collective entities entailing governmental- 
political processes, which differ from those of regular market exchanges. It has been said that 
the advantage a government has over the market is derived from  its power to  force people to 
contribute to public goods. Quite interestingly, national defense, often considered to be a prime 
example of a ’’pure” public good, is included for example in Charles Tilly’s notion of strong 
state-formation in the Early Modem period through a ’’monopoly o f violence”.81
Figure 5. Consumption of Defense as a Public Good, by Two Agents
Consumption of defense by 
agent X
Source: adapted from Atkinson-Stiglit2 1980,485.
The basic premises of the theory of public goods are summarized in Figure 5. An increase of 
one unit in the consumption of a private good by one of the agents reduces the consumption of 
the same unit by the other agent by one unit, whereas an increase of one unit in the consumption 
of a public good does not impose a reduction of consumption on the other agent. Thus, Figure 5 
displays the consumption possibility frontiers for private and public goods. The consumption of
80 Hjerppe 1997, 14, 18—19; Lee 1990, 25. On government failure, see e.g. Buchanan 1984, 11— 12; 
Ostrom 1984; Huromel-Lavoie 1990,42—43.
81 Buchanan 1968,7—8; Lee 1990,25. See e.g. Tilly 1985.
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impure public goods, in case nonrivalness does not apply in full, would perhaps resemble th e  
third consumption possibility frontier presented in the figure.82
One of the first important distinctions to be made in the analysis of the demand for any p ub lic  
good is the level of analysis —  i.e., whether one wishes to analyze the demand for a  public g o o d  
at the level o f  a state or within a particular group of nations, such as an alliance. Some of th e  
most important insights into the analysis o f military spending have indeed originated from  th e  
analysis o f NATO by Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser (1966) in their path-breaking 
article An Economic Theory o f Alliances. The theoretical propositions developed in the a rtic le  
relied strongly on the notions of nonrivalry and nonexcludability within an alliance fram ew ork. 
An alliance —  as opposed to the “public” in a state —  is treated as providing a public good fo r  
its members in the form of deterrence against aggression, yielding either purely or im purely 
public benefits, although the authors do not develop the latter dimension of the analysis very fa r . 
A  purely public good cannot be denied from the nonpayers (or agents who pay less for it), a n d  
thus the agents who value the good will overprovide for it. Others can free ride to  a certa in  
extent at the expense of the said agents.83 A key notion supporting the idea o f NATO provid ing  
a pure public good arises from the weapons technology and the strategic aspects o f the p o s t-  
Second W orld W ar period. When it is possible for a state to retaliate on behalf of its allies in  a  
way that produces devastating damage and this retaliatory threat is deemed automatic a n d  
credible, the conditions for a  purely public good alliance (nonrivalry, nonexcludability) are in  
place. For example, in the case of nuclear deterrence there is no reason to limit the size o f  th e  
group sharing the good if the above conditions are met. NA TO 's strategy o f M utual A ssured 
Destruction (MAD) in 1949— 1966 indeed provided such conditions, yet since and before th e n  
alliances have rarely possessed the required pure public good qualities.84
Olson and Zeckhauser’s article, in addition to other efforts inspired by it in the more recen t 
literature, introduced several useful hypotheses concerning the analysis of military spending as a  
pure public good in an alliance. Firstly, military burdens in such an alliance are anticipated to  b e  
shared unevenly; the large, wealthy allies should shoulder the defense burdens for the sm aller, 
poorer allies (=HYPOTHESIS 1485). Correspondingly, one ally’s defense provision needs to b e  
perfectly substitutable by that of another ally. Secondly, defense spending should be allocated
82 For further details on the discussion, see especially Atkinson-Stiglitz 1980.
83 Olson-Zeckhauser 1966, e.g. 267—271.
84 Olson-Zeckhauser 1966; Sandler-Hartley 1999, 29, 37—38. See also Bruce Russett’s early seminal 
contribution on alliances, Russett 1971.
85 The numbers refer to the list of hypotheses presented in Section 2.3.
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inefficiently from an alliance standpoint, as the sum o f marginal benefits of defense provision 
would not equal the marginal cost of this provision (=HYPOTHESIS 15). Thirdly, as argued 
previously, there is no need to restrict alliance size when defense is purely public. Fourthly, 
some central authority is required in the alliance to coordinate spending to overcome this 
tendency for suboptimal provision (=HYPOTHESIS 16). These hypotheses, as evaluated in 
Section 5.1, are commonly investigated with fairly simple statistical tools, such as 
nonparametric tests o f statistical equality between samples.86
Figure 6. Demand for Military Spending in a Two-member Alliance
Source: adapted from Sandler-Hartley 1999, 33.
Two of the notions embodied by the hypotheses above may not be immediately apparent; 
namely, the exploitation or free riding by the small at the expense of the large allies, and the 
tendency for suboptimal defense provision. Firstly, the optimality of defense provision by an 
ally is dependent on the defense provision, or the expected defense provision, of others. Thus, 
suboptimality is closely linked to the free riding phenomenon. As the number of allies grows, 
the equilibrium in the alliance becomes even more suboptimal as the free riding increases. 
Moreover, each ally reacts to the behavior o f the others and ignores the increase in the sum of
86 Olson-Zeckhauser 1966; Sandler-Hartley 1999, 30—31.
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marginal benefits that their defense provision brings to the others’ disposal.87 Free riding can b e  
illustrated by comparing the reaction paths of two states in a two-member alliance, as seen in  
Figure 6 above. Curve RtRi indicates the reaction path for ally 1, whereas R2R2 marks th e  
reaction path for ally 2. These reaction paths display the ally’s best choice for its defense 
provision, given the level of defense provision by the other ally, holding other independent 
variables constant. E  indicates the equilibrium point for the two countries’ defense provision, 
which will not survive an adjustment by one of the allies, thus leading to  a corresponding 
adjustment by the other. For example, a change in the disposable income o f ally 2, assum ing 
that defense is normal good (i.e., increases in income shift the demand curve rightwards), leads 
to a  new reaction path by ally 2, equaling R2 ’R2 • Respectively, the corresponding equilibrium  
E2 * indicates that ally 1 is now paying less for the common defense due to its tendency to  free  
ride. Other factors that could be argued to have an impact in the reaction path include the p rice  
of defense provision, changes in threats, as well as changes in strategy (i.e., a  move from  M A D  
to Flexible Response by NATO in 196788). For example, ally 1 might make an adjustment to  
reaction path R\ 7?;' if it perceived an increase in its threats, for example in the absence o f  a  
comprehensive retaliatory strategy, thus leading to a new equilibrium E \\  This, o f course, 
would mean that it has a different preference or “taste” for defense, indicating the presence o f  
joint products, than ally 2. Furthermore, one of the allies could hold a price advantage in  
producing defense compared to the other.
The types of equilibria achieved in an alliance or at the level of an individual state, in terms o f  
pure public goods provision, can, o f course, vary. One o f the most typical equilibria 
characterizing military spending behavior is the Nash equilibrium, wherein in the public goods 
contributions are devised independently by the states or by individuals and/or groups within a  
state. Each agent chooses their public and private good allocation levels, subject to a budget 
constraint, while the others’ public good contribution level is assumed as given a t a  best- 
response level. This model entails purely self-interested behavior. A variant of this m odel 
assumes a dynamic setting with repeated interactions, wherein multiple Nash equilibria are  
formed, and the subgame perfect equilibrium in year t is dependent on the Nash equilibrium at t~ 
1. Other types o f equilibria, forming a departure from the rationality expectation, include such 
in which an agent believes that a  change in his/her public good contribution will induce the 
other agents to alter their aggregate contribution by a nonzero amount, entailing simultaneity
87 See e.g. Sandler-Hartley 1995; Sandler-Hartley 1999,33—34.
88 See Sandler-Hartley 1999,37—41.
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and dynamic, systemic interactions.89 In a  Lindahl equilibrium, respectively, the equilibrium is a 
price vector imitating a market allocation system, with tax shares referred to as “Lindahl 
prices”. Country groups maximize their utility according to their tax share. Between countries, 
this would mean negotiation on the assigned shares of public good provision within a particular 
country. It is sometimes also called a quasi-market solution, which implies an “auctioneer” 
would assign the “correct” tax shares.90 This would in turn require extensive leadership or 
agreement in the system on how to measure the “correct” shares.
There have been numerous theoretical and empirical ruminations on how to measure the 
demand for a public good, and some common features have indeed emerged. The most common 
demand elements, at the state level, include prices; income; various kinds of complementarity 
and substitutability relationships both within the public sector and between the private and the 
public sector; tastes and/or preferences; and population size and structure. The supply side 
influences usually include technology and factor prices.91 To be more precise, there are several 
characteristics that distinguish the demand for a public good from the demand for a private 
good. Firstly, the demand for a public good is susceptible to spillins (=contributions of others), 
as indicated by the free-rider dilemma discussed in Section 2.2. It also means that an agent’s 
public good demand is dependent on the contributions and actions of others. Secondly, the 
identity o f the decision maker is an important factor in estimating public good demand. For 
example, the decision maker can be an oligarchy, a bureaucrat, a median voter, interest group, 
or a combination of these, whereas the agent is known in estimating private good demand. 
Thirdly, the price of a public good is difficult to ascertain, especially in the case of military 
goods and services, since there is rarely relevant statistical information available.92
If we attempt to represent military spending in a public good demand framework, it is possible 
to isolate several factors influencing this process from macroeconomic perspective. Based on 
the utility maximization of an individual between a private good and a public good93, we can 
write the demand for a public good for agent i in period t as:
(2)
89 Comes-Sandler 1996,30—32.
90 Drazen 2000,381—382; Comes-Sandler 1996,30—31,201—204
91 Cullis-Jones 1987,80—85.
92 Comes-Sandler 1996,485—487.
93 For the appropriate derivation of this demand function, see Sandler-Hartley 1995,53—60, and Comes- 
Sandler 1996,484—487.
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in which q stands for the public qood, I  represents income, p  equals the price of the public good, 
Q signifies lagged spillins (assuming that an agent responds to the preceding period’s spillins), 
and E  denotes environmental factors affecting the demand for the public good.
In the case o f military expenditures (=ME), one of the most common adaptations o f this demand 
function, following Sandler-Hartley (1995), is the following basic linear function:
M E , =  0iO + 0nPRICE' + 0 i2INCOME' + 0iiSPlLUNSt,_1 + 0 i4THREATSi,_l.» "
. . . + ¡STRATEGY +E, (3)
in which ME  stands for military expenditures for agent i in year t\ PRICE for the price 
development o f military goods; INCOME for the income of the state in question, for example 
GDP per capita; SPILLINS (usually lagged) for spillovers from  both actual defensive alliances 
and free-riding based on perceived increased security, either as a  combined index or a  vector; 
THREAT (usually lagged) is the perceived military spending o f a  potential enemy or enemies, 
again either as a combined index or a vector; STRATEGY usually stands for a dummy indicating 
a change in the defensive or offensive strategy of the nation or alliance.94
If this simple demand were tested for a single state or among a group of states, one would 
expect the INCOME variable to have a positive effect, as argued before, thus indicating that M E 
is a normal good (=HYPOTHESIS 19). The PRICE variable should have a negative impact on 
M E (=HYPOTHESIS 20). SPILLINS could be expected to have a negative coefficient in an 
alliance producing a pure public good with deterrence or at least with some pure public good 
characteristics, indicating free-riding behavior. In the presence o f joint products spillins are not 
perfectly substitutable among states, yet some degree o f free riding is likely to occur 
(=HYPOTHESIS 21) THREATS could be expected to have a positive impact on the said 
country’s M E (=HYPOTHESIS 22). The effect of STRATEGY depends greatly on the nature o f 
the change in the military strategy (^HYPOTHESIS 23); for example, the change from MAD to 
Flexible Response in the case of NATO would be expected to increase the presence of joint 
products for the NATO allies. Moreover, it would also be possible to include a slope dummy 
(strategy dummy times the SPILLINS variable(s)) to see what kind of an impact the strategy 
change had on another variable in the equation. Here, as discussed in subsequent chapters, it is 
pointed out that it is hard to distinguish the changes in the strategy of these nations due to both
94 See more Sandler-Hartley 1995,60—62.
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an absence of detailed information on the strategic development of some of them, as well as the 
shortness of the period under study. The latter quality makes the study of all of the dummies in 
the equations more difficult to achieve.
As indicated above, if defense is purely public in an alliance, SPILLINS should be perfectly 
substitutable. Thus, INCOME and SPILLINS could be added together to form a full income 
{-FULL) variable. Moreover, the above equation might no longer feature the SPILLINS and 
INCOME variables separately rather than the FULL variable alone: ME=f(PRICE, FULL, 
THREATS, STRATEGY). In essence, Equation 3 is the simplest form of the joint product 
model, with joint products being quite unspecified as to their origins, and the pure public good 
model with the full income variable is nested within Equation 3. Equation 3 could be rewritten, 
for example, as (with ME as an alliancewide or individual country military spending):
MEt =fin + PaPRICE' +PiiFULI^+0i2SPlLUNSi4_l + ^ THREATS, ^
...+^STRATEGY, +et
in which the pure public good alliance would yield a zero coefficient for the SPILLINS term. It 
might also be that both the FULL variable and SPILLINS variable are found statistically 
significant, indicating the presence of joint products. Moreover, there are a variety of ways to 
distinguish between the two models. For example, Todd Sandler and James Murdoch (1990) 
used multiple regression analysis to distinguish whether the coefficient of the SPILLINS 
variable was different from zero (^HYPOTHESIS 18). One could also use, for example, an F- 
test to test the coefficients associated with the SPILLINS term.95 In case the alliance yielded 
joint products, it could be argued that the military burdens in the alliance in question should be 
shared according to the benefits received (=HYPOTHESIS 17).
In this thesis I am  interested in the individual country military spending demand, not primarily 
as a common response by the selected countries. The common responses and effects from 
within the system will, nonetheless, emerge out of the analyses. Also, since the time period is 
too short to offer very reliable individual country regression results, not to mention the issue of 
limited degrees o f freedom, the regression analyses will here be performed with pooled data. 
The primary tool used here is, assuming that the countries selected here faced similar “shocks” 
(especially external ones) that affected them all, the technique of Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (SUR). I will, however, evaluate these results with Two-Stage Least Squares
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(2SLS) if endogeneity and autocorrelation are both encountered. 2SLS assumes the presence o f  
Nash equilibrium(s), implying independent behavior among the countries in the in itia l 
regressions upon investigating the pure public good characteristics. The preferred solution here , 
nonetheless, is to solve these problems within the SUR-ffamework, if encountered, with Three- 
Stage Least Squares (3SLS). Yet, the choice of technique will depend on several pre-conditions 
as well as certain empirical considerations. Moreover, the results and variables found significant 
in the various stages, respective of the analytical levels, will be carried over to the follow ing 
stages.95 6 As Lois W. Sayrs (1989) has noted, pooling time series requires a number o f  
conditions, such as the expected error term value to be zero and not be correlated with th e  
independent variables, to be met in the pool, depending naturally on the chosen technique. T h e  
results of these exercises and the underlying conditions suggested by the data will b e  
investigated in the corresponding chapters of the thesis.97
Figure 7 below features the key features of a pure public good model in explaining the dem and 
for military spending, essentially in an alliance. At the level of state, prices (often assum ed 
common for all or excluded from the analysis altogether98), full income, and threats form th e  
key independent variables. Alliance is argued to provide a public good in the form o f  
deterrence, which leads to suboptimality in defense provision as well as exploitation of th e  
“large” by the “small”. The most important factors that are missing from this framework are, in  
particular: 1) Systemic influences; 2) Impacts of regime type; 3) Adequate representation of the  
price of “defense”; 4) Group influences on the budgetary process within the states 
(bureaucracies, industries, as well as other interest groups). Given the expected rarity of an  
alliance providing a pure public good deterrence, these aspects of the analysis o f military 
spending seem quite crucial, although often not analyzed together with the pure public goods 
perspective and the related hypotheses. As shown above, pure and impure benefits are usually 
both present in forming the demand for a public good, with the pure public goods model often 
being nested in the derived impure public good models.
95 Sandler-Murdoch 1990, e.g. 884— 885; Comes-Sandler 1996,495.
96 SUR allows error terms to be correlated among equations and involves pooling between coefficients 
whose equality cannot be rejected. On the 2SLS variation, see Sandler-Hartley 1995, Comes-Sandler 
1996; this technique involves making one of the independent variables endogenous. Sandler-Hartley 
(1995, 62—63), for example, advocate using the THREATS variable for alliances as dependent variable 
in the second equation, whereas e.g. Hewitt (1996, 551—554) uses CGE as a function of GDP, ME, and 
foreign financing for this purpose. Hewitt employs also, as is done in this thesis as well to improve the 
SUR coefficient estimates, Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS). See subsequent chapters for further details.
97 See Sayrs 1989 for more on these models. See also Fomby et al. 1984, chapter 15.
98 See e.g. Sandler-Murdoch 1990 as an example of such assumptions.
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Figure 7. Military Spending as a Pure Public Good in an Alliance
PURE PUBLIC GOODS: Military Spending in an Alliance with Perfectly
Substitutable Spillins
: ,. ©  SUBOPTIMALITY, EXPLOITATION, FREE RIDING PROMINENT IN THE
DEFENSE PROVISION OF AS INDIVIDUAL STATE
Source: constructed by the author.
2.2. Measuring Impure Public Goods: The Impact o f Systemic Changes, Regime Type, 
Domestic Actors, and the Political Markets
As discussed in the previous section, there are numerous aspects that one might perceive lacking 
in the framework arising from the analysis of pure public goods. Nonetheless, which aspects 
could and should we include in a  broader analytical framework? How can we measure systemic 
impacts, for example? And, is it indeed possible to come up with a comprehensive research 
framework for the study of such a complex phenomenon as military spending? Such a widening 
of scope, linked to the research influences reviewed in Section 1.2, can have its dangers as 
well." For example, where should we draw the line as to which elements of the society should 
be included in the study? Where do the “civil” and “military” spheres intercept and can they in 
fact be separated from one another? I would argue that these two spheres cannot be separated, 
mainly since the actors involved in the decision-making processes serve multiple functions. Any 
research framework is, thus, by necessity an abstraction of “reality”. Its representative value 
should be judged on the basis of its* success in explaining the phenomenon in question.
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Although it has been suggested that the systemic, or in general a “wider context”, approach 
might be more useful in studying Great Powers, it is here argued (see Chapter 6) that “w eak”  
states may indeed be studied in such a fashion as well. Thus, this thesis is following in th e  
footsteps o f researchers who have made a clear effort of going beyond the so-called realist, 
statist tradition of historical and/or security studies. Other explanatory levels are equally  
important in the analysis military spending.9 100
Here in this thesis, following the framework outlined by Buzan et al. (1998), the levels o f  
analysis include: 1) International system, meaning the largest conglomerates o f interacting o r  
interdependent units that have no system level above them; 2) International sub-systems, such a s  
alliances, meaning groups of units within the international system that can be distinguished fro m  
the entire system by the particular nature or intensity of their interactions with o r  
interdependence on each other; 3) Single units, here referring to states, meaning actors 
composed o f various subgroups within a unit, sufficiently cohesive and independent to  b e  
differentiated from other such units; 4) Subunits, meaning organized groups o f individuals 
within the units that are able or wish to  affect the behavior of the unit, such as bureaucracies, 
lobbies. Buzan et al. also include a fifth level of analysis, that of an individual, which is n o t 
pursued here.101 O f these levels of analysis, I will first review some of the limitations an d  
implications o f the systemic perspective. .. •
Did the world or at least the Western states form a “system” in the interwar period? Is there  
reasonable basis for treating it as such? In fact, the world was dominated by the W estern G reat 
Powers, following the colonial exploits o f the 19th century, almost exclusively by 1920, with th e  
fall of the Ottoman Empire leading to even greater Western domination. More precisely, 
Europeans or the former colonies of Europe in the Americas controlled 84 per cent o f the earth’s 
land surface in 1914. As described by Samuel Huntington, “by 1910 the world was more one  
politically and economically than at any other time in human history”. The new challenges o f  
the 1920s were mostly ideological by nature.102 Thus, the interwar period should lend itself w ell 
to the analysis o f a  “world system” or “Western system”, which is indeed taken up in Chapter
99 Buzan et al. 1998, 1—3.
100 Buzan et al. 1998; Tilly 1990, 6—8; Geller-Singer 1998, 7. For a truly global, somewhat neorealist 
argument, namely in terms of civilizations and their potential clash in the post- Cold War era, see 
Huntington 1997. Huntington also criticizes the older realist school, especially for its preoccupation with 
power alone as a motive for state behavior; see e.g. Huntington 1997, 33—35. For a strong push towards 
the adoption of a neorealist perspective, see Rosecrance-Stein 1993.
101 Buzan et al. 1998,5—6. See also Geller-Singer 1998,20.
102 Huntington 1997, e.g. 50—53. See also McNeill 1982 in particular.
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4.103 Even though for example Beth A. Simmons has argued in the interwar monetary context 
that systemic forces did not vary enough during the interwar period104, I would question this 
assumption at least without corroborating evidence. As Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer 
have put it: “ ...the  global/intemational system is an evolving one, with some of its properties 
changing slowly over time, others rapidly fluctuating, and still others remarkably constant over 
the decades and centuries”.105 106Hypotheses arising from relevant research on systemic factors 
should therefore indeed be investigated to determine their role in the military spending demand 
fluctuations. Moreover, one of the premises here is, shared by both Simmons and Barry 
Eichengreen, that the interwar period should be studied as a uniform period. The Great 
Depression simply could not be understood without the failure of the renewed Gold Standard 
and the absence of centralized monetary cooperation among states. An analogy, reviewed 
more rigorously in the coming chapters, could be made quite easily to comprise the security 
policy environment of the period: It is impossible to understand the rearmament of the 1930s 
without the analysis of the preceding failure of centralized cooperation on disarmament among 
the members of the League of Nations. Yet, what kinds of hypotheses have been put forward 
concerning systemic forces, whether representing increased or decreased stability?
The structure of an international system, as vague as the term may be, has been characterized in 
terms of three features: 1) Anarchy among the states; 2) Functional homogeneity of states and/or 
other intergovernmental organizations; 3) Distribution of capabilities among states. It is often 
maintained in conflict studies that the warproneness of a system is contingent on the distribution 
of capabilities within the system; in essence, this is an extension of the realist argument o f self- 
interested behavior by the states in the system, with all states reacting similarly given the same 
resources and strategic opportunities.107 According to Geller-Singer (1998), factors increasing 
the probability of war at the system level include polarity (such as weak unipolarity and/or 
declining leadership), unstable hierarchies, the number of borders, and the frequency of 
civil/revolutionary wars. Factors increasing the severity of war at this level include especially 
high polarization between alliances.108 Coincidently, such effects and ensuing hypotheses have 
rarely been investigated as possible independent variables in explaining military spending 
behavior.
103 Chapter 4 will also feature details on how could approximate such a system, as well as discussion on 
the potential problems in the empirical analysis.
104 Simmons 1994,13.
105 Geller-Singer 1998,9.
106 Simmons 1994; Eichengreen 1992.
107 Geller-Singer 1998,26. For an overview, see also Levy 1985.
108 Geller-Singer 1998, 27—28.
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The effect o f  polarity in a system seems to be one of the key issues to analyze. As a concept 
polarity is, however, quite contentious and ambiguous. Whereas some argue that a system  
dominated by a single state is the most stable, it is not entirely clear how multipolar system s 
compare w ith periods of bipolar hegemonic competition. It may be important whether th e  
hierarchies in a system are well defined or not, since challenges may be directed against th e  
leading state or lesser states within an increasingly unstable international order. Thus, the b est 
solution may be to analyze the concentration of resources, especially total resources available to  
a state as well as its military resources. It is possible that as the international system moves fro m  
a high concentration of resources in the leading state or among the leading states towards 
multipolarity, as has been discovered empirically in terms of war occurrence, military spending 
rivalry among the states is more likely to  occur.109 Here in this thesis I will first test the notion 
that an increase in systemic military spending, representing an increase in systemic threats, 
should induce a positive military spending response among the individual states 
(=HYPOTHESIS 1). Moreover, an increase in the dispersion o f military spending among th e  
system states should also induce higher individual state military spending (=HYPOTHESIS 2). 
The impact o f changes in systemic concentration, as a structural variable, should also b e  
measured with more adequate indicators representing total resources as well as m ilitary 
resources.110 It could be argued, like above, that a decline in the concentration o f total resources 
should induce higher individual state military spending (=HYPOTHESIS 3); similarly, a decline 
in the concentration of aggregate military resources ought to induce higher individual state M E  
(=HYPOTHESIS 4).111 These hypotheses, however, say little about the role o f actual leadership 
in the system, whether for example a system having a hegemonic leader might be more averse 
to arms races.
A leader (or leaders) in a system, as proponents of hegemonic stability theory maintain, m ay 
possess the required capabilities for the maintenance of the kind of international regime it 
favors. A similar argument is often made that stable economic regimes require leadership. A  
system is likely to be hegemonial if there are major benefits to be gained by the leading actor(s). 
This implies both positive (actual power to change the rules, for example) and negative control 
(power to block moves by other states), at least up to a degree, by the actual or potential 
hegemon. These kinds of structuralist assumptions stem partially from Charles Kindleberger’s 
conception o f world leadership as producing international stability in the form o f a public good.
109 Rapkin 1990,3—8; Geller-Singer 1998,115— 118.
110 The actual indicators are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
111 The actual concepts used in the measurement as well as other empirical issues are discussed in Chapter
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Furthermore, quite curiously, economic capabilities are seen as necessary for a state to exercise 
hegemonic leadership, whereas military-strategic capabilities are often assigned a secondary 
role.112 As explored further in Section 4.2, military spending is commonly considered an 
eventual burden for such a hegemon, as it has tendency to increase even faster than the acquired 
resources, therefore becoming instrumental in its downfall, although the empirical evidence 
proving such a mechanism exists is less than convincing.
Could these theoretical suggestions be adapted to the analysis of individual states’ military 
spending behavior? Firstly, it could be argued that all the states in the system, besides the 
leader(s) of course, should respond to the leader(s)’s military spending behavior, either as 
military challengers or followers (=HYPOTHESIS 9). Again, the analysis of military spending 
behavior by the leader(s) might be misleading. Given the system’s structure, individual nations 
might respond, as challengers or followers, to changes in the total resources held by the 
systemic Ieader(s) (=HYPOTHESIS 10). Or, respectively, they might react to changes in the 
total military resources held by the leader(s) in their own military spending behavior 
(=HYPOTHESIS 11). These hypotheses ought to clarify the role played, or instead the absence 
of such a role, by the so-called hegemons in the interwar system. Also, as Barry Eichengreen 
has argued convincingly, one o f the key problems of the international economic relations in the 
period was the absence of leadership and cooperation by the major powers. This in turn led to 
disastrous consequences, among other factors, such as the Great Depression and the 1930s* 
monetary chaos, not to mention trade disruptions.113 Did, similarly, the absence o f leadership (as 
discussed in the subsequent chapters) in the military sphere have a likewise impact in this 
period?
The peace scientists, like defense economists, have been abundantly interested in the notion and 
impact of alliances. Often in such studies —  contrary to the more openly applicable tool of 
analyzing an “alliance”, which could be any organization producing a pure or impure public 
security benefits, from the perspective of the theory of public goods —  the focus has been on 
purely military alliances. Bruce M. Russett (1971), for example, defined an alliance in his 
seminal article as “a formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the
4.
112 Keohane-Nye 1977, 44—46; Eloranta 2001a; Kindleberger 1973; Rapkin 1990, 3—8; Dobson 1998, 
134— 138. See also Kindleberger 1988,153— 158 -  Kindleberger is in fact quite critical of the hegemonic 
theories pa- se. As Beth Simmons has pointed out, Kindleberger does not advocate “blind” assumptions, 
often germaine to the structuralist interpretations, about the hegemons’ priorities and interests. See 
Simmons 1994,5—6. See also Section 4.2 of this thesis.
113 Eichengreen 1992, Introduction. To be fair, Eichengreen’s argument is much more complicated than
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conditions under which they will or will not employ military forces”.114 Alliances, if  considered 
in more general terms, although ignoring the analytical dimension of intergovernmental 
organizations such as the League of Nations, can be qualified even further. As for example th e  
ATOP  (=Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions) database utilized in this thesis takes in to  
consideration, alliances can have five different characteristics: 1) Defensive (=alliance mem ber 
commits to defensive obligations); 2) Offensive (=alliance member commits to  offensive 
obligations); 3) Neutrality (=alliance member commits to  neutrality obligations); 4 ) 
Nonaggression (^alliance member commits to nonaggression obligations); 5) Consultation 
(^alliance member commits to consultation obligations).115 A  more detailed discussion o f  
alliances, foreign policy, and the concept of neutrality is taken up in the subsequent chapters.
W hat about the impact of alliances defined in such terms as above? In peace science research 
the evidence on system-level alliances and warfare seems to  be clear: The onset o f war is 
unrelated to either alliance formation or configuration, yet the magnitude, duration, and severity 
o f war are consistently correlated with alliance configuration. Also, at the level o f dyads o r 
intra-dyad alliances, the findings seem quite convincing: Dyads where only one member has an  
external alliance tie are more likely to experience war than are dyads in which both members 
have external ties. These explanations have also been connected to (changes in) the military 
balances expressed through available knowledge on capabilities.116 Here in this thesis I w ill 
indeed focus on testing the military spending impacts of alliance configuration. Based on the  
use o f  the ATOP database in building alliance dummies, it is possible to investigate the impacts 
that the various alliance — in this instance defined more restrictively as described above —  
characteristics had on the demand for military spending. For example, did alliances in general 
(including all o f  characteristics 1—5 listed above) reduce the m ilitary spending of the said states 
(=HYPOTHESIS 12)? Or, did membership in an alliance provide increased security only 
according to  the nature and conditions o f the alliance (=HYPOTHESIS 13)?
Another important factor in the analysis of military spending, especially in the more recent 
periods, has been the underlying regime. It has been suggested both theoretically and 
empirically in conflict studies, again in terms of war proneness, that democracies do not fight 
each other. This framework has often been coined “the democratic peace” argument. While
the simplification presented here. On exchange rates, in particular, see Eichengreen-Sachs 1985. 
1,4 Russett 1971, 262—263.
115 See ATOP 2000 and Appendices, Appendix 2 for more details.
116 Geller-Singer 1998, 82—85,119—120.
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there is a great body of research supporting this notion117, there is much less agreement on the 
theoretical causes of this phenomenon. In essence, the explanations can be divided into two 
variants: 1) The political culture of a democracy imposes the same norms to conflict resolution 
which are characteristic of its domestic political processes (=the normative explanation); 2) The 
democratic political structure, with its built-in decision-making constraints, makes it difficult for 
democratic leaders to move their countries into war (=the structural explanation).118 The latter 
argument has been developed further by, for example, Michelle Garfmkel, who argues that 
electoral uncertainty associated with competition between political parties imparts a negative 
bias on the nation’s military spending.119 Nonetheless, there have been very few efforts in order 
to study the impact o f regime type on the military spending of a  state, especially before the post- 
Second World W ar period.
Although a more detailed discussion of the concept of democracy (or autocracy), its 
measurement, and the impact of regime type in general follows in Section 4.1, it is nevertheless 
possible to outline some general hypotheses to be tested subsequently. At the level of a system, 
it could be argued that an increase in the aggregate military spending (=HYPOTHESIS 5) or in 
the total resources (=HYPOTHESIS 6) held by the democracies would represent increased 
systemic stability for the participants o f the system, thus reducing the individual country 
military spending. Contrary hypotheses could be tested for the influence of autocracies in the 
system, again on the aggregate. For example, did increased aggregate military spending 
(=HYPOTHESIS 7) or total resources (=HYPOTHESIS 8) held by autocracies represent a 
systemic threat? In the empirical applications, the definitions of regime type will be crucial; a 
task, which is taken up especially in Section 4.1. Furthermore, these types of arguments can also 
be taken to the level o f a state. For example, it could be maintained that the more democratic a 
regime was, the less of a military burden (=HYPOTHESIS 24) or a defense share 
(=HYPOTHESIS 25) it would prefer. O f course, contrary arguments could be made about 
authoritarian regimes (^HYPOTHESES 26 and 27).
Any analysis of wars, or military spending for that matter, must draw its theoretical insights 
from models of decision-making. So far in this thesis the main sources of theoretical insights 
and testable hypotheses have been the rational models of decision-making, especially at the
117 For an overview, see Debating the Democratic Peace. Ed. by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 
and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge 1996. For examples of dissenting voices, see e.g. Layne 1996; Farber- 
Gowa 1995.
118 Russett 1993,24—40; Geller-Singer 1998,85—89; Rummel 1997,4— 6.
119 Garfmkel 1994,1294—1295.
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level of states, alliances, and systems. However, latest peace science research and so c ia l 
sciences in general have put more emphasis on nonrational models of decision-making, fo cu sin g  
on psychological and cultural factors, coalitions of groups, as well as organizational 
functionality in decision-making.120 12Indeed, there may be no coherent preference function f o r  
the decision-making unit (most commonly the state) as whole, due to the nature of the g ro u p s’ 
position and influence in the decision-making process, as well as the institutional “playing f ie ld ”  
in which the decisions are formed. Yet, a compromise outcome can be detected, and often a ls o  
the main actors’ role in the collective action processes.
Public expenditures are the results o f policy choices by governments, shaped by the respective  
stages of the decision-making process. Among economics and political science there have b e e n  
fewer attempts to model the demand for military spending in terms of decision-m aking 
opportunities and constraints. Macro-models of public expenditures, arising out o f th e  
assumption of a particular type of rationality on the part o f an individual and respectively th e  
military spending decision-making, attempt to explain the development of public goods in te rm s  
of a range of aggregate macro-level independent variables. In contrast, a second class of m o d els  
can be labeled microeconomic or decision-process models, which are strongly rooted in t h e  
public choice tradition and institutional economics. In these models, the underly ing
characteristics o f the decision-making process are linked to  the analysis of the d em an d
• • 121 variations.
For example, James Buchanan has argued that a researcher o f public goods must attempt to  
derive the institutional structure from  the "broadly conceived exchange process”, in w h ich  
outcomes can be estimated and approximations made on the efficiency of the po litica l 
institutions. In this process, three main features should be concentrated on: 1) T h e  
complementarity of the goods; 2) The substitutability o f the goods; 3) The institutional 
arrangements governing the provision o f the goods.122 All of these aspects are related to the fa c t  
that the actual decision-making as to how the demand, or ’’public good”, takes place is estim ated 
within the complex decision-making system of the country in question.
Public goods are provided by a government or a decision-making body by determining th e  
demand for the public good in question, to be financed with compulsory taxes. W hat does th is
120 See especially Geller-Singer 1998.
121 See more Brown-Jackson 1978.
122 Buchanan 1968,7—8,78.
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mean for military spending, if it indeed can be defined as a public good? Key concepts in this 
respect are the so-called free-rider dilemma, group dynamics, and rent seeking. The most 
important starting points for the study of bureaucracies and public-good decision-making 
processes are Mancur Olson’s (1965) The Logic o f Collective Action and Anthony Downs’ 
(1967) Inside Bureaucracy on the internal dynamics of political and economic groups, 
especially bureaucracies.123 The free-rider dilemma relates to  the fact that there are always 
persons who benefit from a particular public good or goods without paying for it. For example, 
it is in everyone’s interests to have a national defense, yet it is difficult for an individual to 
decide how much funds to invest for this purpose. Thus, a rational individual would wait for 
others to pay for a national defense, which does not have direct pay-off potential except in crisis 
situations. The end result would be that no one invests in national defense. National defense is 
therefore a public good which has to be funded with compulsory taxes. The free-rider problem 
is also related to group behavior. According to Olson, the larger the number of individuals or 
organizations that would benefit from a collective good, the smaller the share of gains from a 
particular line of action. This also leads to the conclusion that large groups are less likely to act 
in their common interest —  for example to pay X amount of money for national defense —  than 
smaller ones. Moreover, large, heterogeneous groups may be less effective in their pressure 
activities than small, homogeneous groups.124
The concept of rent seeking is important in analyzing the behavior of actors in a polity. Firms, 
either on their own or more commonly through joint trade organizations and ultimately their 
national peak association, attempt to obtain benefits from governments via different rent seeking 
strategies such as campaign funding and political networking. As expounded by Gordon 
Tullock125, rent-seeking behavior is said to occur when the profits exceed the opportunity costs 
for the owners of resources in the political markets, with the costs of these actions entailing a 
waste of social resources. Thus, the idea of profit, implying self-interested behavior, is 
instrumental in all forms of rent seeking. Accordingly, it is considerably more reasonable to 
argue that national defense, the end product of all the investments and consumption, is a pure 
public good than to extend this argument to military spending. In particular, there are additional
123 There are two distinctly different research traditions relating to bureaucracies. The older organizational 
tradition is based on sociology and the thoughts of Max Weber (e.g. Mouzelis 1975; Blau 1973), whereas 
the newer Anglo-American tradition is strongly rooted in the public choice tradition. In the latter, the 
actors and bureaus are seen as utility maximizers, which act according to their own notion of rationality. 
See Downs 1967, 1—2; Lane 1987. For other studies relating to the bureaucracy research, see especially 
Niskanen’s (1971) seminal study; also, de Bruin 1987; Peters 1978.
124 Olson 1965, 9—16; Olson 1982, 25—34; Mueller 1991; Buchanan 1968, 84—86. For a definition of 
the free-rider problem, see Stiglitz 1988,120—122.
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theoretical concerns that the formulations of military spending demand fail to cap tu re, 
especially arising from supply-side influences, such as the principal-agent problem. It is a ls o  
fruitful to include the influence of political/economic agents and the impact of group dynam ics 
in the analysis. This type o f analysis of economic development focuses namely on the in ternal 
dynamics o f different groups, which respectively influence the outcome of political decision­
making and state formation. This aspect becomes even more pronounced in the analysis o f s u c h  
a politically volatile “public good” as military expenditures.125 26
! 'i ",
For example Keith Hartley has indicated three key determinants in the formation of m ilitary  
spending levels: political (i.e., political markets), strategic (i.e., technical progress), a n d  
economic (available total resources) factors. Respectively, the groups involved in the decision­
making for military spending levels include: 1) Voters/consumers; 2) Political parties; 3) S ta te  
bureaucracies; 4) Interest groups, especially representing producers; 5) International com m unity  
of foreign nations and international agencies.127 Political markets resemble other markets in th a t  
they contain buyers and sellers pursuing certain interests by undertaking mutually beneficial 
exchange within the rules determined by both formal authorities and informal practices. In th e  
formation o f military budgets, firstly, a bureaucrat chooses the levels of defense, for example, to  
present to the decision-makers, often choosing to maximize the discretionary defense budget. A  
decision-maker(s) and/or the different organizations involved then make the assessment on th e  
“necessary” level (=demand) of military spending. During this process the various interest 
groups and other interested parties attempt to influence this decision, according to their com plex 
motives, often being more interested in the government’s acquisition policies after the decision 
is made.128
The idea o f group influence and interaction being crucial parts o f decision-making processes is 
hardly new. Interest groups have been the topic of intense scrutiny in the post- Second W orld  
War period, especially among political scientists. Research has mainly been channeled in to  
three schools o f thought: 1) Pluralism, in which groups are considered central to the political 
processes, and the policy is the outcome of various group pressures; 2) Marxism, in w hich 
interest groups in general are of little importance except the representatives o f labor and  
representatives o f capital; 3) Corporatism in which the increased complexity o f industrial 
society is interpreted to eventually force the state to incorporate groups into the policy process
125 Tullock 1967; Tullock 1980.
126 Eloranta 1998; Eloranta 1999.
127 Hartley 1987,404— 406; Hartley 1991, 42—52. See also Appelbaum-Katz 1987; Gradstein 1993.
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in order to promote economic growth and stability.129 The approach here in this thesis could 
perhaps be defined as coming closest to the pluralist variant, with specific interdisciplinary 
flourishes.
Providing a definition for an “interest group” is instrumental in clarifying one’s analytical 
perspective. Following for example Graham Wilson, here interest groups are defined as 
organizations, not necessarily entirely separate from the government, attempting to influence 
public policy. Thus these groups —  be they unions, producers’ groups, or for example 
corporations —  provide an institutionalized linkage between the state and the major sectors of 
the society.130 However, the state should not be understood as a cohesive, unified actor; rather, 
the sectors and departments within the state apparatus have the ability to act autonomously in 
particular situations, depending on the availability of resources.131 Equally, as suggested by 
Martin Smith, it is possible to improve the above definition o f an interest group by emphasizing 
that these groups, in order to achieve their goals, are dependent on policy networks; The 
government needs the assistance of the various groups in the development and implementation 
of policies, whereas groups are equally dependent on the state for “rents” and subject to  state 
coercion.132
The ’’formal” (i.e., political parties and bureaucracies) and ’’informal” (i.e., interest groups) 
spheres o f influence can be linked by analyzing not only their actual activities, but including 
also an evaluation of their contact surfaces in different kinds of committees and other 
cooperative organs. As Downs intuitively has pointed out, ’’committees to study the situation 
and recommend possible action are almost always used whenever substantial changes in a 
bureau’s organization are required”.133 This perspective is adopted in this thesis through a 
review o f the workings of such committees, especially the Defense Revision committees in 
Sweden and Finland, designed to alter the premises of the entire military establishment, both in 
terms of funding and organization. It is equally beneficial to analyze the workings o f more 
permanent committees, especially relating to the allocation of military outlays, which formed an 
important part of the interwar governance systems. 289301
28 Buchanan 1968. See also Sandler-Hartley 1995,54—58; Eloranta 1999.
29 See Smith 1993 for further discussion and review of these research trends.
30 Wilson 1990,8—9.
31 See e.g. Eloranta 1999.
32 Smith 1993,50-61.
33 Downs 1967,207.
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Downs defines all officials and politicians as utility maximizers, which should here b e  
understood in terms of the broad definition of rationality offered later.134 Downs describes th e  
following potential aims to explain the behavior of officials: power, money income, prestige, 
convenience, security, personal loyalty, pride in proficient performance at work, desire to serve 
the ’’public interest”, and commitment to a specific program of action. Furthermore, he divides 
officials into categories, ideal types o f sorts, including purely self-interested officials (climbers, 
conservers) and mixed-motive officials (zealots, advocates, statesmen). For climbers, power, 
income, and prestige form the most important values, whereas conservers seek to  retain th e  
amount of those factors they already possess. In contrast, zealots seek power for both its ow n 
sake and to achieve the goals they value. Advocates in turn are loyal to the organization an d  
want to have an influence upon the policies, and statesmen see themselves as loyal to  the society 
as a whole.135
Additionally, as Rune J. S0rensen has shown, research of bureaucracies has tended to  em phasize 
two often opposing features of bureaucracies and political markets: 1) Complexities o f budget 
making, as well as limitations o f knowledge, time, and resources lead decision-makers to focus 
on marginal adjustments in the previous year’s budget, thus making it the determinant of th e  
next year’s appropriations; 2) Each bureau maximizes its appropriations on the basis of knowing 
the demands o f the decisive organs and keeping the costs of supplying the good a secret w ithin 
the bureaucracy.136 The first one could be defined as a path dependence argument, which 
maintains that military spending should be path dependent, especially in terms of being 
dependent on the possible immobility o f central government spending (^HYPOTHESIS 42).137 
As argued in Chapters 6 and 7, it is even more likely that consumption ME will be path  
dependent (=HYPOTHESIS 40) due to the legislative difficulties involved in changing its 
levels, whereas capital ME (=HYPOTHESIS 41) should be more susceptible to rent seeking b y  
economic interest groups, within the constraints and opportunities allotted by the institutional 
framework. The second argument essentially views bureaucrats primarily as self-interested rent 
seekers, attempting to maximize the prestige and power of their bureau. The armed forces could 
be characterized as having similar goals, namely attempting to  maximize the level o f military 
spending (=HYPOTHESIS 43), although inter-branch rivalries may be influential as well.
134 Downs 1967, 81—82; also, 1—2. Downs’ definition is less stringent than e.g. Niskanen’s proposition 
that bureaucrats are essentially attempting to maximize their budgets, which in turn leads to bureaucratic 
inefficiency —  see Niskanen 1971. On criticism of this notion, see e.g. Lane 1987,11— 16.
135 Downs 1967,84— 111.
136 Sprensen 1987, 63. On the definition of a bureaucracy, see Downs 1967, 26—27. :
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Competition within the legislative dimension of the “formal” sphere, especially among officials 
selected for a limited term, can also have a profound effect on a nation’s military spending. As 
Michelle Garfmkel has argued cogently, electoral uncertainty associated with competition 
between political parties, each representing a certain part of the electorate, should theoretically 
impart a negative bias on the said country’s military budgets. Her key argument is that decision­
makers in democracies consider military spending as security for future consumption, yet they 
feel the burden of military expenditures in lower current consumption. The incumbent, unless 
elected for another term, cannot enjoy the benefits and the popularity arising from the security 
achieved through military spending.137 38 Moreover, it is possible to  take this argument further in a 
different direction and test whether increased party fragmentation, implying more electoral 
confusion and increased political competition, lowers military spending levels (=HYPOTHESIS 
49).139 It has also been suggested, in the context of analyzing war initiation by democratic states, 
that aggression, or in this case military spending, might be linked to election cycles in the 
political markets. Some evidence links aggression to early phases in a country’s election cycles, 
perhaps related to preceding weak economic performance.140 One could argue that military 
spending should respond to election year cycles, with an election year bringing a negative 
adjustment to M E (=HYPOTHESIS 50) along the same logic as suggested by Garfmkel.
In politics diverse non-governmental interest groups, especially groups representing the 
different production sectors, attempt to influence political decisions especially through 
campaign financing, different types of networks, and outright bribery. As Juha-Antti Lamberg 
has indicated in the Finnish context, the interest groups attempt to  "buy” politicians by awarding 
them direct campaign contributions or offering people/organizational resources at their disposal. 
It is not illegal to accept campaign funding from corporations, similar to most o f even 
contemporary Europe, in Finland, which differs at least in principle from the current American 
system. Nonetheless, even the current day American interest organizations have been able to 
channel campaign financing to their candidates through specific political action committees 
(PAC), in essence making the formal institutional framework completely ineffective.141
137 See e.g. Koistinen 1980,101.
138 Garfmkel 1994, e.g. 1294— 1295. To be more precise, as John M. Mbaku argues, in dictatorships the 
dictator usually controls the supply of legislation, yet interest groups can participate in the functions of 
the governmental apparatus. See Mbaku 1991.
139 Details on the indicators used can be found in Chapter 6.
140 Gaubatz 1991; Geller-Singer 1998.
141 Lamberg 1997, 148— 150. On the American campaign financing system, see e.g. Coleman 1985, 50— 
54,101— 104; Eloranta 2000b.
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W hen do situations arise that the interaction between the public and the private sectors 
increases? Immoral or even criminal activity becomes rational action when the benefits to be 
acquired exceed the risks (for example, moral condemnation, punishment, economic 
consequences) involved. According to Douglass C. North, increasing returns arising from 
political participation and imperfect markets are prerequisites for private sector investments in 
political markets.142 How then is the rent seeking of interest groups limited in the political 
markets? Following North’s notions, the constant interaction between institutions and 
organizations, within an established system of constraints (formal rules, such as laws and 
statutes; informal rules, such as codes of behavior), and opportunities are crucial in order to  
understand and explain the paths of different economies. The formal, governmental groups in 
the political market (for example, political parties) and the informal, non-governmental groups 
(for example, economic interest groups) form the ’’players” that limit the actions of their 
members but also act as collective entities in shaping societal development in interaction with 
each other. This activity by the organizations, within an institutional and cultural framework, 
shapes economic performance in the Noithian framework.143 Individual firms, for example, 
often via various cooperative group structures, anticipate and adjust to institutional changes. 
Firms and their networks can and will respond to changing institutional challenges, and will 
attempt to change the existing rules of the game in their favor. The form which the interaction 
between the firms and the political entities takes will depend critically upon a combination o f 
market, institutional, social, and legal dynamics.144
It is nonetheless difficult to proxy the influence of different groups in the process of military 
spending decision-making. The economic interest groups in particular exert their influence, as 
discussed previously, in a multitude o f  ways, and they also receive the rewards of their actions 
in many forms (such as tariffs, quotas, informal favors etc.), often almost impossible to  measure 
comprehensively. For example, the cooperation networks of firms are often aimed at competing 
in the political markets for formal and informal “rents”, in which the so-called insider groups 
have the advantage of participating in m any of the existing forms of cooperative organs or those 
being created between the public and private sectors, such as various committees. These 
networks and diverse forms of cooperation are created also due to a need on the part of the
142 North 1994,94—96.
143 North 1994,17—27; North 1997, 8— 12. Organizations can be defined broadly as political, economic, 
social, and educational groups.
144 Lamberg et al. 2002; Colli-Rose 1999,28.
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public sector to utilize the expertise offered by the private sector and/or to rely on its political 
support.145
The rent seeking by economic interest groups, usually by clusters of firms organized for a 
common purpose or by large individual firms, can be investigated with the help of a set of 
theoretical propositions. As argued in Lamberg et al. (2002), the rent seeking of such agents is 
not necessarily motivated by purely profit maximization alone. It may be possible to divide the 
factors increasing the probability of political action among industries into three groups: 1) Intra- 
organizational; 2) Intra-industry; 3) Inter-industry. At the intra-organizational level, the factors 
that are hypothesized as affecting the probability of participation in the political markets include 
past economic performance and organizational slack as well as firms’ past performance in the 
political markets. For example, good economic performance may reduce the probability of 
political activity, similar to big organizational slack. Secondly, at the intra-industry level, the 
probability of participation might be influenced by the nature and competitive situation in the 
industry, phases of the industry life-cycle, and the relative strength o f the representative interest 
group in the political markets. For example, a phase of growth within the industry may increase 
the probability of political activity, whereas the relative weakness o f the representative group 
should reduce the probability of political activity (through this particular group). Thirdly, at the 
inter-industry level, selective incentives and excludable benefits, institutional opportunities 
available, and institutional constraints should have an impact on the probability of collective (or 
individual firms) action in the political markets, as argued already above as well.146 In this thesis 
I will concentrate on measuring, firstly, the quantitative impact o f the most important economic 
interest group respective of capital ME, namely domestic market industries, by arguing that 
industries as an interest group should attempt to maximize the level of military expenditures 
especially in times of economic hardship (=HYPOTHESIS 44).
Figure 8 below represents an effort to incorporate the various actors and their collective action 
into a military spending decision-making framework. The three top levels are similar to the ones 
already discussed in this chapter: The international community (League of Nations and beyond), 
the international armaments markets (see Chapter 6), and the individual states. The actors within 
a state consist of the groups introduced earlier: 1) Voters/consumers, assuming a limited role 
besides influencing the strength of the political parties; 2) Political parties, influenced by 
competition within the parliament and myopic survival perception (as well as strong ideological
145 Colli-Rose 1999, 27—28; Smith 1993,4—7,60-61; Eloranta 2000b.
146 See Lamberg et al. 2002 for details and theoretical discussion.
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convictions); 3) State agencies, especially the various bureaucracies attempting to maximize 
their perception o f required spending; 4) Economic and political interest groups, attempting to 
influence the level of public goods provision as well as the ensuing government acquisition 
policies. In addition, their contact surfaces, such as committees, are displayed therein as well. 
This framework, nonetheless, does not feature discussion of the instances when the interaction 
between those awarding the military contracts and those competing for them becomes collusion, 
inasmuch their interests become identical and the rent seeking becomes a joint venture.147
Figure 8. Demand for Military Spending as an Impure Public Good: The Actors and 
Collective Action
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Paul Koistinen (1980) has argued quite convincingly that the First World War formed an 
important watershed in business-government relations. In the U.S. context, the federal 
government, the business community, and the military services had developed complex, 
modem, and professionalized structures by the Great W ar, which became virtually 
indistinguishable from one another during the wartime. He sees the Military-Industrial Complex
147 In the NATO and public choice context, see especially Sandler-Hartley 1999,124— 128.
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(MIC) — defined as a loosely structured form of collusion, an outgrowth of the “power elite” —  
resulting from the economic mobilization for the First World War as well as the interwar 
planning cooperation between the armed forces and the business community.148 However, 
Koistinen does not define the MIC very specifically, and the U.S. case is somewhat different 
from many of the European countries where the armed forces did not usually have independent 
procurement powers. How should we define the MIC and how is it relevant for the research 
aims of this thesis?
The demand side o f defense markets is dominated by the government in its role as a purchaser 
o f all the inputs of labor, capital, land, other resources, and services needed in the maintenance 
of national defense. In this context, for example Sandler-Hartley (1999) has defined the 
business-government relations in the following manner: ‘This combination of government, the 
armed forces, defense contractors, together with politicians and other lobbying interest groups 
forms the military-industrial-political complex.” 149 This type of definition still is rather vague 
regarding the actual functioning of these networks and other forms of cooperation. Following 
Mark Harrison (2001), it is essential to make a distinction between different forms o f  rent 
seeking (entailing profit maximization) and actual collusion between the agents involved. 
Collusion can occur in many ways, at many levels, and between many combinations o f actors. 
For example, at the level of economic interest groups collusion enables rivalrous agents to pool 
their probabilities o f winning the contract in question.150
Collusion is also possible between the state agencies responsible for the military budgets (such 
as Ministry of Defense), acting as the principal in the contractual relationship, and the domestic 
market industries, in turn acting as the agent. The purchase of military goods involves the 
decision to acquire a certain good, the relevant contract to be drawn between the contracting 
parties, as well as the delivery of a certain quality and quantity of this good in a specific time 
period. Repeated transactions and extensive cooperation are likely to occur in countries with 
less developed armaments production capabilities and military trade constraints, including also a 
limited pool of professional expertise in arms technology. This relationship also involves 
transaction costs in the form of acquiring information about the possible products and suppliers, 
organizing competitions, bargaining with the contractors, and then the writing, monitoring, and 
enforcing of the contracts. In short, the government as the principal has to choose the contractor
148 Koistinen 1980, 8—47. Government efforts to regulate business activity also stimulated business 
groups to organize; see Hrebenar-Scott 1982,9—10.
149 Sandler-Hartley 1999,120—121.
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or the agent, and to ensure that the agent pursues the goals of the principal. Furthermore, 
armaments markets and industries are commonly under regulatory control of the state to varying 
degrees, due to their role in crisis management.150 51 *
However, the game between the principal and the agent is not quite as simple as described 
above. Often the armed forces act as the third player, since they are in practice employed in 
some form in the preparation o f the military budgets. The U.S. interwar case forms the extreme 
in this sense, since the armed forces were able to carry out, almost without any centralized 
control, their own procurement. Collusion between groups can occur in different ways and lead 
to different cooperative game outcomes. The possible, yet often competing objectives of the 
players in the “European” interwar context could perhaps be simplified in the following way: 1) 
Ministry o f Defense —  Goals: bureau budget maximization, prestige, efficiency, national 
security readiness; 2) Other state agencies involved, especially Ministry of Finance —  Goals: 
lower central government spending, budget maximization; 3) Armed forces — Goals: efficiency, 
budget maximization; 4) Domestic market industries —  Goals: lower central government 
spending, m axim um  domestic share of purchases of military goods and services. Collusion 
would occur when the interests of the players, or at least most of them, coincided after repeated 
games. Then the competitive rent seeking, based on complex utility maximization, o f the groups 
involved would lead to collusion, either resulting in the creation of an actual MIC or at least 
amounting to  m ore temporary forms o f collusion, depending on the level o f military 
expenditures. The concept of a  corruptive contact surface describes this collision of interests. It 
refers specifically to  the increasing opportunities (sometimes called windows of opportunities) 
of corruption and rent seeking as the interaction between the public sector organizations and 
private firms (or their representatives) increases. Yet, many forms of rent seeking and especially 
collusion on this surface are only morally reprehensible, not illegal. The extension o f this 
contact surface can take place, for example, due to societal crises or changing economic 
conjunctures.
It is possible to  develop certain hypotheses to test these ideas on the interwar military spending 
decision-making process, which is here mainly undertaken with the cases of Sweden and 
Finland. This is because, as Harrison has argued, it is very difficult to measure the outcomes o f
150 Harrison 2001,4.
131 See e.g. Sandler-Hartley 1995, 113—115. On transaction costs and exchange relationships, see Greif 
2000.
132 North 1994; Hrebenar-Scott 1982,9—12; Isaksson 1997,130; Eloranta 2000b.
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military budgeting and procurement reliably through statistical indicators.153 Thus, most o f these 
hypotheses will be verified with the use o f extensive archival materials and relevant literature. 
Firstly, based on the rent-seeking framework outlined earlier, we could argue that industries as 
an interest group will attempt to maximize the binding nature of formal and informal military 
procurement rules in favor of the domestic markets (=HYPOTHESIS 46). Secondly, armed 
forces, inclusive of relevant state acquisition bureaucracies, and domestic market industries 
should resort to collusion in the military acquisition policy if the economic interest groups have 
been able to achieve an extensive role in government functions (=HYPOTHESIS 47), such as 
via crisis planning and procurement. Thirdly, an institutional shock, requiring extensive military 
acquisition cooperation between the relevant groups, or an institutional “power vacuum" should 
increase the amount of collusion between the armed forces, inclusive of relevant state 
acquisition bureaucracies, and the domestic market industries (=HYPOTHESIS 48). In other 
words, clearly defined rules of the game, with the enforcement of individual property rights 
encountered commonly among modem democracies should reduce the probability of actors’ of 
resorting to  rent seeking or further to collusion. Conversely, poorly defined rules of the game 
should induce rent-seeking behavior, which implies profit-maximization by the firms involved, 
and lead to collusion when some of the groups* interests coincide.154
Figure 9 below displays a simplified conceptualization of the research framework pursued in 
this thesis. It features systemic level forces, alliance level influences, significance of regime 
type, state-level influences, as well as factors arising from within a particular state and its 
decision-making system. It does not offer details on the various hypotheses developed here, 
however. The key arguments in this framework are that one needs to account for the influences 
arising from all of the explanatory levels, and that military spending is likely to be an impure 
public good (including both pure and impure public good characteristics), as argued throughout 
this chapter. Figure 9 hardly presents a comprehensive model, since it does not address some of 
the aspects of military spending demand as discussed in this section; namely rent seeking, 
collusion, interaction between the players, and the institutional framework, which are included 
in the aggregate research framework. Also, it fails to account for such hard-to-measure 
influences as culture, ideology, and group rationality in the framework. It does, however, 
provide a working conceptualization o f the impure public good characteristics of military 
spending demand, especially in terms o f quantitative analysis.
153 Harrison 2001, 7.
154 See Lamberg et al. 2002 for more details.
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Figure 9. A Research Framework for Studying Military Spending as an Impure Public 
Good
IM P U R E  PU B L IC  G O O D S: M ilita ry  Spending w ith  P u b lic -P riv a te  B enefits
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DEFENSE PROVISION OF AN INDIVIDUAL STATE 
o  LACK OF EXPLOITATION, OFF-SETTING TENDENCIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
BENEFITS INCREASE THE OPTIMALITY OF DEFENSE PROVISION
Source: c o n stru cte d  b y  th e  author.
Organizations operate under limited or bounded rationality, routines and organizational rules 
rather than calculated decisions, as well as self-interest and competition with other organizations 
and/or bureaucratic units. Here it is assumed that, following Herbert Simon, individuals act 
rationally within the cognitive, information, and temporal bounds surrounding them .155 It is, 
nevertheless, quite irrelevant for this analysis to concentrate on the rationality o f individuals in  
explaining mesa- and macro-level events.156 The rationality, the aims in relation to the actions 
taken, of groups involved in the military spending decision-making is of course very important 
in this respect. Many of the hypotheses developed in this chapter imply a certain type o f  
rationality on the part of a certain group. Many of these rational model expectations do not 
exactly comply with the notion of bounded rationality, yet some of the (often competing) 
hypotheses do take into account more complex decision-making frameworks and the interaction 
between the relevant actors. Any model, no matter how complex, is still only an approximation 
of the complex reality of human interaction.157 The success of the model depends on how well
155 Simon 1957; Lamberg et al. 1997; Geller-Singer 1998,39— 40. See also Lamberg et al. 2002.
156 On a call for further emphasis on understanding group dynamics, see e.g. van Winden 1997.
157 For further discussion, the read«' should consult e.g. Geller-Singer 1998.
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and convincingly it performs this abstraction. The modelt being a combination of hypotheses* 
has to be verifiable on the basis of empirical data and provide transparency on the methods how 
the tests are accomplished.158
Mark Casson (1999) has provided a useful interpretation on how to relax the quite stringent 
rationality assumptions behind especially neoclassical economic models. As such, most 
neoclassical models assume that people, firstly, optimize, and that there is a tendency toward 
equilibrium in interactions between optimizers. He makes four assumptions relaxing the rigidity 
of these assumptions, which comply quite well with the theoretical additions introduced in this 
section: 1) Interaction with and within the legal system is costly, entailing transaction costs; 2) 
Information is costly to acquire and scarce; 3) All firms cannot be reduced to a “black box”, 
whereby the role o f the entrepreneur or a group of entrepreneurs159 is often crucial; 4) Material 
rewards are not enough to make the analysis comprehensive, as there are material as well as 
emotional rewards for particular actions, linked to the social fabric of the society.160 Thus, 
different types of hypotheses, sometimes representing competing theoretical interpretations of 
“aggregate rationality” or group rationality, are necessary in the analysis of public good 
decision-making.
One of the problems of modeling decision-making with at least some assumptions of rationality, 
as opposed to nonrational models (for example, chaos theory), are the notions o f group 
dynamics and collective action. One of the key issues in defining the rationality of actors is the 
relationship between the individual and the group, and in groups ’’irrational” individuals are 
often of negligible importance in the outcome. Mancur Olson’s theoretical framework on the 
rationality of an individual, for example, recognizes altruistic behavior as a problem in defining 
rationality, and he also attempts to analyze the different forms o f altruism. A typical altruistic 
and rational individual does not influence decisively the bargaining for collective goods in a 
large group. On the other hand, an altruist interested in making ’’visible” sacrifices has to be 
taken into account in explaining group rent seeking.161 Still, it is a dubious exercise to attempt 
making a value judgment on the efficiency or perhaps even irrationality of different kinds of 
historical choices.162 For example, a certain nation’s defense acquisitions may be consciously
158 See especially Kalela 1976,126— 127.
159 On emphasis of other factors, see Lamberg et al. 2002.
160 Casson 1999, 12— 13. ..........
161 Olson 1965; Olson 1982, 19—20,34—35. Cf. e.g. North 1994. For an excellent analysis of the notion 
of rationality, see Williamson 1997. Also, the tools of bureaucracy research should not be ignored; see 
Eloranta 1998 for more on this aspect.
162 See Buchanan 1968, 6—7.
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directed towards significantly more expensive domestic production in a certain year, which 
would make it tempting to classify this situation and its consequences as path dependence, 
implying inefficiency in one form or another. The analysis must, on the other hand, take into 
account the personal motives o f the decision-makers, the social and political incentives created 
by group dynamics, as well as other ideological and cultural constraints.163 Most likely, the 
outcome is a  combination of several causal factors, which are often inseparable. For example, 
favoring domestic production may also have positive consequences for the entire economy, 
even though at first it might appear to  be economically inefficient. Here these perspectives will 
emerge from the comparisons between the more macro-level statistical analyses and the more 
detailed analysis of the decision-making mechanisms of Sweden and Finland. Thus, the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches are seen as crucial, complementary parts of the analysis 
of the demand for military spending.
2.3. Summary o f the Hypotheses
This thesis aims to analyze the demand for military spending as an impure public good for 
eleven European states (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) in the interwar period. The key 
research question in this thesis can be summarizes in the following manner: What determines 
the demand for a military spending for a democratic nation or a nation that behaves like a 
democracy in the interwar period? Based on the theoretical premises outlined previously, it 
seems evident that military spending is not just a pure public good in this period, as it lacks the 
required pure public good alliance characteristics, to say the least. Also, the other explanatory 
levels and the relevant theoretical insights attached to them would suggest that both systemic 
forces as well as actor-related influences within the nations are crucial in any analysis o f 
military spending behavior.
163 The application of different degrees of path dependence to e.g. political and economic phenomena 
should include an element of caution. The starting point for the analysis must be the different views of 
the world by the individuals and their effect on the group, however large, behavior. See Eloranta 1997c 
for more.
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Figure 10. Organization of the Hypotheses in the Thesis
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Source: constructed by the author.
The general outlines of the questions that are pursued have already been summarized in Section
1.4. As has been emphasized already, the analysis in this thesis will seek insights from four 
different explanatory levels: system, alliance(s), state, and within state. These levels are all 
intricately linked, and the aim  here is to explain how these levels (and the variables 
approximating their behavior) affected the military spending behavior of a single state, although 
common responses are possible as well (for example, on the axis “weak” states —  Great 
Powers). As seen in Figure 10, at the systemic level I will be concentrating on verifying 
hypotheses grouped into three clusters: balance of power, democratic peace, and systemic 
leadership. At the level of an alliance, the focus will be on hypotheses evaluating alliance 
membership, pure public good aspects, and joint products. The level of a state will have four 
clusters of hypotheses: pure public good aspects, democratic peace, economic development -  
military spending, and “weak” states vs. Great Powers. Finally, within a state, I will explore the 
various impure public good hypotheses related to the political markets and the actors involved 
in the game for public goods.
Below you can find a complete list of the hypotheses tested and evaluated in this thesis, based 
on the organization according to the levels as explained above. There is a description of the
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hypothesis, its number (that is used as a reference tool in the various chapters), description of 
the main form  of analysis, the location where the hypothesis was first put forth, and the location 
where the hypothesis will be tested. Although most of the hypotheses were developed in this 
chapter, some are introduced in the subsequent chapters instead. One should also note that some 
of the hypotheses are complementary, whereas others are competing.
LIST OF HYPOTHESES: (1—50)
1. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: (HYPOTHESES 1— II)
1.1. BALANCE OF POWER: (HYPOTHESES 1—4)
An increase in the total system military spending should induce a positive threat response in the form 
of increased individual country military spending (at a lag) (^HYPOTHESIS 1). FORM OF 
ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. 
LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
An increase in the dispersion of military spending by the states in the system should represent 
mounting threats to the individual states, thus inducing higher military spending (at a lag) 
(-HYPOTHESIS 2). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
<& A decline in the concentration of total resources should increase the polarity in the system, thus 
increasing uncertainty in the system, and inducing higher military spending by the individual states (at a 
lag) (=HYPOTHESIS 3). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
A decline in the concentration of military resources should increase the polarity in the system, thus 
increasing uncertainty in the system, and inducing higher military spending by the individual states (at a 
lag) (=HYPOTHESIS 4). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
1.2. DEMOCRATIC PEACE: (HYPOTHESES 5—8)
O' An increase in the total resources held by democracies in the system should exert a spillover effect on 
the individual states, thus inducing a reduction in their military spending (at a lag) (=HYPOTHESIS 5). 
FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: 
Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
An increase in the aggregate military spending of democracies in the system should exert a spillover 
effect on the individual states, thus inducing a reduction in their military spending (at a lag) 
(^HYPOTHESIS 6). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
An increase in the total resources held by autocracies in the system should represent a threat for the 
individual states, thus inducing an increase in their military spending (at a lag) (=HYPOTHESIS 7). 
FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: 
Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
& An increase in the aggregate military spending of autocracies in the system should represent a threat 
for the individual states, thus inducing an increase in their military spending (at a lag) (^HYPOTHESIS 
8). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: 
Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
1.3. SYSTEMIC LEADERSHIP: (HYPOTHESES 9— 11)
Individual nations in the system should respond, in the form of either challenger or follower behavior 
in their military spending, to changes in the military spending behavior of the perceived systemic 
leader(s) (at a lag) (=HYPOTHESIS 9). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. 
LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
S  Individual nations in the system should respond, in the form of either challenger or follower behavior 
in their military spending, to changes in the total resources held by the perceived systemic leader(s) (at a 
lag) (^HYPOTHESIS 10). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
Q  Individual nations in the system should respond, in the form of either challenger or follower behavior 
in their military spending, to changes in the military resources of the perceived systemic Ieader(s) (at a 
lag) (=HYPOTHESIS 11). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
2. ALLIANCE: (H Y PO TH ESES 12— 18)
2.1. ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP: (HYPOTHESES 12— 13)
® Membership in an alliance, without qualifying the type of alliance, should increase the feeling of 
security for an individual state, thus inducing lower military spending (=HYPOTHESIS 12). FORM OF 
ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. 
LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
<S Membership in an alliance should provide increased security only according to the nature and 
conditions of the alliance (=HYPOTHESIS 13). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE. 
LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
2.2. PURE PUBLIC GOOD: (HYPOTHESES 14— 16)
® Military burdens (military expenditures of GDP) are anticipated to be shared unevenly in an alliance; 
thus, large wealthy allies (measured by real GDP) would be expected to shoulder more of the common 
defense than the smaller, poorer allies (=HYPOTHESIS 14), and one ally’s defense provision needs to 
be perfectly substitutable by that of the other ally. FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, RANK 
CORRELATIONS. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: 
Chapter 5.
@ Defense spending would be expected to be allocated inefficiently from an alliance standpoint, as the 
sum of marginal benefits from defense provision will not equal die marginal costs of this provision 
(=HYPOTHESIS 15). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, RANK CORRELATIONS. 
LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
& A central authority in an alliance is required to coordinate spending to overcome suboptimal provision 
and ensure the functionality of the cooperation (=HYPOTHESIS 16). FORM OF ANALYSIS: 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION 
WHERE TESTED: Chapters 3—5.
2.3. JOINT PRODUCTS (=IMPURE PUBLIC GOOD WITHIN AN ALLIANCE): 
(HYPOTHESES 17— 18)
Military burdens in an alliance yielding joint products should be shared based on the benefits received 
— the greater the ratio of excludable benefits to total benefits, the larger should be the agreement between 
the benefits received and burdens shared (^HYPOTHESIS 17). FORM OF ANALYSIS: 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION 
WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
If there are joint products present at the level of an alliance, spillins from other allies are no longer 
perfectly substitutable among members and the so-called full income variable (equals nation’s available 
income plus the defense spending of other alliance members) does not adequately capture the income 
effect (^HYPOTHESIS 18). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, GLS SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
3. STATE: (HYPOTHESES 19—39)
3.1. PURE PUBLIC GOOD CHARACTERISTICS: (HYPOTHESES 19—23)
@ Military expenditures can be expected to be positively correlated with income, thus having the 
characteristics of a normal good (^HYPOTHESIS 19). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR 
SYSTEM. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
Military spending can be expected to be negatively correlated with the price of “defense” 
(=HYPOTHESIS 20). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
Military spending can be expected to yield a negative correlation with spillins (alliances, groups of 
states, neighboring countries considered “nonhostile”), thus some free riding should occur (yet impure 
public good at the international level, therefore spillins should not be perfectly substitutable) 
(=HYPOTHESIS 21). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
External threats (alliances, groups of states, neighboring countries considered “hostile”) should exert a 
growth influence on a particular state’s military spending (^HYPOTHESIS 22). FORM OF ANALYSIS:
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QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION 
WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
©  A change in domestic military strategy may produce a change in the military spending path of the said 
nation (^HYPOTHESIS 23). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
3.2. DEMOCRATIC PEACE: (HYPOTHESES 24—29)
©  The more democratic a regime is, the less of its economic resources, in relative terms, it should 
allocate for military purposes (=HYPOTHESIS 24). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, 
VARIOUS STATISTICAL TESTS. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION 
WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
©The more democratic a regime is, the less of its central government expenditures, in relative terms, it 
should allocate for military purposes (^HYPOTHESIS 25). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, 
VARIOUS STATISTICAL TESTS. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION 
WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
© The more authoritarian a regime is, the more of its economic resources, in relative terms, it should 
allocate for military purposes (^HYPOTHESIS 26). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, 
VARIOUS STATISTICAL TESTS. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION 
WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
© The more authoritarian a regime is, the more of its central government expenditures, in relative terms, 
it should allocate for military purposes (^HYPOTHESIS 27). FORM OF ANALYSIS: 
QUANTITATIVE, VARIOUS STATISTICAL TESTS. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. 
LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
© Authoritarian states without totalitarian characteristics and centralized leadership should be unable to 
concentrate more resources for military purposes than democracies (^HYPOTHESIS 28). FORM OF 
ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, VARIOUS STATISTICAL TESTS. LOCATION WHERE
DEVELOPED: Chapter 4. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
©A change in the form of government, resulting in authoritarian rule as well as enabling totalitarian and 
centralized leadership, should create a disruption in the relationship between military spending and 
economic growth (=HYPOTIIESIS 29). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, VARIOUS 
STATISTICAL TESTS. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 4. LOCATION WHERE 
TESTED: Chapter 4.
3.3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - MILITARY SPENDING: (HYPOTHESES 30—33)
© Economic growth should Granger-cause military spending in the short run (=HYPOTHESIS 30). 
FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, GRANGER NON-CAUSALITY TESTS. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 4. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
© Military spending should Granger-cause economic growth in the short run (^HYPOTHESIS 31). 
FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, GRANGER NON-CAUSALITY TESTS. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 4. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
© Military spending should have a positive economic growth effect in the short run (=HYPOTHESIS 
32). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, REGRESSION ANALYSIS. LOCATION WHERE 
DEVELOPED: Chapter 4. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
© Military spending should have a negative growth effect in the short run (=HYPOTHESIS 33). FORM 
OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, REGRESSION ANALYSIS. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: 
Chapter 4. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 4.
3.4. “WEAK" STATES VS. GREAT POW ERS: (HYPOTHESES 34— )
©  There should be fewer domestic constraints on the foreign and trade policy decision-making of a 
“weak” state (carrying the connotation of limited political and economic power in a given system), 
implying that external variables such as market prices or perceived threats ought to have primacy in 
explaining the military trade behavior of these nations (=HYPOTHESIS 34). FORM OF ANALYSIS: 
QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM ON ARMS TRADE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 
6. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 6.
©  Great Powers should respond more strongly to changes in the balance of power in the system than 
“weak” states, e.g. in tenns of greater dispersion of military spending among the states inducing higher 
military spending, due to the tendency of Great Powers to engage in hegemonic competition with one 
another (^HYPOTHESIS 35). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM. LOCATION 
WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 6. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 5.
©  “Weak” states should be highly dependent on military trade and military imports in particular 
(^HYPOTHESIS 36). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, RATIOS AND SUR SYSTEM ON
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ARMS TRADE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 6. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: 
Chapter 6.
©  “Weak” states should differ from one another mostly due to factors such as their geographic and/or 
strategic location, the level of industrialization, the type of foreign policy tradition, and the size of the 
economy (^HYPOTHESIS 37). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM ON ARMS 
TRADE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 6. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 6.
©  “Weak” states may be influential in the international system when a balance of power exists between 
the Great Powers (=HYPOTHESIS 38). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM ON 
ARMS TRADE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 6. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: 
Chapter 6.
©  “Weak” states should be influential in the international system when there is hegemonic competition 
for leadership between the Great Powers (=HYPOTHESIS 39). FORM OF ANALYSIS: 
QUANTITATIVE, SUR SYSTEM ON ARMS TRADE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 
6. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 6.
4. W ITHIN STATE: (HYPOTHESES 40—50)
4.1. IMPURE PUBLIC GOOD: (HYPOTHESES 40—50) (*=evidence arising only from the 
Swedish-Finnish interwar context)
© Military consumption expenditures should be more path dépendait than military capital expenditures 
due to the difficulties in changing the laws concerning conscription and will cause military spending to 
exhibit path dependence on the whole (=HYPOTHESIS 40). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE 
AND QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE 
TESTED: Chapter 7.*
©  Military capital expenditures in a nation should be subject to complex rent seeking by various groups 
within the said polity — the less binding the rules governing such rent seeking, the higher the military 
spending levels (^HYPOTHESIS 41). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE AND 
QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: 
Chapter 7.*
©  Military expenditures as a whole should be path dependent and strongly influenced by the central 
government budgetary path dependence (-HYPOTHESIS 42). FORM OF ANALYSIS: 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION 
WHERE TESTED: Chapter 7.
© The more developed the nation is economically, with more established institutions and political 
markets, the lower its military spending should be (=HYPOTHESIS 43). FORM OF ANALYSIS: 
QUANTITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 5. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: 
Chapter 5.
© Armed forces and bureaucracies should attempt to maximize the level of military spending 
(^HYPOTHESIS 44). FORM  OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE A N D  QUALITATIVE. LO CA TIO N  
W HERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LO CA TIO N  W HERE TESTED: Chapters 5 ,7 .
©  Industries as an interest group should attempt to maximize the level of military spending in times of 
economic hardship (=HYPOTHESIS 45). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE AND 
QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: 
Chapters 5,7.
©  Industries as an interest group should attempt to maximize the binding nature of formal and informal 
military procurement rules in favor of domestic market actors (^HYPOTHESIS 46). FORM OF 
ANALYSIS: QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE 
TESTED: Chapter 7.*
©  Armed forces (including the relevant acquisition bureaucracies) and domestic market industries should 
resort to collusion in the military acquisition policy if the economic interest groups have been able to 
achieve an extensive influence in government functions (=HYPOTHESIS 47). FORM OF ANALYSIS: 
QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: 
Chapter 7.*
© An increase in the amount of collusion between armed forces (including the relevant acquisition 
bureaucracies) and domestic market industries should arise when an institutional shock occurs, requiring 
extensive contacts between these groups, or an institutional “power vacuum” exists (^HYPOTHESIS 
48). FORM OF ANALYSIS: QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. 
LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapter 7*
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^  An increase in the fragmentation of the parliament in a democracy should result in lower military 
spending levels, due to the myopic bias on the part of the legislator (=HYPOTHESIS 49). FORM OF 
ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 
2. LOCATION WHERE TESTED: Chapters 5,7.
^  Military spending within a state should respond to election cycles, with an election year bringing a 
negative adjustment to military spending (=HYPOTHESIS 50). FORM OF ANALYSIS: 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE. LOCATION WHERE DEVELOPED: Chapter 2. LOCATION 
WHERE TESTED: Chapters 5 ,7.
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3. ECONOM IC CHALLENGES, ELUSIVE COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND 
DIVERGENT M ILITARY SPENDING PATTERNS, 1920—1938
3.1. Economic Development, Central Government Spending, and the Impact o f the Great 
Depression
This chapter focuses on providing broad outlines of two components that had a crucial inpact 
on the military spending environment of the interwar period, namely: 1) The economic 
development environment that prevailed before and the one that emerged after the Great 
Depression; 2) The collective security environment that prevailed before and the one that 
emerged after the failure of the League Nations’ disarmament process in the early 1930s. 
Furthermore, as it is argued throughout in this thesis, the interwar period should nevertheless be 
analyzed as a complete segment, because it is inpossible to understand the mechanics and 
timing o f the 1930s rearmament without understanding the role played by the Great Depression 
and the turn towards domestic markets, and the impact of the gradual revelation of the 
impotence of the League of Nations in security policy issues. This chapter represents, however, 
an effort to merely describe the processes involved at a macro-level, without going deep into the 
analysis of the reasons, for example, behind the League o f Nations’ failure in providing 
collective security guarantees. These aspects of the analysis are taken up in earnest in the 
subsequent chapters. This chapter also entails an effort to see how the military spending of the 
eleven selected nations, respective of a  variety of indicators, developed in comparisons with 
other nations and within the sample. Firstly, I will present an overview o f the economic 
development of the period, the Great Depression being featured quite prominently in this effort, 
as well as discussion of the central government spending changes and policy environment of the 
interwar period.
’’Whether 1914 or 1929 is the break point, the period labelled ‘the inter-war years’ has acquired a 
poor reputation for achievements in the fields of economics and politics. What were later regarded 
as the mistakes of the inter-war years fixated policy-makers at the end of the Second World War 
and subsequently. These were years of metamorphosis of institutions and beliefs. The old 
international liberal economic order seemed unable to cope with the disruptions of the ‘war to end 
all wars’ and with die Great Depression. Rival doctrines of fascism and communism both offered 
remedies which emphasised greater state economic control. And all policy-makers chose more 
corporate ways of organising domestic and international economic relations.”
James Foreman-Peck 1995'64
164 Foreman-Peck 1995,175.
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As Charles Tilly has noted, the 20th century was the most war-prone in human history, 
producing a death rate of 46 per thousand of population, almost an eightfold increase in 
comparison with the 19th century. One of the features of the 20th century was also the tendency 
for Great Power conflicts to decline in frequency, duration, and the number of participating 
states in comparison with the four preceding centuries.165 One of the monumental milestones of 
the century was the First World War; a war that the participants expected to be short like the 
wars that preceded it in the 19th century. Instead, the more or less ad hoc organization for “total 
war”166 required the warring nations to undertake economic mobilization at unprecedented 
levels, necessitating also tremendous public spending increases. During the war as much as 
30— 40 per cent of the belligerents’ GDP was controlled directly or indirectly by the state. The 
political, economic, social, and cultural impacts of the First World War can hardly be 
overlooked either. It has been estimated that approximately nine million combatants and twelve 
millions civilians died during the Great War, with damage to property perhaps amounting to as 
high as 36 billion current USD.167
As Feinstein et al. (1997) have argued, there were four direct economic consequences arising 
from the war and its long shadow: 1) Two immediate exogenous shocks, in terms of disruptions 
of supply and demand as well as excess mobilized production (and military) capacity after the 
conflict; 2) A  more rigid economic environment, since for example wage flexibility was 
diminished; 3) A  weaker financial structure, since the economies had to cany the new, increased 
levels o f public spending as well as the acquired debts with mainly pre-war levels of taxation; 4) 
A fragile international monetary system. The “winners” of the war, at least in terms of economic 
growth effects, seemed to be the neutral states, such as the Nordic countries, who outperformed 
other Western states.168 According to  Barry Eichengreen, the First World W ar shattered tw o  
important features of the prewar system; namely, the credibility of the monetary system and  
international financial cooperation. The credibility of governments in making economic 
adjustments in accordance with the Gold Standard was challenged by an array of political and 
economic changes affecting the concentration and operation o f political decision-making within 
the countries. New political influences and groups entered the political arena, riding the wave o f  
corporatist experiments and enlarged franchises, which in turn exerted pressure upon the central 
banks. Thus, a domestic economic adjustment to market disturbances was no longer an  
automatic response. International cooperation faced three insurmountable obstacles: dom estic
165 Tilly 1990,67. See also Geller-Singer 1998 for an overview.
166 On this, see especially Neilson 1987.
167 De Groot 2001,1; Hardach 1977,150— 152; Feinstein et al. 1997,18— 19,25.
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political constraints, international political rivalry, and incompatible conceptual frameworks.168 69 
How, then, did these economic challenges and constraints imposed by the Great War affect the 
economic development of European states, especially the selected eleven democracies or 
transitional democracies?
It is fairly illuminating to first take a look at the economic development of the economic leader 
nation in the time period, the United States. The New Era -label, as the 1920s were often 
understood to be in the United States, has some merit in describing this period in American his­
tory. Some of the themes in American economic thinking in the 1920s were the supremacy of 
the United States in the world economy and the minimization of government activity in 
economic life. As President Calvin Coolidge expressed it in 1923: ”We have now reached a 
point in our financial program where we can lighten the tax burden of the people, which is an 
added reason for taking a firm stand against any and all programs o f spending that would tend to 
absorb the expected margin between receipts and expenditures.”170 This period, and especially 
the last few "crazy” years, represented a time of significant economic growth. The economic 
collapse that occurred in September 1929 launched the United States into a deep depression 
known as the Great Depression. Some o f the reasons for this crash have been said to include 
speculation, overheated markets, lesser demand for housing, and huge increases of supply while 
the demand stayed the same, and monetary instability. Structural problems of the new industries 
and their needs have also been emphasized. This crash spread throughout the world rapidly, 
contributing to a worldwide depression.171
As James Foreman-Peck has noted, the links between the Great Depression and the First World 
War were extensive. Without the war the depression would have been much less severe. The 
human costs and injuries resulting from the war damaged the European economies even more 
than the destruction of capital. Another notable feature of the interwar economy was the 
significant decline in foreign trade, even in the 1920s —  this development was mainly caused 
by the nationalist commercial policies. Also, it is important to take into account that during the 
1920s the United States was largely economically independent o f the rest of the world, or so it 
had seemed. Overall, this period was marked by uneven economic growth in the 1920s and
168 Feinstein et al. 1997,12—14,20—25.
169 Eichengreen 1992,8—11.
170 Message of the President of the United States transmitting budget for service of fiscal year 1925.1923. 
House Documents 76,68th Congress, Second Session, Volume 31.
171 Kindieberger 1973, 58—62; Barber 1985, 4, 14. See also Bernstein 1987, 1—20. On the severity of 
the depression, see Maddison 1991,54—55, 87. See also Eichengreen 1992.
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divergent experiences of recovery from the depression in the 1930s among the Western 
democracies.172
Figure 11. Mean Adjusted Real GDP per Capita (in 1929 Quasi-USD) of the Selected 
Eleven European States and the Aggregate Adjusted Real GDP (in 1929 Quasi-USD) of 
Seventeen Nations, 1920—1938
GDP PER CAP, GDP, ADJUSTED
_________________________ Year___________________
----- MEAN GDP PER CAPITA, THE 11INCL. IN THE
THESIS
------TOTAL ADJUSTED REAL GDP, 17 COUNTRIES
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Note-, for details on the PPP-adjustment (see also Chapter 1), see Appendices, Appendix 2 for more. The eleven 
are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The six others included in the 17-country total are: Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia/USSR, and the United States.
As seen in Figure 11, the 1920s was unquestionably a time of economic growth, both for the 
larger sample o f states seen above as well as for the selected eleven European states. This 
growth spurt came to an end with the Great Depression in 1929. Recovery, on the whole, seems 
to have begun after 1932, and countries outside the sample of eleven seem to have experienced 
a deeper slump. Nevertheless, the general trend is quite clear for the 1930s: the recovery can be 
distinguished quite clearly. The individual experiences, as will be shown shortly, of course 
varied. Figure 12, below, underlines these conclusions. Iron and steel production, on the 
aggregate, experienced a small plunge in 1921, followed by a growth period until 1929. 
Subsequently, the most important iron and steel producers decreased their production volume 
until 1932, after which a recovery ensued. Another smaller downturn can be seen to have taken
172 Foreman-Peck 1995,176—180.
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place in 1937, which was mainly caused by the renewed economic difficulties experienced by 
the United States. The steady growth of the urban population points to an uninterrupted trend of 
industrialization and urbanization during this period.
Figure 12. Aggregate Urban Population and Aggregate Iron and Steel Production of 
Seventeen Countries, 1920—1938
URBAN PO P, IRON AND STEEL
Year
----- URBAN POPULATION, 17 COUNTRIES
----- IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION, 17 NATIONS
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Note: for details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
The level of industrialization, correlating highly with the level of GDP per capita as discussed in 
Chapter 1, varied greatly among the selected eleven European states. In 1930, four groups could 
be discerned from among them: 1) Highly industrialized countries (BEL, NED, SWI, UK173); 2) 
Industrialized countries (DEN, FRA, NOR, SWE); 3) Semi-industrialized countries (POR, 
SPA); 4) Agricultural countries (FIN).174 The last group among these states, however, is rather 
redundant since Finland caught up quickly to the third group and even surpassed it.175
How did the impacts o f the Great Depression vary among the European states? The depression 
reached Europe as well as the Unites States with equal strength, although for example Finland 
and many Central European countries had experienced signs of the coming depression as early
173 All abbreviations used in this thesis are listed in Appendices, Appendix 1 A.
174 Following Feinstein et al. 1997, 56—58.
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as 1928.175 76 The repercussions o f the crash included, among other things, a partial collapse of the 
Gold Standard and the international trade agreements, numerous bank failures, high rates of 
unemployment, and internal political disturbances. By the summer of 1932, industrial pro­
duction in many Western countries had been halved to that o f 1928, and world trade had been 
reduced by a third. Both international and domestic politics were greatly affected by the 
economic crisis. The increased trade rivalry divided countries into competing blocs by mid- 
1930s: a Sterling Bloc led by the British; a Yen Bloc dependent upon Japan; a Dollar Bloc led 
by the United States (after a similar Gold Bloc had fallen apart); and the detached socialism of 
the USSR.177
The growth o f GDP (or GNP) in real terms during the interwar period was quite uneven among 
these eleven countries. The depression years did emerge distinctly from the growth experience 
of these countries; only the length and the severity o f it differed. In the United Kingdom, 
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark the depression seems to have been milder than for example in 
France, where the depression was severe and long lasting. All in all, as argued earlier, the 1920s 
seemed to be a time of vigorous economic growth compared to the more divergent trends of the 
1930s.178 As Figure 13 amply displays, the economic development of three W estern Great 
Powers —namely, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States — was not particularly 
impressive, especially in the 1930s. In the U.S. case, the 1920s produced the said growth 
phenomenon, which reached its zenith in 1929. After that, the Great Depression seems to have 
persisted throughout the decade. The American economy did not reach the 1929 real GDP per 
capita levels before the outbreak of the Second World W ar. In the British case, the Great 
Depression indeed had a relatively mild impact, yet the overall positive growth trend of the  
whole period was not very steep. In the French case, there was a distinct growth path evident 
before 1929, yet the 1930s did not produce a recovery for France —  modest recovery did not 
take place until the last years o f the 1930s.179
175 For extensive analysis of the Finnish economy in the long run, see Hjerppe 1988.
176 Eichengreen 1992,222.
177 Kennedy 1989, 364—366; Hjerppe 1988, 45—46; Autio 1992, 17— 18; Foreman-Peck 1995, 208—  
209; Paasivirta 1987,204.
178 See e.g. Maddison 1991; Maddison 1995 for details. See alsoEloranta 1996.
179 On public expenditures, see e.g. Levy-Leboyer 1978, e.g. 248—255. On labour conflicts, see Lequin 
1978. On monetary developments, see Kindleberger 1993, 337—349.
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Figure 13. Adjusted Real GDP per Capita (in 1929 Quasi-USD) for France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, 1920—1938
ADJUSTED
Year
-------- UK, GDP REAL PER CAP
-------- FRA, GDP REAL PER CAP
-------- USA, GDP REAL PER CAP
Sources: see Appendices. Appendix 2 for details.
Note: for details on the PPP-adjustment (see also Chapter 1), see Appendices, Appendix 2 for more.
Of the three, the British position in the world economy was still strong after the First World 
War. As Paul Kennedy has noted, Great Britain was not ’’predestined to decline” after the war. 
A significant feature of the British economic policy was the attempt to reclaim her position as 
an economic/political leader, which was made at least hypothetically possible by the American 
political isolationism and the near collapse of the German economy.180 The British economy 
experienced a slump in 1920— 1921, the worst depression of the interwar period in terms of 
output. Another such downturn occurred in the mid-1920s. From 1929 to 1933, the Great 
Depression caused unemployment to rise, and real GDP per capita decreased. Recovery started 
in 1933 and was sustained throughout the 1930s. Compared to for example the French economy 
in the 1930s, the difference was pronounced.181
In comparison, the Great Depression posed the greatest difficulties for the American economy. 
The position attained by the United States was central in the world economy by the 1920s, as 
the supreme creditor of war-tom Europe. The depression reached its bottom during the winter
180 Kennedy 1981, 223— 227.
181 Broadberry 1986; Solomou 1996, 113—115 — however, the British growth in the 1930s was modest
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1932— 1933, when various civil disturbances occurred and the national government had used u p  
all of its ideas, yet the economy was disarray.182 The American economy started to reco v er 
slowly after 1933, although unemployment fell only from 25 percent to 17 percent in 1933—  
1935.183 The most distinct signs o f recovery emerged in 1936, when for example veterans’ 
benefits and increased wages boosted the aggregate demand. This growth spurt, however, w as 
followed by another recession in 1937. The American economy did begin to  grow just b e fo re  
the Second W orld War due to, among other factors, increased war production. The decisive  
element was, however, the drafting o f over twelve million men to arms during the S econd  
World W ar.184
Figure 14. Adjusted Real GDP per Capita (in 1929 Quasi-USD) for Belgium, Finland, a n d  
Sweden, 1920—1938
ADJUSTED
Year
BEL, GDP REAL PER CAP 
SWE, GDP REAL PER CAP 
FIN, GDP REAL PER CAP
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Note: for details on the PPP-adjustment (see also Chapter 1), see Appendices, Appendix 2  for more.
The experiences o f small and medium size countries, here referred to as “weak” states, d iffe red  
from one another as well. In Finland, for example, the period after the First World W ar w a s
compared to e.g. Germany.
lfil *Kmdleberger 1973,198; Leuchtenberg 1963,22-30. See also Eichengreen 1992.
183 Kindleberger 1973, 233. On unemployment, see Jensen 1989; on the impact on the African-American 
population, see Sundstrom 1992. On the development of real wages, see Temin 1990.
84 Kindleberger 1973,262—271; Robertson 1973,708; Higgs 1992.
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followed by a period of accelerating growth that lasted until the end of the 1920s. As Riitta 
Hjerppe has noted, the international depression of 1921 merely slowed down this growth pattern 
in Finland. The Great Depression was less severe in Finland, similar to the other Nordic 
countries, and the decline also turned out to be shorter. As seen in Figure 14, after 1932 Finland 
entered ”a record-breaking pace of growth” as the average rate o f growth for 1920— 1938 rose 
to 4,7 per cent.185 Whereas in Finland the depression was rather short-lived, the Belgian 
experience was rather different. The depression lasted longer in Belgium and the economy did 
not start to recover until 1934. The problems that the Belgian economy faced especially in the 
1930s included monetary instability (Belgium was part of the Gold Bloc after 1931 until the 
devaluation of 1935), stagnation of international trade, the economy’s dependence on traditional 
low-value, cyclically prone heavy sectors (coal mining, metallurgy, and textiles), and indecisive 
government policies. Overall, the 1930s performance of the Belgian economy seems to  have 
been modest at best (see Figure 14).186
The Norwegian economy, in turn, went through three periods o f crises during the interwar 
period: early 1920s, mid-1920s, and early 1930s. The post- First World War depression resulted 
in slow recovery and once again in a new domestic economy downturn in the mid-1920s. As 
Ola Honningdal Grytten has pointed out, GDP per capita did not reach the 1920 level until 
1927. The 1930s depression made the Norwegian real GDP fall by 8,4 percent in 1931 — 
despite the setbacks, the interwar period on the whole represented a period of significant 
economic growth compared to the early 20th century.187 In Norway, the depression was sharp 
yet recovery occurred rather swiftly after 1933. Massive unemployment, which plagued other 
Scandinavian countries as well, was reduced considerably. A common feature, with Finland 
being a somewhat o f a latecomer among Nordic states, in the development of these “weak” 
states in the late 1930s was the emergence of early corporatist structures, social security 
schemes, and coalition politics.188
The years of the First World W ar were a time of almost an unbroken boom for Sweden. Another 
boom began in 1918, yet Sweden experienced also the crises of the international economy in 
1921— 1922. The effects of this recession were short-lived, and in 1922 exports were back on 
track again. The Swedish exports, for example, increased 11 per cent annually for the rest of the
185 Hjerppe 1988.
186 Mommen 1994,1—33; Buyst 1995; Eloranta 1996. See also Autio 1992,15—20.
187 Grytten 1996, 1—3. See also Hodne-Grytten 1992.
188 Jorberg-Krantz 1976, 435—440; Mommen 1994, 30—33; Hjerppe 1988; Derry 1979, 317—325. In 
Scandinavia, an essential part of this period was the rise of Social Democracy. See also Kennedy 1991,
78
1920s. Brisk economic growth also ensued, amounting to circa 7— 8 per cent annual grow th 
until 1929.189 The international crisis came to Sweden again, with a delay in 1931, leading to  
unemployment and a profound financial crisis in 1932. The Great Depression had an acu te  
disruptive effect on Swedish exports. Although the initial real GDP per capita drop was m ore  
pronounced in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries, the recovery in the 1930s was very  
rapid and exceeded the economic performance of, for example, Finland or Denmark. T h e  
domestic markets expanded rapidly in Sweden during the 1930s.190 As we can see in Figures 15 
and 16, the disruption of trade was a uniform phenomenon among European states.
Figure 15. Aggregate Trade (Exports plus Imports) for France, the United Kingdom, a n d  
the United States, in Current USD, 1920—1938
USD,
Year
-------- UK, TOTAL TRADE
---------FRA, TOTAL TRADE
- - ■ USA, TOTAL TRADE
Source: Internationa] Trade database 1998.
Figure 15 displays the dramatic decrease in trade for the three leading Western states. T h e  
United States decreased its external trade in the most dramatic fashion after 1929. However, i t  
should be noted that the growth trend in the 1920s was almost nonexistent for these states, o r a t  
least fairly tenuous. The French trade seemed to maintain almost the same level in the 1920s,
320—321. On unemployment, see e.g. Grytten 1995.
189 Magnusson 1996,367—369.
190 Olsson 1993, 73—80; Myhrman 1994, 117— 137; Magnusson 1996, 373—374. On the banking crises, 
see e.g. Lindgren 1993.
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only to decline during the persistent burden of the Great Depression. The British case indicated 
the most extensive recovery in this sense in the 1930s, although this reprieve merely meant 
much lower trading levels than in the 1920s.
Figure 16. Aggregate Trade (Exports plus Imports) for Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland, 
in Current USD, 1920—1938
USD,
Year
POR, TOTAL TRADE 
SPA, TOTAL TRADE 
SWI, TOTAL TRADE
Source: International Trade database 1998.
"Weak” states —  the states included in the sample of eleven other than France and the UK —  
were economically hurt by the tightening of protectionism in the 1930s, even though the 
increased domestic demand and the bilateral trade treaties enabled quite strong growth for them 
in the late 1930s. However, as Fritz Hodne has pointed out, the small nations carried relatively 
little military weight in the "international power game”, and were in general open and export- 
dependent economies.191 As seen in Figure 16, the Portuguese economy developed quite similar 
to France in this period inasmuch its trade barely increased in the 1920s and then declined in the 
1930s, only to experience a modest recovery at the end o f the decade. Switzerland and Spain, in 
turn, experienced more pronounced growth in the 1920s, and also a more distinct drop due to 
the Great Depression. Recoveries in both cases were modest, at least in terms of not coming 
even close to the trade levels achieved in the 1920s.
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Table 5. Industrial Recovery in the Selected Eleven European Countries, 1929=100
A. B. C. D.
BEL 85 99 101
DEN* 90 124 135
FIN* 8S 121 152
FRA 74 72 81
NED 84 91 103
NOR* 94 108 130
POR 103 112 119
SPA 84 86 52
SWE* 89 123 152
SW1 M
UK* 89 113 130
Source: Feinstein et al. 1997, 172. A=country; B=year 1932; C=year 1935; D=year 1937. POR figures provided by 
Jaime Reis.
Note: *=country devalued in 1931. Abbreviations can be found in Appendices, Appendix 1, Table 1A
It seems that the growth rates o f the European countries that went off the Gold Standard in 1931 
exceeded the others in the 1930s. Industrial recovery varied a great deal among European states, 
yet by 1935 most countries had achieved at least a partial revival of industrial production. A s 
Table 5 suggests, the countries that followed the United Kingdom in 1931 by devaluing th e ir  
currency experienced a rather vigorous industrial recovery. Some of this recovery was th e  
contribution o f their currency depreciation, making their exports more competitive in the w orld  
markets, yet their departure from  the constraints of the Gold Standard seem to have been ev en  
more important. By contrast, the Gold Bloc countries stagnated.192 Why was the Gold S tandard  
so constraining for the interwar economies?
The world economy of the early 1920s experienced for the first time during peacetime since th e  
latter half o f the 19th century a situation in which the currencies were not tied to a unifying G o ld  
Standard, since the First W orld W ar had issued a devastating blow to the old Gold Standard. 
This situation stabilized for a while in the mid-1920s with most of the countries returning to  th e  
Gold Standard. Yet, the Gold Standard o f the 1920s could not perform like the prewar system , 
and it set the stage for the Great Depression of the 1930s by heightening the fragility o f th e  
international financial system. The stability of the prewar Gold Standard had been contingent o n  
two factors: credibility and cooperation. Credibility represented the confidence invested by th e  
public in the government’s commitment to a policy, and was derived from the priority a ttached  
by governments to the maintenance of a balance-of-payments equilibrium. Such adjustm ents 
went mostly unopposed until the first decade of the 20th century, until unemployment becam e a  
prominent social issue. International cooperation has been argued to have been the basis o f  th e
191 Hodne 1995, 60—61. See also Fitzmaurice 1996,253.
SI
entire system: the system was stabilized ultimately by cooperation among governments and 
central banks. In the interwar period, however, according to Eichengreen, “it [Gold Standard] 
was the mechanism transmitting the destabilizing impulse from the United States to the rest of 
the world”.192 93 It represented an obstacle to  offsetting action and a constraint on the decision­
makers. Thus, the uncertainty in international transactions persisted, as the Gold Standard 
allowed little flexibility for the domestic decision-makers, with the arrival of the Great Depres­
sion. Great Britain was the first of the European states to give up its gold parity in 1931.194 The 
dates of entry into and exit from the interwar Gold Standard for the selected eleven states can be 
observed below in Table 6.
Table 6. Entry into and Exit from the Interwar Gold Standard by the Selected Eleven 
European States
A. B. C.
BEL 1925 (1926) 1935
DEN 1927 (1926) 1931
FIN 1926(1924) 1931
FRA 1928 (1926) 1936
NED 1925 (1924) 1936
NOR 1928 (1928) 1931
POR 1931 (1929) 1931
SPA - -
SWE 1924 (1922) 1931
SWI 1925 (1924) 1936
UK 1925(1925) 1931
Source: Eichengreen 1992, 188-191. Asxountry; B=entry into the Gold Standard; C=exit from the Gold Standard. 
Note: the year in parenthesis in column B is the de facto  year of return to the Gold Standard, from Feinstein et aí. 
1997,46.
The conviction that the maintenance o f the “golden fetters” and balanced budgets were 
necessary remained widespread until the Great Depression, and even then the change in 
attitudes followed slowly. Accordingly, unemployment rose to new heights in the 1930s, around 
20— 30 per cent according to the official figures, even though many countries had experienced 
sizable unemployment also in the 1920s. Unofficial unemployment was even higher during the 
depression era. Many of the unemployed remained without work for many years, with the 
younger workers hit especially hard. Unemployment reached all echelons of work and economic 
life, including white-collar workers and investors.195 In the British case, for example, the
192 Feinstein et al. 1997,171—173.
193 Eichengreen 1992,5—8; xi.
194 Foreman-Peck 1995; Eichengreen 1992; Autio 1992,11— 18; Hirvilahti 1993,26—34; Hirvilahti 1996 
— in many countries the return to the Gold Standard often resulted in an undervalued currency. For a 
detailed account of financial crises, see Kindleberger 1993. On the case of Norway and other Nordic 
countries, see Grytten 1996, e.g. 5—-6.
195 Clavin2000,112— 115.
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number of registered unemployed persons reached its peak in 1932 at 22,1 per cent, whereas it 
had been only as high as 9,7 per cent five years earlier. Needless to say, the relatively 
undeveloped European welfare systems were ill equipped to handle the social problems that 
followed. Yet, the recovery fixed some of these tensions, since for example in the British case 
unemployment was down to 10,8 per cent by 1937.196
Political instability was hardly the by-product of the Great Depression in the interwar period  
There were many factors that contributed to a new climate of political competition in the 
interwar period. The extension of the voting franchise, also to women, was one o f the 
revolutionary features of the First World W ar phase and its immediate aftermath. It also 
represented the rise of labor and socialist parties to the national political arena as worthy 
contenders. In some countries, like Finland, this had already taken place before the war. Also, 
the electoral reforms that were carried out gave more voice to the minority groups in national 
politics. This meant more political conflicts and cabinet instability, since the coalition partners 
in the cabinets often brought down the government they sat in if it adopted policies considered 
unacceptable. Even the well-established democracies, such as the United Kingdom, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway, experienced more political instability in the interwar period 
than in the prewar period.197 In the French case, as Paul Kennedy has pointed out, the economic 
weakening was irreversibly connected to  the turmoil in domestic politics in the 1930s.198
Table 7 below serves as a case in point. There were only three countries experiencing less 
political instability, in terms of cabinet changes, in the interwar period compared to the period 
1870— 1913; namely, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. If we consider the 0,5 level 
(=one cabinet change in two years) a threshold for comparative purposes, there were only four 
countries (FRA, POR, SPA, and UK) that surpassed this level in the prewar period. In  the  
interwar period, only the three mentioned above (DEN, NED, and SWI) were below this 
threshold. Of course, one needs to consider also who had access to political power in the tw o 
periods. They were not entirely compatible in this sense, due to the reforms brought on by  the 
First World War. Access to political decision-making increased significantly after the war, as 
seen in the percentages of votes per population in the first elections held in these two periods. 
Exceptions, although only temporarily, were Belgium, France, and perhaps Switzerland. T hese 
issues will be discussed further in Section 4.1.
196 Clavin 2000,114— 117. British figures from Thorpe 1994, 88.
197 Eichengreen 1992,92—95; Simmons 1994,25—27.
198 Kennedy 1989,403—404.
83
Table 7. Average Number of Cabinet Changes in a Year in the Selected Eleven European 
Countries, and the Number of Votes Cast /  Population in the First Elections Held during 
the Periods 1870—1913 and 1920—1938
A. B. G D. E.
BEL 0,30 0,67 0,28 (1894) 0,26(1921)
DEN 0,46 0,39 0,06 (1880) 0,32 (1920)
FIN - 1,00 - 0,27(1922)
FRA 0,74 1,39 0,21 (1871) 0,23 (1924)
NED 0,44 0,39 0,05 (1888) 0,42 (1922)
NOR 0,44 0,61 0,04(1882) 0,34(1921)
FOR 0,58 0,83 lt
SPA 1,16 1,61 M
SWE 0,37 0,61 0,01(1881) 0,11(1920)
SWl 0,02 0,00 0,13(1875) 0,19(1922)
UK 0.60 0,67 0,12(1885) 0,31(1922)
Source: calculated from Banks 1976. A=country; B=average number of cabinet changes in a year, 1870— 1913; 
C=average number of cabinet changes in a year, 1920— 1938; D=number of votes cast per population in the first 
election of the period 1870— 1913, year of election in parenthesis; E=number of votes cast per population in the first 
election of the period 1920— 1938, year of election in parenthesis.
Note: Refers to voting in parliamentary elections, to the lower house if applicable.
All the issues discussed in this section so far, such as the economic constraints of the period and 
the impacts of increased domestic political competition, had a profound bearing on the public 
spending choices of the interwar period. The First World War imposed its own constraints on 
the budgetary decision-making of Western states. Many states, like Germany and France, were 
unwilling to fund the war with high taxes, contrary to for example the United Kingdom, but 
preferred the sale o f debt as a solution instead. Even the United Kingdom and the United States 
discarded central controls and high taxes after the war. The war also enhanced preexisting 
tendencies for higher public spending, as social programs, for example in France and Britain, 
were expanded and new programs added. Aggregate spending levels thus tended to remain 
higher after the war compared to the prew ar period. Another factor contributing to this 
development was the growth of state bureaucracies. According to the displacement hypothesis 
first expounded by Peacock and Wiseman, people get used to paying higher taxes during wars, 
which in turn leads to higher spending and taxation level afterwards. This indeed seems an 
adequate description o f the fiscal impact of the First World War. Another feature of the period 
was the persistence of balanced budgeting and, especially in the U.S., efforts to introduce public 
spending cuts based on conservative policies. The factors outlined above also tended to make 
public spending quite path dependent, due to the counterbalancing tendencies.199
199 See for example Webber-Wildawsky 1986,431— 451; Rasler-Thompson 1989; Eloranta 1998.
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Figure 17. Central Government Expenditures (CGE) as a Share of GDP (or GNP), Mean 
Percentage, for the Selected Eleven European Nations and the 17-Country Sample
Y ear
----- MEAN CGE/GDP, 17 NATIONS
------MEAN 11 CGE/GDP, THE 11 INCL. IN THE THESIS
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for further details.
Note: for details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
The mean percentage of central government expenditures to GDP for the selected eleven 
European states, similar to the larger 17-state sample, did display a declining trend for the 1920s 
(see Figure 17 above). Yet, for the eleven this share began to increase again, albeit slowly from  
1927 onwards, and it continued throughout the Depression era. Nonetheless, the larger sam ple 
demonstrated that the countries, beyond this group increased their central government spending 
much more aggressively in the 1930s, outlining the out-of-sample countries’ commitment to  a  
greater central government role during the depression. By 1938, an almost five percent 
difference existed between the two groups, whereas the levels had been practically identical u p  
until 1927.
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Figure 18. CGE as a Share of GDP (or GNP), Per Cent, for France, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, 1920—1938
Year
--------FRA, CGE/GDP --------- UK, CGE/GNP
------- USA, CGE/GDP____________________________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for further details.
A comparison of three Western economic giants —  France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States — highlights two different approaches to central government spending. In the U.S. case, 
the Republican presidents of the 1920s were against large public expenditures, which can be 
seen in Figure 18. For example, Calvin Coolidge's (President of the United States in 1923—  
1929) basic principles were resistance to war (as he considered it a  waste of money), active 
pursuit of peace without politically "dangerous" entanglements, and showing off America as an 
example in combining peace and wise financial management.200 In fighting the downward 
economic trend, the Hoover Administration in turn merely tried limited investments in 
construction, for example, in order to re-establish confidence in business, thereby initiating 
recovery. The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the beginning o f the so-called New Deal 
signaled a change in the government's economic activity. Federal government expenditures and
public debt continued on an upward trend, even though Roosevelt was an ardent supporter of
201balanced budgets throughout the 1930s.
McCoy 1988,147— 149,168—170; Eloranta 1995; Eloranta 1998.
Barber 1985, 80—83,193; Kindleberger 1973, 262—263; Documents of American History 1949, doc.201
L i M J  f
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In Britain, the public authorities expenditures continued to grow throughout the time period. 
This modest trend was initiated during the First World War, since the growth o f governmental 
activities affected also the local governments. The persisting wish o f the Conservative Party to 
“pull back” to the central government spending role that had existed in the prewar period was 
not fulfilled in the 1920s.* 2003 The percentage share of CGE to GNP, in turn, remained almost the 
same; only slight growth occurred. The only notable increase took place during the latter part of 
the 1930s. One reason for this must have been the unusually good performance of the British 
economy during the Great Depression. As said before, the French experience was, in 
comparative terms, more turbulent, arising from the tumultuous domestic political struggles (see 
Figure 18).
Figure 19. CG E as a  Share of GDP, P e r  Cent, for D enm ark, the  N etherlands, and Norway, 
1920— 1938
Year
---------DEN, CGE/GDP - -------NED, C G E/G D P
-  -  -  N O R, CGE/GDP
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for further details.
no. 496,482—484.
202 See Sefton-Weale 1995. These figures are used in this thesis due to their consistency. There are 
significant discrepancies in the following regarding the UK: Mitchell 1988 and Mitchell 1992. See also 
Feinstein 1972, which has served as the basis for Sefton-Weale 1995.
203 See e.g. Beloff 1984,10—14,58—59.
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W hat about the “weak” states? Can we distinguish various types of “patterns” in their public 
spending choices? For example, Finland’s efforts in restraining the growth of the central 
government expenditures were as unsuccessful as the efforts of many other states. Some “weak” 
states, such as Belgium and Norway, differed from Finland in this respect: there was no 
sustained increase in central government expenditures after the Great Depression. In Belgium, 
the central government expenditures dropped significantly after 1926, and stayed at a lower 
level until the World W ar II. One reason for this might have been the monetary crisis of 1926.204 
Significant is also the abnormally high percentage share of these expenditures out of GDP after 
World War I due to the reconstruction efforts. Norway and Denmark, as seen in Figure 19, 
actually decreased both the volume and the percentage share of central government expenditures 
in the 1930s.205
Central government consumption (=central government as final consumer)206 developed along 
two different patterns in Sweden and Finland in the interwar period. Whereas for Finland the 
interwar period represented a rapid upward adjustment in the central government’s role, the 
Swedish long-run development path was much smoother. Many key decisions affecting the role 
o f the state were undertaken already before the war. In the sphere of social services and 
transfers, the period from the turn of the century to the First World War saw the first 
breakthroughs in Swedish social policy. For example, universal and compulsory old age and 
invalidity pension was introduced in 1913. At the end of the war, state responsibility for 
employment and housing was assumed for the first time and social expenditures, both the 
consumption and especially the transfer payments, rose considerably. Yet, among European 
states Sweden was among the countries providing the lowest levels of social security in the 
1920s.207 Major adjustments to the central government role took place mainly after the Second 
W orld War, yet the foundations were laid already in the 1930s.
In Sweden, the 1920s was a period of instability and minority governments with unemployment 
as the main issue in political discussions. This situation changed in 1932, when the Social 
Democrats and the Agrarian Party began cooperating with one another. The first coalition 
government was formed in 1936 and the first of the corporatist agreements between the trade
204 Mommen 1994, 9— 11. For a recalculation and re-interpretation of Belgian public finances see 
Clement 1995; Clement 2000.
203 See Eloranta 1998.
206 Central government expenditures in the national accounting (expenditure approach) framework consist 
of central government consumption expenditures, investment expenditures, subsidies, transfer payments, 
and debt payments. See Clement 2000, e.g. 24— 37 for more.
207 Olson 1986,4; Johansson-Magnusson 1998,24.
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unions and the Employers Federation was reached in 1938. The 1930s represented a new period 
in the development of the Swedish public sector —  among the new policies, there were state 
employment creation programs, state subsidies to voluntary (trade union) unemployment benefit 
societies, and a housing program for families with many children. The level of state 
involvement was unprecedented compared to the previous decades. At the outbreak of the 
Second World W ar, the Social Democratic-Agrarian coalition government was replaced by an 
even broader coalition with Per Albin Hansson, the creator of the Swedish ”folkhemmet”-ideal, 
still as the prime minister. Four of the five parties represented in the parliament were involved 
in the cabinet with support of over 95 percent of the electorate. The Social Democratic party 
reached practically a hegemonic position in the Swedish politics by the end of the 1930s.208
Figure 20. Development of Finnish and Swedish Real Central Government Consumption 
in the Long Run
V O L 1929=100, 
LO G
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Year
—— SWE, CENTRAL GOV. CONSUMPTION 
------FIN, CENTRAL GOV. CONSUMPTION
Source: see Eloranta 1997a and the sources listed in it. See also Eloranta 1997b.
Finland experienced the neo-classical principle of reducing government involvement gaining 
popularity in policy-making in the 1920s. During the 1930s, efforts were made to reduce the 
overall amount o f public finances. These aims were only partially met. All in all, though, central 
government expenditures continued to rise almost yearly from their lowest point in 1932. When
208 Olson 1986, 5—6; Rojas 1991, 70—73; Johansson-Magnusson 1998, 17—22. On longer ierm
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the Winter War against the Soviets began in 1939, the percentage share of these expenditures 
had reached an all-time high of 22,3 percent.209 The Finnish ’’welfare state” building, which 
may be an overstatement in regards to the Finnish case in the 1930s, was slow during the 
interwar period. The political and social division caused by the Civil War of 1918 affected 
social policy legislation as well. Among the few developments o f the 1920s was an act 
prescribing a compulsory eight-year period o f education, although it was not implemented until 
the late 1930s. In financial terms, social legislation was not extensive. In the 1930s, the role o f 
the state increased, especially in economic policy matters, only to decrease late in the decade.210 
The more cooperative stance of the Social Democratic Party in coalition politics as well as the 
re-integration of the Finnish society after the division of the Civil W ar of 1918 were much more 
influential features o f the 1930s Finnish domestic politics than the welfare state measures.211
In conclusion, the First World W ar brought forth enormous social, economic, and political 
changes for the European states. The economic performance o f these states was deeply affected 
by the burden as well as reforms introduced by this new type of conflict, “total war”. Whereas 
the 1920s, in general, were a time of economic growth, the economic environment o f the 1930s 
was plagued by uncertainty and ambiguity. Despite the appearance o f return to normalcy in the 
1920s, the inherent economic weaknesses o f the national economies o f the period were serious 
to begin with, especially stemming from the lack of economic cooperation and credible 
commitment by the nation states to economic adjustments. Thus, the seeds of an economic crisis 
were already contained in the New Era. The Great Depression, beginning in 1928— 1929, was 
an important watershed in the interwar period. It forced the European states to undertake a 
comprehensive re-evaluation of their economic policies. The impact o f the crisis was profound, 
and for example GDP per capita levels plummeted and unemployment soared. The recoveries 
from the slump varied, as the so-called Gold Bloc countries, such as France and the 
Netherlands, performed quite poorly in the 1930s. In contrast, the neutrals of the First World 
War, such as Scandinavian states, and other countries that devalued in 1931 or soon thereafter 
experienced a fast recovery in the 1930s. This was mostly due to the increased freedom in 
policy-making after the abandonment of the “golden fetters” and the increases in domestic 
demand.
comparisons, see especially Eloranta 1997a.
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The First World W ar also produced the seeds of greater domestic political instability for the  
interwar period. The enlargement of the voting franchise, the greater involvement of business 
groups in governance, and the emergence o f new political challengers in the legislative arena all 
portended increased domestic political competition. Thus, the interwar period would have a 
much higher number of annual cabinet changes than the prewar period. The war also led to  a 
greater central government role, especially in the social policy sphere. The new social programs 
introduced after the war, the persistence o f high public debt, as well as the various 
reconstruction efforts exerted an upward bias on central government expenditures. However, the 
various conservative parties, who wanted to  see a return to the prewar austerity in the public 
sector spending, provided a counter pressure to  these tendencies especially in the 1920s. These 
two tendencies mostly canceled each other out, whereas the Great Depression again increased 
the pressure for a greater government role. Thus, mostly central government spending increased 
in the 1930s. All in all, however, central government spending tended to be quite path  
dependent. As such, both the economic developments of the period as well as the central 
government spending environment had important consequences for the military spending 
behavior of the European states. First, nonetheless, we should take a closer look at the collective 
political environment o f the period, especially in terms of the search for disarmament solutions 
and collective security guarantees.
3.2. Collective Security Aspirations and the League o f Nations
The aim of this section is to undertake a review of the functions of the League of Nations, 
especially in terms of aspirations towards disarmament, regulation o f arms trade, and a general 
strive towards improved collective security. Also, I will review some of the key measures aim ed 
at promoting peace outside the League o f Nations. Thus, here I will not venture deep into th e  
reasons why the League was not successful in its efforts to, for example, advance disarmament. 
Nor will I undertake a detailed review of the foreign policy stances of the eleven European 
states. These issues will be discussed further in Section 5.1. First I will review the structure an d  
functions of the League of Nations in the sphere of collective security, by necessity often a t a n  
elusive macro-level. Then I will present an overview of the extra-League peace initiatives. 
Finally, I will conclude this section by reflecting on the impacts o f American isolationism fo r  
Europe, and the broad policy stances of the United Kingdom and France in comparison.
The termination o f the First World W ar on November 11, 1918 brought with it a q u ick  
withdrawal of American forces from Europe and a significant initial change in the political
attitudes of the Great Powers. With the devastation brought on by the war, the advancement of 
peace became a popular theme in international politics in the 1920s.212 The efforts to achieve 
peace rested on W ilson’s Fourteen Points, developed on the basis of many similar ideological 
schemes that surfaced during the Great War, and the Treaty of Versailles, which included the 
foundations of the League of Nations, to bring the United States back into the policy of interna­
tionalism.213 These aspirations were dealt a severe blow right from the beginning. For many 
reasons, the attempt to bring the United States back into the international politics failed. The 
U.S. Senate refused to  ratify the treaty first in November 1919, and again in March 1920 as 
Woodrow Wilson stubbornly refused to compromise.214 Thus, Wilson and the League of 
Nations were defeated politically in the United States. Warren G. Harding's victory in the 
American presidential elections in 1920 led the United States into isolationism again, which 
became the leading guideline in American foreign policy for two decades.215
The League of Nations came into existence on January 10, 1920. All in all eighteen states 
became members of the League at first by formally approving the peace treaty. By late 1920, the 
number of members had already grown to  over forty. In 1938, by comparison, the member 
count was fifty-five (see Table 8). The member states of the League of Nations in 1920 
comprised 74 per cent o f the world’s population and, respectively, 63 per cent of the world 
states’ area.216 If  one were to ask what the League of Nations was, Zara Steiner’s depiction 
might be considered fairly accurate: "It was an institutionalized form of collective action by the 
sovereign states to maintain the peace.”217 The League also became the supreme defender of the 
Versailles settlement in the postwar world. And, it represented no real effort to create a 
supranational authority, because its decision-making structure granted the member states the 
final say in all matters.218
The League o f Nations’ structure consisted o f three essential bodies: 1) Assembly; 2) Council; 
3) Secretariat. The first two were the ones that had the power to act, whereas the Secretariat 
formed the functional bureaucracy of the League. The Assembly was in essence the League’s 
legislative arm, whereas the Council functioned as its cabinet. The Assembly consisted of not
212 Preston-Wise 1970,78—79; Pogue 1964,209.
213 Eloranta 2000b; Soule 1968,81—82; Northedge 1986,25—30.
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215 Bemis 1959,440—441; Stimson-Bundy 1948,106.
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more than three representatives of each member state, and the Council had eight members (the 
ninth seat was reserved for the United States).
Table 8. Members of the League of Nations in 1920 and 1938
A. B.
Argentina Afghanistan
Australia Albania
Belgium Argentina
Bolivia Australia
Brazil Austria
British Empire Belgium
Canada Bulgaria
Chile Canada
China Chile ,
Colombia China
Cuba Colombia
Czechoslovalda Cuba
Denmark Czechoslovakia
Ecuador Denmark
France Dominican Republic
Greece Ecuador
Guatemala Estonia
Haiti Ethiopia
Hedjaz Finland
India France
Italy Greece
Japan Guatemala
Liberia Haiti
Netherlands Honduras
New Zealand India
Nicaragua Iran
Norway Iraq
Panama Ireland
Paraguay Italy
Persia Latvia
Peru Liberia
Poland Lithuania
Portugal Luxemburg
Roumania Mexico
San Salvador Netherlands
Siam New Zealand
South Africa Nicaragua
Spain Norway
Sweden Panama
Switzerland Peru
Uruguay Poland
Venezuela Portugal
Yugoslavia (Seib-Croat-Slovene State) Roumania
Salvador
Siam
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
UK
Uruguay
USSR
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Sources: The League of Nations Starts 1920,2; Northedge 1986, Appendices B and C. A=League of Nations original 
members in 1920; B=League of Nations members 1.2.1938.
The Assembly was meant to assuage the fears of the smaller states, since the num ber o f  
representatives was set to be equal among members. The Assembly also exercised considerable
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control, when it wished to do so, over the Council —  it, for example, controlled the appointment 
of four out of eight Council members as well as determined its size and basic character* The 
Council, in turn, was intended to give the smaller states even further say in the matters of the 
League, because four o f the eight represented the smaller states (Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and 
Spain), yet they were only meant to be temporary seats. Permanent seats were occupied by the 
former Allied Great Powers: the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan. By design, the 
Council was expected to be (which turned out to be true) a passive organization, although most 
policy decisions were up to the Council to initiate and act upon. Finally, the organization was 
run by a Secretary-General, with the Secretariat at his disposal.219
The cornerstone of the League of Nations was its Covenant, consisting of 26 articles, which 
remained mostly intact in the form adopted in 1919 throughout the interwar period.220 Articles 
1— 7 set up the central machinery of the League. The basic premises o f the disarmament were 
outlined in Articles 8— 9, and Articles 10— 17 elaborated on the so-called League system for 
the prevention of war, cited by the organizers as “the one great object o f  the whole 
o rg a n iza tio n The rest of the Articles, “following the piece de resistance”, dealt with a 
miscellaneous group o f “important matters”.221 The Covenant's Article 8 consisted of the key 
elements of the future disarmament. It maintained that the League Council was to assess each 
state’s security needs and to formulate a plan for the disarmament of its members, based on this 
assessment. Equally, with this Article and others the League was entrusted with the task of 
supervising the collection of information on the development o f armaments among its 
members.222 It maintained that “the Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of 
peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national 
safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.” Additionally, it put 
the Council in charge of achieving this goal: “The Council, taking account of the geographical 
situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the 
consideration and action of the several Governments.”223 Moreover, Article 9 provided for the 
establishment of a permanent commission, The Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, 
Naval, and Air Questions, to study what criteria to set for the member states and to request 
relevant information pertaining to these matters. This commission was also open to
219 The League of Nations Starts 1920,5—18; Northedge 1986,49—55.
220 Compare The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I (containing the 1919 Covenant) and 
Northedge 1986, Appendix A (containing the 1938 amended Covenant). Many of the amendments dealt 
with changes in the administrative structure of the League.
221 See the League of Nations Starts 1920, 26; Appendix I
222 Barros 1993, 606—607; Peterson 1993.
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representatives of all states, including non-League countries when the matters were of concern 
to them.224 ;
The Articles relating to the resolution of conflicts, through voluntary or forced arbitration, were 
both impressive in their detail yet vague in their enforcement. It provided for conflict resolution 
both among the League members, as well as between a League member and non-member. The 
general principle was, outlined in Article 11, that “any war or threat o f war, whether 
immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter o f 
concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and 
effectual to safeguard the peace o f nations.”225 The principles o f arbitration were found in 
Articles 12, 13, and 15. Article 16, the most important part o f the Covenant in terms of 
collective security guarantees, outlined the courses of action available to the League and its 
members in case arbitration was not successful or it was rejected altogether:226
“Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 
13, of 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members 
of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade and 
financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of 
the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, and personal 
intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other 
State, whether a Member of the League or not. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to 
recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the 
Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the 
covenants of the League.”
As was the case with the advancement o f disarmament, the responsibility for determining the 
necessity of sanctions, or indeed a harsher punishment, was placed on the hands of the Council. 
Nonetheless, the Council’s task was merely to recommend what contributions member states 
should make to the armed forces to protect the covenants of the League.227 The same standards 
were applied to both intra-League and extra-League conflicts. Article 17 stated that “in the 
event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member o f the 
League.. .If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations o f membership in the League 
for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the 
provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action,”228 Finally,
224 The League of Nations Starts 1920, 137— 138. See also the later Temporary Mixed Commission for 
the Reduction of Armaments, e.g. its report in League of Nations, Assembly Documents, A  35. 1923. IX 
(Part 1): August 30.
225 The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix L Article 11.
226 The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I, Article 16.
227 Northedge 1986, 56—57.
228 The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I, Article 17.
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Article 23 trusted the League with the supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition as 
well.229 230Thus, the war-prevention strategy of the Covenant consisted of four parts: 1) Reduction 
o f the means to fight wars with; 2) Enforcement the principle of sending unsettled disputes to 
third-party settlement and taking measures against states which refused the arbitration or 
ignored its outcome; 3) Exchange of guarantees on the status quo created by the Treaty o f 
Versailles; 4) Resolution of international conflicts before they become dangerous for world
230peace.
It became apparent early on in the 1920s that individual states, regardless of their commitment 
to  the League framework, would not disarm unless they felt secure. This for most states meant 
some type of a framework of collective security guarantees. Within the League of Nations, the 
member states attempted to achieve disarmament measures in earnest at least until the mid- 
1930s. The first plans right after the war were merely aimed at containing the military spending 
levels or preferably reducing them.231 All of these efforts failed due to one reason or another (for 
example, due to different conceptions of disarmament among the Great Powers). Mostly these 
efforts took place between diplomats within the various committees in the League of Nations’ 
political machinery. One of the many difficulties with achieving concrete results was the 
heterogeneous nature o f the participants and their different expectations. For example, the 
Geneva Protocol of 1924 —  which advocated principles such as denouncing of war, agreement 
on sanctions against aggressor(s), and the convening of a  disarmament conference —  failed 
ultimately due to British rejection of the Protocol. In 1925, nonetheless, a Preparatory 
Commission for the Disarmament Conference was established, to prepare for a disarmament 
conference. Its work took five years and culminated in the Disarmament Conference of 1932—  
1934.232 The Preparatory Commission was not particularly successful in its endeavors, since 
there were, for example, major disagreements between the British and the French over the scale 
o f disarmament and security guarantees, and between the British and the Americans over naval 
disarmament. There were three important sources of disagreement still left concerning the 
commission’s recommendations before the actual conference took place: 1) It made no 
provision for the inclusion of trained reserves; 2) It assigned no limitations for the materials of
229 The League of Nations Starts 1920, Appendix I, Article 23.
230 Northedge 1986,54. See also Steiner 1993.
231 See e.g. League of Nations, A. 13. 1921. IX: August 22. Reduction of National Expenditure on 
Armaments. Including replies from 26 governments; League of Nations, C.90.M.40.1921.IX: June 7. 
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armies and navies; 3) There were no restrictions placed on the cost of material for the air
forces.233
The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments was convened on February 2, 
1932, when the League was already experiencing the difficulties o f furthering world peace due 
to Japanese aggression against China in Manchuria. Before the opening, a draft resolution of the 
Danish, Norwegian, Dutch, Swedish, and Swiss delegations was submitted requesting the 
Council to urge governments to abstain from increases in their level of armaments. These 
countries had made a similar suggestion already on September 11, 1931, leading to  the 
acceptance of this principal by the participants of the upcoming conference. This was a curious 
solution, one of the few temporarily successful disarmament acts, known as the armaments 
truces, in fact very similar to the early armaments containment efforts in the 1920s. Thus, an 
armaments truce was maintained during the Disarmament Conference, which of course was the 
peak of the Great Depression for many countries, making the acceptance of this measure less 
challenging.234 Although the conference met on and off for nearly two and a half years, it failed 
to produce results. The differences of opinion between the participants were simply too great, 
and the emergence of Hitler’s rule in Germany at this time hardly helped matters. The failure o f  
the League in Manchuria dealt the League an “almost fatal blow”, surely also contributing to  the 
failure of the Disarmament Conference. On the spring of 1934, the Danish, Norwegian, Spanish, 
Swedish, and Swiss delegations made a final plea to overcome the impasse of the conference, 
but to no avail. Hopes of collective disarmament died in a  definitive fashion with the departure 
of Germany from the League. Fifteen years o f effort had been wasted. When the Disarmament 
Conference met for the last time on June 11, 1934, the disarmament “process” was effectively 
dead on its tracks.235
One of the few successful disarmament undertakings by the League of Nations was the 
collection of data on military spending and arms trade. The first report, titled Budget 
Expenditure on National Defence: 1913 and 1920—1922, was published in 1922, and it 
included military spending data for twenty-one countries in the post-war period. T he 
introduction to the report made specific stipulations on the limitations of the enquiry, yet the
233 Northedge 1986, 120— 121. See also Scott 1973, e.g. 189. A good overall account of the disarmament 
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data for each country also included real value comparisons with the prewar period. The aim was 
“to furnish material indicating the development and tendency in each individual country”.236 
The next report was issued already in 1923, titled Statistical Enquiry into National Peace-time 
Armaments. This time the report included two volumes, nearly two hundred pages in total. Also, 
the report gave detailed data on the military spending, including the colonies, and the armed 
forces of seventeen nations in all.237 One of the most detailed statistical sources on peacetime 
armies and military spending of the world was created on the same principles in 1924, as the 
Armaments Year-Book came into existence.238 This yearbook continued to provide fairly reliable 
data on the military establishments of most countries, excluding Germany in the late 1930s, as I 
have already discussed in Chapter 1.
In the period following the First World War, there were a multitude of efforts aimed at 
controlling and limiting the trade of armaments with the League of Nations. Among others, the 
Versailles Peace Treaty established controls for the arms trade of the losers of the war, and there 
were negotiations on embargoes and production limitations both at the national and the 
supranational level, mainly under the auspices o f the League of Nations. Similarities with the 
overall disarmament process are abundant. For example, the St. Germain Convention for the 
Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition of 1919, which attempted to establish a 
government licensing system for certain weapons, was to be supervised by a specific League o f 
Nations’ Central International Office. The downfall of this agreement was mainly the opposition 
o f the United States to the close connection with the League of Nations. A broader agreement 
following the Conference for the Supervision o f the International Arms Trade in 1925 ran into 
similar problems when it came to the ratification phase of the convention. The participating 
states attached conditions to the ratification process, which effectively destroyed its chances of 
success. The United States’ Senate did not ratify the convention until 1934. The main results 
that emerged from the 1920s armaments trade limitation negotiations were the establishment o f 
a  licensing system among the nations, which also served as a basis for the gathering o f statistical 
information on this type of trade in the League publications. One of the basic aims in the control 
efforts of the 1920s and 1930s was to ban private manufacture and sale of armaments, although
236 League of Nations, A  38(a). 1922. DC. Budget Expenditure on National Defence: 1913 and 1920— 
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hese initiatives never really produced concrete results, with especially the ratification phase 
isually providing the final blow to any regulative endeavor.239
Vhat was the significance of extra-League peace initiatives, with usually a larger participation 
ase and more precise focus in the negotiations? The first significant peace conference took 
lace in the aftermath o f the First World W ar and the failure of the American involvement in the 
eague of Nations. The Washington Conference on Naval Limitation became a reality in 
ov ember 1921, with participation by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, 
elgium, Netherlands, Portugal, and China. The question of Far East, mainly China, was one of 
ie important issues at the conference. Since the Americans were not ready to fight for China, 
e treaties provided an excuse not to carry the burden of the protection of the Far East.240
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The most important of the treaties accomplished in the Washington Conference was the 
Washington Treaty for Limitation of Naval Armaments in 1922. In this treaty the United States, 
Great Britain, and Japan (in addition to France and Italy) agreed upon maintenance of a 
battleship and carrier ratio of 5—5— 3 for the ’’big” naval powers (and 1,7 respectively for the 
others).241 With the Four Power Treaty (1921), the United States, Japan, Great Britain, and 
France agreed upon displaying mutual respect for their interests and possessions in the Pacific 
region. The third treaty, the Nine Power Treaty (1922), was designed especially to solve the 
problem of China's "defense", which in practice meant the continuance of Western domination. 
In this treaty the nine naval powers agreed, at least in principle, to respect China's sovereignty, 
independence, and other matters.242 Even though these reforms had honorable aims and were 
recognized to be outstanding achievements in their time, the outcomes proved to be 
disappointing in many ways. The limitations were not always obeyed.243 The treaties accomp­
lished in the Washington Conference also lacked the machinery required to enforce the 
established agreements. For example, the Nine Power Treaty on China was mainly rhetorical by 
nature and did not offer anything concrete for its enforcement.244
Another Republican President, Calvin Coolidge, tried to revive the naval limitation tradition in 
1927 by assembling a new conference, but the effort was a total failure. The reasons behind the 
failure of the conference can be found in the lack of communication by the participants over the 
aims of the conference, and in the British domestic pressures.245 Herbert Hoover's effort in the 
1930 London Conference extended the limitations set in the Washington Conference only a 
little further. The more militaristic climate of the 1930s, however, rendered these new 
agreements useless almost immediately.246 Efforts to renew these commitments in the London 
Naval Conference o f 1936 resulted only in a treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and 
France. Many other states later concluded similar treaties with Great Britain. The latter half o f 
the 1930s was, however, mostly a time of bilateral treaties and continuous negotiations, often 
with less than satisfactory results.247
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The illusion of increased likelihood of lasting peace was propounded by other limited successes 
in the field of international diplomacy in the 1920s. The Locarno agreements, creating the so- 
called Locarno System, brought Germany back to the international arenas of diplomacy in 1925, 
which was welcomed especially by the British. The British felt that they had now appeased the 
French demands for security guarantees against possible German aggression. The basic premise 
of the agreements was that Britain and Italy agreed to guarantee the Belgian-German and 
Franco-German frontiers against aggression from  either side.247 48 As far as other initiatives were 
concerned, the Pact of Paris (or Kellogg-Briand Pact) that was signed in 1928 was at first 
thought to lead to  one of the most important peace achievements of the time. However, as the 
negotiations among the diplomats progressed, and especially since the Americans wanted to 
make this pact as vague as possible, the final declaration was received with less enthusiasm due 
to the restricted nature of the pact. It represented the "outlawry of war" -ideology that was 
popular among the diplomats in particular, to renounce war "as an instrument o f national 
policy". Even though altogether 62 nations finally adhered to this agreement, it provided no 
means of enforcing these principles. Furthermore, it included no positive obligations or 
procedures for a pacific settlement o f disputes, due to the reservations o f some of the 
signatories. In fact, the Kellogg-Brian Pact has been said to have been quite characteristic of the 
hopes and the illusions of the late 1920s. According to George Scott, “it meant no new 
obligations and cost nothing but a promise o f  good behavior/’249
If the League o f Nations failed for the most part in its mission to provide leadership in 
furthering peace and the other extra-League efforts provided only partial solutions, what was the 
role of the peace movements within nations? Paul Kennedy has expressed the British sentiment 
accurately: "With almost unanimous fervor and emotion, the British people revolted against the 
idea o f war and all that the contemporary sources of wisdom —  politicians, historians, publicists 
— claimed it was caused by: arms races, secret diplomacy, military ententes, imperialism.” The 
peace movement was strong and widespread, for example, in the United States between the two 
World Wars. There different organizations, of which U.S. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace was the most prominent, operated on different levels and tried to  achieve 
different goals. These organizations could not, however, present a  unified front on issues 
relating to the advancement of peace —  for example legalists and feminists emphasized wholly 
different things. This divided movement was still strong enough to pressure Coolidge and the
247 See more Buckley 1993; Pearton 1982.
248 Northedge 1986,119; Steiner 1993,48— 49; Kennedy 1989.
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American Administration into a balancing act between their demands and the ultra-isolationist 
Senate’s views. The peace movement started to  lose its influence in the White House in the late 
1920s as the peace movement started to move politically towards the left.250
The European peace movement, which is a misleading title for a group of movements lacking 
any unity what so ever, drew its inspiration from the 19th century and prewar movements to 
further peace. However, the divisions among the different groups were readily apparent during 
the First World War, especially on ideological basis. After the war the situation presented both 
opportunities as well as obstacles for the European peace movement(s), since the nature of the 
w ar produced a strong public backlash against such cruelty in the future. Yet, these groups were 
constrained in their actions by the strong nationalist and revisionist elements existing in many 
continental countries. Furthermore, some o f the most fervent advocates of pacifism were 
enthusiastically supporting the League of Nations as the solution to the problems of the past, 
whereas some in fact opposed it as a remnant of the balance-of-power world. In the 1930s the 
European peace movements lost most of their steam, and in fact ceased to function in many 
countries (at least officially) due to  both domestic pressures as well as loss of credibility when 
the League of Nations displayed its inherent weakness.251
W hen did the League’s impotence in the task o f maintaining the world peace become apparent 
to  all of its members? As I argue in Section 5.1, the weaknesses that were contained in the 
League framework and the foreign policy stances of the members made it impossible for the 
system to work. The real tests of the covenants came first with the surprising Japanese 
aggression in Manchuria. This turned out to be quite a shock for the League members, since 
Japan, a permanent member of the Council, had been conciliatory in its foreign policy in the 
1920s, even during the naval disarmament conference of 1930. The long slide into war in 
Manchuria began on September 18, 1931, when local Japanese army attacked the city of 
Mukden without the knowledge and the wishes of the government in Tokyo. The government 
was forced to follow the military’s lead on the matter, and the incident developed into an 
international conflict as the Japanese made considerable headway against the inferior Chinese 
forces. This prompted extensive debate in the Council, yet it was not willing to put heavy 
pressure against Japan. Further Japanese military action in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, 
finally triggered a more unitary collective response, which, despite being quite cautious, got 
Japanese troops out o f Shanghai. When a special report condemning Japan was approved on
250 Kennedy 1991,321; Ferrell 1952,21—22; DeBenedetti 1980,108—109,120.
251 Robbins 1993,73—83.
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formal withdrawal from the League on M arch 2 7 ,1933.252
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The “Manchurian Incident”, as it was called, was just the first of many deadly blows to come at 
the League of Nations. The Soviet Union’s joining of the League in 1934 at first provided a 
signal of hope for peace. Hitler’s ascendancy to power in 1933 and his revisionist ideas soon 
came to  fore in European politics. Germany’s withdrawal from the League (admitted to the 
League in 1926) and its fevered rearmament from 1935 onwards certainly cast doubts on the 
League’s and Europe’s future. Equally, the process of “peaceful” conquests started by the 
remilitarization o f Rhineland in March 1936, leading up to the Second World, were certainly 
among the death blows to the League’s credibility.253
Figure 22. Map of Europe in 1930, by League of Nations
EUROPE
Source: Image scanned from the League of Nations Statistical Year-Book 1930.
252 See e.g. Scott 1973,208—229; Northedge 1986.
253 See, for example, Murray 1984; Kennedy 1989; Northedge 1986.
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Yet, inability of the League to halt Italian (another member of the League’s Council) aggression 
in Abyssinia in 1935— 1936 turned out to be its most decisive fiasco. Mussolini, in essence, was 
able to achieve his illicit conquest despite the protestations of the other European and world 
powers. Especially the British, who initially were the prominent force behind them, were against 
the continuation of the sanctions put in place under Article 16 initially, and thus even the 
sanctions were removed in July 1936. This merely acknowledged the prevailing situation: the 
Great Powers were not ready to initiate aggression against Italy because of this conflict, and that 
Mussolini’s victory in Abyssinia had already been sealed months before. To many revisionists, 
especially Hitler, this meant that the League was truly unable to stand in the way of the 
redrawing of the map o f Europe and the destruction of the status quo created at Versailles.254
If  the League could not uphold peace, what could and would the leading Great Powers, 
essentially the guardians of the status quo, do in such a situation? The three leading 
democracies, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had only limited interests in 
providing diplomatic leadership in the interwar period. The most crucial aspect, however, was 
the absence of the United States in the League of Nations, as well as its only half-hearted 
participation in any event that might seem like a sacrifice of its principles of non-involvement in 
supranationalist flirtations. The American isolationism has inspired a lot of debate over its 
extent and impact on the world affairs during the interwar period Paul Kennedy refers to the 
American position as ”at least relative diplomatic isolationism”.255 Thomas Paterson et al. 
advocate the use of the term ’’independent internationalism”. The American influence was 
strong in Europe and Latin America, although the Americans had arrived at the conclusion, 
which stuck throughout the interwar period, that Europe would have to solve its own problems 
before any significant American involvement.256 What were the consequences of the cautious 
withdrawal of the economic leader from the European power politics? The 1920s was a pivotal 
time in the confirmation of the isolationist stance, since the deep depression of the 1930s forced 
the United States to concentrate on her domestic problems and the established policies o f the 
1920s held their ground almost unchallenged.
Warren G. Harding's victory in the American presidential elections led the United States into 
isolationism, which became the leading guideline in American foreign policy for two decades: 
During the years between 1920 to 1940 no party dared to put the League in their political plat-
254 See especially Northedge 1986, Chapter 10.
255 Kennedy 1989,357.
256 Paterson et al. 1983, 305. See also Eloranta 1995.
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form 257 Though the Harding Administration followed a generally isolationist course regarding 
the League of Nations membership, it also established a tradition of cooperation outside the 
organization on issues like disarmament —  the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations followed 
suit since the League was a politically dangerous item to advocate.258 Scandals, such as the 
Teapot Dome oil incident and the Veteran's Bureau mismanagement, occurred during the latter 
part of Harding's presidency, and his death on 2 August 1923 "saved" him from the  
embarrassments to come.259 Yet the legacy that Harding left to  Coolidge and the presidents fo l­
lowing him was that of clear isolation from the European affairs but also of improvised efforts 
outside the League o f Nations' organization.
Although isolationism was the three Republican Administrations' guideline in matters of foreign 
policy, they strongly pursued international cooperation on disarmament. These efforts w ere  
meant to steer decisively clear of any connection to the League o f Nations. The United S ta tes 
only participated in numerous humanitarian, cultural, economic, and technological conferences 
with the League —  in practice, America held on to their idea o f isolationism, which m eant 
cooperation outside an internationally binding organization and activity generally initiated by  
American diplomats.260 The purpose of these efforts was to create a world of peaceful nations 
characterized by economic and political stability, with the emphasis on nonmilitary means o f  
enforcing such principles.261
For example Calvin Coolidge, who became the president o f the United States after W arren G . 
Harding's surprising death in August 1923, had only few basic principles in his foreign po licy  
efforts: he was against war and militarism, and pursued peace actively without entangling 
America in a military alliance. Coolidge wished to make America an example in com bining 
peace and wise financial management.262 Coolidge believed international peace efforts to b e  th e  
only effective way o f  fighting communism and fascism. He did not really believe that th e  
League of Nations could achieve these aims, but he also did not wish to "betray" H arding's 
voters during his first term. Opposition to the  League of Nations was, in addition, politically 
wise at the tim e263 He was, above anything else, a skeptic when it came to politics, and he d id
Bemis 1959,440—441; Stimson-Bundy 1948, 106.
258 Morisonetal. 1977,586.
259 Hicks 1963,73—78, 80; Hawley 1979,74—75, See also Noggle 1965 on the Teapot Dome scandal.
260 Bemis 1959,479; American Foreign Policy 1961,243.
261 Paterson et al. 1983,305.
262 McCoy 1988,177— 178; Eloranta 1995.
263 McCoy 1988,184— 185.
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not fully believe in the peace efforts of the 1920s. Nevertheless, he pursued them since they 
were popular and were aimed at reducing federal government expenditures.264 This passive 
nature Coolidge's presidency became evident in the World Court, or more correctly, the Court o f 
International Justice issue. Even though Coolidge, and the public opinion for that matter, 
favored joining the W orld Court, the ultra-isolationist Senate rejected the membership and 
shaped the future of American foreign policy to be isolation from world politics. The trend was 
clearly to return to the strict isolationist tradition of the Monroe Doctrine. The Senate's opinion 
on entanglements or international organizations for controlling world peace was clear in 
1926:265
"Resolved further, that adherence to the said protocol and statute hereby approved shall not be so 
construed as to require the United States to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, 
interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of 
any foreign state; nor shall adherence to the said protocol and statute be construed to imply a 
relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."
Though Coolidge did not agree with the Senate, he did not wish to argue the matter and stray 
from  his principles.266 American foreign policy, therefore, continued on the same course during 
Coolidge's presidency as already defined by Harding—  that is, emphasis placed on individual, 
issue-specific peace-efforts rather than reliance on international organizations.
From the 1920s until the Roosevelt Administration, the American foreign policy decision­
making was characterized by, as Paterson et al. have pointed out, ’’weak presidential leadership, 
congressional-executive competition, and increased professionalism in the Foreign Service” . 
Both Harding and Coolidge left the foreign policy decisions, especially Harding, to their 
respective secretaries of state Charles Evan Hughes (1921— 1925) and Frank B. Kellogg 
(1925— 1929). Herbert Hoover held a similar philosophy in foreign affairs yet was more active 
than his predecessors in the 1920s. Hoover’s secretary of state Henry L. Stimson was a 
combative and eager leader of American foreign policy, often disapproved by Hoover for his 
tactics.267 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who became the president in 1933, had gained some 
foreign policy-making experience in the 1920s and often conducted diplomacy personally. He 
centralized decision-making to the White House. Roosevelt’s diplomacy was, however,
264 Brown I960,108; Bamch 1960, 133. On Coolidge’s attitude towards the military establishment, see
Eloranta 1995 for details.
265 American Foreign Policy 1961,243; 256, Senate Reservation to the Protocol of the World Court Jan 
27,1926. Also see Hicks 1963,145—146.
266 McCoy 1988,359—363; Eloranta 1995.
267 Paterson et al. 1983, 305—308.
ambiguously tom between Wilsonian ideals within isolationist policies. He did believe in 
limited collective security arrangements, yet he shared mostly the basic components of 
isolationist thought: 1) Abhorrence of war; 2) Limited military intervention abroad; 3) Freedom 
of action in international relations.268 Overall, his foreign policy continued the isolationist 
tradition established in the 1920s.
What about the European large democracies o f United Kingdom and France? Firstly, the British 
position towards the League of Nations, as well as commitment towards European mainland 
defense, was one o f caution right from the start. There were essentially two views on foreign 
policy: those who favored the British involvement in the League and its aims in disarmament, 
and those who wanted to improve Franco-German relations by regional agreements and political 
concessions. Inevitably, policy tensions resulted. Nonetheless, neither of these views expressed 
enthusiasm about extensive commitment on the European continent. The British view, if there 
was such a thing, underscored the importance o f self-defense by the individual states, and was 
against commitment to international troops to  maintain peace.269 Prime Minister Ramsay 
MacDonald’s speech at the League of Nations on September 4, 1924 perhaps illustrates the 
point:270
“Our position briefly is this. We do not believe that military alliances will bring security. We 
believe that a military alliance within an agreement for security is like a grain of mustard seed. 
Small to begin with, it is the essential seed of the arrangement and that seed, with the years, will 
grow and grow until at last the tree produced from it will overshadow the whole of heavens and we 
shall be back in exactly the military position in which we found ourselves in 1914.”
The French, on the contrary, firmly believed that an international military force or at least 
military cooperation in some formal way was necessary. From the very beginning, the 
Americans and the British were opposed to  this due to the reasons outlined above. The French 
foreign policy was quite consistent in its attempt to achieve “adequate” security guarantees 
against possible German aggression. The French solution, by and large, was to work towards 
these aims in the League as well as construct a  net of alliances intended to contain Germany. 
The main directions where alliances were sought were Great Britain in the north as well as 
Eastern European states, like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland, in the east. An 
alliance was first formed with Belgium in 1920, and then with Poland in 1921. In 1924, France
268 Paterson et al. 1983, 308—309. Roosevelt ignored his secretary of state in most of the foreign policy 
decisions in the 1930s. See also Kennedy 1989.
269 Towle 1993,127— 140; the League of Nations Starts 1920,234—235.
270 League of Nations, C.708.1924.IX. Arbitration, Security, and Reduction of Armaments. Extracts from 
the Debates of the Fifth Assembly, 9.
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concluded an alliance with Czechoslovakia, and entered into protracted negotiations with the so- 
called Little Entente countries (Romania and Yugoslavia). The French solution of alliances was 
meant to be a comprehensive security, economic, military, and political resolution to the 
problem. This system suffered setbacks in the 1930s as its allies turned out to be more of a 
burden than a blessing.271 All in all, as expressed eloquently by Prime Minister Edouard Herriot 
in 1924, the French approach was to combine the collective security needs of Europe in 
particular with comprehensive solutions on disarmament and conflict resolution enforcement, 
“to mate justice with might”:272
“Arbitration, security, disarmament: the three words are, we hold, closely inter-connected. Without 
real international solidarity we shall, we believe, never attain that international community which 
we passionately desire, which we are resolved to create, to perpetuate, to organize conformably 
with the laws which govern life and being. Without international solidarity there will never be 
international peace. Through international solidarity alone shall we attain disarmament, which is 
our goal.”
The American isolationism, however inadequate as the term may be, thus left the European and 
even the ’’world” power relations in the hands o f Great Britain and France. They were reluctant 
leaders in their own right, with their own interests displayed in their actions for example in the 
League of Nations functions. Germany and Russia had been defeated in the First World War, 
thus leaving room for these traditional Great Powers to re-emerge in European politics. There 
were obvious disagreements in the goals valued by the British and the French. The British, like 
the Americans, were less and less interested in the goal that France valued the most: keeping 
Germany in check. Additionally, Great Britain was more pre-occupied by extra-European 
problems, namely keeping the vast Empire from disintegrating. At the beginning o f the 1930s 
France seemed to be the leading nation in the European scene. Its economic performance in the 
1930s, however, proved to be poor in comparison with the other European Great Powers.273 
Thus, the European stage created a sort of a ’’power vacuum” during the 1930s, which seemed 
to invite hegemonic competition for leadership.
The “weak” states were actually important players in the League of Nations and the failure o f 
the disarmament in particular during the interwar period. The impact of these states will be 
analyzed in connection with the discussion of the reasons behind the failure of the League o f 
Nations in Section 5.1. All of the factors discussed in this chapter so far have underlined 
important points about the key elements in this period: 1) The variety of economic performances
271 Hovi 1993, e.g. 115— 126; Murray 1984,93—97; Groth-Randall 1991.
272 League of Nations, C708.1924.IX Arbitration, Security, and Reduction of Armaments. Extracts from 
the Debates of the Fifth Assembly, 21.
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among the selected eleven European states; 2) The tendency for their public spending to be path 
dependent; 3) The failure of the League of Nations in its various aims one blow after another, 
starting with the structural factors of the 1920s inherent in the League Nations and gathering 
force after the Japanese aggression in 1931, as well as the other events that followed (failure of 
the disarmament conference, the rise of Hitler, Abyssinian conflict etc.). These factors provided 
the setting for the military spending framework of the eleven nations selected for a closer 
scrutiny in this thesis. How did they respond in their military spending choices?
33. Military Spending Patterns Emerging Through Different Indicators -  How Much is 
“Enough”?
This section represents an effort to re-evaluate the military spending efforts of especially the 
eleven core countries in this thesis, by utilizing different types o f indicators to see whether 
patterns will emerge. As such, it seems that the “general” picture of the interwar military 
spending has emerged through various studies in the post- Second World War period. This 
literature, as indicated in Chapter 1, has usually focused solely on the 1930s, often ignoring the 
possibility o f continuous processes at work in the military spending decision-making. Mostly 
this literature maintains that the 1920s were a time of military spending cuts due to  the impact 
of the Great War and the scattered efforts at organized pacifism, the economic difficulties 
involved in the keeping of large standing military establishments, and the collective security 
enhancing steps taken in the international arenas. In turn, the 1930s represented a time o f  
emerging challenges to the Versailles settlement, namely by the authoritarian nations, whereas 
the democracies were unable or unwilling to match this challenge, at least in the early stages.273 74 
How accurate is this snapshot of the military spending characteristics in this period? For 
example, how did the military-goverament-business relations affect the military spending paths? 
Did they exhibit resistance to change, as expected on the basis of the theoretical points made in 
Chapter 2? Or, how exactly should we compare the military spending efforts of these eleven 
nations? Furthermore, how divergent were the military spending paths of these nations in this 
period? A comparative study going beyond the Great Powers of the period has so far been 
lacking. The less than complete comparisons made in the earlier literature often offer a
273 Kennedy 1989,357—375; Pearton 1982, 177,197— 198.
274 See, among others, Kennedy 1981; Kennedy 1989, e.g. 380—412, with emphasis on the harmfolness 
of high military spending; Webber-Wildawsky 1986, 462—472; Coox 1988, 257. See also The 
economics of World War II 1998 and Murray 1984, cf. 20—21. The overview presented here is merely a 
simplification, and the authors listed here provide much more in-depth analyses of the issues in question 
in these readings.
109
somewhat limited view of the phenomenon, and indeed are not entirely convincing due to the 
lack of rigor to be applied in the comparisons.
The scale and the economic impact of the First World War has already been discussed in this 
chapter, yet the military spending implications of this “global war”275 have not been explored 
yet. The military-economic dimension of the war has not been studied very thoroughly so far, 
compared to the Second World War for example. As seen in Table 9, it is possible to compile 
some comparative indicators on the extent o f  the economic mobilization, central government 
spending, and the demographic strain placed on the population of the Great Powers by the 
mobilization of large standing armies. It seems that columns C and E, by and large, match one 
another. The highest public sector or central government military spending share was borne by 
Germany, with France and Russia following close behind it. The American defense share, for 
example, was low in comparison, due to the brevity of its involvement in the war. The same 
observation could be made, more or less, for the mean military burdens of the war years. 
Notably, however, the British share was quite low, below fifty per cent. Finally, in the 
demographic sense, the French mobilization respective o f the population was the most 
extensive, eleven per cent of the population on the average, whereas the United States had to 
mobilize only circa two per cent of its population to its armed forces. Still, Germany and Russia 
suffered similar numbers of casualties in the war (1,8 and 1,7 million respectively), whereas the 
British lost significantly less men in this conflict (0,9 million).276
Table 9. Military Exertions of Five Great Powers in the First World War
A. B. C D. E. F.
FRA 1914— 1918 79 43 77 11
GER 1914— 1918 83 91 7
RUSSIA 1914— 1916 76 ,, 4
UK 1914— 1918 63 22 49 7
USA 1917— 1919 54 7 47 2
Sources: Column C from Hardach 1977; column D calculated from Fontvieille 1976 (ME for France), Morgan 1952 
(ME for UK), Historical Statistics 1975 (ME for USA), Mitchell 1998b (GDP for France and UK), Historical 
Statistics 1975 (GNP for USA); column E calculated from the same ME sources as column D except National 
Capabilities database (Singer-Small 1993) (ME for Germany), as well as Mitchell 1998b (CGE for France, Germany, 
and UK), Historical Statistics 1975 (federal government outlays for USA); column F calculated from the National 
Capabilities database (Singer-Small 1993). A=country; B=years; C=percentage, total war expenditures of total public 
expenditures; D=mean military burden; E=mean defense share; F=mean percentage, armed forces of population.
275 On the concept of global war and its occurrence in history, see especially Rasler-Thompson 1989, 
127—151.
276 On the casualties, see Correlates of War, Inter-State War Data 2000 —  France lost circa 1,4 million 
and the United States “only” 0,1 million men in the First World War.
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After the First W orld War, especially in the 1920s, although the defense shares of large 
democracies dropped noticeably, their respective military burdens stayed either at similar levels 
as before or actually increased. As can be seen in Table 10 below, the mean military burden of 
sixteen countries did not change much from the period 1870— 1913 (Al) to the interwar period 
(AJ); in fact, only a slight increase occurred. However, the mean defense share of the pre-First 
World War period (BS) was nearly double that of the interwar period (BT), with the latter 
amounting to eighteen per cent.
Table 10. Military Burdens and Defense Shares of Seventeen Nations, Individually and on 
the Aggregate, 1870—1913 and 1920—1938
AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA JA P NED NOR POR RUS SPA SWE SWI UK USA TOT
A. C. E. G. I. K. M. O. <?• S. u. W. Y. AA. AC. AE. AG. AL
3,47 1,88 1.89 - 3,68 2,56 2,75 4,99 2,77 534 1,34 3.87 2,01 2,13 1,12 2.63 0,74 2,71
B. D. F, H. J . L. N. P. R. T. V. X. Z. AB. AD. AF. AH. AJ.
0.90 2,01 1,03 2,85 4.34 3,33 438 5.73 1,70 0.96 3,77 7,11 2,94 1.88 1,01 2.95 1.21 2,83
AK. AM. AO. AQ. AS. AU. AW. AY. BA. BC. BE. BG. BL BK. BM. BO. BQ- BS.
12,03 14,54 29,93 25,91 54,12 21,69 32,24 26,18 8533 18.95 27,91 21,35 35,93 6031 3732 29,43 3333
AL. AN. AP. AR. AT. AV. AX. AZ. BB. BD. BF. BH. BJ. BL. BN. BP. BR. BT.
5.84 9,80 15,64 20,56 2237 23,81 25,40 20.13 10,74 10,63 26,49 11,93 23,80 19,92 22,85 16,25 22,36 18.00
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for the interwar period; plus Eloranta 2001b for the preceding period. 
A=Austria, mean military burden, 1870— 1913; B=Austria, mean military burden, 1920—1938; C=Belgium, mean 
military burden, 1870— 1913; D=Belgium, mean military burden, 1920— 1938; E=Denmark, mean military burden, 
1870— 1913; F=Denmark, mean military burden, 1920— 1938; G -  Finland, mean military burden, 1870—1913; 
H=Finland, mean military burden, 1920— 1938; I=Erance, mean military burden, 1870— 1913; J=France, mean 
military burden, 1920— 1938; K=Germany, mean military burden, 1870—1913; L=Germany, mean military burden, 
1920— 1938; M=Italy, mean military burden, 1870— 1913; N=Italy, mean military burden, 1920— 1938; 0=Japan, 
mean military burden, 1870— 1913; P=Japan, mean military burden, 1920— 1938; Q=Netherlands, mean military 
burden, 1870—1913; ^N etherlands, mean military burden, 1920—1938; S=Norway, mean military burden, 1870— 
1913; T=Nonvay, mean military burden, 1920—1938; U=Portugal, mean military burden, 1870— 1913; V=Portugal, 
mean military burden, 1920— 1938; W=Russia, mean military burden, 1870—1913; X=Russia/USSR, mean military 
burden, 1920—1938; Y=Spain, mean military burden. 1870—1913; Z=Spain. mean military burden, 1920— 1938; 
AA=Sweden, mean military burden, 1870— 1913; AB=Sweden, mean military burden, 1920—1938; 
AC=Switzerland, mean military burden, 1870— 1913; AD=Switzerland, mean military burden, 1920—1938; 
AE=cUK, mean military burden, 1870— 1913; AF=UK, mean military burden, 1920— 1938; AG=USA, mean military 
burden. 1870—1913; AH=USA, mean military burden, 1920—1938; Al=16-country (excl. Finland) mean (average 
of annual averages) military burden, 1870— 1913; A J=  16-country (excl. Finland) mean (average of annual averages) 
military burden, 1920— 1938. AK=Austria, mean defense share, 1870—1913; AL=Austria, mean defense share, 
1920— 1938; AM=Belgium, mean defense share, 1870— 1913; AN=Belgium, mean defense share, 1920— 1938; 
AO=Denmark, mean defense share, 1870— 1913; AP=Denmark, mean defense share, 1920—1938; AQ= Finland, 
mean defense share, 1870— 1913; AR=Finland, mean defense share, 1920— 1938; AS=France, mean defense share, 
1870— 1913; AT=France, mean defense share, 1920— 1938; AU=Germany, mean military burden, 1870— 1913; 
AV=Germany, mean military burden, 1920—1938; AVV=Italy, mean defense share, 1870—1913; AX=Italy, mean 
defense share, 1920— 1938; A  Y=Japan, mean defense share, 1870— 1913; AZ=Japan, mean defense share, 1920— 
1938; BA=Netherlands, mean defense share, 1870— 1913; BB=Netherlands, mean defense share, 1920— 1938; 
BC=Norway, mean defense share, 1870— 1913; BD=Norway, mean defense share, 1920—1938; BE=PortugaI, mean 
defense share, 1870— 1913; BF=PortugaJ, mean defense share, 1920—1938; BG=Russia, mean defense share, 
1870— 1913; BH=Russia/USSR, mean defense share, 1920—1938; BI=Spain, mean defense share, 1870— 1913; 
BJ=Spain, mean defense share, 1920— 1938; BK-Sweden, mean defense share, 1870—1913; BL=Sweden, mean 
defense share, 1920— 1938; BM=Switzeriand, mean defense share, 1870—1913; BN=Switzerland, mean defense 
share, 1920— 1938; BO=UK, mean defense share, 1870— 1913; BP=UK, mean defense share, 1920— 1938; 
BQ=USA, mean defense share, 1870— 1913; BR=USA, mean defense share, 1920— 1938; BS= 16-country (excl. 
Finland) mean (average of annual averages) defense share, 1870— 1913; BT= 16-country (excl. Finland) mean 
(average of annual averages) defense share, 1920— 1938.
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Thus, military spending relative of economic development proved quite resistant (or path 
dependent) to change, whereas the military expenditures’ budget shares shrunk noticeably as 
new spending programs were introduced in the spheres of social issues and education. O f the 
eleven individual countries under analysis in this thesis, for example France’s military burden 
average increased respectively in the interwar period compared to the earlier period, and its 
mean defense share declined only slightly. Other countries that behaved similarly included 
Belgium, Portugal (with also its defense share average increasing after the First World W ar), 
Spain (with its defense share developing the same way as in the case o f Portugal), and the UK.
Many of the smaller countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and 
Switzerland decreased their military spending in the interwar period, compared to the period 
before the First World War, even in terms o f the military burden. The general pattern outlined 
above — namely, either a similar in size or slightly higher military burden, and a declining 
defense share —  applied to most of the other nations, even the authoritarian states (perhaps also 
due to only partial periods of authoritarian and/or totalitarian rule), listed in Table 10.
Figure 23. M ean M ilitary Burdens of the Selected Eleven E uropean Countries Com pared 
with The Six O th er Countries, 1920—1938
------M EAN MILBUR, TH E 1 1 INCL. IN  THE THESIS
------ MEAN MILBUR, TH E 6 EXCL. FROM  TH E THESIS
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. The averages are unweighted. 
Note: for details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
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As seen above in Figure 23, the mean military burden of the eleven states selected for the 
analyses in this thesis was very stable during the period in question. Only slight growth occurred 
in the 1930s. Comparatively, the mean military burden of the six excluded states (with only the 
United States embodying uninterrupted democratic rule in this period) —  included here since 
the same states are included in the systemic analysis o f Chapter 4  —  differed radically from the 
sample states. Besides the fact that the variance between the military burdens o f these states was 
much greater, it can be seen that the more aggressive stance o f the authoritarian and totalitarian 
states among them caused this average to increase sharply from 1930 onwards. The gap between 
the eleven and the six portrayed in Figure 23 widened drastically in the late 1930s.
Figure 24. Military Burdens of Denmark, Finland, France, and the UK, 1920—1938
---------DEN, MILBUR ---------FRA, MILBUR
— -— UK, MILBUR ---------FIN, MILBUR
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Figure 24 displays the military burdens o f the two Great Powers, France and the United 
Kingdom, in the sample as well as two o f the “weak” states, Denmark and Finland. The French 
military burden was quite erratic by nature, with a strong growth trend from the late 1920s 
onwards. Thus, the French military burden on the economy increased rather dramatically in the 
1930s. The British trend was much more even, indeed almost flat, until the rearmament began to 
assert itself on the economy after 1934. Finland also represented, like France and the United 
Kingdom, a country with a high military burden in the sample of eleven. The Finnish military 
burden, moreover, remained quite stable, with a very slight growth trend discernible from the
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late 1920s onwards. The Danish military burden remained equally stable» yet the Danish 
military burden was less than half the level maintained by the other three in Figure 24.
Among the “weak” Western democracies, Finland, for example, invested more on its national 
security than its Nordic neighbors. The Finnish defense share was circa twenty percent during 
the entire 1920s. The only years that noticeable drops occurred were 1923 and 1928. During the 
Great Depression this share rose significantly above the twenty percent level for some o f the 
years. For the rest of the 1930s, the defense share stayed close to the twenty percent level until 
the last few years before the war. Of the Nordic countries, Norway maintained a ten percent 
level throughout the 1920s and 1930s.277 The Swedish defense share, respectively, stayed close 
to twenty percent for most of the 1920s. At the tum of the decade this share started to decrease 
rapidly, which was partly a result of conscious disarmament (at least as far as state budgets were 
concerned) policy in the 1930s. In Denmark, the defense share rose in the 1920s, but did not 
reach the twenty percent level. For the Danish military the 1930s was a time of shrinking budget 
shares like in most of the Nordic countries, with Finland being an exception.278
The military burdens of the authoritarian and totalitarian challengers of France and the United 
Kingdom grew strongly from 1933— 1934 onwards, and the overall levels of these countries 
during authoritarian rule were in general higher than those o f most democratic states. One 
should also take note of the impression that the more authoritarian the nation was, the higher its 
military burden seemed to be. For example, Mussolini’s Italy, with Mussolini unable to 
subjugate and consolidate all groups under his direct rule, seems to have been unable to  match 
the militaristic drive of Japan (under a military regime) and Germany (under Hitler’s centralized 
regime), perhaps also the Soviet Union, in the late 1930s. For the European democracies, the 
mid-1930s in general marked the beginning of rather slow rearmament, although their 
authoritarian challengers had begun earlier. Hitler's Germany increased its military burden from 
1,6 per cent in 1933 to 18,9 in 1938, a  rearmament program promising both “guns and butter”. 
Mussolini's efforts in Italy were less successful, producing a military burden of four to five per 
cent in the 1930s. The Japanese rearmament drive was perhaps the most extensive, relative of its 
economic base, amassing a military burden as high as 22,7 per cent in 1938.279 However, these 
impressions need to be verified with more substantial empirical data and more specific 
hypotheses testing, which will indeed be taken up in Section 4.2. What about the defense shares
277 Eloranta 1998; on Norwegian military spending in the long ran, see Gleditsch 1992.
278 Eloranta 1998.
279 Eloranta 2001b and the sources in it.
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of the selected eleven European states, for example in comparisons with other states? If  military 
spending of the said eleven maintained a rather steady share of the economic resources, can the 
same be said o f its budget share?
Figure 25. Military Burdens of Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia/USSR, 1920—1938
25
20
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5
0
1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Year
— *— GER, MILBUR -------- ITA, MILBUR
-------- JAP, MILBUR --------RUS, MILBUR
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Note: the data of these countries are less robust than the eleven; see Chapter 1 and Appendices, Appendix 2.
Indeed, as we can infer from Figure 26, the mean defense share of the eleven showed a 
remarkably stable, slightly decreasing trend, at least until the mid-1930s. The late rearmament 
could be seen clearly in their mean defense share, although this share did not surpass the 1920 
level until 1937. The rearmament of these nations was therefore quite modest, which could also 
be deduced from  the development of their mean military burden. The mean defense share of the 
six countries excluded from the thesis, however, displayed a strong growth trend from 1933 
onwards, quite similar to their respective mean military burden. Their rearmament, and thus the 
priority status awarded to military expenditures in their budgets (with the United States and 
Austria definitely not fitting the pattern outlined by the other four) created a significant gap 
between them and most democracies during the 1930s. The curious jump in 1923 was mostly 
due to the German data, caused either by data inaccuracies or the deep crisis in German 
government finances in the midst of the hyperinflation.
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Figure 26. Mean Defense Shares of the Selected Eleven European Countries Compared
with the Six Other Countries, 1920—1938
Y ear
----- MEAN DFSHARE, THE 11 INCL. IN THE THESIS
----- MEAN DFSHARE, THE 6 EXCL. FROM THE THESIS
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. The averages are unweighted.
Note: for details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
If we look at the individual defense shares more closely, as in Figure 27, it is possible to 
distinguish different patterns among the selected countries. The United Kingdom and France 
both had similar defense shares in the beginning of the 1920s, but whereas the French share 
increased until circa 1932 with great variations being shown from year to year, the British share 
was very stable with a slight decreasing trend. Also, it seems that the French governments o f the 
1930s were not able and/or did not wish to maintain such high defense shares, and the British 
share slowly caught up with the French in the last years o f the decade. Similar to their respective 
military burdens, their defense shares were practically identical when the Second World War 
started. In both instances, the French relative military spending was quite high, possibly 
becoming a hindrance to the economy as a whole. Even so, the British seemed to outspend the 
French in absolute terms.280
280 See e.g. Kennedy 1989, 402—412; Murray 1984, 95—97. One of the most significant military 
spending constraints in the British case was the so-called Ten Year Rule, introduced in 1919, which based 
the British military spending policy on the assumption that Britain would not be involved in a war with 
another major power in the next ten years. This principle was finally abandoned in 1932. Thorpe 1994, 
113—115.
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Figure 27. Defense Shares of France, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK, 1920—1938
Year
--------FRA, DESHARE POR, DESHARE
-------- SWE, DESHARE -------UK, DESHARE
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Again, the erratic nature of the French military and public finances is amply displayed in Figure 
27. Sweden, in turn, began with a high defense share, which declined noticeably until the end of 
the period. M any of the smaller states did not begin active rearmament until after 1935, except 
the ones that had high military burdens already in the 1920s (like Portugal and Finland). 
Sweden, a member of the League of Nations from the beginning, was a good example of an 
active pursuit o f disarmament policies throughout the period. According to U lf Olsson (1973), 
the Swedish rearmament was slow to  react to the worsened international security climate. 
Nonetheless, its military burden remained meager until 1939, below two per cent. In relation to 
for example Germany and the United Kingdom, the Swedish rearmament was very modest 
indeed. In fact, it was quite similar to the slow reaction of the United States in the late 1930s. 
Even during the Second World W ar the Swedish military burden rose to only about 11— 12 per 
cent, whereas the Great Powers usually exceeded the 50 per cent level for many of the war 281
281 See Olsson 1973,9—23; Olsson 1982; Eloranta 2002b.
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Figure 28. Defense Shares of France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, 1920—1938
-------- FRA, DFSHARE --------- UK, DFSHARE
---------G E R , DFSHARE — ■— ITA, DFSHARE
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
The Portuguese defense share seemed to  retain quite a high and stable level since the beginning 
of the 1920s, with a  bit of a decline occurring in the first half of the 1930s. Part of this stability 
was certainly caused by the fact that all political leaders in this period, even Salazar, had to  keep 
the armed forces happy, despite for example Salazar’s strong drive for economy in public 
spending. The economic difficulties and political instability o f the 1920s in fact paved the way 
for this authoritarian government. Salazar’s possibilities of introducing drastic changes to  the 
military budgets were hindered by the fact that his power base included the armed forces, the 
Church, the upper bourgeoisie, banking interests, as well as right-wing intellectuals and 
monarchists. He applied his conservatism to old-fashioned budgetary financing and restricted 
the access to foreign investment. In essence, he quite successfully balanced the budget in the 
1930s, yet he was unable and unwilling to promote, for example, rapid industrialization or carry 
out social reforms. Accordingly, the Portuguese military spending remained, in comparative 
terms, quite high.282
282 Lee 1987,221—226. See also Gallagher 1983. More details on the foreign policy stances of the eleven 
European states can be found in Section 5.1.
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If we compare the French, German, Italian, and British defense shares to one another (see 
Figure 28), it seems clear that the German case was quite exceptional since the ascendancy to 
power by Hitler. For example, the Italian and French defense shares behaved very similarly. 
Thus, it would be difficult to characterize the Italian case as belonging to the totalitarian camp 
on the basis o f its military spending per se. Although these issues are discussed at length in 
Section 4.1, it should prove useful to see how the selected eleven countries differed from one 
another in terms o f their military burdens and defense shares when their level of economic 
development (measured by real GDP per capita) is accounted for.
Figure 29. Military Burdens of the Selected Eleven European Countries Regressed Against 
Their Respective Real GDP per Capita (in 1929 Quasi-USD), 1925
Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = 0.0000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r = .91785
Regression 
95% confid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Case l^Belgium; Case 2= Denmark, Case 3=Finland; Case 
4=France; Case 5=the Netherlands; Case 6=Norway; Case 7=Portugal; Case 8=Spain; Case 9=Sweden; Case 
10=Switzeriand; Case ll=the United Kingdom Independent variable: real GDP per capita. Model: piecewise 
linear regression with breakpoint.
If we observe the military burdens o f the eleven countries selected here in 1925 and 1935 (see 
Figures 29 and 30 respectively283), it seems that there were two groups of countries based on 
using their real GDP per capita data as a predictor of their relative military spending, utilizing a
283 See Appendices, Appendix 4 for the graphs on the military burdens and defense shares, as seen above 
and below, for the year 1930.
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breakpoint regression. The countries that remained in the low military burden group throughout 
the period included Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. This group 
included also Spain and Sweden in 1935. The higher military burden group included 
consistently four states: Finland, France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. As seen in the 
graphs, the two groups seemed to come closer to one another in the 1930s, perhaps implying 
that they were responding, albeit slowly, to  a common threat impetus, namely represented by 
the authoritarian nations.
Figure 30. Military Burdens of the Selected Eleven European Countries Regressed Against 
Their Respective GDP per Capita (in 1929 Quasi-USD), 1935
Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = 0.0000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r = .86456
Regression 
95% confid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Case I=Belgium; Case 2=Denmark, Case 3=Finland; Case 
4=France; Case 5=the Netherlands; Case 6=Norway; Case 7=Portugal; Case S=Spain; Case 9=Sweden; Case 
10=Switzerland; Case ll= the United Kingdom. Independent variable: real GDP per capita. Model: piecewise 
linear regression with breakpoint.
The development of the defense shares, respective of the individual GDP per capita levels, 
sheds further light into the military spending behavior of these eleven European nations. In 1925 
(Figure 31), the low spending group included Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
the United Kingdom, whereas the higher spending group consisted of Finland, France, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 1935 (Figure 32), the only change was Spam’s passage to 
the lower spending group. Spain’s interwar foreign policy, even compared to the conflicting
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views of Portuguese interwar governments, was contradictory by nature: Whereas in the 1920s 
under Primo de Rivera’s authoritarian rule the Spanish foreign policy still encompassed hopes 
for a return to a Great Power status, including relatively high military spending, during the 
Second Republic the aim of the foreign and defense policy was to achieve pacifist aims within 
the League o f Nations. The third phase was, of course, that of the chaos of the Civil W ar, which 
enticed the involvement of numerous competing states and ideologies.284
Figure 31. Defense Shares of the Selected Eleven European Countries Regressed Against 
Their Respective GDP per Capita (in 1929 Quasi-USD), 1925
Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = .00000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r = .87635
Regression 
95% confid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Case 1-Belgium; Case 2=Denmark, Case 3-Finland; Case 
4=France; Case 5=the Netherlands; Case 6=Norway; Case 7=Portugal; Case 8=Spain; Case 9=Sweden; Case 
10=Switzerland; Case ll= the United Kingdom. Independent variable: real GDP per capita. Model: piecewise 
linear regression with breakpoint
Therefore, on the basis of both the military burdens and the defense shares, Finland, France, and 
i Portugal were consistently high-spending nations in terms of their military effort, and Belgium, 
< Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway low-spending states. The others seemed to move 
between the groups during this period. However, it seems evident that the groups had come 
closer to one another also in terms of their defense shares by 1935, and the groupings were less 
o
284 See e.g. Saz 1999a, 54; Saz 1999b, 73— 76.
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clear in this sense. As we have seen before, the rearmament of the authoritarian nations seemed 
to be ignored by all of these states in the very beginning of the phenomenon* Finally, the Great 
Depression did not seem to be an exceptional event from this perspective; namely in terms of 
perhaps expected military spending cuts. The continuity involved in the military spending o f the 
period for the eleven European states was quite remarkable.
Figure 32. Defense Shares of the Selected Eleven European Countries Regressed Against 
Their Respective GDP per Capita (in 1929 Quasi-USD), 1935
Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = .00000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r = .85739
X  Regression 
95% confld.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Case l=BeIgium; Case 2= Denmark, Case 3=HnIand; Case 
4=France; Case 5=the Netherlands; Case 6=Norway; Case 7=Portugal; Case 8=Spain; Case 9=Sweden; Case 
10=Switzerland; Case ll= the United Kingdom. Independent variable: real GDP per capita. Model: piecewise 
linear regression with breakpoint.
What about military spending in real absolute values? The relative shares, it could be argued, 
might provide a misleading view of the military spending trends in this period. Again, if we 
look at the mean military expenditures per capita, in a common currency (converted with the 
deflator calculated as the arithmetic average of the respective WPIs and CPIs as explained in 
Chapter I), for the eleven, it becomes apparent again that the military spending of these states 
was very stable in this period, at least on the average (see Figure 33 below). And once more, the 
military spending gap between these democracies and transitional regimes, and the authoritarian 
states increased dramatically after 1933. The interwar democracies spent, on the average, less
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than a third of the average ME per capita that their authoritarian challengers did in 1938. What 
about the “true” military spending potential o f the democratic Great Powers; i.e., in absolute 
values? Who were the “leaders” and how did the “balance o f  power” among them change 
during the course of this period?
Figure 33. Real Military Spending (=ME, in 1929 Quasi-USD) per Capita 
(POP=Population) of the Selected Eleven European Countries Compared with the Six 
Other Countries, 1920—1938
USD PER
Year
— MEAN ME/POP, THE 11INCL. IN THE THESIS 
----- MEAN ME/POP, THE 6 EXCL. FROM THE THESIS
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Averages are unweighted.
Note, for details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
As seen in Figure 34 below, the real military spending of the United States, in absolute term s, 
was the highest until Hitler’s ascendancy to power in 1933, after which the German M E  
increased rapidly. The United Kingdom and France matched the U.S. spending levels q u ite  
closely throughout the period. The enormous military spending effort of Nazi Germany w as 
indeed quite staggering. Whereas Germany was spending approximately 7,2 billion 1929 quasi- 
USD on its military establishment in 1938, the combined spending of France, the United S ta tes, 
and the United Kingdom amounted to  only less than 5,1 billion 1929 quasi-USD. It is im portan t 
to note, however, that although the U.S. military burden was below 1,5 per cent in 1938, it w as  
still able to produce such a high level of absolute military expenditures, revealing the h u g e
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mobilization potential of the world’s leading economy. The British military burden, for 
example, was almost 6,5 per cent in 1938.285
Figure 34. Real Military Expenditures (in 1929 Quasi-USD) of France, Germany, the UK, 
and the United States, 1920—1938
USD,
1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Year
--------FRA, ME ---------GER, ME
--------UK, ME — ■— USA, ME
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
How well do the common currency figures reflect the “true” military spending of the selected 
eleven states? The deflator that has been used throughout the thesis comprises a simple 
combined wholesale and consumer price index.286 As was discussed in Section 1.3, it is also 
possible to construct alternate deflators according, roughly, to use. Would the use of these 
deflators change the results achieved here? As seen in Table 11, the deflator that has been used 
throughout this thesis was found statistically almost identical to the alternative one for most of 
these countries. For three (Finland, Spain, and Switzerland), the two deflators had different 
means and medians, yet the variance seemed to be the same. Thus, especially since it is 
practically impossible to replicate the procedure involved in constructing the alternative deflator 
for a wider sample of countries, the deflator chosen for these comparisons seems quite adequate. 
Figure 35 also displays the fairly close agreement between the tw o deflators for France, and the 
divergence between the two in the latter part of the period for Switzerland.
285 See Appendices, Appendix 2 for details on the sources. See also Eloranta 2002b.
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Table 11. Statistical Tests on the Means, Medians, and Variances of the Two Military 
Expenditure Deflators, 1920—1938
A. B. c. D.
BEL 0/1 0/5 0/5
DEN 1/1 3/5 0/5
FIN 0/1 0/5 0/5
FRA 0/1 0/5 0/5
NED 0/1 0/5 0/5
NOR 0/1 0/5 0/5
POR 0/1 0/5 0/5
SPA 1/1 3/5 0/5
SWE 0/1 0/5 0/5
SWI 1/1 3/5 0/5
UK 0/1 0/5 0/5
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. A=country abbreviation; B=mean test between the two deflators; 
C=five median tests between the two deflators; D=five variance tests between the two deflators.
Note: here are shown the number of tests that reject the null hypothesis at 10 per cent level of significance. Null 
hypotheses = same mean; same median; same variance. See Appendices, Appendix IB for details on the statistical 
tests.
Figure 35. Comparison Between the Two ME Deflators for France and Switzerland in the 
Interwar Period
1929=100
Year
— ♦ -F R A , COMBINED1  : - FRA, COMBINED2
— ♦— SW1, C O M B IN E D l-------- SWI, COMBINED2
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Note: COMBINEDl is the deflator used in most of the comparisons here (^average of WPI and CPI); 
COMBINED2 is the alternate deflator, as explained in Chapter 1.
286 See Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
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How large were the armed forces of the eleven selected countries, again compared with the six 
excluded nations? As seen in Figure 36 below, the mean military personnel per capita share of 
the eleven was quite stable, with a declining trend until the mid-1930s. Furthermore, this share 
by the eleven was considerably higher for most of the period compared with the six excluded 
states. Thus, in relative terms, the eleven relied more on troops in their choices for armed 
security. If  the authoritarian states spent more, were they then more inefficient in their military 
spending? Or, did the authoritarian states merely choose to maintain higher capital military 
expenditure?
Figure 36. Military Personnel (=MP) per Capita (POF=Population) Percentage Shares of 
the Selected Eleven European Countries Compared with the Six Other Countries, 1920— 
1938
Year
----- MEAN MP/POP, THE 11INCL. IN THE THESIS
-----MEAN MP/POP, THE 6 EXCL. FROM THE THESIS
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Note: for details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
These questions require some estimations of the available military stock by the states to be 
compared. One measure, advocated by George Modelski and W illiam R. Thompson (1988)287, is 
the number of battleships, perceived by the aforementioned authors to reflect the ability of a
287 M odelski and Thom pson also u se  som ew hat scattered estimates o f  th e  Great Power naval spending to 
calculate world leadership shares as well as other variables. Their study is, in particular, to  be com m ended 
due to its detailed explanations on the sources used and the weaknesses of the estimates. See M odelski- 
Thompson 1988, e.g. 38-48. Here I have chosen to define a battleship as a m ilitary capital ship o ther than 
an aircraft carrier w ith a tonnage o f  a t least 15 000 tons.
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state to  assume a leadership position within a system. As seen below in Figure 37, the number 
of battleships reflects rather well the earlier discussion o f naval limitation agreements by the 
Great Powers. By 1931, the United Kingdom and the United States seem to have achieved a 
balance with the other states also maintaining steady numbers of battleships. Was the 
rearmament of the 1930s an illusion, especially in the sphere o f naval armaments?
Figure 37. Number of Battleships by France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, 1920—1938
NUM BER
Year
-------- FRA, BATTLESHIPS — —  JAP, BA TTLESH IPS
-  — UK, BATTLESHIPS ---------USA, BA TTLESH IPS
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
It is argued here that this picture may be quite misleading as a representation of the naval 
competition, or the lack of it, in the 1930s. I have constructed figures on the depreciated total 
tonnages o f the seventeen states (see Figure 11 on the countries chosen), using the guidelines o f  
the League o f Nations on the depreciation lengths of different kinds of ships. As this procedure 
is extremely labor-intensive, the depreciated tonnages were constructed only for the years 1923, 
1928, 1933, and 1938. The totals were then interpolated using the indices explained in  
Appendices (Appendix 2).288 These figures should provide a better estimation of the “true”  
naval stock o f these nations, especially in terms of naval competition, because: 1) Battleships
288 Thus, the  w hole period series display  the  changes between these interpolation periods. I f  these to n n a g e  
figures had been used as straightforw ard tim es series in the statistical exercises in this thesis, a  sm o o th in g  
procedure w ould have been em ployed.
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represent perhaps merely the offensive capabilities of states, or the ability to maintain 
“leadership”; and 2) Outdated materials were indeed deemed to be useless in battle, as displayed 
by the British estimations that during the First World War an older standard German battleship 
would last no more than five minutes against a modem, British Dreadnought.289 Let us first 
examine the comparative depreciated naval tonnages of some of the Great Powers in this period 
(see Figure 38 below).
Figure 38. Total Depreciated Tonnages of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, 1920—1938
TONNAGES,
___________________________Year________________
— •—  FRA, TOTAL DEPRECIATED TONNAGE
--------GER, TOTAL DEPRECIATED TONNAGE
-------- UK, TOTAL DEPRECIATED TONNAGE
-------- USA. TOTAL DEPRECIATED TONNAGE
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
The view provided by the number of battleships seems to, in fact, have been quite accurate for 
the 1920s. The naval limitation agreements indeed decreased the usable tonnages of the United 
Kingdom and the United States, while the tonnage held by France in effect increased, producing 
an actual parity between the three. This had not been the aim of the naval limitation accords 
discussed earlier. Nonetheless, quite divergent trends emerged after 1933. While the British 
rearmament programs, often in connection with depression-related employment efforts, 
produced a strong increase in the 1930s (with the U.S. effort somewhat more meager), the 
French actual naval stock declined, both due to lack of funding and the aging of the ships. The
289 Modelski-Thompson 1988,76.
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German fleet, practically nonexistent before the 1930s, was built up quite fast, at least to 
provide a significant threat to the French, yet the naval lead o f  the United Kingdom and the 
United States remained clear.
Figure 39. Total Depreciated Tonnages of Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Sweden, 1920—1938
TONNAGES,
___________________________Year___________________
--------FIN, TOTAL DEPRECIATED TONNAGE
-------- NED, TOTAL DEPRECIATED TONNAGE
-------- POR, TOTAL DEPRECIATED TONNAGE
— ■—  SW E. TO T A L  D EPRECIA TED  TO N N A G E
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
A complete rundown of the naval capabilities of the seventeen states discussed here can be 
found in Appendices, Appendix 3, Table 1. Firstly, Great Powers that increased their relative 
depreciated tonnage among the 17 nations in this period included for example France, Germany, 
and Italy, whereas countries that seemed to experience a naval capability decline included 
Japan, the United Kingdom (the end o f the 1930s notwithstanding), and the United States. 
Another interesting figure in the said table is the percentage o f depreciated tonnage to nominal 
tonnage for these states. Countries with over 50 per cent share were: Finland (1933, 1938), 
Germany (1938), Italy (1928), Japan (1923, 1928), Portugal (1933, 1938), the United Kingdom 
(1923), and the United States (1923). These years usually also represented the peaks in their 
respective “reap’ tonnages and fighting power. One should not, nonetheless, draw too grave 
conclusions about, for example, the decline of the British and the American naval capabilities, 
as mentioned before: For most o f the period, the combined tonnage of these two states 
accounted for over half of the 17-country combined depreciated tonnage.
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And the “weak” states -  how did they behave in general? As we have already seen, high- 
spending countries such as Finland and Portugal seemed to  develop significant naval 
capabilities, of course only in relative terms, in the 1930s. Overall, it seems that of these 
countries Finland and Portugal did increase their naval capabilities, whereas for example the 
Dutch and the Swedish naval capabilities developed in a more erratic fashion (see Figure 39). 
There were two apparent growth phases during this period: one during the Great Depression and 
another in the late 1930s. From the late 1920s onwards, the “weak” states behaved quite 
similarly. What about on the whole, were there clear tendencies to be detected among the 
seventeen states on the aggregate?
Figure 40. Index of Naval Threat (1928=100), 17-country Total Nominal Tonnage, and 17- 
country Total Depreciated Tonnage, 1920—1938
NAVAL THREAT TONNAGES, IN
INDEX BILLIONS
Year
-------COM BINED INDEX (NAVAL SPENDING + BSHIPS) (1928=100)
— 17-COUNTRY, TOTAL TONNAGE
—  17-COUNTRY, TOTAL DEPRECIATED TONNAGE___________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Note: for details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
Figure 40 includes three possible indicators of naval threats among seventeen states. The first is 
a volume index constructed from the figures provided by Modelski and Thompson (1988) as 
well as other sources (see Appendices, Appendix 2), the second is the total nominal tonnage of 
the seventeen states, and the third is the total depreciated tonnage of the said states. This third 
index seems to indicate most clearly a decline in the 1920s, and an emerging growth trend in the 
1930s. The combined volume index of “threat” ignores some of the disarmament tendencies of
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the 1920s, and the nominal tonnage indicates, for example, a m ore abrupt growth trend from the 
mid-1930s onwards. I would argue that the total depreciated tonnage confers a more accurate 
picture of this phenomenon. The emergence of systemic threats, for example, will be discussed 
in more detail and with more precise concepts in Chapter 4. J ■ - .
One could, o f course, make certain inferences from such data. In Table 12 below, I have 
collected together various indicators of the relative military stocks and military spending of 
France and Germany, to compare their relative strengths and weaknesses in both respects. 
Column D indicates the French relative strength in military personnel in comparison with the 
German forces (with 100 equaling balance), column G displays the relative advantage of the 
French depreciated tonnage in comparison with the German equivalent (with 100 equaling 
balance), and column J designates the relative advantage of the French military spending in a 
common currency compared to the German M E (with 100 equaling balance). A combined index 
of the three can be found in column K.
Table 12. Comparison of the Relative Military Stock and Military Spending of France and 
Germany, 1920—1938
A. B. C. D. E. F. G . H . I. J. K.
1920 0,001457 0,000114 1278,1 0,000231 0,000014 1597,4 0,654445 0,190237 344,0 1073,2
1921 0,000547 0,000114 479,8 0,000267 0,000017 1597,4 0,618050 0,192872 320,4 799,2
1922 0,000545 0,000114 478,1 0,000206 0,000013 1597,4 0,602181 0,024818 2426,4 1500,6
1923 0,000511 0,000114 448,2 0,000194 0,000012 1597,4 0,497505 0,000000 4.0E+8 l,3E+8
1924 0,000479 0,000114 420,2 0,000178 0,000028 635,4 0,447044 0,218314 204,8 420,1
1925 0,000475 0,000114 416,7 0,000178 0,000028 635,4 0,407725 0,253013 161,1 404,4
1926 0,000471 0,000114 413,2 0,000175 0,000027 635,4 0,359980 0,265086 135,8 394,8
1927 0,000494 0,000114 433,3 0,000187 0,000030 635,4 0,565893 0,275311 205,5 424,7
1928 0,000469 0,000114 411,4 0,000185 0,000029 635,4 0,459420 0,309566 148,4 398,4
1929 0,000411 0,000114 360,5 0,000264 0,000047 568,1 0,498073 0,256072 194,5 374,4
1930 0,000411 0,000114 360,5 0,000276 0,000049 568,1 0,697363 0,269950 258,3 395,7
1931 0,000441 0,000114 386,8 0,000283 0,000050 568,1 0,657798 0,270590 243,1 399,4
1932 0,000422 0,000114 370,2 0,000292 0,000051 568,1 0,722139 0,310487 232,6 3903
1933 0,000449 0,000118 380,5 0,000312 0,000055 568,1 0,710263 0,368026 193,0 3803
1934 0,000458 0,000315 145,4 0,000200 0,000172 116,3 0,653052 1,619759 40,3 100,7
1935 0,000548 0,000461 118,9 0,000225 0,000194 116,3 0,781891 2,478563 31,5 88,9
1936 0,000588 0,000596 98,7 0,000256 0,000220 116,3 0,811412 4,248703 19,1 78,0
1937 0,000613 0,000603 101,7 0,000263 0,000226 116,3 0,936582 5,089629 18,4 78,8
1938 0,000581 0,000782 74,3 0,000304 0,000262 1163 1,117205 7,225170 15,5 68,7
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. A=year; B=France, military personnel, billions; (XSerm any, 
military personnel, D=(French military personnel / German military personnel) x 100; E=France, total depreciated 
tonnage, billions; F=Germany, total depreciated tonnage, billions; G=(French depreciated tonnage / German 
depreciated tonnage) x 100; H=fTance, real military spending in 1929 quasi-USD (adjusted as explained in 
Appendices, Appendix 2), in billions; I=Germany, real military spending in 1929 quasi-USD (adjusted as explained 
in Appendices, Appendix 2), in billions; J=(French real ME in USD /  German real ME in USD) x 100; 
K=unweighted mean of D, G, and J.
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It seems that the French held at least circa fourfold lead in military personnel, over fivefold lead 
in depreciated tonnage, and circa twofold lead in military expenditures up until 1933. The 
French dominance eerily echoes the German diplomats’ calls for a restoration of even a 
semblance of parity between the countries, as well as the impossibility of real disarmament to be 
undertaken by the League of Nations.290 Hitler’s ascendancy began to crumble this lead quite 
rapidly, although the overall French lead index falls below 100 for the first time only in 1935. 
Germany’s lead was the most pronounced in military spending in the late 1930s, which is 
consistent with historical accounts of the German rearmament: it was concentrated on the 
mechanization of the armed forces. Nonetheless, as Robert A. Doughty has said: “While the 
French military could always have used more resources, the major difficulties sprang not so 
much from inadequate funding as from how those funds were spent”. This sentiment could 
actually be seconded for many European interwar polities.291
Even “high”, at least in comparative terms, military spending was not a guarantee of military 
success or the security of the borders. The importance of military spending in combination with 
a credible military stock cannot be underestimated in the maintenance of peace, yet how this 
stock would be wielded into action and maintained during a conflict are ultimately the 
determinants of military success. According to Samuel Huntington, military power has four 
dimensions: quantitative (men, arms, resources); technological (effectiveness of the equipment); 
organizational (discipline, training etc. o f troops); societal (ability and willingness to apply 
military force in various situations).292 In terms of military effectiveness, a nation’s military 
effectiveness is defined through a process by which armed forces are converted into fighting 
power. Military activity, in turn, takes place at four different levels —  political, strategic, 
operational, and tactical —  of which the political sphere contains the funding dimension for the 
armed forces.293 The question of ‘how much is enough’ can be approached from these different 
perspectives, although the “final” answer always depends on the point of view adopted by the 
analyst. For example, the contemporary French policy-makers, as in all cases resulting from a 
complex compromise among various groups, were convinced that the French security required 
high military spending in the 1920s. On the other hand, the inability of the French to maintain 
competitive military spending in the 1930s may have contributed to the technological 
weaknesses of the French forces in the Second World War. Similarly, the Finnish military
290 See e.g. Northedge 1986; Ahmann 1993.
291 See especially Doughty 1988, 43; Murray 1984; Messerschmidt 1988. On the Finnish case, see e.g. 
Eloranta 1997c; Eloranta 1998.
292 Huntington 1997, 88.
293 Millett et al.1988,1—12
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expenditures met most of the targets set for them by the various committees in the 1930s, yet 
some of the units of the Finnish armed forces were rather poorly equipped in the Winter War 
1939— 1940. Why? Because it was not a  question of inadequate funding rather than how the 
funds were spent. In the Finnish case, the funds went for, among other things (see Chapter 7 for 
details), supporting the building of a domestic military-industrial base.294
All in all, we may distinguish certain overall features in the military spending patterns outlined 
in this section. Firstly, it seems that the military burdens of most states in the interwar period 
remained at similar levels as experienced before the First W orld War, whereas the military 
expenditures’ budgetary role apparently decreased. Secondly, the military burdens and defense 
shares of the selected eleven European states were, on the average, remarkably stable during this 
period, suggesting budgetary path dependence in the post- First World War military spending. 
The Great Depression did not make too much of an impact, at least on the whole, perhaps due to 
the domestic market support strategies adopted by many governments. Yet, the military 
spending of the “authoritarian challengers” increased quite clearly from 1930 onwards. Thirdly, 
the eleven European states seemed to engage in rearmament quite late in the 1930s, certainly 
much later than the non-democratic regimes. This might have been due to their inability to 
adjust quickly because of their democratic institutions or their trust in the League o f Nations 
and/or in each other. Or, other impurely public benefits affected their military spending demand 
functions, as explored in the subsequent chapters. Fourthly, the individual experiences of these 
countries differed greatly. Indeed, what were the “causal” factors behind these differences? 
Fifthly, even by a cursory analysis, it seems that the interwar international political climate was 
not very conducive for common security arrangements. For example, as discussed in connection 
with the League of Nations and economic development, the international “system” lacked 
leadership and credible commitment to  cooperation. Respectively, for example the French 
completely dominated the Germans until Hitler in their military spending and effective military 
stock. These disparities were reflected on to the international diplomatic scene. Sixthly, it seems 
that the Great Powers, in general “high” military spenders, had different military spending 
strategies than the “weak” states (with Finland and Portugal as exceptions). Did the overall 
priorities o f these eleven states differ? Can we say that the democracies were indeed 
“different” ?
294 See e.g. Doughty 1988; Eloranta 1997c; Eloranta 1998.
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4. THE DEM OCRATIC PEACE ARGUMENT, LACK O F INTERNATIONAL 
LEADERSHIP, AND SYSTEMIC FACTORS, 1920— 1938
4.1. Military Spending and Regime Type —  Exploring the Democratic Peace Argument
This chapter presents empirical evaluations o f some of the hypotheses developed on the basis of 
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2; namely, whether the eleven democracies or 
transitional democracies developed in a different maimer than for example authoritarian states 
(depending on the extent of authoritarian rule); whether there was an interdependence between 
military spending and economic development during this period as suggested by some; and 
whether certain systemic factors, measured by a pooled sample, were relevant for the 
development of the demand for military spending among the eleven. Firstly, the measurement of 
the levels of democracy is contingent on the utilization of relevant indices, which are discussed 
in this section, and the differentiation between regime types requires various kinds of statistical 
tools, which will form the basis for the hypotheses tested here. Secondly, the possible 
interdependence between military spending and economic development is explored by utilizing 
Granger non-causality tests, explained in Section 4.2. Thirdly, the systemic forces, forming the 
first phase of the more extensive evaluations of the pooled-sample military spending demand, 
will provide an indication which of the indicators developed in Section 4.3 should be relevant 
for the analyses in the subsequent sections. Additionally, the democracy and autocracy indices 
will be utilized to assess systemic changes.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the First World War introduced sweeping political 
changes for the Western European states. One of the most important reforms brought on by the 
war —  due to especially the necessity of maintaining public support for the massive, usually not 
preplanned, government spending during the war —  was the extension of the voting franchise, 
also to include women in many countries.293 As seen below in Table 13, the interwar period 
political climate of at least Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom was surely influenced by the existence or introduction of universal adult 
suffrage. Even in the other cases the extension of the franchise as a percentage, compared to the 
pre- First World W ar period, was quite apparent. The percentage o f population over 20 allowed 
to vote remained, however, below 50 per cent in the countries that did not have universal adult *
295 See e.g. Eichengreen 1992,92; Simmons 1994; Webber-Wildawsky 1986, e.g. 430.
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suffrage. In the Swedish case, the first election under the universal adult suffrage in 1921 
brought 87,9 per cent of the age group the right to vote.296
Table 13. Extension of the Franchise, Eleven European States
A. B. C D.
BEL* 1948 (21) 3,7 (1870) 45,5 (1921)
DEN 1918(29) 26,0(1872) 70,0(1920)
FIN 1907 (24) . . 73,4 (1922)
FRAn 1945 (21) 43,7(1871) 39,9(1924)
NED 1922 (25) 5,0(1870) 80,7 (1922)
NOR 1921 (23) 8,5(1870) 86,9(1921)
POR . . 10,2(1875) 9,6 (1925)
SPA . . . .
SWE 1921 (23) 9,8 (1872) 33,0(1920)
SWP 1971 (20) 38,7(1881) 40,3 (1922)
UK 1928 (21) 14,9(1871) 74,5 (1922)
Source: Flora 1983, except POR data provided by Jaime Reis. A=country; B=date of introduction of universal adult 
suffrage (minimum voting age in parenthesis); C=first observation on the group 20 years or older allowed to vote per 
population, percentage, period 1870— 1913 (year of observation in parenthesis); D= first observation on the group 2 0  
years or older allowed to vote per population, percentage, period 1920—1938 (year of observation in parenthesis). 
Note: The electorate refers to those eligible to  vote in parliamentary elections, to the lower house if applicable, 
"^universal and equal manhood suffrage for men over 21 in 1919; n=universal and equal suffrage for all m ale 
citizens of 21 years and older in 1848; ^universal and equal suffrage for male citizens of 20 years and over in 1848.
As discussed previously, the impact o f the franchise was much less revolutionary in the cases  
where the universal suffrage did not include the whole adult population. This also applied to  th e  
actual voting behavior of the population: in France and Belgium, as seen for example in F ig u re  
41, the number of votes cast per population hardly changed in the interwar period compared to  
the previous period. In turn, for countries like Sweden and the United Kingdom the extension o f  
the franchise also translated into a drastic jump in the election participation rates. T h is  
encouraged the widening of the political field and the introduction of new political parties. A lso , 
for practically the first time the left-wing parties entered the political arenas with considerable 
impact in Europe. Their support base was strengthened by the electoral reforms, and th e  
emergence o f unions as a quasi-corporatist force also encouraged their rise. Social D em ocratic 
parties in for example Sweden, Denmark, France, and Norway, as well as the British L a b o u r 
party, made significant gains over the other parties in terms of membership. For exam ple, 
France experienced its first moderate Left government in 1924, with many other installments to  
come in the 1930s.297
296 Flora 1983,141.
297 See e.g. Eichengreen 1992; Simmons 1994, e.g. 23—27. See also Flora 1983 on the political parties 
and their electoral success. In the context of military spending, see Eloranta 1998.
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Figure 41. Number of Votes Cast per Population (=POP) in Belgium, France, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom, 1870—1938
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Source: Banks 1976.
Yet, how can we define a democracy? Or, respectively, an authoritarian regime? Obviously, 
these concepts are far from being uncontentious. A fairly common definition, based on Robert 
Dahl’s concept of polyarchy as the closest approximation of this elusive ideal, usually equates 
democracy with a voting franchise for a substantial fraction o f the citizens, a government 
brought to power in contested elections, and a popularly elected executive controlled by an 
elected legislature. Often also certain civil liberties such as free speech are included, yet less 
frequently applied in the practical adaptations.298 For Gordon Tullock, to provide an even 
stricter definition, the term electoral system is more appropriate to describe a democracy, since 
he argues that universal adult suffrage is necessary for a country to  be a democracy. Thus, as 
suggested by the tables above, most of these countries achieved the status of democracy, even in 
the strictest sense, in the interwar period.299 Robert Dahl has recently defined specific criteria for 
“a democratic process”: 1) Effective participation; 2) Voting equality; 3) Enlightened 
understanding (meaning equal access to relevant information); 4) Control of the agenda
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298 Russett 1993,14. See also Dahl 1998. On comparative criteria, see Linz 2000.
299 Tullock 1987,1—5. Regarding emphasis on civil rights and other freedoms, see especially Linz 1978, 
5. On the remarkably short history of “democracy”, see especially Dahl 1998.
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(meaning that the policies are open to change); 5) Inclusion o f  adults.300 Even if we were to  
accept these notions as the starting point for the analyses here, how should we define the “other”  
forms of government, especially the ones lacking most o f these characteristics?
One of the concepts immediately rejected here for both practical purposes and theoretical 
arguments presented by several authors is dictatorship. This term, with its origins in Ancient 
Rome, has changed meanings several times in history with such concepts as tyranny and 
despotism, and should be limited in use to describe emergency rule that suspends or violates 
temporarily the constitutional norms of accession to an exercise of authority.301 Yet, as Juan J . 
Linz has argued convincingly, a simple dichotomy between democratic and authoritarian (o r 
nondemocratic) regimes is not adequate, especially for empirical purposes. Here I will adopt th e  
concept of totalitarianism —applied to some of the most oppressive regimes o f the 20th century 
such as Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union by Hannah Arendt initially —  to describe 
certain types of extreme forms of authoritarianism in the interwar period. According to Linz, a  
totalitarian state requires certain characteristics to fit the bill: 1) Monistic center of power, 
being the center of legitimacy of political power; 2) Exclusive, autonomous and usually 
intellectually elaborate ideology used by the leader and/or leading group for identification a n d  
as a basis for practical rule; 3) Mobilization of the citizenry for collective purposes, channeled 
through a single party. Furthermore, such a regime would resort to brutal use of violence against 
real or perceived opponents.302
Authoritarian regimes (=autocracies) in turn, imply limited political pluralism, no elaborate o r  
guiding ideology, lacking extensive ability to instigate political mobilization. This term is o f  
course very generic, and the various types of authoritarian regimes include the autocratic- 
monarchic variants typical o f the 19th century, military-bureaucratic regimes such as Japan in  
the 1930s, and various transitional authoritarian regimes.303 Here it is argued that depending 
especially on the degree of centralized rule, the variants of authoritarian influence on m ilitary  
spending decision-making should emerge. Quite similar to Linz, I would not refer to F a sc is t 
Italy as a totalitarian state, at least until Mussolini was able to  consolidate his power in the la te  
1920s. Moreover, Fascist Italy never achieved such a degree o f totalitarianism as for exam ple  
Nazi Germany.304 Thus, a roughly three-way definitional scheme is adopted here to describe t h e
300 Dahl 1998,37—38.
301 Boesche 1996,10—11; Linz 2000,61.
302 Linz 2000,71; Boesche 1996,419—421.
303 See e.g. Linz 2000,54,159. In addition, see Lee 1987.
304 Linz 2000,7—8.
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interwar regimes: democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian. Additionally, the three regime types 
were either stationary (more or less) or transitional (passing from one category to another) 
during this period.305 How can we measure the differences? Is it possible to do so quantitatively?
Table 14. Two Different M easurements on the Num ber o f Democracies and the Number 
States on the Aggregate, 1870— 1940
A. B. C. D. E.
1870 2 39 6 37
1880 3 41 8 37
1890 4 42 8 38
1900 6 43 8 42
1910 8 48 9 44
1920 15 51 26 59
1930 22 64 24 64
1940 19 65 12 62
Sources: Dahl 1998, 8; Polity HID 2000. A=year, B=number of democracies (Dahl); C=number countries (Dahl); 
D=number of democracies (based on Polity IQD and the criteria outlined in the text below); E=number of countries 
(based on Polity IEOD and the criteria outlined in the text below).
Table 14 includes two estimations on the number of democracies in the period 1870— 1940. 
Although there are some discrepancies between the two, certain common conclusions can be 
drawn from this. Firstly, it seems that there were less than ten democracies, in the modem sense 
o f the word outlined above, in the world before the First World W ar.306 Secondly, the number of 
democracies either doubled or tripled, depending on the series used, by 1920. Thirdly, the 1920s 
seems to have been the zenith of the democratization process, at least until the latter part o f the 
20th century. Fourthly, the number of democracies declined again significantly in 1930s.307 
Thus, roughly this outline seems to agree with the story emerging from the extension of the 
franchise and voting behavior. Yet, what do these indices include? How are they constructed?
The combined index used in this study, the Polity DID, stems from efforts by political scientists, 
especially Ted Gurr, to construct such indices on a broad basis to cover a long time period. 
Polity I was created already in the 1970s, in which the unit of analysis was polity or political 
system, describing six dimensions of authority patterns, in 1800— 1971. Since then, there have 
been numerous updates and improvements, and the data therein can be deemed fairly robust. 
The Polity II indices, for example, were based on a ten-point scale inclusive of following
305 However, as Bruce Russett has said, there are always shades of gray between the categories of 
democracy and autocracy. See Russett 1993,15.
306 Russett estimates circa 12 to 15 democracies in existence at the end of the 19th century. See Russett 
1993,20.
307 See also Guit et al. 1993.
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characteristics: competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of executive 
recruitment; openness of executive recruitment; and constraints on chief executive.308 These 
essential parts also form the basis for the Polity HID dataset. The democracy score, as an 
aggregate, country-based index, indicates the general openness o f  political institutions. Thus, 
the ten-point index has been constructed additively on the basis o f  the sub-categories. Table 15 
displays the breakdown of how both the democracy and autocracy scores were constructed in 
Polity m D.
Table 15. Composition of the Polity HID Democracy and Autocracy Indices
DEMOC (3-numeric) Range = 1—10 AUTOC (3-numeric) Range = 1—-10
(0 = low; 10 = high) (0 = low; 10 = high)
PARCOMP PARCOMP
(5) Competitive +3 (1) Suppressed +2
(4) Transitional +2 (2) Restricted +1
(3) Factional +1
PARREG
XRCOMP (4) Restricted +2
(3) Election +2 (3) Factional/Restricted +1
(2) Dual/transitional +1
XRCOMP
XROPEN (only if XRCOMP=2 or 3) (1) Selection +2
(3) Dual/election +1
(4) Election +1 XROPEN (only if XRCOMP=l) 
(1) Closed +1
XCONST
(7) Executive parity or
(2) Dual/designation +1
subordination +4 XCONST
(6) Intermediate category +3 (1) Unlimited authority +3
(5) Substantia] limitations +2 (2) Intermediate category +2
(4) Intermediate category +1 (3) Slight to moderate limitations +1
Source: Polity HID 2000. PARCOMP=competitivene$s of participation; XRCOMP=competitiveness of executive 
recruitment; XROPEN=openness of executive recruitment; XCONST=constraints on the executive; 
P  ARREG =rcgulati cm of participation.
As such, the Polity DID can be criticized, for example, on the basis of its insensitivity to the 
issue of electoral franchise. As we have seen, Switzerland was half a century behind most 
Western states to award women the right to vote, yet it consistently scores a full ten on the 
democracy scale from 1848 onwards (i.e., the beginning of the universal adult male suffrage). 
Similarly, the United States scores ten on the democracy scale for most of the 19* century and 
throughout the 20* century despite the lack of access to political processes by the African-
308 Gurretal. 1993.
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Americans until the 1960s.309 An alternative index should certainly be weighted with a measure 
o f the extensiveness o f the franchise.
Figure 42. Aggregate Democracy (=DEM OC) and Autocracy (=AUTOC) Scores in  the  
L arger Sample of Seventeen States, 1920— 1938
COMBINED
Year
---------D EM O C MINUS AUTOC, 17 COUNTRIES
-------- DEM OC, 17 COUNTRIES
--------- AUTOC, 17 COUNTRIES_________________
Source: calculated from Polity HID 2000.
Note: all missing data and years of transition replaced with zeros in the individual country series. For a  list of 
the states included here, see Figure 11.
These criticisms notwithstanding, the Polity indices can be used in quantitative applications to 
differentiate between the levels of democracy achieved —  excluding such a weighted impact of 
the franchise as suggested above —  and the types of regimes experienced by the countries in 
question. Here I will, for example, characterize the larger sample, used in some o f the 
comparisons, in the following manner: ten democracies, defined as achieving at least a score of 
six out of ten in the Polity HID democracy index for the whole period 1920— 1938 (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, the N etherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U nited 
Kingdom, and the United States); three transitional democracies, defined as fluctuating above 
and below the score of six in the democracy index in the period 1920— 1938 (Spain, Portugal, 
and Austria); and four transitional or stable autocracies (defined as either maintaining their
309 See also Dahl’s minor criticisms on the inclusiveness of the database. Dahl 1998, 196— 199. On non­
elite participation, see Ertman 1998.
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levels of authoritarian or limited democracy regimes and/or becoming even more repressive), 
resulting in an autocracy score of at least three, in the period 1920— 1938 (Germany, Italy, 
Russia/USSR, and Japan). O f the last mentioned, Germany under Hitler and the USSR under 
Stalin can further be distinguished as totalitarian states. As we can see in Figure 42, among the 
sample of 17 nations the comparative advantage enjoyed by the democracies dwindled 
throughout the period, especially in the early 1930s. Respectively, displayed in Figure 43, 
among the sample of eleven the relative advantage of democracies or, more precisely, the 
democracy-autocracy power ratio remained almost stable, which would suggest that they 
formed a uniform sample.
Figure 43. A ggregate Democracy an d  Autocracy Scores in  th e  Sample o f Eleven E uropean  
States, 1920— 1938
1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Year
--------- DEM OC M INUS A U TO C , 11 COUNTRIES
---------DEM OC, 11 CO U N TRIES
----------AUTOC, 11 CO UN TRIES_________________
Source: calculated from Polity HID 2000.
Note: all missing data and years of transition replaced with zeros in the series. For the list of states involved, s e e  
Figure 11.
The basic premises of the democratic peace argument have already been presented in Chapter 2 .  
In essence the argument here is, following the mainly empirical finding that democracies do n o t  
fight each other, that democracies should be more peaceful also in terms of their m ilita ry  
spending behavior. This will also underline the choice o f countries in this thesis. In this section  I  
will test the so-called democratic peace hypotheses at the level o f state, whereas the s y s te m  
level hypotheses will be revisited in Section 4.3. The hypotheses tested in this section are: I )
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The more democratic a regime is, the less of its economic resources, in relative terms, it should 
allocate for military purposes (^HYPOTHESIS 24); 2) The more democratic a  regime is, the 
less of its central government expenditures, in relative terms, it should allocate for military 
purposes (=HYPOTHESIS 25); 3) The more authoritarian a regime is, the more of its economic 
resources, in relative terms, it should allocate for military purposes (=HYPOTHESIS 26); 4) 
The more authoritarian a regime is, the more of its central government expenditures, in relative 
terms, it should allocate for military purposes (^HYPOTHESIS 27); 5) Authoritarian states 
without totalitarian characteristics and centralized leadership should be unable to concentrate 
more resources for military purposes than democracies (=HYPOTHESIS 28); 6) A change in 
the form of government, resulting in authoritarian rule as well as enabling totalitarian and 
centralized leadership, should create a disruption in the relationship between military spending 
and economic growth (=HYPOTHESIS 29). The main tools involved in the testing o f these 
hypotheses are simple quantitative methods, consisting chiefly of nonparametric statistical tests 
between samples as well as regression analyses.
Firstly, to see whether the eleven countries chosen for this thesis comprised a uniform sample, I 
regressed the individual country defense shares and military burdens in a similar manner as in 
Section 3.3, although this time against their respective levels of democracy measured by the 
Polity HID indices. Here I will utilize a larger sample than before to facilitate the comparisons 
and generate more convincing results, and the data quality concerns should be considered the 
same as in the case of most of the authoritarian states. Of particular interest are the groupings 
for the cross-section year 1935310, in the midst of the rearmament surge. Again, there seemed to 
be roughly two groups of countries based on their defense shares and the levels o f democracy in 
1935: the low-spending and the high-spending group. There was quite a bit of dispersion among 
the high-spending group (see Figure 44), which consisted of France, Germany, Greece, 
Rumania, Poland, Italy, and Yugoslavia. All but France were authoritarian regimes to some 
degree. The results on the military burdens were by and large similar. The high-spending group, 
however, was much more uniform and consisted of more nations. Included were Germany, 
Poland, France, Japan, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, Greece, and Italy. Only France and 
Czechoslovakia represented democracies in this group. The five countries that were in the high- 
spending group in terms of both the military burdens and the defense shares were Germany, 
Poland, France, Greece, and Italy. Thus, clearly the impact of the German threat was paramount 
in explaining the French military spending patterns. Also, it seems likely that both Germany and 
Italy achieved the level of centralization of authority required to spend heavily on military
purposes.310 11 Nonetheless, the inferior quality of the data for som e of these countries has to be 
taken into account.
Figure 44. Defense Shares of Twenty-four Countries Regressed Against Their Respective 
Levels of Democracy, 1935
Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = 0.0000 + 1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r  = .81729
s o >. Regression 
95% confid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Case l=Austria; C ase 2=Belgium, Case 3=Bulgaria; C ase  
4=Czechoslovakia; Case 5=Denmark; Case 6=Finland; Case 7=France; Case 8=Germany; Case 9=Greece; 
Case 10=Hungary; Case ll=Italy , C ase 12=Japan; Case 13=the Netherlands; Case 14=Norway; C ase 
15=Poland; Case 16=Portugal; Case 17=Rumania; Case 18=Ru$sia/USSR; Case 19=Spain; Case 20=Sweden; 
Case 21=Switzerland; Case 22=the United Kingdom; Case 23-the United States; Case 24=Yugoslavia. 
Independent variable: individual level o f democracy, measured by the Polity HID index. Model: piecewise 
linear regression with breakpoint.
Thus, HYPOTHESIS 28 received some cautious support from this exercise. More convincing 
evidence must, nonetheless, be mustered to  prove the validity o f this notion. One could em ploy 
for example unit root tests on the appropriate series, with evidence o f nonstationarity making it 
plausible that a change or a  break affects the trend of the series. Or, one could resort to the u se  
of the Chow-tests for structural breaks in the time series.312 Based on such exercises it might b e
310 The cross-section figures for years 1925 and 1930 can be found in Appendices, Appendix 4.
311 The case of the USSR does not fit the pattern in this manner, yet one has to take into account the 
unique structure of its central government spending behavior. Thus, the defense share may be poorly 
representative of its military spending capabilities.
312 Preliminary support for the notions developed here using these methods was found in Eloranta 2000a.
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possible to detect structural changes, yet it is also essential to determine the kind of change that 
took place. Furthermore, it is possible to evaluate the structure of a  sample and the impact o f the 
change by employing standard statistical tests as well as the so-called dummy variable approach 
across a sample of states.
Figure 45. Military Burdens of Twenty-four Countries Regressed Against Their 
Respective Levels of Democracy, 1935
Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = 0.0000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r = .92820
V .  Regression 
95% confid.
Predicted Values (MÏLBUR)
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Case l=Austria; Case 2=Belgium, Case 3=Bulgaria; Case 
4=Czechoslovakia; Case 5=Denmark; Case 6= Finland; Case 7=France; Case 8=Germany; Case 9=Greece; 
Case 10= Hungary; Case ll=Italy; Case 12=Japan; Case 13=the Netherlands; Case 14=Norway, Case 
15=Poland; Case 16= Portugal; Case 17=Rumania; Case 18=Russia/USSR; Case 19=Spain; Case 20=Sweden; 
Case 21=Switzerland; Case 22=the United Kingdom; Case 23=the United States; Case 24=YugosIavia. 
Independent variable: individual level of democracy, measured by the Polity II1D index. Model: piecewise 
linear regression with breakpoint
Firstly, we should assess the structural qualities of the military spending series used in this 
thesis. Time series can be broadly divided into stationary (containing deterministic trends) and 
nonstationary (containing stochastic trends) time series. Nonstationarity involved in the time 
series to be analyzed can lead to the problem of spurious regressions, where the results might 
suggest that there are statistically significant relationships between contemporaneously 
correlated variables. Damodar N. Gujarati has provided a fitting definition of a weakly 
stationary stochastic process: “Broadly speaking, a stochastic process is said to be stationary if
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its mean and variance are constant over time and the value of covariance between two tim e 
periods depends only on the distance or lag between the two time periods and not on the actual 
time at which the covariance is computed.”313 Furthermore, we may differentiate between trend- 
stationary (TS) time series and difference-stationary (DS) stochastic time series. In a TS 
process, the subtraction of the trend results in a stationary series. However, if  we the series has 
to be differenced (that is, converting time series Yt to  AY J by X times, it represents a D SP 
process, in which for example there can be several different trends or the trend can be increasing 
(=explosive) over time. Stochastic trends are characterized by unit root(s).314 *
hi a simple first-order autoregressive (AR) process, as shown by Dickey and Fuller (1979), for 
time series Y,: * •
y , = ( v , - 1 + “. (5)
if |p| < 1, the time series converges toward stationarity. If |p| = 1, the time series is not stationary 
rather than a “random walk”. Further, if  |p| > 1, the time series is not stationary and the variance 
of the time series grows exponentially as t  increases.313 If the time series of certain nth order 
autoregressive process has to be differenced once to  achieve stationarity, only one unit root is 
present in the series. If it has to be differenced twice for it to be considered stationary, it has tw o 
unit roots (and so on).316
As the presence o f  a unit root(s) indicates change(s) in the trend o f the time series, I will use 
unit root tests as an initial indicator of short-term structural changes in the military spending 
time series selected here. How can we test for the presence of unit roots? Perhaps the m ost 
commonly used test in detecting unit roots is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, which is 
an extension o f a Dickey-Fuller test based on an AR(1) process. The original Dickey-Fuller test 
uses specific critical values in the statistical testing, calculated by Fuller, instead of a standard t- 
distribution. The autoregressive process can also be allowed to have an intercept as well as a  
trend component. The ADF test extends the Dickey-Fuller test to cover an AR(p) process:
313 Gujarati 1995, 713. See also Harris 1995. Thus, the conditions for series Y, are: 1) constant mean: 
E(Y0 as ji; 2) constant variance: var(Y,) = a2; 3) covariance: yk = E[(Y, - p)(Y,+k -  p)].
314 Gujarati 1995, 722—724; Hatanaka 1996. On more complex models trend stationarity not considered 
here, such as a broken trend model, see especially Noriega-Muro 1993.
313 Dickey-Fuller 1979,427.
316 On the relevant derivations, see Harris 1995, e.g. 17.
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y* = ^ iX-i +v2y,-i +-v,yt.p +«, (6)
Another test commonly used is that suggested by Phillips and Perron (1988), which undertakes 
a nonparametric correction to the /-test statistics, rather than adding extra terms to a process that 
is not AR(1).317 Hare I will primarily employ the ADF-tests on the military spending time series; 
however, if they failed to reject the null of a unit root, Phillips-Perron tests would also be 
utilized to  confirm the results. The results should be considered only tentative as to whether a 
unit root(s) exists. As has been shown, the ADF-tests tend to  under-reject the null and the 
Phillips-Perron tests tend to over-reject the null, especially in small samples. Also, in small 
samples any unit root process can be approximated by a trend-stationary process.318
Table 16. Unit Roots in the Defense Shares and the Military Burdens for Seventeen 
Countries, 1920—1938
A. B. C
AUT -27,65*** (L=2; C + TREND) -44,27*** (L=2; C + TREND)
BEL -2,74* (L=6; C) -4,75** (L=3;C +TREND)
DEN -4,59*** (L=7;C) -3,82** (L=1;C +TREND)
FIN -4,35*** (L=7; C) -3,49* (L=1;C +TREND)
FRAU -3,59* (L=l; C + TREND) -3,93** (L=7; C + TREND)
GER [1(1)1 -6,41*** (L=l) [1(1)1-3,66** (L=1;C)
ITA -6,85*** (L=7; C + TREND) -11,78*** (L=7; C + TREND)
JAP [1(1)1-5,46*** (L=1;C +TREND) -5,45*** (L=6; C + TREND)
NED -3,77** (L=7; C) [1(2)1 -2,00** (b=\)
NOR ' -4,02** (L=6; C + TREND) -4,49** (L=2; C + TREND)
POR -5,66*** (L=2; C + TREND) -4,51** (L=2; C + TREND)
RUSSIAAJSSR -3,43**(U=7;C) -5,04*** (L=l; C + TREND)
SPA -8,00*** (L=7; C + TREND) [1(1)3 -3,86** (L=2; C + TREND)
SWE -2,97*** (D=3) -3,21** (L=7;C)
SW1 -2,84* (L=3; C) -6,04*** (L=6; C + TREND)
UK [1(2)] -2,00** (1^1) [1(2)] -2,72** (L=l)
USA -3,85** (L=3; C + TREND) -5,91*** (L=1;C +TREND)
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. A=country; B=coefficient and other details on the unit root test, 
defense share; C=coefficient and other details on the unit root test, military burden. * = null hypothesis of a unit root 
rejected at 10 per cent level; ** = null rejected at 5 per cent level; *** = null rejected at 1 per cent level. L = number 
of lags; C = constant; TREND = time trend in the series. All variables in logs.
Note\ All test results are ADF.
Table 16 displays the results of the unit root tests for both the defense shares and the military 
burdens o f  seventeen countries. The unit root tests were conducted backwards from a maximum 
lag of seven years, including both an intercept and a trend to begin with, until the null o f unit
317 See more Phillips-Perron 1988; Harris 1995, 33.
318 Harris 1995,37-^0.
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root was rejected or the tests had to be continued to first- or second differences.319 The results 
indicated strong evidence (-both  ME series imply the presence o f unit root(s)) for Germany and 
the United Kingdom, whereas moderate evidence (=one of the series indicated the presence of 
unit root(s)) was uncovered for Japan, the Netherlands, and Spam, indicating no distinct 
differences between democracies and the few authoritarian/totalitarian states in the sample. 
However, this preliminary result needs to be investigated further with structural stability tests 
and the dummy variable approach, since different kinds o f structural changes have different 
types of impacts across such a small sample span.320
In Eloranta (2000a), the military spending data of fourteen states was first tested for a 
breakpoint —  with nominal ME and military burden, separately, as regressands, and nominal 
GDP (or GNP) and GDP per capita as regressors —using the Chow breakpoint test for the years 
1929, 1930, and 1931, with the assumption that the onset o f the Great Depression and the 
disruptions in trade and international relations that followed caused changes in the military 
spending patterns of European democracies. The Chow breakpoint test is designed to fit the 
equation separately for each subsample and to see whether there are significant differences in 
the estimated equations.321 A  significant difference indicates a structural change in the 
relationship. The Chow breakpoint test is based on a comparison of the sum o f squared residuals 
obtained by fitting a single equation to  the entire sample with the sum of squared residuals 
obtained when separate equations are fit to each subsample o f the data, using the standard F- 
distribution. Additionally, a  log likelihood ratio statistic was calculated, based on the y2 
distribution. Both have no structural change as the null hypothesis.322
The results of the Chow breakpoint tests pointed again to different directions, both among 
democracies and between the two different dependent variables. In the cases o f Finland, France, 
Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the UK, it is feasible to suspect that the military spending series of the 
1920s and 1930s were structurally different. However, it is likely that the sample size, 
specification errors, and unit roots in the equations also had an impact on the results. Thus, as 
we are especially interested in the differences between democracies and the non-democratic
319 Here: a = 0.05 preferred; a  = 0.10 taken as indication of weak stationarity. Also, as indicated, ADF- 
tests are preferred here, with PP-tests (with the said tendency to over-reject the null) conducted only after 
ADF-tests failed to reject the null. Critical values for the Dickey-Fuller jc-statistic, one-sided test, were 
obtained from the revised critical values in MacKinnon 1991.
320 On the impact of different kinds of structural breaks, see in general Noriega-Muro 1993; Harris 1995.
321 Note: here the regressions were corrected for autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity. Also, the 
variables were not differenced even if unit root tests failed to reject the null.
322 On the Chow breakpoint test, see e.g. Gujarati 1995. Rejection of the null was accepted if both
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regimes in the sample, one should try to estimate the possible timing of the break. One 
possibility is to use a one-step Chow forecast323 test, in which each recursive residual is the error 
in a one-step ahead forecast. To test whether the value of the dependent variable at a particular 
year might have come from the model fitted to all the data up to that point, each error can be 
compared with its standard deviation from the full sample.324 Here I am particularly interested in 
the possible dating of breaks in the military spending series of the non-democratic regimes. As it 
will be shown, there are also problems with using the military spending series contained under 
different definitions in the authoritarian and/or totalitarian cases, especially concerning 
Mussolini’s Italy.
In the Italian case, there are several possible choices for the dating of the beginning of the 
Fascist period. The first is October 1922 when the Fascists marched to Rome under Mussolini’s 
leadership (although he did not participate in person) and he was appointed prime minister. 
However, Mussolini did not ultimately win his fight with parliamentarism and the political 
parties until 1925— 1926, to become il Duce of Italy. From the point of view of public finances, 
the budget year 1924— 1925 marked the return to a balanced budget, after serious public 
spending cuts had been implemented.325 Thus, here I will compromise and follow Banks (1976) 
to consider the year 1924 (also the year of last elections) as the first year of authoritarian rule, 
especially from the perspective of public finances.326 Another problem is what series to choose 
to represent Italian military spending. For example, Repaci’s (1962) figures on the “effective 
expenditure” exclude war expenditures, whereas Ercolani (1975) figures include war expenses 
and pensions as well. As discussed in the Appendices (Appendix 2), the Italian M E series 
chosen here is a composite series comprising three different sources, which is closer to the 
Ercolani variant.327 Needless to say, as in most cases dealing with authoritarian states in this 
period, the estimates are not as reliable as those compiled for the democracies. Here I will test
statistics indicated it (a=0.05). See Eloranta 2000a for details on the results.
323 The Chow forecast test estimates the model for a subsample comprised of the first set of observations. 
The estimated model is then used to predict the values of die dependent variable in the remaining data 
points. A large difference between the actual and predicted values casts doubt on the stability of the 
estimated relation over the two subsamples. See e.g. Gujarati 1995.
324 On various possibilities of detecting structural breaks, see Fomby et al. 1984. The graphs for other 
countries (nominal ME) except the authoritarian regimes can be found in Eloranta 2000a. Others available 
from the author by request.
325 Cf. Di Palma 1982,109—110; Fameti 1978; Zamagni 1993,244.
326 Dummy variables, based on Banks 1976, were assigned to equal one for the years of non- 
parliamentary rule in the dummy variable regressions.
*27 See Repaci 1962, 168—169, 354—355; Ercolani 1975, 400. On other sources of Italian military 
spending figures for parts of this period, see i.e. Covino et al. 1976; Ceva 1981. The best, detailed 
breakdown and discussion on the Italian military expenditures for the 1930s can be found in Zamagni 
1998. Zamagni also criticizes Repaci’s figures as "planned outlays”, which reduces their reliability;
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both Italian military spending series (defense share and military burden) for structural b reaks 
and contemplate on the differences. Conversely, the same will be done for the Portuguese a n d  
the Spanish data.
Figure 46. One-step Chow Forecast Test on the Italian Military Burden (Independent 
Variable: Real GDP per Capita in 1929 Quasi-USD), 1920—1938
° One-Step Probability --------Recursive Residuals
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2. Variables in logs.
One-step Chow tests on the Italian defense share and military burden pointed towards d ifferen t 
conclusions.328 Whereas the defense share, respective of economic development, did not seem  to  
reveal structural changes in the period, the one-step Chow tests on the military burden ind icated  
breaks in 1936 and 1937. This result is not surprising for the mid-1930s, since the I ta lian  
military spending grew strongly as a result of Italy’s colonial adventures. Although the resu lts  
were not exactly the same for both series, it is possible to suspect that at least one structu ral 
break took place in the mid-1930s. These results have to be, o f course, treated with a degree o f  
caution. The choice of the military spending series to be used has a large impact on th e  
findings.329 In comparison, for example in the Portuguese case, the results are not a s  
straightforward to interpret. In Portugal, the period starting from 1926 until the 1974 could b e
Zamagni 1998, 217 (note 36).
328 On the other figures, see Eloranta 2000a.
329 See e.g, Eloranta 2000a.
149
characterized as authoritarian period* with Salazar gradually becoming the dictator after his 
nomination as prime minister in 1932.330
Figure 47. One-step Chow Forecast Test on the Portuguese M ilitary B urden (Independent 
Variable: Real G D P per C apita in 1929 Quasi-USD), 1920— 1938
Sources: see Appendices* Appendix 2 for details. Variables in legs.
As we can see in Figure 47 (and in Eloranta 2000a), the one-step Chow tests implied structural 
breaks in 1927 and 1935 for the Portuguese series, suggesting a possible change in the statistical 
relationship. The latter year is more probable as a breakpoint, perhaps resulting from Portugal’s 
rearmament and the changed international climate. In the Spanish case, Primo de Rivera’s 
dictatorship 1923— 1930 did not seem to have any structural effect on either of the military 
spending variables.331 All in all, there is some evidence that the structural changes in these three 
countries’ military spending behavior were not caused by the regime shift. Therefore, these 
authoritarian regimes, perhaps also including Fascist Italy, were not able to achieve such 
sweeping centralized powers required to  undertake massive arms buildups. Compared to for 
example Germany and Japan, the Italian military burden in the late 1930s was quite meager, as 
seen in the previous chapter.
330 See Banks 1971; Porch 1977,18—26.
331 See Eloranta 2000a. See also Blinkhom 1986, 1—3. Results on the Spanish case available from the 
author by request.
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The results o f these statistical tests are inconclusive, however, due to the small sample bias, yet 
suggestive nonetheless. Based on the unit root tests and breakpoint tests, it seems that some o f 
the states endured structural changes in their military spending behavior during this time period. 
Most of those that did experience such changes in their spending behavior were authoritarian 
nations. All in all, they provide only very preliminary support for HYPOTHESIS 29. They do 
not, however, provide us with clues as to what these changes meant. For example, did the 
authoritarian regime shift increase military spending? Or, did authoritarian nations as a whole332 3
spend more than democracies?
Table 17. Spearman Rank Correlations333 on the Relationship Between Military Spending 
Variables and Levels of Democracy Across a Cross-section of Twenty-four Countries, 
1925,1930,1935
A. B. C. D, E.
1925 MILBUR, DEMOC 22 -0,45 0,04
1930 M1LBUR, DEMOC 24 -0,43 0,04
1935 MILBUR, DEMOC 24 -0,56 0,00
1925 DFSHARE, DEMOC 24 -0,10 0,64
1930 DFSHARE, DEMOC 24 -0,08 0,71
1935 DFSHARE, DEMOC 24 -0,36 0,09
1925 MILBUR, DEMDUM 22 -0,42 0,05
1930 MILBUR, DEMDUM 24 -0,53 0,01
1935 MILBUR, DEMDUM 24 -0,45 0,03
1925 DFSHARE, DEMDUM 24 -0,17 0,43
1930 DFSHARE, DEMDUM 24 -0,26 0,22
1935 DFSHARE, DEMDUM 24 -0,30 0,16
1925 MILBUR, AUTOC 22 0,50 0,02
1930 MILBUR, AUTOC 24 0,50 0,01
1935 MILBUR, AUTOC 24 0,45 0,03
1925 DFSHARE, AUTOC 24 0,23 0,27
1930 DFSHARE, AUTOC 24 0,28 0,18
1935 DFSHARE, AUTOC 24 0,33 0,12
1925 MILBUR, AUTDUM 22 0,39 0,08
1930 MILBUR, AUTDUM 24 0,49 0,02
1935 MILBUR, AUTDUM 24 0,51 0,01
1925 DFSHARE, AUTDUM 24 0,24 0,25
1930 DFSHARE, AUTDUM 24 0,33 0,11
1935 DFSHARE, AUTDUM 24 0,43 0,04
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. A=cross-$ection year; B=pair of variables, cross-section; O val id 
N\ D=Spearman R; E=p-level. MILBUR»military burden; DFSHARE=defense share; DEM OOIevel of 
democracy, measured by the Polity IIID scale; DEMDXJM=democracy dummy, set to 1 when the level of democracy 
measured by the Polity IIID scale is six or more, otherwise 0; A U T O O  level of democracy, measured by the Polity 
IIID scale; AUTDUM=autocracy dummy, set to  1 when the level of autocracy measured by the Polity IIID scale is 
three or more.
332 Preliminary evidence on the individual country series was already discovered in Eloranta 2000a.
333 See Section 5.1 (and Appendices, Appendix IB) for details on the nonparametric tests utilized in this 
thesis.
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It is possible to  assess the size and significance of the impact of regime type on military 
spending better among a group of countries in a cross-section by utilizing nonparametric 
statistical tools. As seen in Table 17, there seems to be quite clear support for HYPOTHESIS 26 
here, especially inasmuch the level of authoritarian rule increased the respective military burden 
for the country in question. The more repressive a regime was, the more of its economic 
resources it allocated for its defense throughout the period. Equally, a threshold level of 
authoritarian rule (here: three on the Polity IHD scale) seemed to be required for a country to 
behave in such a manner. Thus, some support is also provided for HYPOTHESIS 28; namely 
that the less oppressive autocratic regimes were unable to concentrate any more resources for 
military purposes than the democracies. This was confirmed with the democracy dummy results 
as well. Moreover, this was the conclusion emerging from the preceding analyses o f the 
structural characteristics of the time series. Furthermore, the more democratic a regime was, the 
less of its economic resources it allocated for military purposes (=HYPOTHESIS 24). 
HYPOTHESIS 25 can be confirmed only for 1935, which complies with the review of the 
military spending patterns presented in the previous chapter: Democracies were slow to rearm in 
the 1930s, at least in comparison with the strongly authoritarian regimes.
In order to revisit HYPOTHESIS 29, we need to utilize the same cross-sections as above by 
using the dummy variable approach suggested by, among others, Gujarati (1995). The dummy 
variable approach is simple and intuitive. For estimating the relationship between military 
spending (for example, military burden as the dependent variable) and economic development 
(real GDP per capita as the independent variable), one would also include an intercept dummy 
Di and a slope dummy DpINCOME in the regression.
M E, =  + 0JN C O M E, + 0 4(Dt, • INCO M E,)+ u, (7)
in which Di is either the democracy or autocracy dummy mentioned in Table 17. ME is either 
the defense share or the military burden; INCOME equals real GDP per capita, pi is the 
intercept of the original equation (covering the whole time period); indicates the significance 
of the change in the intercept in the period affected by the dummy (i.e., the whole intercept, if 
both pi and pi are found to be statistically significant with standard t-tests, for the non- 
democratic period is Pi + # ) ;  p3 is the coefficient of the INCOME variable for the whole period; 
and p4 is the differential slope coefficient in the period affected by the dummy (i.e., p 3 + p4 if 
they are both found to the statistically significant). Individual country cases discussed in 
Eloranta 2000a supported the idea that regime shifts towards more authoritarian rule occurring
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in more authoritarian countries such as Italy and Japan produced structural changes in a  
different manner than for, for example, Portugal and Spain.334 35
Table 18. Impact of Regime Type on the Military Burden Across a Cross-section o f  
Twenty-four Countries, 1925,1930,1935
A. B. C. D. E. F.
1925 MILBUR 1,62** AUTOC: 0,15* -0,39* -
1925 MILBUR 2,77*** tAUTOC: -3,67** -0,72*** 1 14***
1930 MILBUR 0,15 DEMOC: 2,31* 0,09 -6,72**
1930 MILBUR -0,11 fDEMOC: 2,98** 0,17 -0,90***
1935 MILBUR 1,02 DEMOC: 3,73* -0,13 -1,10*
1935 MILBUR 0,91 tDEMOC: 3,53** -0,10 -1,04**
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2. Real GDP per capita from Maddison 1995. A=year; B=independent variable; 
C=intercept; D=dummy variable as in Table 17; E=reai GDP per capita (in 1990 Geary-Khamis USD), log; F=slope 
dummy, D times E. * = null hypothesis of zero coefficient rejected at 10 per cent level; ** = null rejected at 5 p e r  
cent level; *** = null rejected at 1 per cent level. All variables in logs. Differencing as in Table 16.
Note: f-Portugal and/or Spain included in the democracy group in the dummy, despite having a three or more in th e  
Polity HID autocracy index. Only the best outcome is listed in the table.335
For the three cross-section years utilized before —  1925, 1930, and 1935 —  the results a ris ing  
from the analysis are quite clear. Firstly, the inclusion o f Portugal and/or Spain in th e  
democratic “camp”, despite apparent authoritarian rule, seemed to improve the coefficient 
estimates. Thus, Portugal and Spain, as suspected also previously, should be included in th e  
sample of eleven in this thesis. Secondly, HYPOTHESIS 29 seems to have merit on the basis o f  
the dummy variable estimates. For example, whereas the regression line for autocracies 
(including Spain) in 1925 had, if  we account only for statistically significant variables, a n  
intercept o f -0,91 and slope intercept o f 0,42; thus, as economic resources increased also th e ir  
military spending increased. In contrast, the intercept for democracies was 2,77 and the s lo p e  
intercept was -0,72, indicating decreasing ME as the level o f  economic development increased. 
The same conclusions emerged from  the other comparisons included in Table 18.
All in all, the results of the various inquiries in this section suggested the following; 1) 
Democracies were different from autocracies, relative of income, in their military spending 
behavior; 2) Less authoritarian regimes were more like democracies than autocracies in th e ir  
military spending behavior; 3) Increased centralization and repression in an autocracy, em erging
334 Eloranta 2000a.
335 The results passed the LM serial correlation test. The Breusch-Godfrey LM serial correlation test is 
used to test the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation up to lag order p, where p is a pre­
specified integer. See Godfrey 1988 for further details. In addition, the so-called Q-statistics were used. 
See e.g. Gujarati 1995. Also, an AR(1) term was included in some of the equations. Details available from 
the author by request.
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through the autocracy index, implied higher military spending; 4) A shift towards an 
authoritarianism had an impact on the country’s military spending only when a centralized form 
of authoritarian rule was consolidated, resulting in a structural break in the time series; 5) The 
more democratic a regime was, the less of its economic resources it dedicated for military 
purposes; 6) The more repressive a regime was, the more of its economic resources it dedicated 
for military purposes; 7) Democracies spent less of their economic resources on defense as their 
level of development increased; 8) Autocracies spent more o f their economic resources on 
defense as their level of development increased. These results have to be taken with a grain of 
salt, however, due to the small sample problems involved in these exercises. Furthermore, the 
systemic implications of the level of democracy and other such hypotheses at the systemic level 
will be investigated in Section 4.3. First, however, I will turn to examining the relationship 
between military spending and economic development in more detail.
4,2, Leader-Challenger-Follower? The Interdependence o f Military Spending and Economic
Development
The idea that economic leadership in a system is crucial to understanding foreign relations has 
been influential especially among political scientists in the post- Second World War period. For 
example hegemonic theorists, such as Robert Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Paul Kennedy, Charles 
Kindleberger, and Robert Gilpin, are among those who claim  a strong relationship exists 
between the pursuit of leadership and economic development. According to Keohane and Nye, a 
state is likely to provide hegemonial leadership in the international regime if there are benefits 
to be gained from such action, with the hegemonial power being able to change the rules of the 
game rather than having to adapt to changes imposed by others.336 The hegemon may use 
coercion (=stick) or positive incentives (=carrot) to achieve the goals that it seeks. This 
hegemon’s economic/political leadership can erode due to crises or shifts in the overall balance 
of power between the states in the international regime. At such a time, the so-called secondary 
powers, the followers, respectively react by altering their goals to challenge the leader’s 
position.337 Needless to say, this very abstract theoretical framework has attracted both 
criticism338 as well as further theorizing in regards to more precise applications. All in all, most 
historical studies utilizing these arguments have focused specifically on monetary markets and 
trade regimes (especially competing trade blocs).339 As far as historical instances of hegemonic
336 Keohane-Nye 1977,44—45.
337 Keohane-Nye 1977,45—46; North 1990, 147—149; Eichengreen 1990.
338 Rapkin 1990, 3—5; North 1990, 142—144; Kindleberger 1988; Eichengreen 1990,273—275.
339 Kindleberger 1973; Eichengreen 1992.
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leadership are concerned, there seems to be unanimous agreement that the post-1945 period has  
been one o f American hegemony, and with considerable agreement on the 19th century having 
been one o f British hegemony.340 , ;. ■
The economic position of the United States was indeed dominant in the international system by  
the interwar period. Its position as the Western world’s creditor nation was reinforced by th e  
massive size o f its economy and internal market. In terms of the 17-country system discussed in  
more detail in the next section of this chapter, the United States was the unambiguous economic 
leader o f the interwar period; a position which had emerged in the late 19* century and w as 
solidified by the First World War.341 As seen in Table 19, the U.S. had already a three-fold rea l 
GDP lead in absolute terms over the United Kingdom in the interwar period, and it occupied a  
dominant position in the world iron and steel production. Despite the lack of political leadership 
by the U.S., its economic position was that of a hegemon.
Table 19. UJS. Leadership Position in Perspective in the Interwar Period
A. B. C D. E.
1925 36,7 11,0 51,1 13,5
1930 34,8 10,6 42,9 13,0
1935 29,9 10,9 33,3 15,8
Sources: see Appendices and Section 4.1 for details on the system. A=year; B=real GDP percentage share (in 1929 
quasi-USD) of the United States in the 17-country system; C=real GDP percentage share (in 1929 quasi-USD) o f th e  
United Kingdom in the 17-country system; D=iron and steel production percentage share (in tons) of the United 
States in the 17-country system; E=iron and steel production percentage share (in tons) of Germany in the 17-country 
system.
However, the American economic leadership did not extend easily to political leadership, as  
hegemonic theorists often presume. According to Charles Kindleberger, a significant feature o f  
the 1920s was the absence of a particular military leader nation in the world. Consequently, 
after the disintegration of the world economy started in the early 1930s, economic cooperation 
turned into economic rivalry and military competition for leadership.342 As Paul Kennedy to o  
has noted, the 1919 American withdrawal, in addition to  Russian isolationism, put the  
international system “more out of jo in t with the fundamental economic realities than perhaps a t 
any time in the five centuries”, thus suggesting a period of adjustment. The United Kingdom  
and France, although weakened, were at the center stage diplomatically until their position w as
340 Rapkin 1990, 8—9. See also Kennedy 1989 — interpretations based on military might or trade 
dominance alone are more contested, such as the case of the Netherlands in the 17* century. Modelski- 
Thompson 1996 on leadership cycles in general; Modelski-Thompson 1988 on seapower. On criticism o f 
the imperial overreach argument in the British case, see especially Hobson 1993.
341 See Prados de laEscosura 2000.
342 Kindleberger 1973.
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challenged in the 1930s by “the militarized, revisionist states of Italy, Japan, and Germany”.343 
Furthermore, as Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye have pointed out, in such a period of 
adjustment the “secondary nations” compete for leadership, and economic nationalism 
increases. This would implicate that the followers embark on higher military spending, naturally 
depending on their economic resources and market position.344
Figure 48. Possible Interaction Between Economic Development and Military Spending 
for the Economic Leader Nation(s)
t
S o u r c e :  c o n stru cte d  b y  the author.
One of the less explored aspects in most studies of hegemonic patterns is the military 
expenditure component in the competition between the states for military and economic 
leadership in the system According to Paul Kennedy, uneven economic growth levels cause 
nations to compete for economic and military prowess. The leader nation(s) thus has to dedicate 
increasing resources to armaments in order to maintain its position, while the other states, the 
so-called followers, can benefit from greater investments in other areas of economic activity. 
Thus, the follower states act as free riders in the international system stabilized by the hegemon. 
A built-in assumption in this hypothesis is that military spending eventually becomes harmful
343 Kennedy 1989, xxi.
344 Keohane-Nye 1977; Gilpin 1977,47—54; Kindleberger 1973.
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for economic development; a notion that has often been challenged.345 The development pattern 
implied, albeit cautiously, by Kennedy would have certain implications for both economic 
development and military spending. At the beginning of a “cycle” for a hegemon, the economy 
as a whole begins to grow much faster than military expenditures. During this time span, th e  
hegemon also initiates ever higher M E in order to secure its economic position. However, in the  
middle of the cycle, economic growth has already begun to  slow, due to the military exertions, 
whereas M E is still growing. At this point, the hegemon attempts to compensate for its  
economic losses by wielding even more political/military muscle. At the end of the cycle, th e  
burden of military expenditures has also declined sharply, enabling a new period of growth.346 
This pattern is of course only an approximation, which has been visualized in Figure 48.
Figure 49. Possible Interaction Between Economic Development and Military Spending 
for the Economic Challenger Nation(s)
t
Source: constructed by the author.
The reaction of the challenger and/or follower nations would, respectively, correspond to this 
pattern of development by the leader. The challengers comprise nations that aspire and have the 
resources to challenge the leader; i.e., existing Great Powers or emerging Great Powers. T he
345 Kennedy 1989, xiii; Hodne 1992, 80—82. See also Maddison 1991; Kennedy 1991; Kindleberger 
1973,
346 See a related article by this author: Eloranta 2001a.
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challenge of the leader’s economic/military position would begin when the hegemon has 
overreached itself (i.e., from t2-tj). Followers are nations that would not able to challenge the 
leader due to their limited resources or limited size; i.e., Medium and Small Powers (=”weak” 
states).347 An approximation of this pattern is presented above in Figure 49 for the challengers. 
The outline for development o f these variables for the “weak” states should be similar, yet the 
military spending response would presumably be more muted. Overall, the assertion arising 
from this framework is that economic development and military spending are closely 
interdependent, with military spending being even the driving force behind economic cycles, 
among the Great Powers.
Moreover, based on this development pattern, it has been suggested that a country’s poor 
economic performance can be linked to  the ’’wasted” economic resources represented by 
military expenditures. However, as recent studies have shown, economic development is often 
more significant in explaining military spending rather than vice versa.348 One may refer to  the 
latter effect as the so-called war chest hypothesis. As some of the hegemonic theorists reviewed 
above suggest, economic prosperity might be a necessary prerequisite for war and expansion. 
Thus, as Brian M. Pollins and Randall L. Schweller have indicated, economic growth would 
induce rising government expenditures, which in turn would enable higher military spending. 
Therefore military expenditures would be “caused” by economic growth at a certain time lag.349 
The exact mechanism of this argument is rather obscure, and it actually would also fit the 
pattern described in Figure 48 above. Here I will, firstly, explore the idea (=HYPOTHESIS 30) 
that economic growth might be “caused” by military expenditures (also referred to as the 
Kennedy argument, yet only in the short run) and/or vice versa (=HYPOTHESIS 31; or the war 
chest hypothesis) by utilizing Granger non-causality tests on the economic development and M E 
variables for the selected countries in the period 1920— 1938. Secondly, as a built-in notion in 
the hegemonic Kennedy framework, I will test to see whether this interaction had a negative 
(=HYPOTHESIS 33) or positive (=HYPOTHESIS 32) growth effect in the short run. For 
example, Alex Mintz and Chi Huang (1990) have suggested that an indirect, negative growth 
effect occurs via investment at a lag of at least five years. Does this hypothesized investment 
effect emerge from the statistical exercises?
347 See e.g. Handel 1981. See also Eloranta 2001a; Eloranta 2002a.
348 On criticism of this mechanism, see the references in Eloranta 2001a.
349 Pollins-Sch weller 1999, e.g. 445— 446.
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Nonetheless, even though it has often been argued that the British leadership in the 19th century  
became too expensive to maintain, a reference to the so-called imperial overstretch argument, it 
is not a particularly convincing or empirically tested notion. At the heart of this argument lies 
the proposition that Great Britain simply had to devote too extensive military resources in to  
defending the Empire. Nonetheless, it is equally often argued that the British army was sim ply 
too small compared to her continental rivals. In an illuminating analysis John M. Hobson has 
proven conclusively that the military expenditures incurred by Great Britain were small in  
relative terms compared to the other Great Powers of the period, with the exception o f th e  
United States, and that it is difficult to  maintain that the British military commitments caused 
the decline o f its hegemonial status.350 George Modelski and William R. Thompson perceive th e  
roots of the British decline not only in the economic catch-up o f its rivals, but also in the erosion 
of its lead in naval technologies, prompting a naval armaments race in the late 19th century an d  
early 20th century. Thus, despite being able to maintain a  strategic dominance in the naval 
standoff during the war, “Britain emerged from the First W orld War no longer the world pow er 
and too poor to  maintain its long-standing naval leadership”.351
The hegemonic framework, in the form advocated by Paul Kennedy, implies that m ilitary 
spending and economic growth are interdependent due to  the “wasted” economic resources 
embodied by military expenditures, often presuming a causal influence of military expenditures 
on economic development. How much is too much? Although the preceding sections m ay 
provide us with some clues as to who might be overspending, they are certainly only indicative. 
For example, the American interwar military burden was, except for 1920— 1922, between 0 .6  
and 1.3 per cent, whereas during the 1950s the American military burden was often over ten pe r 
cent.352 Thus, it is not difficult maintain that the meager burden imposed by the m ilitary 
spending of the interwar years could not have been very significant in the development o f the  
American economy. The conclusion could be the exact opposite: military spending was, in fact, 
in line with the war chest argument, dependent on the development of the economy and 
economic rivalry in general. Firstly, we can attempt to verify the “causal” links between 
economic development and M E by applying the concept of Granger non-causality.353
Granger non-causality can be represented as:
350 See especially Hobson 1993 and the key studies scrutinized in it. Also, Offer 1993.
351 Modelski-Thompson 1988,210—211.
352 See e.g. Stiglitz 1988,41-—42.
353 Granger non-causality tests have been applied to military spending analysis e.g. in Eloranta 2001a; 
Chowdhury 1991. For long run applications, see especially Rasler-Thompson 1991.
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where the possible causality between X and Y is verified by testing the following null 
hypotheses: bj = 0 and dj = 0, in addition to testing the validity of the lagged values of X and Y 
in predicting their performance. If, for example, the former hypothesis is rejected, Y Granger- 
caused X, and vice versa. If both X and Y are rejected, there was interaction between X and Y; 
the failure to reject both of the above hypotheses would imply independence between these 
variables. Here these relationships were tested for the following three pairs of variables for 
seventeen countries: the defense shares and real GDP per capita (in 1929 quasi-USD); the 
military burdens and real GDP per capita (in 1929 quasi-USD); the individual country real ME 
and individual country real GDP shares (in the 17-country system)354 35. Of these variables, the 
defense share can be expected to reveal a “budgetary response”, the military burden a “direct 
economic impact”, and the real ME share a "systemic response” to economic changes. In order 
to provide a consistent framework, I have applied the following rules to the analysis: 1) Tw o out 
of the three pairs of Granger-causality relationships would have to indicate the same direction of 
causation for the results to be deemed credible; 2) Granger-causality relationships found at more 
than one lag structure, especially since relationships at t-1 may be poorly representative, were 
deemed more reliable than others.353
Due to potential problems of autocorrelation and nonstationarity, the logarithmic forms o f these 
variables were preferred. The assumption of stationarity, based on the ADF-unit root tests, holds
354 On the last-mentioned pair, see the next section for details.
355 The rating scheme is as follows: 1) ECONOMY-^ ME: 2 pairs of variables at more than one lag in the 
same direction = weak evidence; 2 pairs of variables at more than one lag in the same direction plus at 
least one of the p-values below 0,01 or 3 pairs at more than one lag in the same direction = strong 
evidence; 2) ME —► ECONOMY: 2 pairs of variables at more than one lag in the same direction = weak 
evidence; 2 pairs of variables at more than one lag in the same direction plus at least one of p-values 
below 0,01 or 3 pairs at more than one lag in the same direction = strong evidence; 3) 
INTERDEPENDENCE: 2 (in one direction) + 1 (in the other direction) pairs of variables at more than 
one lag = weak evidence; 2 (in one direction) + 2 (in the other direction) pairs of variables at more than 
one lag = strong evidence; 4) INDEPENDENCE: 1 (in one direction) + 1 (in the other direction) pairs of 
variables at more than one lag = weak evidence; all other cases not meeting these minimum requirements 
= strong evidence. Thus, the ratings in Table 20 should be reviewed in connection with Appendices, 
Appendix 3, Table 2.
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for most o f the variables in this period, with the exception o f a  few of the time series.356 A ll o f  
the Granger non-causality tests were applied to a maximum number of five lags, given th e  
shortness o f the period. The results are summarized in Table 20, whereas the detailed findings 
can be observed in Appendices, Appendix 3, Table 2.
Table 20. Results of the Granger Non-causality Tests for Seventeen States, 1920—1938: 
Summary of the Findings
ECONOMY—»ME ME—»ECONOMY INTERDEPENDENCE INDEPENDENCE
FRA*, ITA**, 
AUT**
FIN**, SWE* BEL**, DEN*, GER**, 
JAP**, NED**, NOR**, 
POR**, RUS*, SPA**, 
SWI**, UK**, USA*
Sources: See Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. All variables in logs.
Note: ** = strong evidence; * = weak evidence. For details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
The war chest hypothesis was supported only nominally by the interwar comparisons. T h e  
notion that these variables operated independently o f one another (at least according to th is  
rigorous rating scheme that requires, for example, at least two o f the military spending variables 
to reject the null of no causality at more than one lag) has substantial support in the in terw ar 
case. These results cast considerable doubt on the idea that “high” military spending may h a v e  
been the driving force in the economic development of the period, at least in the short term. I f  
we were to accept the idea that military spending is not the primary “causal” influence affecting 
the economy, can we also determine the nature of its impact, whether positive or negative?
Here I have, in order to increase the representativeness of the estimates, pooled the three pairs o f  
variables in GLS regressions, as seen in Tables 21 and 22, to see whether the lagged m ilitary  
spending variables had either of the proposed impacts on the economic development in th is  
period. Furthermore, I would like to  impose two restrictions on the results in order to im prove 
their reliability. Firstly, if the sign o f the coefficient remained the same for all of the statistically 
significant lags, it would be interpreted as weak evidence o f either positive or negative im pact. 
Secondly, in addition to condition one being applicable, if the sign of all the coefficients o f th e  
military spending variable in question remained the same, this would be interpreted as strong 
evidence o f either positive or negative impact. These conditions were set on the basis o f th e  
Granger non-causality results and standard practices of performing regression analysis.
356 The results of the tests on the stationarity of the series can be obtained from the author by request. On 
other applications, see especially Harris 1995. The variables found to contain unit roots to the same level 
of integration used in the analyses of this paper were also tested for possible cointegration vectors using 
the so-called Johansen test, yet no cointegration was discovered. Results of these tests available from the 
author by request.
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Based on this analytical scheme, it seems that there was strong evidence that economic 
development was influenced by the military burdens and the real ME shares of the 17 states 
included in Table 21. Equally, the budgetary ME variable produced weak evidence of a negative 
impact. Moreover, it seems that the military burden produced a positive growth impetus that 
was partially offset by the defense share. At the systemic level, the impact of military spending 
was small. For the core sample of eleven in this thesis (Table 22), the results were less clear. 
Again, the military burden invoked a positive economic growth response, yet the defense share 
seemed to  produce an equal negative response. The systemic equation failed to produce a 
consistent relationship in these terms. Therefore, one should again make a distinction between 
the democracies and autocracies in these samples. Whereas for autocracies the economic growth 
impact in the short run seems to have been positive, in democracies this relationship was more 
obscure. Yet, a  negative investment impact such as suggested earlier was hardly forthcoming.
Table 21. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) Estim ates o n  the Short-Run Im pact of 
M ilitary Spending on Economic Development for Seventeen States, 1920— 1938
A. B. C D.
GDPCAP MILBUR(-l) 0,03*** N=153
MILBUR(-2) 0,09*** S.E.=0,02
MILBUR(-3) 0,14*** DW=1,61
MILBUR(-4) 0,14*** F=179000
MILBUR(-5) 0,09***
MILBUR(-6) 0,05***
MILBUR(-7) 0.00
GDPCAP DFSHARE(-l) 0,01 N=153
DFSHARE(-2) -0,02 S.E.=0,03
DFSHARE(-3) -0,07** DW=1,53
DFSHAREH) -0,07*** F=223000
DFSHARE(-S) -0,04**
' DFSHARE(-6) 0,01
DFSHAREC-7) 0,00
GDPSHARE MESHARE(-l) 0,01 N=187
MESHARE(-2) 0,01* S.E.=0,02
MESHARE(-3) 0,01* DW=1,73
MESHARE(-4) 0,01*** F=34000
MESHARE(-S) 0,01***
MESHARE(-6) 0,01***
MESHARE(-7) 0,00
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2. A=dependent variable for the GLS (with cross-section weights); 
B=mdependent variables (with lags indicated in parenthesis) for the GLS; (^coefficients for the independent 
variables; D=GLS regression statistics. * = null hypothesis rejected at 10 per cent level; ** = null rejected at 5 per 
cent level; *** = null rejected at I per cent level. Differencing as in Table 16. All variables in logs.
Note: AR(1) term included in the GLS equations, as well as fixed effect intercepts, yet they are not reported in the 
table. Details on these available from the author by request. For details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
It has also been implied in conjunction with the hegemonic literature reviewed earlier that the 
harmful economic impact of military spending may emerge at a long time lag, such as 30 years
1162
or more. This idea was tested in a simplistic manner in Eloranta (2001b) by regressing the rea l 
GDP per capita on the military burden (and vice versa) at lags from 39—20 years for two G reat 
Powers (the United Kingdom, the United States) and two small states (Denmark, Sweden). 
These countries were selected on the basis of reasonably uniform data. The period 1870— 1990 
was selected as representing the decline o f the United Kingdom and the ascendancy o f the  
United States; moreover, the starting year corresponds to our other samples, and the ending year 
seemed to, approximately, mark the beginning of a new type o f military spending regime fo r  
most countries. The variables were tested for unit roots and differenced if necessary.
Table 22. GLS Estimates on the Short-Run Impact of Military Spending on Economic 
Development for the Selected Eleven European States, 1920—1938
A. B. C. D.
GDPCAP MILBUR(-1) -0,08 N=99
MILBUR(-2) 0,00 S.E.=0,02
MILBUR(-3) 0,08* DW=1,87
MILBUR(-4) 0,07* F=51200
MILBUR(-5) 0,02
MELBUR(-6) 0,10***
MILBUR(-7) 0,07***
GDPCAP DFSHARE(-l) -0,01 N=99
DFSHARE(-2) -0,07*** S.E.=0,02
DFSHAKE(-3) -0,10*** DW=1,71
DFSHARE(-4) -0,10*** F=122000
DFSHARE(-S) -0,05***
DFSHARE(-6) 0,02
DFSHARE(-7) -0,00
GDPSHARE MESHARE(-l) 0,04*** N=121
MESHARE(-2) -0,00 S.E.=0,02
MESHARE(-3) -0,028** DW=1,91
MESHARE(-4) -0,01 F=13700
MESHARE(-5) 0,04
MESHARE(-6) 0,00
MESHARE(-7) 0,00
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2. A=dependent variable for the GLS (with cross-section weights); 
B=independent variables (with lags indicated in parenthesis) for the GLS; C=coefficients for the independent 
variables; D=GLS regression statistics. * = null hypothesis rejected at 10 per cent level; ** = null rejected at 5 per 
cent level; *** = null rejected at 1 per cent level. Differencing as in Table 16. All variables in logs.
Note: AR(1) term included in the GLS equations, as well as fixed effect intercepts, yet they are not reported in the 
table. Details on these available from the author by request. For details on the countries included, see Figure 11.
Furthermore, the results had to pass the Breusch-Godfrey LM  serial correlation test up to five 
lags to be accepted. Within the selected lag structure, the emerging statistical relationship had to 
occur at least three times, and the coefficient of the independent variable had to remain the same 
(either positive or negative) for the results to  be considered robust.357
357 Additionally, the regressions were corrected with AR or MA error terms in order to eliminate 
autocorrelation. All regressions were corrected with the Newey-West covariance estimator, a covariance 
matrix estimator that is consistent in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of
I
♦
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The results indicated, according to the criteria outlined above, that the military burden had a 
long-term impact on the economy in the cases of Denmark and the United Kingdom. However, 
the two countries exhibited the impact of military spending differently: in the Danish case the 
coefficient was negative, whereas in the British case it was positive. In both cases, the 
coefficient was small. In the Swedish case, these variables seem to have behaved independently 
of one another in the long run. Quite surprisingly, in the case o f the United States, the earlier 
war chest hypothesis was confirmed in the long run, with a 100 per cent increase in the real 
GDP per capita inducing an almost identical rise in military spending. All in all, these results 
contradict one another, perhaps due to the size of military burden or other more complex 
reasons. It can, however, be said that the argument o f military spending being harmful to 
economic growth is certainly not given much support by these findings. Furthermore, the 
conclusion, such as reported in the overview of numerous studies on this topic by Todd Sandler 
and Keith Hartley, that the inpact of defense on growth is either small or non-existent, whether 
in the short or long run, seems to be supported by the analysis here.358
4.3. Systemic Characteristics o f the Demand for Military Spending
As discussed so far in this thesis, it is essential to include the systemic dimension in the military 
spending analysis. And, on the basis of the earlier review, it is fairly apparent that the “W est” in 
the context described by Samuel Huntington was the dominant political force in the world in 
this period. On the basis of data availability and the dichotomy between democracies and 
autocracies, I have further diminished the sample in many of the comparisons undertaken 
already to consist o f 17 states, and, respectively the eleven states analyzed in more detail in this 
thesis. One could say that these 17 countries in fact represent the “world system” quite well, 
since they formed 84,8 per cent of the “world” ME in 1913 and 87,7 per cent of the “world” ME 
in 1929.359 They were naturally equally dominant economically as well.360 The purpose here, 
however, is not to  estimate war proneness like for example conflict scientists have done rather 
than try to  estimate their (joint) demand for military spending in this system, as responding (or 
not) to common systemic and/or individual indicators. In this section I will concentrate solely
unknown form. Details on the regressions available from the author by request.
358 See Sandler-Hartley 1995, Chapter 8 for further discussion. On a similar conclusion, see e.g. 
Alexander 1990; Eloranta 2001a On the view that both 50- and 100-year (approximately) waves are 
crucial in this interaction, see Modelski-Thompson 1996.
359 Calculated using the most comprehensive military spending database (National Capabilities) available: 
Singer-Small 1993. The figure in 1929 includes also Finland, which was not separately in existence in 
1913. Without Finland the figure for 1929 was 87,5 per cent.
360 See e.g. Maddison 1995; Prados de la Escosura 2000; Huntington 1997.
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on the systemic level influences, whereas the following chapters will utilize the results achieved 
here to include the other analytical levels as well.
First, however, we should discuss the various types of systemic indicators that can be  
constructed to analyze the behavior of the actors in the system as well as the system as a whole. 
The method of achieving common currency estimates was already discussed in Chapter 1. In 
addition to the variables reviewed in this thesis so far, I have chosen, as is commonly done 
among conflict researchers361, to calculate total resource shares and military resource shares for 
the individual countries. The total resource share, the so-called CINC (=Composite Index o f  
National Capabilities), is usually calculated as an arithmetic average of six series: the share o f  
military personnel, the ME share, the energy consumption share, the iron and steel production 
share, the total population share, and the urban population share. The sources of these series a re  
listed in the Appendices, Appendix 2. As has been indicated throughout this thesis, these data  
are considerably less reliable for the following countries in the sample of seventeen: Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia/USSR. The reasons include both source problems as well as  
conceptual problems involved with the data series, such as the inclusion o f war expenditures. 
Here I have also decided to replace the energy consumption share commonly used in the C O W  
CINCs, which may be a poor proxy for economic stature in a  system, with the real GDP share 
explained in Chapter l .362 Thus, the military resource share (=MILCINC) of a  country is 
calculated as an average o f only the military components in the CINC (the military personnel 
share and the real ME share). Table 23 displays a comparison with the original COW  CINCs 
and the new, modified CINCs constructed here.
The comparison suggests, despite the samples not being the same, that the new CINCs indicate 
a significant upwards adjustment for Russia in particular, as well as for Germany in 1935 and 
the United States in 1930, for example. The new, modified CINCs make, in addition, the British 
decline seem more gradual, which also seems to more or less apply to the other cases as well. 
Quite surprisingly, the new CINCs bestow the Soviet Union the “lead” in the total resources in 
1938, whereas the old estimates indicated approximate parity between Germany, the United 
States, and the Soviet Union in the same year. Soviet data is, nonetheless, perhaps the most 
suspect in this sample due to, for example, lack of readily available exchange rates.
361 See especially Singer 1990; Geller-Singer 1998.
362 In addition, energy consumption appears to be highly correlated with economic growth (see Smil 
1994, e.g. 206), yet it is hard to argue it would represent national economic resource levels better and 
more accurately than the concept of (real) GDP. Here also the ME shares are based on the PPP-adjusted 
figures as explained in Chapter 1.
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Table 23. Original CINCs (Based on the Entire COW Database) and the Modified CINCs 
in a 17-country System for France, Germany, Russia/USSR, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, 1920—1938
A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K.
1920 5,92 9,08 7,22 7,99 10,21 18,19 12,79 11,81 28,47 29,20
1925 6,07 9,57 7,93 9,49 10,20 11,69 9,37 12,58 25,06 27,87
1930 6,13 9,84 7,33 8,81 14,95 14,31 7,63 11,39 22,36 26,13
1935 5,20 7,53 10,18 13,75 18,12 19,83 7,17 9,93 18,86 21,33
1938 4,55 6,28 15,34 15,78 16,61 21,22 7,54 9,43 16,46 18,63
Sources: see Appendix 1. Original COW-indices generated with the EUGene software and database 2000. A=year; 
B=original CINC, France; Oroodified CINC, France; D=originaI CINC, Germany; E=modified CINC, Germany; 
F=original CINC, Russia/Soviet Union; G=modified CINC, Russia/Soviet Union; H=original CINC, the United 
Kingdom; I=modified CINC, the United Kingdom; J=original CINC, the United States; K=modified CINC, the 
United States.
Note: details on the countries included in the 17-country system can be found in Figure 11, whereas details on the 
COW database can be found in Singer-Small 1982; Singer-Small 1993.
The dilemma of Russia’s strong showing in the CINC-scores and the military resource shares 
has been astutely addressed by William C. Wohlforth for the pre- First World W ar period. An 
important aspect in these measures is whether they mirror perceptions of, in this case Russia’s, 
power potential among the Great Powers. As he argues persuasively, none of the others 
considered Russia as a superior power to Germany or Great Britain before the First World War. 
It seems, nonetheless, that Russia’s allies actually possibly overestimated Russian power, 
whereas Germany and Austria underrated its potential. Wohlforth places the most explanatory 
value on the variables comprising the military resource share, although even for the military 
components several other aspects affected the credibility of Russia’s (military) power: 1) 
Russia’s political and military inefficiencies; 2) slow mobilization capabilities; 3) lack of 
internal societal cohesion; 4) Russia’s difficulties of withstanding a long war (which was not 
thought to  occur anyhow); 5) Russia’s inability, due to many o f the factors already mentioned, 
to wage an offensive war.363 The same qualities certainly plagued the interwar Soviet Union as 
well; i.e., how to mobilize its vast capabilities.364 On the other hand, it may be difficult to 
separate the perception of defensive and offensive capabilities in the macro-level estimations. 
And, to be certain, Russia possessed immense defensive capabilities that were displayed in the 
two World Wars and did engage in significant military reforms after its shocking defeat against 
Japan in 1905. This critique of the use o f the CINC-scores notwithstanding (especially regarding 
the futility of trying to assess the probability of war with them), it may however be plausible 
that these countries reacted to such perceptions in their military spending decision-making. In
363 Wohlforth 1987. This article is an illustrative critique of the use of these aggregate indices of power 
distribution.
364 For further discussion, the reader is referred to Ziemke 1988; Harrison 1998.
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addition, following Wohlforth, it is here expected that the military resource shares would b e  
more significant than the aggregate CENC-scores in the system estimations.
In terms of evaluating the qualities and changes in the system in question, there are several 
variables available for military spending analyses. It has been suggested, for example, that th e  
effect of system-level capability concentration, with capabilities concentrated mostly in  th e  
hands of major powers (or just one hegemon), might have an enhancing decision-m aking 
certainty effect, although there is no consensus on this. A standard way in the conflict research  
literature to  measure capability concentration is:
CONC,
^(s.y-vN,
\  1-1/AT, (10)
where Sit equals the proportion o f the aggregate capabilities (=CINC) possessed by a m ajor 
power in year r; Nt=the number of major powers in the system in year t. This index takes a va lue  
from 0 to 1. Although many studies have indicated that system-level capability concentration is  
unrelated to the occurrence of a major power war, this system indicator has not previously b een  
tested as a possible determinant of military spending.365 Thus, it is hypothesized here that a  
decline in the concentration of total resources (=CINCs) should increase the polarity in th e  
system, thus inducing higher ME by the states in the system (=HYPOTHESIS 3). O ther 
indicators that will be utilized here, in addition to the ones already mentioned, include th e  
CINCs and military resource shares o f the declining and prevailing systemic leaders (assum ed 
to be the UK and USA), the total 17-country system military spending and its dispersion 
(measured by coefficient of variation), the CINCs of democracies and respectively autocracies 
on the aggregate, the military spending shares of democracies and respectively autocracies, and  
individual country alliance effects.366 The hypotheses related to these indicators are: 1) A n  
increase in the total system military spending should induce a positive threat response in the  
form o f increased military spending by the individual states (=HYPOTHESIS 1); 2) An increase 
in the dispersion of military spending by the states in the system should represent mounting 
threats to the individual states, thus inducing higher military spending (=HYPOTHESIS 2); 3) A  
decline in the concentration of military resources (=MELCINCs) should increase polarity in the
365 Geller-Singer 1998,122.
366 See Appendices, Appendix 2 for details on the sources.
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system, thus increasing uncertainty in the system, and should induce higher military spending 
among the individual states (^HYPOTHESIS 4).
Additionally, based on the section on the democratic peace argument as well as the discussion 
on the leadership effects, we can add the following hypotheses to  be tested here: 1) An increase 
in the total resources held by democracies in the system should exert a spillover effect for the 
individual states, thus inducing a reduction in their military spending (=HYPOTHESIS 5); 2) 
An increase in the aggregate military spending of democracies in the system should exert a 
spillover effect for the individual states, thus inducing a reduction in their military spending 
(=HYPOTHESIS 6); 3) An increase in the total resources held by autocracies in the system 
should represent a threat for individual states, thus inducing an increase in their military 
spending (^HYPOTHESIS 7); 4) An increase in the aggregate military spending of autocracies 
in the system should represent a threat for individual states, thus inducing an increase in their 
military spending (at a lag) (=HYPOTHESIS 8); 5) Individual nations in the system should 
respond, in the form of either challenger or follower behavior in their military spending, to 
changes in the military spending behavior of the perceived systemic leader(s) (=HYPOTHESIS 
9); 6) Individual nations in the system should respond, in the form of either challenger or 
follower behavior in their military spending, to changes in the total resources held by the 
systemic leader(s) (=HYPOTHESIS 10); 7) Individual nations in the system should respond, in 
the form of either challenger or follower behavior in their military spending, to changes in the 
military resources of the systemic leader(s) (=HYPOTHESIS 11). All of the hypotheses 
revisited here assume a time lag due to the slowness of the budgetary process.
Thus, our two dependent variables to be tested are the pooled defense shares and military 
burdens of the two samples (seventeen and eleven states respectively). Thus, the following 
equation was estimated based on the systemic hypotheses presented above, with a lag of one 
year on the independent variables as the starting assumption367:
ME, =p%+ faSYSTOTME, + fcSYSTOTMECV,^ + fcClNCCONC^ + fcMILCINCCONC
_  + 0 S DEMOCCINC,^ + psDEMOCTOTM%_t + &AUTOCCINC, + 0 XAVTOCTOTM5 _, ( 11)
~  + fi'USAME,^ + p wUKMEy + 0 uVSACINCt^  + 0 uUKCINC+ 0 aUSAMILCINC^
+ p j j m i i c i N C , + e,
367 Details on the variable and other abbreviations can be found in Appendices, Appendix 1, Table 1 A.
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Based on these hypotheses, the following independent variables were expected to have  a  
positive sign, at a lag: total system M E (=SYSTOTME); coefficient of variation in the m ilita ry  
spending o f the system countries (=SYSTOTMECV); total resources (CINCs) held by  th e  
autocracies (=AUTOCCINC), with countries scoring three or more in a given year in the P o l i ty  
HID scale qualifying as representing autocratic rule; and total ME by such au tocracies 
(=AUTOCTOTME). Moreover, the following variables were expected to incur a  n eg a tiv e  
coefficient at a lag: concentration o f the total resources (CINCs) held by the system coun tries  
(=CINCCONC); concentration o f the military resources (MILCINCs) held by the s y s te m  
countries (=MILCINCCONC); total resources (CINCs) held by the dem ocracies 
(=DEMOCCINC), with countries scoring six or more in a  given year in the Polity H IP  s c a le  
qualifying as representing democratic rule; and total ME by such dem ocracies 
(=DEMOCTOTME).
The rest o f the signs would depend on an individual country’s position — Le., its importance in  
the international system—  and thus Great Powers would be expected to behave differently th a n  
other states. Also, there should be differences among the Great Powers depending on th e ir  
regime type. For example, Germany might be expected to engage in challenger behavior, 
resulting in either a large, negative coefficient respective of the economic leader(s), or in  f a c t  
responding to  their decline only at the systemic level. A democratic challenger such as F ra n ce  
should also incur a negative, albeit a  more moderate coefficient as a direct response to, fo r  
example, American military burden. Its challenge would be more in line with an attempt to  k e e p  
Germany in check than as a move towards greater power in international politics. This would in  
turn reflect on the systemic military spending responses. “Weak” states could act like follow ers, 
“copying” the military spending behavior o f the leader(s) at a lag, or ignore the behavior o f  th e  
leader(s) altogether. It should be emphasized here that this approach ignores many o f  th e  
fundamental structures usually “driving” military spending behavior in any state, especially 
dyadic threats and spillovers, as well as impure public good influences, which are added to  th e  
analysis in the later chapters.
Before moving to the statistical treatment of these hypotheses, we should peruse the system ic 
developments, the military spending behavior of democracies in comparison with autocracies, 
as well as the implications of the leadership qualities in the system. Additionally, a review o f  the  
military spending patterns in the system may be warranted, especially if a balance existed in the  
way that the economic resources and military resources were valued by the individual states. A s 
seen in Figure 50, systemic “threats” at first glance seemed to decline after the early 1920s, only
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to resurge from circa 1933 onwards. Both the total system ME and an approximate threat index 
indicate remarkable support for such an assessment. The increase o f systemic military spending 
threat was dramatic and continuous for the rest of the 1930s.
Figure 50. Total System (Real) Military Spending and a System Threat Index in a System 
of Seventeen States, 1920—1938
Year
------- SYSTEM TOTAL ME (Y1
AXIS)
-------- SYSTEM2 (INDEX, Y2 AXIS)
Sources: see the system state data sources in Appendices, Appendix 2.
Note: SYSTEM TOTAL ME calculated as the sum of the teal ME figures of the seventeen stales in 1929 
quasi-USD. SYSTEM2 equals the combined mean military burden and military personnel index, weighted by 
the countries’ share of total real ME in 1929 quasi-USD, for seventeen states. The volume index was set as 
1929=100 for the individual states.
However, if we look at Figure 51, this preliminary appraisal o f  the period becomes more 
dubious. Especially based on the balance of power literature, the assumption usually is, similar 
to some of the hypotheses tested in this section, that decreasing concentration of power leads to 
systemic instability. The 1920s therefore was not only a period o f decreasing total military 
spending, but also a period of new states evening the playing field in terms of military 
resources. This development is hardly visible in the development of the total resource 
concentration. This might suggest that the 1920s already provided the seeds of the systemic 
instability of the 1930s. The increasing concentration in the depression decade was the result of 
the new challengers, namely Great Powers, emerging on to the international scene. Did similar 
developments take place in the “power balance” between the democracies and the autocracies?
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Figure 51. Indices of Concentration, for CINC and M IL C IN C , 1920— 1938
Y ear
-------- INDEX OF CONCENTRATION, CINC
---------INDEX O F CONCENTRATION, M ILCIN C
Sources: see tbe system (seventeen states) data sources in Appendices, Appendix 2.
Note: indices of concentration calculated as indicated by Equation 10. Definitions of CINC and MILCINC provided in tbe 
text
Figure 52. Total Real M ilitary Spending Shares o f the  Democracies Versus the  
A utocracies in  the 17-country System, 1920— 1938
%
______________________ Y ear_____
-------- DEM OC T O T A L  M E SHARE
--------- AUTOC T O T A L  M E SH ARE
Sources: see tbe system state data sources in Appendices, Appendix 2.
Note: DEMOC (»democracies) defined as those scoring at least six in the Polity HID (2000) democracy index; AUTOC 
(»autocracies) defined as those scoring at least three in the Polity HID (2000) autocracy index. Real ME calculated as 
explained in other figures and in Appendices, Appendix 2.
f t
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The ascendancy of the authoritarian nations and their military spending role indeed began 
already after the mid-1920s, although the balance between the democracies and the autocracies 
did not shift until 1933, with especially Germany tipping the balance (see Figure 52). After that, 
the decline of democracies as a military force was a fairly rapid phenomenon. Thus, the 17- 
country system was at first destabilized by the déconcentration of military resources in the 
1920s, with the rapid decline of democracies further fueling this process in the 1930s. The 
argument that the déconcentration of military resources was indeed destabilizing is closely 
linked to the absence of military leadership by the Western economic giants, especially the 
United States. This can be seen in Figure 53 below. Whereas the United Kingdom allocated 
even more for military purposes than its share of total resources would have warranted for some 
of the period, the U.S. MELCINC was far lower than its economic and political position 
“required”. The absence of a credible military leader, not to mention an economic leadership 
broker, made this déconcentration a destabilizing force in the 1920s.
Figure 53. Modified CINCs and MILCINCs for the United States and the United 
Kingdom, 1920—1938
-------- USA, MODIFIED CINC
—  USA, MILCINC 
------- UK, MODIFIED CINC
Sources: see the system state data sources in Appendices, Appendix 2.
Note: CINCs and MILCINCs calculated as explained in the text and in Appendices, Appendix 2.
Finally, it is possible to approximate a way of estimating whether states as a whole or 
individually spent more than their other resources would have necessitated. One way of doing
V172
this is to calculate the following ratio: the total average military resource share (M ILCINC), 
weighted by the real ME shares o f countries, divided by the total average economic resource 
share (the four other components in the modified CINC=ECONCINQ, again weighted by th e  
real ME shares of countries, (=SYSTEM3, weighted). Alternatively, an unweighted m easure 
was calculated as well (SYSTEM3, unweighted). These would give an indication, on th e  
aggregate as in Figure 54, of whether military resources were overextended (a value above one) 
or vice versa (a value below one). As we can observe from Figure 54 below, as a whole these  
countries overextended their military resources during the interwar period. The late 1930s 
induced a rise in the weighted index. Of the individual countries, the clear m ilitary 
“overachievers” included, Finland, France, Switzerland, and Spain during this period. 
Conversely, the clear military “underachievers” included, among others, the United States, 
Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
Figure 54. Mean Military Resource Shares (MILCINCs) Divided by Mean Economic 
Resource Shares (ECONCINCs), Both Weighted and Unweighted, 1920—1938
Y ear
-------- SYSTEM3 (W E IG H T E D )-----------SYSTEM 3 (UNW EIGHTED)
Sources: see the system state data sources in Appendices, Appendix 2.
Note: SYSTEM3 (WEIGHTED) equals the ratio of mean MILCINCs to ECONCINCs, weighted as explained 
in the text; SYSTEM3 (UNW EIGHTED), the same but not weighted.
In order to estimate Equation 11, I will first apply simple GLS with cross-section weights to 
estimate the parameters of the 17-country system, utilizing W hite heteroskedasticity-consistent
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standard errors and covariance. As Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley have noted, the SUR 
technique may be appropriate when a nation is a member of an alliance and demand equations 
are estimated for multiple allies.368 Although this was not technically the case, common 
responses could be expected to  systemic changes. However, to make a preliminary assessment 
on the significance o f the explanatory variables in the pooled samples, I decided to use the GLS 
to begin with. Furthermore, in order to verify whether the inclusion of the countries with more 
dubious data (1920— 1938: AUT, GER, RUS/USSR) influenced the underlying SUR system, I 
also estimated the pooled GLS regression for the eleven European sample states separately. As 
indicated previously, one lag was the beginning assumption, yet the optimum lag structure was 
tested up to three lags. The equations were corrected for autocorrelation if needed, with AR(1) 
arising as the most common additional variable. The ME variables of the “leaders” —  the 
United States and the United Kingdom —  were their defense shares and military burdens, 
depending on the dependent variable. Although the estimated systems were expected to display 
certain joint responses, one would have to  be careful not to place too much emphasis on these 
estimates alone, due to the forcing of common response coefficients for most o f these variables. 
Also, the absence, based on the theoretical framework developed in this thesis, of other 
significant independent variables will certainly influence the results somewhat, and therefore 
these results will be revisited in the subsequent estimations in the later chapters.
Overall, as we can discern from Tables 24 and 25, it is possible to draw some general 
conclusions from the results achieved: 1) Both the military burden and the defense share 
equations were by and large different between the two samples; 2) The military burden 
equations displayed less specification errors as well as higher F-values and were thus deemed 
more reliable; 3) The parameter estimates in these equations were volatile, switching their signs 
at different lags, and therefore these results should be considered only preliminary; 4) System 
variables are obviously relevant for the military spending analysis of this period, yet the more 
precise impacts would have to be evaluated in connection with other theoretically relevant 
independent variables; 5) The sample o f eleven displayed less specification errors and thus 
formed a more uniform sample, confirming the earlier analyses on the differences between the 
samples.
368 Sandler-Hartley 1995, 62. On an application o f this method, see e.g. M urdoch-Sandler 1986.
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Table 24. GLS Estimates o f  the Systemic Influences on Pooled Defense Share and  M il i ta ry  
B urden  in the 17-state System, 1920— 1938
A. B. C.
SYSTOTME -0,03*** (t-2) -0,18*** (t-2)
SYSTOTMECV 0,57*** (t-3) 0,58*** (t-3)
CINCCONC -0,74*** (t-2) 0,09*** (t-2)
MILCINCCONC -0,34*** (t-3) -0,11*** (t-3)
DEMOCCINC 1,06*** (t-2) 0,62*** (t-2)
DEMOCTOTME -0,16*** (t-3) 0,18*** (t-3)
AUTOCCINC -0,02*** (t-2) -0,17*** (t-2)
AUTOCTOTME -0,02*** (t-1) -0,19*** (t-1)
USAMES 0,28*** (t-1) -0,12*** (t-1)
UKME& 0,53*** (t-1) 0,09*** (t-1)
USACINC -1,00*** (t-1) 0,63*** (t-1)
UKCINC -0,03*** (t-1) -0,32*** (t-1)
USAMILCINC 0,34*** (t-1) 0,65*** (t-1)
UKMILCINC -0,40*** (t-1) -1,01*** (t-1)
AR(1) t t
N 255 255
S.E. 4,77 0,50
D.W. 1,99 1,87
F 31055 3,83E+22
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details on the system. A=independent variable names and names of regression sta tis tics  
reported here; B=coeffidents and other details on the independent variable (dependent variable: defense share)-, C=coeffidents a n d  
other details on the independent variable (dependent variable: m ilita ry  b urden ). * =  null hypothesis of no correlation rejected a t  1 0
per cent level; ** = null rejected at 5 per cent level; ***  = null rejected at 1 per cent level, n  = for B, the independent variable is
defease share; for C, the independent variable is military burden. Lag length indicated in parenthesis. All variables in logs.
N ote: t -  cross-section spedfic. coeffidents not listed here. No differendng undertaken to ensure uniformity with the S U R
estimations.
Table 25. G LS Estimates o f  the System ic Influences on Pooled Defense Share a n d  M il i ta ry
B urden  in  the 11-state System, 1920— 1938
A. B. G
SYSTOTME -0,34*** (t-3) -0,35*** (t-3)
SYSTOTMECV 0,53*** (t-3) 0,79*** (t-3)
CINCCONC 0,30*** (t-1) -2,34*** (t-1)
MILCINCCONC 0,46*** (t-1) 1,80*** (t-1)
DEMOCCINC 0,38*** (t-2) 2,48*** (t-2)
DEMOCTOTME 0,21*** (t-2) -0.25*** (t-2)
AUTOCCINC 0,23*** (t-3) -0,33*** (t-3)
AUTOCTOTME -0,08*** (t-1) 0,34*** (t-2)
USAMES -0,09*** (t-1) 1,05*** (t-1)
UKMEa 0,21*** (t-2) -0,18*** (t-2)
USACINC 0,79*** (t-1) 2,84*** (t-1)
UKCINC -0,26*** (t-3) 0,08*** (t-3)
USAMILCINC -0,05*** (t-1) -2,78*** (t-1)
UKMILCINC 0,19*** (t-1) 1,47*** (t-1)
AR(1) t t
N 165 165
S.E. 0,07 0,23
D.W. 2,29 2,00
F 24836 1.34E+9
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details on the system. A=independent variable names and names of regression statistics 
reported here; ¿co effic ien ts and other details on the independent variable (dependent variable: defense share): C=coeffidents an d  
other details on the independent variable (dependent variable: m ilitary  burd en ). * = null hypothesis of no correlation rejected a t 10
per cent level; ** = null rejected at 5 per cent level; *** = null rejected at 1 per cent level, n  = for B, the independent variable is
defense share; for C, the independent variable is military burden. Lag length indicated in parenthesis. All variables in logs.
N ote: t  = cross-section spedfic, coeffidents not listed here. No differendng undertaken to ensure uniformity with the SU R
estimations. The common intercept for column C not listed here.
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As far as the individual hypotheses pursued in this section are concerned, it seems that 
HYPOTHESIS 1 —  inasmuch increasing total system ME was perceived as a threat —  is not 
supported by the results here (4/4 of the signs disagree with the hypothesis), as in fact the exact 
opposite is suggested. HYPOTHESIS 2 —  implying a positive ME response to  increasing 
dispersion in the system’s military spending —  has clear support (4/4 of the signs agree with the 
hypothesis), and its impact varied in the equations. HYPOTHESIS 5 —  indicating that a decline 
in the total resources held by democracies would promote the free-riding tendencies o f these 
states — is clearly rejected (4/4), and it seems that the impact was the exact opposite. This is not 
surprising considering the “false” security environment of the 1920s and the increasing threats 
brought on by the 1930s* power concentration. The performance o f democracies may have been 
a benchmark of sorts in the system. The nature of this process was obviously important. 
Furthermore, for example HYPOTHESIS 7 and 8, pertaining to the threat qualities o f 
autocracies, seem to have support exactly in the opposite direction (3/4 in both cases). 
Moreover, HYPOTHESIS 3 and 4 seem poorly supported by the analyses here.
HYPOTHESIS 9, implying a response to  the military spending of the declining democratic 
leaders (especially UK), seems to apply. As discovered already elsewhere3®, the European 
democracies appeared to respond mostly to the British (and perhaps the French) military 
spending changes in their own spending behavior. This occurred in the form of follower 
behavior (positive sign). HYPOTHESIS 10, implying a response to  the total resources held by 
the economic, democratic leaders (USA, UK), also has considerable merit It seems that the 
United States was structurally important for the system at the level o f total resources, attracting 
a positive ME response from both samples of states in both equations. The declining British 
CINC also induced an opposite ME response as a whole. HYPOTHESIS 11, implying a  M E 
response to the changes in the military resources held by the economic and democratic leaders 
(USA, UK), was not forthcoming through this initial analysis. Yet, the response of most states, 
especially to declining American economic and military might (at least until the mid-1930s), 
was to engage in cautious follower behavior. All in all, these results suggest that most o f these 
systemic variables are relevant for the subsequent analyses, yet they need to be revisited in 
connection with other key variables. Furthermore, the sample of eleven European democracies 
or transitional democracies indeed seemed to form a structurally more uniform group than the 
alternative 17-state sample that included also strongly autocratic states.
369 Eloranta 2001a; E loranta 2001b.
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w5. M ILITARY SPENDING BEHAVIOR O F THE SELECTED ELEVEN 
EUROPEAN STATES, 1920— 1938: Responding to External o r In te rn a l 
Variables?
111
5.1. The Demand fo r  Military Spending as a Pure Public Good in an “Alliance”: The League 
o f Nations as an Alliance?
This chapter represents an effort to assess the importance of the pure and impure public good 
characteristics in the demand for military spending among the selected eleven European states: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. First I will explore further the idea that the League o f 
Nations might have failed to produce a public good in the form of collective security, and what 
this failure would have entailed for the military spending decision-making of these nations. The 
military spending framework under the superficially strong League of Nations in the 1920s did 
not provide encouragement for meaningful spending cuts, which fits well within the proposed 
arms race model introduced in this section. Furthermore, the reasons behind the disarmament 
failure of the League are explored in this chapter, and especially the role of the “weak” states is 
re-evaluated. Secondly, 1 will move towards analyzing the demand for military expenditures in a 
more comprehensive fashion, combining both pure and impure public (although in essence pure 
public good influences are nested in the impure public good models) good variables at the level 
of the system, alliance(s), and the state in the analysis as suggested in Chapter 2. The impure 
public good characteristics of M E within states are also brought into the analysis in the next 
section.
As the discourse on the League o f Nations in Section 3.3 implied, the League of Nations can be 
argued to have formed an alliance of sorts, even militarily. An attempt was certainly made to 
provide a framework for collective security in the League Covenant, which consisted of various 
measures meant to  force states into arbitration over disputes. Furthermore, for example Article 
16 provided measures, such as the assembly of a collective military force, for the enforcement 
of these principles. Bruce Russett has qualified the League of Nations as a “quasi-global 
collective security arrangement...which bind[s] all members to coalesce against any aggressor, 
even one of their own number”.370 Despite the fact that the structure of the League and the 
different views o f its members on these commitments rendered these ideals quite unreachable371, 
the League certainly on paper filled the requirements of a military alliance. And, as such, it can
370 Russett 1971,263.
371 See e.g. a seminal article by Roland Stromberg: Stromberg 1956.
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be investigated as providing a possible pure public good deterrence to its members, in th e  
fashion described in Chapter 2.372 The maintenance of collective security, i.e. at least some fo rm  
o f lasting peace, was indeed “the one great object of the whole organization”, to  be pursued  
through institutionalized collective action.373
Figure 55. A rm s Race Gam e Dynam ics Among Nations in the In terw ar Period
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Source: adopted from Sandler-Haitley 1995,75.
The military spending choices of the League members can be described with a rather sim ple 
Prisoner’s Dilemma arms race framework, similar to the Richardson model outlined in C hapter 
1. One possible realization o f this is presented in Figure 55. The two participating nations have 
two strategies: either to limit or escalate one’s military spending. The hypothetical payoffs 
presented arise from four strategy combinations: 1) Both countries limit their ME; 2) Nation 1 
limits while nation 2 escalates; 3) Nation 2 limits while nation 1 escalates; 4) Both countries 
escalate their military spending. The first number in a cell indicates the payoff to nation 1, 
whereas the second the payoff to nation 2. The matrix shows that each nation is best o ff when it 
escalates and the other limits ME, The worst outcome for any nation, for example within the
372 Other organizations can of course be studied in a similar fashion, as providing a pure public good in a 
fashion other than militarily. See Olson-Zeckhauser 1966; Sandler-Hartley 1999.
373 The League of Nations Starts 1920,26; Steiner 1993,38.
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League of Nations, would be to  limit military spending while another, especially a rival, 
escalates.374 However, given the absence o f trust or some type o f guarantee, the escalate-escalate 
strategy would prevail, producing the worst outcome in terms of the maintenance of peace 
between the two nations.
In the 1920s, the League of Nations framework provided only a semblance of collective 
security, amply revealed in the 1930s. Although in general the 17-country system ME remained 
quite stable after its sharp reduction in 1920— 1922 until 1933, systemic stability was 
undermined by the decreasing ME share o f democracies. Also, whereas the eleven European 
states analyzed here kept their military spending shares, on the average, very stable throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s, their authoritarian challengers increased their relative spending strongly in 
the 1930s, thus tipping the balance between the democracies and autocracies after 1933. 
Moreover, not all states were willing to disarm in the 1920s, given the League’s vague 
collective security enforcement guarantees. Only the naval disarmament seemed to produce 
more concrete results, although even this process produced results that were not entirely 
beneficial for the power balance; namely, the strong emergence of France in terms o f real 
tonnage.375 Thus, the “disarmament equilibrium” achieved in the 1920s was a tenuous one. The 
dominant strategy of the League members, which emerged in the 1930s, was to escalate military 
spending again within the constraints placed upon them by their respective political economies. 
The absence of successful repeated interactions that would foster trust between the key states 
(such as in achieving comprehensive disarmament measures) and the impotence of the central 
arbiter, the League and the United States,376 were among key reasons for the escalation of 
military spending in the 1930s.
The failure of the League to include all the important world powers was of course in itself of 
paramount importance for its effectiveness. The isolationism of the United States; the distrust of 
the Soviet Union towards the League; Germany’s at first externally imposed exclusion in the 
1920s and then its own decision to abandon the League in the mid-1930s; and Japan’s exit from 
the League on the heels of the Manchurian Incident were all huge blows to the collective peace 
aspirations. After all, a key idea in the League structure was, contrary to the wishes of France 
and Eastern European states, that the enforcement of peace should be left to the hands of the 
members themselves. Especially the British were in favor of this interpretation of the League
374 Sandler-Hartley 1995,74—76, which also presents the ordinal version of this game.
375 See Sections 3.3 and 4.3 of this thesis.
376 On the comparison between the pre-war arbitration movement and the more extensive League of
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commitments. A comment attached to the presentation of the original League Covenant to  th e  
Parliament in June 1919 is quite illustrative: “It is true that, in default of a  strong international 
striking force, ready for instant action in all parts of the world, the Members of the League m ust 
make their own arrangements for immediate self-defence against any force that could b e  
suddenly concentrated against them, relying on such understandings as they have come to w ith  
their neighbours previously for this purpose/’377
The French, however, firmly believed that an international military force, preferably o n  
permanent basis, or at least extensive military cooperation would be necessary in order for the  
League to function properly. The British and the Americans obviously did not want to m ake 
such binding arrangements. The British wanted to minimize their involvement in continental 
matters, especially in military affairs378. France was perhaps the most ardent advocate o f  
collective security guarantees among the Great Powers, yet it mainly viewed the League as  a  
system of force directed against real or imagined German aggression. Their views on  
disarmament differed drastically as well, since for example the British were not willing to  
commit to extensive collective security arrangements, and the French were not willing, in th e  
absence o f such commitments, to disarm. Both were at best sceptical of the chances o f th e  
League to provide real security solutions.379 While the accession of Germany to  the L eague 
seemingly fostered the “spirit of Locarno”, in fact very little changed in terms of the League’s 
credibility. Good diplomatic relations between the European “Big Three” (France, the U nited  
Kingdom, and Germany) did facilitate the everyday functions of the League, yet these  
superficial improvements were undermined by the representatives of their respective 
governments in their nationalistic domestic appearances. The “Big Three” only really turned to  
the League as an instrument of last resort. According to George Scott (1973), “Britain’s 
influence was often the most decisive in keeping the League out of things.”380
The role o f the “weak” states, carrying the connotation of limited political and/or economic 
importance, was not quite as weak as their economic position in the international system w ould 
suggest. This was guaranteed by the very structure of the League organs. Both the Assembly 
and the Council ensured the Small and Medium Powers381 practically equal say in the matters o f
Nations, see Egerton 1974.
377 The League of Nations Starts 1920,234— 235.
378 This was hardly a unanimous view held by British officials, especially those serving in the League of 
Nations. See Towle 1993.
379 Northedge 1986, 44; Stromberg 1956, 252—253; Egerton 1974; Steiner 1993, 37.
380 Scott 1973,161— 166. See also Towle 1993.
381 See e.g. Ray-Singer 1973 for discussion on how to construct indices, based on diplomatic
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the League. Moreover, as Ronald Stromberg has pointed out, the “small” states were not 
necessarily any more virtuous than the Great Powers in international politics.382 They also 
pursued their own interests and agendas within the League. There were also many types of 
“weak” states, even within Europe, representing a heterogeneous array of views. For example, 
the Scandinavian states — consisting of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden — felt that because of 
their geographic and political positions they were not willing to even entertain sanctions as a 
coercive tool, let alone military force. They attached, on the basis o f their small populations and 
military weakness, very little value to armaments as the basis for security, and they were ready 
to implement general disarmament, even unilaterally, without further guarantees. The position 
adopted by these states maintained that general disarmament itself would constitute an 
important guarantee for international security.383
Thus Sweden, for example, a member o f the League of Nations from the beginning, was an 
active pursuer of disarmament policies in the League of Nations. All of the interwar Swedish 
governments worked for international disarmament vehemently, like the other Nordic 
governments did as well. The goal of the Swedish disarmament policy was to persuade other 
nations in the League to adopt radical disarmament measures, such as reductions in the tonnage 
of war ships, prohibition of chemical and biological warfare, and so on. The Swedish 
governments of the 1930s (until 1936) continued to put their faith in the League despite the 
increasing tensions. The main motivation behind the Swedish disarmament efforts was a 
commitment to humanitarian and democratic policies, as well as belief in the League as the only 
means of maintaining peace in the world. The basic principles in the Swedish interwar foreign 
policy were the maintenance of neutrality and non-commitment.384
The Swedish disarmament began with the Defense Act of 1925, a result of the recommendations 
of the parliamentary Defense Revision committee appointed in 1919 and motivated by the 
League of Nations standards. Although the reductions in military expenditures were still modest 
and were not met for the most part, they still represented a significant effort towards conscious 
disarmament. The Swedish government strove actively to achieve disarmament measures both 
domestically and in the League conferences in the 1930s.385 O f the other Nordic countries 
Norway and Denmark made similar commitments: Norway passed acts reducing the size o f its
representation, to measure power status. See also the discussion in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
382 Stromberg 1956, 263, footnote 14.
383 Jones 1939, 217—225; van Roon 1989. See also Salmon 1997.
384 Trönnberg 1985; Paasivirta 1987, 194— 195. See also Agoy 1996,
385 Trönnberg 1985, 33—73; Böhme 1988; Paasivirta 1987.
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armed forces and the officer corps in 1927 and again in 1933; Denmark in 1922 and 1932. 
Norwegian interwar governments felt secure and beyond military threats, which limited th e ir  
foreign policy interests to foreign trade issues. Danish governments, however, were convinced 
that even large military outlays would not secure their country against an invader.386
The Nordic front was not uniform in this respect, however. Finland did not follow the exam ple 
set by the other Nordic countries, both in military build-up as well as foreign policy. The aim  o f  
the Finnish foreign policy in the 1920s was largely to attempt to unite forces with o ther 
potentially or actually “weak” nations such as the Baltic states and Poland, thus providing 
security against a  Soviet invasion. The Taito peace agreement in 1920 with its massive although 
temporarily weakened eastern neighbor had not created a consistent basis for functioning 
foreign relations with the Soviets. The approach of forming an alliance with the aforementioned 
neighbors o f the Soviet Union failed in  1922.387 Until the mid-1920s, the Finnish foreign policy 
could be described as a passive policy o f  ’’non-alliance”.388 The policy of relying on the League 
of Nations gained more ground from  1924 onwards, yet a  clear turning point in  this was th e  
Finnish membership in the Council o f the League of Nations in 1927. In 1927— 1931, the  
Finnish government participated actively in the League of Nations functions.389 Faith in th e  
League of Nations in upholding the peace, however, was relatively scarce among the political 
parties.390 In the late 1930s, the Finnish foreign policy was centered around achieving an  
alliance with Sweden, which turned out to be impossible.391 In the League o f Nations Finland 
was often closer to the views of France and such Eastern European states as Czechoslovakia, 
which wanted to implement collective security guarantees.392
There were also other constellations among the “weak” states that served as the basis for their 
activities in the League of Nations and beyond. For example, the so-called Oslo states —  a 
group which came into existence in 1930 and lasted until 1940 — consisted of Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Finland. The principal aim of this group
386 Ag0y 1996, 478; Paasivirta 1987, 194— 195, 225—227, On the Danish ’’faith” on the League of 
Nations, see Wiberg-Jensen 1992,353—354.
387 Paasivirta 1984, 256—258, 262, 265—267; Kallenautio 1985, 63—67, 86—91; Roiko-Jokela 1996; 
Tervasmaki 1964,23—24. See also Paasivirta 1987.
388 Paasivirta 1984,267—269, 272—273.
389 Kallenautio 1985,105—107,113; Paasivirta 1984,272—273.
390 Kallenautio 1985, 113, 123; Hietanen 1989, 75; Defense Revision 1926, 12— 14; Parliamentary 
Minutes/1927,375—377,386—387. On the Finnish League of Nations policy, see also Seldn 1974.
391 Soikkanen 1984; Turtola 1984. On the Finnish defense cooperation plans with Estonia, see Leskinen 
1997.
392 See e.g. Jones 1939,217.
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was to promote economic and political cooperation, mainly under the auspices of the League of 
Nations. In reality, most of the cooperation took place directly between the Oslo states. 
However, since the core of this group consisted of the three neutral Scandinavian states, there 
were many disagreements over policies between them. For example, whereas Belgium and the 
Netherlands were in favor of extending political cooperation to the so-called Group of Eight — 
which in addition to the Oslo states (not counting Luxembourg) comprised Czechoslovakia, 
Spain, and Switzerland —  the Scandinavian states were in favor of forming an entity based 
around the former neutral states. Similar difficulties plagued the actions of the Group of Eight, 
which was mainly aimed at promoting the disarmament process within the League. Differences 
between the positions adopted by these states, for example in disarmament, were often 
irreconcilable. For example, Finland and Czechoslovakia were strongly in favor of security 
guarantees, whereas the Scandinavian states were willing to undertake unconditional, unilateral 
disarmament. The Scandinavian policy of non-involvement actually extended to denying 
automatic assistance to the victims of aggression, thus going against the proposal made by 
Finland in the League.393
The ambiguous foreign policy o f the southernmost member of the Group of Eight, Spain, was 
not particularly helpful for the cause o f disarmament either. Primo de Rivera’s authoritarian 
regime, lacking fascist-style state control, maintained an ambiguous dualism in its foreign 
policy, alternating between a revisionist stance and a traditional policy of accepting the status 
quo. Rivera considered success abroad to be vital for the survival o f his regime. It maintained a 
lukewarm diplomatic courtship with Italy as an ongoing process while attempting to make 
headway in Northern Africa, mainly at the expense of the French. Despite some modest 
1 successes due mainly to luck, its biggest challenge was to obtain greater recognition from the 
League. Since the beginning, Spain’s seat in the Council had been a nonpermanent one, which 
was a source of irritation for the regime. As Germany acceded to the League in 1926 and 
obtained a permanent seat, Rivera began a campaign to get Spain a permanent seat as well, 
which after numerous twists and turns resulted in Spain’s withdrawal from the League for two 
years in the late 1920s. When Spain rejoined, it did so under the same conditions as before, 
having achieved practically nothing except a political embarrassment and ending up 
undermining the League.394
393 van Roon 1989, e.g. 128, Chapter IX; Jones 1939,238; Salmon 1997.
394 Saz 1999a, 53—64. See also Lee 1987,227—231.
During the Second Republic, the foreign policy reversal of the regime was quite extensive. T h e  
Republican government relied on international cooperation and the promotion of pacifist ideas. 
It was actually Spain’s initiative that led to the establishment of the Group of Eight. Spain  
demanded the greatest possible disarmament compatible with a guarantee of internal public  
order and the fulfillment of international obligations. Yet, although Ismael Saz c la im s 
otherwise, this group was far from uniform and imposed its own difficulties to the disarm am ent 
process. Thus, it was a combination o f competing visions among the Great Powers and the o th er 
states that ultimately made the disarmament compromise impossible.395 Neutrality was n o t 
really a choice that Spain embraced willingly rather than a continuous descent towards “ a  
hesitant and frequently shameful neutrality”, as the cooperation with the other “weak” sta tes 
failed to produce results.396
If  we think in terms of Figure 55, the near impossibility of the disarmament becomes apparent. 
W hen the participants in the game had, broadly speaking, either the goal o f obtaining 
comprehensive collective security guarantees (like France) or, at the other end o f the spectrum , 
were willing to  accept disarmament without any agreement at all, the disarmament process 
certainly faced an uphill battle in order to  be a success. At the level of individual countries* 
foreign policy, the aims and motivations of the participants differed even more drastically. 
Furthermore, when repeated negotiations failed to produce results and centralized m ilitary  
leadership —  either by the League of Nations or the leader nations — was not forthcoming, an  
arms race ensued in the 1930s. Even the disarmament process of the 1920s was most likely a  
phenomenon that had more to do with individual state public finances and other dom estic 
factors. The response by the autocracies, encouraged by their populist leaders, was to achieve 
revisionist aims (like Germany) or simply take advantage o f the existing power vacuum. T he  
response of the democracies was a more protracted one; i.e., they retained the strategy of non­
escalation until the mid- or late 1930s, which of course meant that the strategic payoff for the  
autocracies from  the rapid arms buildup was even greater.
Why did the League of Nations ultimately fail to achieve widespread disarmament? M aurice 
Vai'sse (1993) has summarized the explanations in the following manner: 1) It failed because it 
was an inperfect instrument for achieving disarmament; 2) It failed because the League was not 
universal; 3) It failed because o f the confrontation between Great Britain and France; 4) It failed
395 Cf. Saz 1999b, 77—99. On competing visions of the reasons behind the disarmament process, see 
Vaisse 1993.
396 Saz 1999b, 83—91. In addition, see Lintz 1978.
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because there were domestic forces inside the countries hostile to disarmament; 5) It failed 
because the Disarmament Conference was convened too late, under hostile conditions; 6) It 
failed because of the confrontation between France and Germany at the Disarmament 
Conference; 7) It failed because of the overly ambitious aims and the practical problems 
involved in the reduction of armaments.397 And, as Northedge has argued, the League failed 
because it was seen as the defender of the status quo, the infamous Versailles settlement.398 As 
argued here, all of these explanations have merit, yet the list is hardly exhaustive. Firstly, 
contrary to Vaisse, I would maintain that the disarmament that took place contemporaneously in 
the 1920s and the early years of the Great Depression did not offer a real window of opportunity 
for disarmament.399 Secondly, the role of the "weak” states was not as constructive as is often 
perceived, since they could not offer a unified front on most issues. Nor were they all pacifist in 
the vein of the Scandinavian countries. Thirdly, as argued in Chapters 6 and 7, the domestic 
opposition among economic interest groups to, for example, arms trade regulation was quite 
formidable. Finally, the rigid negotiation stances of the key states in the disarmament process 
prevented a more favorable outcome, since far-reaching compromises were required from all 
participants. Thus, the states tended to pursue their own interests, which were not the same for 
each state nor were the means that they were ready to use to achieve their aims. The way that 
these interests emerged in the foreign policy of a particular state, which is the argument in this 
thesis, was a combination o f external (systemic, alliance-specific, dyadic) and internal 
(economic, political, actor-specific) factors.400
It also is possible to test the notion whether the League actually produced a pure public good 
deterrence. First, however, the representativeness of the sample must be discussed. The eleven 
European states can hardly be said to represent the whole of the League of Nations, yet they 
could be argued to represent the European dimension o f the organization quite well. Finland, 
Spain, and Portugal represented the periphery of Europe, the Scandinavian countries formed 
their own, fairly distinctive group, whereas the others could be viewed as belonging to  the 
European core in terms of geography and level of economic development. Such countries as 
Germany and Japan, for example, did not belong to the organization during the whole period. In 
this fashion, Spain perhaps is the least fitting of the group. Nonetheless, Spain’s position in the 
League or its military spending were hardly affected by its short absence. Moreover, France and
397 Vaisse 1993.
398 Northedge 1986, 288—289.
399 Cf. Vaisse 1993, 185—186.
400 On this type of argument, see Rosecrance-Stein 1993; Rosecrance-Steiner 1993, 124—125. More 
specific tests of this argument, in relation with military spending demand and the relevant variables, are
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the United Kingdom were most certainly the leading states in the League, so perhaps th e  
representativeness of the sample of eleven is better than one might at first expect. Certainly th is  
sample should reveal the effectiveness or inadequacy of the League of Nations as a provider o f  
collective security.
As briefly explored in Chapter 2, it is possible to perform relatively simple tests to see whether 
military spending was a pure public good among the selected sample states. If it actually was, 
then the League of Nations obviously was more important for these nations than the previous 
discussion indicates. Beginning with M ancur Olson and Richard Zeekhauser’s pathbreaking 
work on NATO, there have been m any testable hypotheses relating to the idea of collective 
security provision in an organization and the implications o f this provision on military 
spending.401 Given the free riding tendency in a pure public good alliance, military burdens a re  
anticipated to be shared unevenly in an alliance; thus, large wealthy allies (measured by real 
GDP) should shoulder more of the common defense than the smaller, poorer allies 
(=HYPOTHESIS 14). The logic outlined by Olson and Zeckhauser maintained that a nation 
with a large area, long frontiers, and a higher population density, in addition to a higher share o f  
vulnerable resources and ideological tendencies, would lead to  a more aggressive military 
spending policy.402 Of course, as I have argued in this thesis, the explanation resting on the 
foundation o f the public goods theory and the suboptimality of defense provision via the  
spillover effect has sound theoretical foundations.403 Indeed, Olson and Zeckhauser found a  
significant positive correlation, using Spearman rank correlation tests404, between the NATO 
allies’ GNP and their military burdens in 1964, indicating clear free-riding behavior by the 
small allies.405 Later studies specified the pure public good alliance to describe the NATO until 
1966, when the positive rank correlation between the variables ceased to be statistically 
significant.406 Here I will perform the Spearman rank correlation tests between the military 
burdens and the real GDP levels407 among the selected eleven European states for three cross- 
section years (1925,1930,1935).
presented in the subsequent sections.
401 See Olson-Zeckhauser 1966 as well as Sandler-Hartley 1999 on NATO.
402 Olson-Zeckhauser 1966, e.g. 371.
403 See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
404 Spearman R assumes that the variables under consideration were measured on at least an ordinal (rank 
order) scale, that is, that the individual observations can be ranked into two ordered series. It is a 
nonparametric test, which is well suited for the analysis of small samples in particular. The null 
hypothesis is a zero coefficient.
405 See Olson-Zeckhauser 1966.
406 Sandler-Hartley 1999, 44 and the studies listed in i t  Some years in the 1980s did produce a similar 
pure public good impact as the yearly years of the NATO.
407 Utilizing the modified GDP data used in most statistical exercises in this thesis. See Appendices,
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Furthermore, defense spending should be allocated inefficiently from an alliance standpoint, as 
the sum of marginal benefits from defense provision should not equal the marginal costs of this 
provision (=HYPOTHESIS 15). This follows from the argument that the military burdens in an 
alliance yielding joint products should be shared based on the benefits received —  the greater 
the ratio of excludable benefits to total benefits, the larger should be the agreement between the 
benefits received and burdens shared (-HYPOTHESIS 17). For example Todd Sandler and 
Keith Hartley (1999) used the mean o f three benefit shares (ally’s share of NATO population; 
ally’s share of NATO’s GDP; and ally’s share of NATO’s exposed borders) to measure the sum 
of benefits, whereas the cost variable was the military burden. Using the Wilcoxon test408 that 
indicates whether the two measures are statistically the same, they found matching cost-benefit 
shares for most o f the post-1966 period, indicating the presence of joint products (i.e., impure 
public good benefits).409 Here I will first perform the Spearman rank correlation tests between 
the real ME share and the ECONCINC, as explained in Chapter 4, for the same three cross- 
section years as indicated above. Furthermore, I will perform the Wilcoxon tests to see whether 
the cross-section variables were statistically the same.
Thus, if the results indicate the presence of joint products, we may deduce that a  central 
authority in an alliance (here: the League of Nations or at least its European core) is required to 
coordinate spending to overcome the suboptimal provision and ensure the functionality of the 
cooperation (=HYPOTHESIS 16). As we have seen, no such leadership was forthcoming either 
from the League itself or outside this organization. Thirdly, relating to the arguments presented 
in the previous chapter as well as the exploitation hypothesis, I will investigate whether the level 
of economic development, measured by real GDP per capita, might be an important explanatory 
variable in the burden sharing. Thus, we may hypothesize that the more developed the nation is 
economically, with more established institutions and political markets, the lower the military 
spending (^HYPOTHESIS 43). Spearman rank correlation tests between the adjusted GDP per 
capita and the military burdens of the eleven should reveal a positive relationship if this 
assumption holds at the level o f development. As a confirmation, I will utilize the Wilcoxon test 
again. Moreover, I will also test this notion for the extended sample of twenty-four utilized 
earlier in Section 3.3, to see whether the behavior of these democracies was unique.
Appendix 2.
408 This procedure assumes that the variables under consideration were measured on a scale that allows
the rank ordering of observations based on each and that allows rank ordering of the differences between 
variables; i.e., it is a nonparametric test like the Spearman rank correlation test. The null hypothesis is that 
the two samples have the same median.
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The results o f the statistical tests relating to HYPOTHESES 14,15, and 17 can be seen in T a b le  
26. The conclusions arising from these exercises are clear. First of all, there was no evidence o f  
free riding by the “small” in this sample, which is one of the basic characteristics o f  a n  
“alliance” producing a pure public good in the form of deterrence. This also indicates a nega tive  
answer to  the hypothesis of inefficiency in the alliance, especially since we already d iscovered  
in Section 4.3410 that the general tendency o f these states was to overallocate their econom ic 
resources for defense. Furthermore, there was a high level of correlation between the m ilita ry  
spending shares and the economic resources, and the null hypothesis of the same median c a n n o t 
be rejected Thus, they were statistically the same; i.e., the costs and the benefits of d e fen se  
provision matched, indicating the presence of joint products. Moreover, HYPOTHESIS 16 w a s  
further reaffirmed by the results here. Military spending was an impure public good am o n g  
these eleven European States.
Table 26. Nonparametric Tests on the Exploitation and Joint-Product Hypotheses for th e  
Selected Eleven European States, 1925,1930,1935
A. B. C D. E.
1925 MILBUR, GDP 11 0,26 0,43
1930 MILBUR, GDP 11 0,35 0,28
1935 MILBUR, GDP 11 0,46 0,15
1925 MESHARE, ECONCINC 11 0,73 0,01
1925* MESHARE, ECONCINC 11 25,00 0,48
1930 MESHARE, ECONCINC 11 0,77 0,01
1930* MESHARE, ECONCINC 11 30,00 0,79
1935 MESHARE, ECONCINC 11 0,85 0,00
1935* MESHARE, ECONCINC 11 27,00 0,59
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. A=cross-section year; B=variable$ tested, with systemic variables 
defined (on the basis of the 17-country system) as in Chapter 4; C=N; D=either Spearman R or t value in th e  
Wilcoxon test; E=p-level.
Note: *-Wilcoxon test GDP equals the modified real GDP of the state in question in 1929 quasi-USD.
What about the impact of the level of development? It seems that HYPOTHESIS 43 held o n ly  
in the larger sample of twenty-four countries (see Table 27), since clear negative correlation an d  
statistical dissimilarity between the series was indeed displayed. In the smaller sample, th is  
relationship became more obscure, although the two cross-section variables clearly were n o t 
statistically the same. Apparently the European democracies, at least as a whole, did not reduce 
their military spending according to  their level of development. One might suspect th a t 
countries like France had an impact on this end result. Thus, the overall tendency of interw ar 
states was to reduce their military burden with economic development, yet income w as 
evidently not enough on its own to explain the changes in the military burdens.
409 Sandler-Hartley 1999,46—48.
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Table 27. N onparam etric Tests on the Level of Development Hypothesis for the Selected 
Eleven E uropean States and the Sample o f Twenty-four States, 1925,1930,1935
A. B. C. D. E.
1925 MILBUR, GDPCAP 11 -0,52 0,10
1925* MILBUR, GDPCAP 11 0,00 0,00
1930 MILBUR, GDPCAP 11 -0,53 0,10
1930* MILBUR, GDPCAP 11 0,00 0,00
1935 MILBUR, GDPCAP 11 -0,45 0,17
1935* MILBUR, GDPCAP 11 0,00 0,00
1925a MILBUR, GDPCAP 22 -0,59 0,00
1925a* MILBUR, GDPCAP 22 0,00 0,00
1930a MILBUR, GDPCAP 24 -0,56 0,00
1930a* MILBUR, GDPCAP 24 0,00 0,00
1935a MILBUR, GDPCAP 24 -0,54 0,01
1935a* MILBUR, GDPCAP 24 0,00 0,00
Sources: real GDP per capita from Maddison 1995 for the larger sample; for other variables, see Appendices, 
Appendix 2 for details. A=cross-section year; B=variables tested; C=N; D=either Spearman R or t value in the 
Wilcoxon test; E=p-level.
Note: *=Wilcoxon test; n=based on the sample of twenty-four countries utilized in Chapter 4, e.g. Figure 45.
We can also utilize the basic military spending demand model (Equation 3) introduced in 
Chapter 2 to estimate the impact of the interwar security environment on the military spending 
patterns of the eleven European states.410 11 If the SPILLINS variable (=contributions of other 
states) is not statistically significant and the full income (FULL=INCOME+SPILUNS) variable 
is, this would mean that defense is purely public in this particular “alliance”. As indicated, if 
defense is purely public in an alliance, SPILLINS should be perfectly substitutable. In essence, 
Equation 3 is the simplest form of the joint product model, with joint products being quite 
unspecified as to their origins, and the pure public good model with the full income variable is 
nested within Equation 3. It might also be that both the FULL variable and SPILLINS variable 
are found statistically significant, indicating the presence of joint products. As Todd Sandler and 
James Murdoch have shown412, it is possible to use multiple regression analysis to distinguish 
whether the coefficient of the SPILLINS variable was different from zero (=HYPOTHESIS 18). 
Here I will adhere to their method of analysis and utilize very simplistic versions o f the 
independent variables. Thus, ME will be represented by either the defense shares or the military 
burdens of the eleven states; INCOME refers to their respective adjusted real GDP in 1929 
quasi-USD; PRICE is the real European unit price of arms and armaments413; SPILLINS will be 
represented by the real ME in 1929 quasi-USD of the states in the sample of eleven other than
410 See e.g. Figure 54.
411 In the simplest form: ME=f(PRICE, FULL or INCOME, SPILLINS, THREATS, STRATEGY).
412 See Sandler-Murdoch 1990 — they also attempted to distinguish between Nash and Lindahl behavior 
by using two different models and the so-called J-test to measure which was superior.
413 Thus, essentially this tests for the responsiveness to a common  price variable. Details on this series can 
be found in Chapter 6.
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the state in question; FULL as explained above; THREATS will be formed by a combined th rea t 
index representing the most probable threats to these states, explained in the next section an d  
utilized in Chapter 6 with the arms trade analyses414; and finally I will attempt to cap ture  
STRATEGY with dummy variables ranging from year 1929 to  1936, although the actual im pact 
and nature o f these dummies will be discussed in connection with the results. The m ethod 
utilized here is straightforward GLS, since none of the independent variables seemed to b e  
correlated with the error term. Thus I will not utilize 2SLS, like Sandler-Murdoch (1990) d id , 
which does entail the notion that a Nash equilibrium or several Nash equilibria were the  
fundamental processes behind the data. It is not clear in this sample whether this indeed was the 
case for all o f the included states.
Table 28. GLS Estimates on the Spillins as an Independent Variable in Representing 
Either Pure and/or Impure Public Good Characteristics of Military Spending for the 
Selected Eleven European States, 1920—1938
A. B. C.
CONSTANT t 2,88***
PRICE -0,23*** -0,09*
INCOME 4,85*** 3,43**
FULL -5,46*** -4,75**
SPILUNS 0,40** 0,63***
THREATS - 1.65 (M)
DUMMY 0,37*** (1933) -
ARU) 0,69*** 0,99***
N 187 176
S.E. 0,74 0,21
D.W. 1,93 1,89
F 14854 884
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details on the system. A-independent variable names and the regression 
statistics reported here; B=coefficient$ and other details on the independent variable (dependent variable: defense 
share); C=coefficients and other details on the independent variable (dependent variable: military burden). * = null
hypothesis of no correlation rejected at 10 per cent level; ** = null rejected at 5 per cent level; *** = null rejected at 1 
per cent level. All variables in logs.
Note: t  = cross-section specific, coefficients not listed here. Lag length indicated in parenthesis; for the dummy, the 
number indicates the year the relevant dummy is set to 1.
The results listed in Table 28 once again clearly reject the idea that military spending could have 
been a pure public good among these eleven European states as a whole. The SPILLINS variable 
was statistically significant in both equations, and the size and sign of the coefficients were 
similar in both cases. Also the INCOME variable was significant in these estimations, as was the 
FULL income variable. This would indicate some type of a mix o f pure and impure public good 
characteristics for the military spending of these countries as a whole. Most likely in a system 
comprising these states the FULL variable would be redundant. However, the presence o f some
414 Again, assuming a common threat, which is a fairly untenable assumption. See the next section for 
further discussion.
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autocorrelation and the theoretical foundations presented in Chapter 2 would suggest that this 
specification cannot be considered as conclusive. Many relevant independent variables are still 
missing from the equation. Also» the form  and content of especially the threat and spillover 
variables need to be addressed in more detail. The dummy variable indicating a change in 1933 
suggests that the change in the international threat scenarios and the failure of the “peace 
process” does have an impact on the military spending policies o f these nations. Whether this 
embodies a change in their strategy remains doubtful. As discussed in the next section» the 
strategic changes that took place in this time period, as far as it is possible to quantify them, did 
not take place at the same time in every country. On the contrary, individual responses varied, 
which need to be taken into consideration in the estimation.
5.2. The Demand fo r  Military Expenditures as an Impure Public Good among the Individual 
Countries
This section represents an effort to, firstly, concentrate on the types of variables one could 
utilize in the analysis of the demand fen- military spending as an impure public good in the 
interwar period. As the previous section o f the thesis has shown, military spending cannot be 
understood solely in terms of pure public good characteristics in this period. Military spending 
is determined through a combination o f forces emanating from the various explanatory levels 
(system, alliance, state, within state) explored in this thesis. Accordingly, suitable variables have 
to be found to represent the influences arising from all o f these levels. In addition to the efforts 
to introduce systemic level variables, as well as variables consistent with the hypotheses on 
leadership and regime type, here I will discuss how to measure the spillins and threats more 
credibly. Furthermore, political market proxies, representing the influences and structure of the 
political system within state, will be explored and developed. Secondly, this section brings forth 
the results of the estimations using all of the independent variables hypothesized to be relevant. 
These results will then be discussed in connection with the results achieved in earlier chapters.
There are almost limitless possibilities o f how to measure the “actual” impact of spillovers and 
threats on a country. In terms o f the SPILLINS variable, I have already introduced one possible 
spillin term in the previous section. It is based on utilizing the eleven state “alliance” as a 
possible source of spillovers, measured by the real MB (in 1929 quasi-USD). However, as 
argued in Chapter 1, it is very likely that countries react to changes in either their own military 
stock or the relative strength of their military stock compared to other states. The first effect, 
implying that a state makes its adjustment on the basis of its standing in the (17-state) system, 
could perhaps be proxied by the concept of M3LCINC introduced earlier. The second is more
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difficult to approximate. Here I will make the assumption that the United Kingdom and F ra n c e  
were the main sources of spillovers among the eleven states. Thus» for example the fo llo w in g  
kind of a spillin variable was calculated:415
SPILUNS
(MP„ RT„ ] ( Rr„,_, 'j
MPt RTj m ,- ,
2 2
J t J
( MPVKj_, | RTm,_, ) xlOO
(12)
in which MP  represents the number o f military personnel and RT  represents the real tonnage o f  
a nation i in comparison with the United Kingdom. In essence, Equation 12 measures th e  
change (from  f-1 to t) in the comparative stock advantage for the United Kingdom over co u n try  
i as a mean percentage (calculated also for France). The same variable was calculated t o  
measure the influence of France over these countries (calculated also for the United Kingdom ). 
Since Switzerland had no sea borders and thus no effective tonnage, only the MP variable w a s  
used in this case. The use o f this variable presupposes almost perfect knowledge on these tw o  
military stock variables by these nations, which is not in fact all that an untenable assum ption. 
The information on these was within the reach of all of these nations via the League of N ations 
publications, especially the Armaments Year-Books. As Figure 56 below displays, the m ean  
relative military stock advantage o f the United Kingdom plummeted especially in the la te  
1920s, only to recover strongly in the mid-1930s, which means that the behavior of the G re a t 
Powers and the “weak” states was not entirely similar at this time. France’s advantage, in  
comparison, developed in a more stable manner. The “weak” states were less willing to  
compromise on their military stock at the height of the European disarmament illusion in th e  
late 1920s.
415 The spillin variable can also be expressed as: SPILU N S —
f
J +
f R Tm ]*r ,  J
^  MPi4_, j + ){ J
I would like to thank Mark Harrison for clarifying my thinking on this.
1 *100
J
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Figure 56. M ean A nnual Change in the  Relative M ilitary Stock Advantage o f F rance  and  
the U nited K ingdom  in the Sample of Eleven European States, 1920— 1938
%
Year
--------- MEAN CHANGE IN UK STOCK ADVANTAGE AMONG THE 11
-------- MEAN CHANGE IN FRA STOCK ADVANTAGE AMONG THE 11
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 and Section 3.3 of this thesis.
Note: military stock advantages calculated according to Equation 12.
As far as the threat variables are concerned, I have already utilized previously a combined threat 
index without explaining exactly how it was constructed. The combined threat index 
(COMBTHRT), a  German-weighted threat index (GERTHRT), or a German-Soviet-weighted 
threat index (GERSOVTHRT) all attempt to approximate the main threats felt by these eleven 
states. Threats were thus calculated as combined indices with different weighting schemes. The 
individual countries representing threats were assumed to  be Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, 
and Austria (on the basis of the First World War). Thus, individually, the development of these 
countries’ defense shares and the number of their military personnel were both turned into 
volume indices (1931=100), and then combined with equal weights for a particular country to 
form the threat index. If a value was missing from one of these series, only one of the indicators 
was used for that particular year. Next, a combined index was formed with the following 
weights: 2/7 for others, 1/7 for Austria (the weakest o f these countries). This index could 
initially be tested for Portugal and Spain416, as well as for the two Great Powers in the sample. A 
German-weighted index (the combined aggregate index of all countries 1/2, Germany’s threat
416 Also, in the case of these two countries, their respective defense shares or military burdens were tested 
as possible sources of threats due to their occasionally uneasy political relationship.
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index 1/2 o f the weighting) could initially be used for Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, a n d  
Switzerland. A German-Soviet-weighted index (the combined aggregate index o f all countries 
1/3, Germany’s threat index 1/3, and the Soviet Union’s threat index 1/3 of the weighting) c o u ld  
form the starting point for the statistical testing in the cases of Finland and Sweden. T h ese  
weighting choices were chosen due to geographic proximity and strategic threat (A ustria  
developed similar to Hungary, which is not included due to  limited data). The sources used a re  
listed Appendices, Appendix 2.417
In addition, I also calculated a stock adjustment variant o f the threat, in the vein done for th e  
spillover effect o f the United Kingdom above, to measure the stock advantage (or disadvantage) 
of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. One must emphasize two things, however: 1) The d a ta  
for these states is, similar to the military spending data, less satisfactory than for the eleven  
states analyzed in detail; 2) It is unclear how much knowledge the eleven countries actually 
possessed especially on the size o f the armed forces of the authoritarian states. Nonetheless, I 
will also test the statistical significance of these threat indices against the com peting 
representations described above. As Figure 57 below shows, the change in the relative m ilitary 
stock threat imposed by Germany in this period remained almost stable until 1934, when th e  
buildup o f German armed forces and military stock compelled this indicator to rise sharply. In  
the late 1930s, the German military threat increased slower respective o f the eleven selected 
states. In the Italian case, most of the interwar period revealed efforts to increase its m ilitary 
readiness, yet the threat impact posed by these efforts remained meager. In the Soviet case, th e  
delayed impact of the Civil W ar and the chaotic early 1920s can be seen clearly in Figure 57 . 
The Soviet Union did increase its potential military stock threat in the 1930s, although not as  
much as Germany especially in the closing years of the decade.
Also, it is possible to represent the relevant prices in military spending decision-making in m any 
ways. Moreover, the problems involved in constructing such price indices have already been 
discussed at length. Here the first price variable to be tested is the real European price of arm s 
and ammunition described in Chapter 6 and the Appendices (Appendix 2). Yet, the use of th is 
variable assumes sensitivity to European “market” prices o f armaments, whereas the domestic 
purchases of durable and nondurable goods formed the biggest spending item. Thus, the use o f  
the alternate military spending deflators may be warranted as well. Again, it is unclear how
417 Japan, which could possible have formed a threat against especially British colonial interests, is not 
included in the calculations. The emphasis here is to investigate the European dimension of threats in 
particular.
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much knowledge the decision-makers had on the price of “defense”. This effect may be 
alleviated by the fact that, as we discovered in Section 3.3, these price indices behaved very 
similar to the combined indices based on wholesale and consumer price indices.
Figure 57. Mean Annual Change in the Relative Military Stock Threat Felt by the Eleven 
European States from Germany, Italy, and the USSR, 1920—1938
%
Year
— M EAN CHANGE IN GER STOCK THREAT AMONG THE 11
-------M EAN CHANGE IN ITA STOCK THREAT AM ONG THE 11
M EAN CHANGE IN USSR STOCK THREAT AM ONG THE 11
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 and Section 3.3 of this thesis.
Note: military stock threat calculations based on Equation 12.
What about the impact of the political markets? How can we measure the influences arising 
from the actions of different groups in the political economy? Here I will first consider 
bureaucrats as a potential interest group in the military spending decision-making process. If 
they are to behave in a  fashion predicted by public choice theorists, they tend to overextend the 
budget beyond the “required” limits and favor producers more than consumers.418 The latter 
assumption seems particularly reasonable in the interwar period, since voters/consumers, unlike 
the other groups mentioned by Keith Hartley previously, were rarely organized as an interest 
group in Western countries until after Second World War. Even though it is difficult to  find 
descriptive variables to represent bureaucratic influences, especially in a comparative fashion,
418 See e.g. Sandler-Hartley 1995, 119. As William Niskanen has hypothesized, most bureaus, unless 
constrained by the aggregate demand, have a budget-maximizing incentive in the short run. Most of this 
spending also tends to be capital-intensive by nature. Niskanen 1971, Part IV, section 12.
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here I will attempt to see whether military expenditures were influenced by the preceding y e a r ’ s  
military spending (MEt.i). Thus, it would reveal whether the previous year’s budget w as t h e  
basis for either similar or differing levels to come.
Competition within the political economy, especially among officials selected for a l im ite d  
term, can also have a profound effect on a nation’s military spending policy. As explored  i n  
Chapter 2, electoral uncertainty associated with such competition between the political p a r t ie s  
may impart a negative bias on the military spending o f a particular state. The myopic bias o f  t h e  
legislators, inasmuch they feel the burden of military expenditures in lower c u r r e n t  
consumption, can be the functional mechanism for this impact. The incumbent legislator i s  
interested in maximizing his or her own immediate interest, which is ensuring re-election.419 
Here I will test whether increased party fragmentation, implying more electoral confusion a n d  
increased political competition, lowers military spending levels. I will utilize the so-called p a r ty  
fractionalization index to proxy this effect:
1*1
( 1 3 )
where t, is the proportion of members associated with the ith party in the lower house o f  t h e  
legislature. Thus, the higher the F, the more fragmented the political field is.420
As the analysis of war initiation by democratic states has shown, military spending m ight b e  
linked to election cycles in the political markets, perhaps due to preceding weak econom ic  
performance.421 Here I will investigate this hypothesis in a crude format by employing e le c tio n  
year dummies as possible explanatory variables. Additionally, I will concentrate on m easu ring  
the impact of one producer group in the economy, the industries as an interest group, by te s tin g  
the development of real industrial value added as an omitted variable. The reason fo r n o t  
including this variable in many of the subsequent estimations is that the data on real industria l 
value added was not found for all of the sample states (missing: BEL, SWI). This la t te r  
perspective, industries as an interest group, is also linked to the archival analysis o f  th e  
industrial federations in Sweden and Finland during this period, undertaken in Chapter 7,
419 Garfinkel 1994, e.g. 1294— 1295.
420 This type of data can be found e,g. in Banks 1976.
421 Gaubatz 1991; Geller-Singer 1998.
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It is difficult to proxy the influence o f different groups in military spending decision-making. 
The quantitative proxies suggested above are by no means perfect for measuring the suggested 
impacts nor do they form an exhaustive list o f possible proxies. Furthermore, the interest groups 
in a particular political economy exert their influence in a  multitude o f ways and the “rents” that 
they receive cannot always be measured quantitatively. Therefore, any credible effort to assess 
the importance of political markets in the decision-making over public goods has to include 
qualitative analysis as well. In general, one should attempt to incorporate a wide variety of 
variables in order to explain interest-group influence, in relation to  the structure of the economy 
and the polity in question, including proxies such as the median income, the aggregate number 
of interest groups, the political fractionalization, the degree of enfranchisement, the size of 
bureaucracy, the start of modernization, the level of industrialization, and so on.422 It is also 
likely that the impact of interest-group activity is less pronounced at the level of economic 
development; rather, it emerges more strongly at the level o f various economic sectors, based on 
their performance and relative strength in the political markets.423
Thus, the hypotheses that I intend to  test in this section include already explored 
HYPOTHESES 1— 11, which represent the systemic level. Secondly, at the level of an alliance 
—  which here pertains to include all defensive, offensive, neutrality, nonaggression, or 
consultation obligations —  alliance dummies were constructed on the basis of the ATOP (2000) 
database to see whether the feeling of security for an individual state was increased by any type 
of alliance (=HYPOTHESIS 12). In addition, it is plausible that the nature and conditions o f  the 
alliance were crucial in this respect (=HYPOTHESIS 13). At the level of state, military 
expenditures can be expected to be positively correlated with income (here: real GDP per capita 
in 1929 quasi-USD=HYPOTHESIS 19), negatively correlated with the price variables presented 
above (-HYPOTHESIS 20), negatively correlated with the spillins variables introduced earlier 
(=HYPOTHESIS 21), and positively correlated with the threat variables discussed above 
(^HYPOTHESIS 22). Also, the possibility of military spending being influenced by strategy 
changes is explored by the use of dummy variables, and the possible interpretations o f these 
dummies are discussed in connection with the results. Moreover, HYPOTHESES 24— 27 are 
revisited in the following estimations.
In the context of the political markets within states, I will first explore the possibility that armed 
forces and bureaucracies will attempt to maximize the level of military spending
422 See e.g. Lamberg et al. 2002; Mueller-Murrell 1985; Grant 2000; Gray-Lowery 1988.
423 See Mueller-Murrell 1985 for further discussion.
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(=HYPOTHESIS 44), respective o f the lagged ME. Secondly, I will attempt to verify w h e th e r  
industries as an interest group would attempt to maximize the level of military spending in  t im e s  
of economic hardship (=HYPOTHESIS 45). Thirdly, as argued above, an increase in  th e  
fragmentation o f the parliament in a democracy should result in lower military spending le v e ls ,  
due to the myopic bias on the part of the legislator (=HYPOTHESIS 49). And finally, m ilita ry  
spending within a state should respond to election cycles, with an election year b ringing  a  
negative adjustment to military spending (^HYPOTHESIS 50). The relevant proxies rela ting  t o  
these hypotheses were discussed earlier.
Thus I will estimate the following equation, which is an extension of Equation 11:
MEU «  p, + &SYSTOTME" + foSYSTOTMECV,^ + faCINCCONC,^ + faMILCINCCONC,.,
... + DEMOCCINC,^ + P% DEMOCTO TME,_X + P.AUTOCCINC,^ + faAUTOCTOTME,^
T T T ? f  ( 14)
... +  P J J S A M E , ^  +  p „ V K M E , _ x +  p ^ U S A C l N C , . , + P X2V K C 1 S C ,_ X +  p ^ V S A M l L C l N C , . ,  v '
+ p ^ U K M I L C I N C ^  + P l$A L U A N C E D  IM ,+p H P R I C E , + p„ I N C O M E ,  +  f t ,  S P I L U N S , ^
... + PnTHREATSt.A + p^STRATEGYDTM,+ p„ M E ,^  + P^Fa + p aINDUSTRYa+
... + p^ELECTIONDW a+ e,
The hypothesized signs of the independent variables are displayed above the resp ec tiv e  
variables, based on the premises explored in earlier sections. In addition to the abbreviations 
already discussed, ALUANCEDUM represents an alliance dummy (denoting a p a rticu la r 
alliance) for country i in time t (set to  1 for each year of any of the alliances listed abo v e); 
PRICE, SPILLINS, and THREATS represent one o f the possible alternates for the said variab le; 
STRATEGYDUM represents a  possible change in strategy, captured by a dummy (set to  1, 
starting with one o f the following years: 1929— 1936); F  equals the party fractionalization in d ex  
introduced earlier; INDUSTRY corresponds to the real value added of industries as whole (n o t 
included in the initial estimations due to  missing data for some countries); and ELECTIONDUM  
represents the election year dummies (set to 1 for each year of parliamentary election). T h e  
preferred method of estimation here is the SUR, which allows a correction for heteroskedasticity 
and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. If endogeneity were to arise a s  
a possible problem, 3SLS would be employed to improve the coefficient estimates. T h e  
possibility o f multicollinearity is also taken into account by examining the correlation m atrix o f  
the variables while carrying out the estimation procedures. Finally, the results were tested fo r  
autocorrelation up to three lags.
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What do the results tell us? Here I will interpret the results as conclusive for a particular 
hypothesis if the coefficients of independent variables in both the defense share and military 
burden equations are in agreement. If only one of them is significant, this will be regarded as 
weak support for a hypothesis, especially since the demand behavior for these two dependent 
variables, based on earlier analyses, seems to have differed somewhat. If both are significant yet 
the signs are opposite, the variable is deemed relevant for the equation but its impact may be 
uncertain. The common responses to these variables can be seen in Table 29, whereas the 
individual responses can be found in Table 30.
Firstly, it seems that the lagged systemic variables had a large, destabilizing impact on the 
military spending o f these states. The coefficients of the systemic variables were in many cases 
quite large and the signs were often the opposite in the two estimations. They were, all in all, 
relevant for these equations, but the actual impacts were difficult to determine. Also, many of 
these variables were highly correlated with each other, which suggested that factor analysis 
might be more suitable for distinguishing the effects of these variables. O f these, the 
concentration of MILCINCs had a large, negative, and consistent impact on the dependent 
variables. Thus, HYPOTHESIS 4 received strong support by the results here. Also, the total ME 
by authoritarian states seemed to have had the hypothesized (lagged) threat effect, hereby 
confirming HYPOTHESIS 8.424 The inpact of the “leadership vacuum” also emerges from the 
results; the lack o f military leadership by the United States and the United Kingdom, by and 
large, produced “challenger” behavior among these states. This may be the wrong term for the 
behavior of these European states, since they were not (with the exception of perhaps France) in 
a position to exert any challenge. They simply turned to their own devices in regards to their 
defense needs. This was partially confirmed by the results on the spillins, which indicated strong 
free riding for the military burdens in particular. Furthermore, the impact of the American 
military spending caution seems to have had a lagged impact, whereas the British influence was 
perhaps more immediate. The declining U.S. modified CINC incurred a positive correlation 
with the military spending variables investigated here at a lag of one year.
The alliance dummies did not turn out significant for any of the specifications, which reinforces 
the general impression outlined earlier on the lackluster nature of these alliances. The price 
variables produced the expected negative adjustment coefficients in most cases, and the relevant 
price variable seems to have been the alternate price index. The income variable produced a
424 In contrast, see Chapter 4 of this thesis, which underlines the importance of including all (or as many 
as possible) theoretically important variables in the statistical analyses.
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Table 29. Common Responses to the Theoretically Relevant Independent Variables in  th e  
Demand for Military Spending Among the Selected Eleven European States, 1920—1938
A. B. C.
C O N S T A N T 0,94* 17,70***
SY S T O T M E - -2,30*** (t-1)
S Y S T O T M E C V 1,44*** (t-2) -9,03*** (t-1)
C IN C C O N C - 33,23*** (t-2)
M IL C IN C C O N C -0,98*** (t-2) -12,17*** (t-2)
D E M O C C IN C - -
D E M O C T O T M E - 5,64*** (t-2)
A U T O C C IN C - 1,68***
A V T O C T O T M E 035*** (t-2) 1,40*** (t-2)
USAMEO. -0,19*** (t-1) 3,09*** (t-2)
U K M E n -0,61*** -0,66***
V S A C IN C 1,19*** (t-1) 3,02*** (t-1)
U KC 1NC - -
U SA M IL C IN C -0,31*** (t-2) -2,78*** (t-1)
V K M IL C IN C 0,14** -
B E L  A L L IA N C E  D U M - -
D E N  A L L IA N C E  D U M - -
F RA  A L L IA N C E  D U M - -
N E D  A L L IA N C E  D U M - -
N O R  A L L IA N C E  D U M - -
P O R  A L L IA N C E  D U M - -
SPA A L U A N C E  D U M - -
S W E  A L L IA N C E  D U M - -
S W l A L L IA N C E  D U M - -
U K  A L U A N C E  D U M - -
E U R O P E M E P R IC E - -
A L T E R N A T E  P R IC E  IN D E X t -032***
IN C O M E t -2.16***
S P IL U N S I - -232***
S P IL U N S 2 - -
S P IL U N S S -0,00*** -
C O M B T H R E A T - t
G E R T H R E A T - -
G E R S O V T H R E A T - -
T H R E A T S  1 - -
T H R E A TS2 - -
TH R E A TS3 0,00*** -
ST R A T E G  YD U M M Y -0,09*** (1930) -0,35*** (1930)
ME,.jU 0,40*** 0,44***
F t -1,02***
IN D U S T R Y - t -
E L E C T IO N D  U M M Y - -
N 173 173
L O G  U K E U H O O D 410,63 297,77
S E 0.06 0,12
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details on the system. A=independent variable names and names of the regression  
statistics reported here; B=coefficients and other details on the independent variable (dependent variable: de fen se  s h a r e d  
C=coefficient5  and other details on the independent variable (dependent variable: m ilita ry  burden). * -  null hypothesis o f  n o  
correlation rejected a t 10 per cent level; ** = null rejected at 5 per cent level; *** =  null rejected at 1 per cent level. AH variab les 
except SPILLINS2— 3 and THREAT1—3 in logs. SPILLINSl=the nonstock variant used in earlier sections; SPILLINS2=stock 
variant as explained in text, respective of U.K. military stock; SPILLINS3=stock variant as explained in text, respective o f F ren ch  
military stock; THREATS1—3-stock variant o f threats as explained in text, with 1=GER, 2=ITA, 3=USSR. n=DFSHARE a n d  
MILE UR respectively.
N o te : t  = cross-section specific, coefficients listed in T able 30 except for the constant. Lag length indicated in parenthesis; for th e  
dummy, the number indicates the year the relevant dummy is set to 1.
negative coefficient in most cases, which provides support for earlier (albeit cautious) findings 
that the level of development had a negative impact on ME (=HYPOTHESIS 43). Thus, m ilitary  
spending was not an income-normal good among these states as a whole. As indicated above, 
the various spillins variables produced contradictory results. The threat responses were, all in
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all, as expected. The COMBTHREAT variable produced a lagged positive response from these 
states, similar to the response to the total M E by the authoritarian states. None of the individual 
country threat variables were found significant for these countries. As in the case of the spillins, 
the stock threat variables did not improve the estimation process. The approximate threat indices 
seemed to explain the responses of these states better.
Table 30. Individual Country Responses to the Theoretically Relevant Independent 
Variables in the Demand for Military Spending Among the Selected Eleven European 
States, 1920—1938
A. B. C.
B E L A LTE R N A TE  P R IC E  IN D E X 0,42+
FRA E U RO P EM E  P R IC E 0,92***
N O R  A LTE R N A TE  P R IC E  IN D E X -0,19**
SPA A LT E R N A T E  P R IC E  IN D E X -0,54+
S W E  A LT E R N A T E  P R IC E  IN D E X 0,86***
U K  A LT E R N A T E  P R IC E  IN D E X -0.40***
B E L IN C O M E -0.61***
D E N  IN C O M E -0.72***
F IN  IN C O M E -0.80***
F RA  IN C O M E -0.87***
N E D  IN C O M E -0,49***
N O R  IN C O M E -034***
P O R  IN C O M E -0,47***
SW E  IN C O M E -0,82***
S W I IN C O M E -0,49**
U K  INC O M E -033***
B E L  C O M B TH RE AT 035*** (t-1)
D E N  C O M B TH R E A T 038*** (t-1)
F IN  C O M B TH R E A T 032** (t-1)
FRA C O M B TH RE AT 032** (t-1)
N E D  C O M B TH RE AT 0,94*** (t-1)
N O R  C O M B TH RE AT 037*** (t-1)
P O R  C O M B TH R E A T 0,42** (t-1)
SPA C O M B TH RE AT 1,07*** (t-1)
S W E  C O M B TH R E A T 037*** (t-1)
S W I C O M B TH RE AT 0,60*** (t-1)
D E N E -8,72*** -
F I N F -5,04*** .
N E D F -5,16*** .
P O R F 1,40** -
S P A F -0,93*** .
S W I F -330** .
F IN  IND U STRY* - -0,22***
F RA INDUSTRY* . -030***
N E D  INDUSTRY* - -033*
N O R  IN D U STR Y* . -0,00***
SPA IND U STRY* . -131***
S W E  INDUSTRY* - -0,35***
U K  IND U STRY* - -1,36***
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details on the system. A=independent variable; B=coefficients and other details on the
independent variable (dependent variable: d efen se  sh a re)1, C=coefficients and other details on the independent variable (dependent 
variable: m ilita ry  burden). * = null hypothesis of no correlation rejected at 10 per cent level; ** »  null rejected at 5 per cent level; 
*** = null rejected at 1 per cent level. Based on the equations presented in Table 29, except those marked with • (»slightly different 
form of the MILBUR equation; results available from the author by request).
N ote: Lag length indicated in parenthesis. Only statistically significant variables reported here.
The so-called strategy dummy was definitely an unfitting title for this dummy, since the most 
significant year of adjustment (negative coefficient) seems to have been 1930, underscoring the 
importance of the Great Depression. This was not, by and large, a year of major strategic
"1
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adjustments by these states.425 The downward adjustment brought on by this crisis a lso  
highlights the ad hoc nature of the disarmament efforts at this pivotal juncture (such as th e  
armaments truce discussed earlier). The ME,.i also produced the expected positive correlation, 
which provides support for the notion o f  bureaucratic forces having had a strong influence in th e  
budgetary process (=HYPOTHESIS 44); although technically this does not measure budgetary 
path dependence rather than military spending path dependence. And, as expected, an increase 
in the party fractionalization index produced a strong, negative military spending response fo r  
both ME variables (with only POR as the exception in the defense share equation with a positive 
coefficient). Thus, HYPOTHESIS 49 can be deemed confirmed by these results. Election 
dummies displayed a negative coefficient in most equation variants, yet they did not im prove 
the estimates as a whole. In addition, the notion that industries as an interest group might have 
an impact on military spending during times of economic hardship was confirmed in a separate 
estimation sample. This provides support for examining the actual mechanism through w hich 
they might exert this influence, which is indeed undertaken in Chapter 7. All in all, the dom estic 
market variables were highly significant in explaining the demand for military spending am ong 
these eleven European states.
5.3. Conclusions
On the basis o f two chapters of statistical endeavors, it is possible now to take stock of how the  
theoretical framework has met the empirical challenges posed by the data. First of all, it seem s 
that systemic forces indeed played a role in the demand for military spending among these 
eleven European states. Whereas often the exact impact of these forces was difficult to ascertain 
precisely, for example the concentration of military resources in fewer hands seemed to  inspire 
greater confidence among these states. Yet, as we have seen in earlier chapters, this 
concentration did not occur in the same lines in the 1930s as after the First World W ar. The new  
authoritarian challengers represented a new systemic threat to  which the democracies on the 
aggregate responded slowly. Clearly the maintenance of balance of power was important, yet 
the disparity in military resources, for example between France and Germany during both 
decades (at first in favor of the French, then in favor of the Germans), undermined systemic 
stability in the absence of security leadership. No such leadership was forthcoming from the 
League of Nations, which was unable to act as the guardian of the status quo sealed in 
Versailles, and thus the selected eleven states did not consider military spending as a public
425 On the military strategy aspect in comparative terms, see for more e.g.: The Domestic Bases of Grand 
Strategy. Ed. by Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A  Stein. London 1993; Military Effectiveness. Volume
r
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good in such an alliance framework. Also, other alliances failed to  inspire any more confidence. 
In such an environment the democracies acted more cautiously to the new challenges, and the 
decision-making systems embodied by the various types of interwar democracies seemed to 
provide support for the idea o f democratic peace even at the level of military spending. Finally, 
the leadership vacuum left by the two leading democracies, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, destabilized the international system even further, thereby rendering disarmament 
almost inpossible to achieve. These factors contributed to the strengthening of other forces, 
especially within states, in the military spending decision-making.
Thus, it seems that the demand for military spending among these eleven European states was 
impurely public in the interwar period, influenced by forces arising from the four explanatory 
levels discussed in this thesis. Military spending was also impurely public, yielding joint 
products, at the level of state and within state. Military expenditures were not an income-normal 
good at the state level; instead, the level o f economic development seemed to exert a downward 
pressure on military spending among European democracies. This meant that more developed 
countries tended to  spend less on defense in this period. An increase in the price of “defense” in 
general decreased their relative military spending. There were quite contradictory spillover 
effects felt by these states, yet they responded to increasing threats by increasing their ME at a 
lag. Also, democracies as a whole clearly spent less for military purposes than authoritarian 
regimes, and it seems that the level of authoritarian rule was important in determining the 
comprehensiveness of the military spending efforts. In terms of the interaction between military 
spending and economic growth, the short-run dynamics of the comparisons suggest that: 1) 
Military spending was Granger-caused by economic development rather than vice versa; 2) The 
short-run impact o f military spending on economic growth was almost negligible due to 
offsetting tendencies.
The domestic political markets clearly are more important in the analysis of military spending 
than earlier studies have indicated. One of the problems has been to be able to find quantifiable, 
credible proxies measuring the impact of, for example, domestic market interest groups. Here it 
seems that: 1) Increased political competition in the legislature tended to decrease military 
spending; 2) Election years might have exerted a downward pressure on military expenditures, 
yet this impact was not stable enough to surface in the pooled sample as a whole; 3) Military 
expenditures tended to be quite path dependent in terms of previous year’s spending levels; 4) 
Industries as a whole, due to their level of organization and lack o f competition from consumer I.
II. The Interwar Period. Ed. by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray. Boston 1988.
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groups, were able to increase military spending during times of industrial slowdown, to  
compensate for their losses. Finally, it seems that there are some indications that the G rea t 
Powers and the “weak” states differed in certain respects in their military spending behavior 
(thus, indicating some support for HYPOTHESIS 35 again). How and why did they do so? W h y  
were there not more apparent distinctions between these groups of states? These questions w ill 
be examined in the next chapter by analyzing the actual allocation o f capital m ilitary 
investments, the domestic and international markets for arms, and the externality effects o f th e  
arms trade in the interwar period from  the perspective of these “weak” states.
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6. THE “WEAK” STATE PERSPECTIVE: Implications of the Interwar Arms 
Trade and the Domestic Political Markets
6.1. Theoretical Implications o f the “Weak” State Perspective and the Interwar Arms Trade
This chapter focuses on the small and medium size arms trade behavior of “weak” —  implying 
limited capabilities of influencing the political and economic system —  European states 
(Belgium, Czechoslovakia426, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland) in the interwar period. I will especially focus on how the ratio of military exports 
and, respectively, military imports of military expenditures, indicators of military trade behavior 
respective military spending, responded to  external and internal variables. The key questions in 
this chapter are whether these countries were merely dependent on their military imports or 
were actually important players in the armaments markets, whether they acted differently due to 
strategic and geographic limitations in particular, and whether they encountered significant 
domestic constraints on their behavior.
The military trade behavior of these nations is here analyzed with previously largely ignored 
data from the League of Nations on the interwar arms trade, the latest historical macroeconomic 
data, as well as with the few studies that have touched upon the subject. As such, the League of 
Nations’ arms trade data includes only small and medium size armaments, without listing such 
large-scale items as warships, aircraft, and internal arms purchases.427 Also, as Milan Hauner 
has pointed out, the figures were usually updated throughout the publication series. However, as 
a comparison between the League of Nations military spending figures and the current figures 
used by this author indicate, it seems that the League of Nations statistics in general, with the 
exception of Germany in the 1930s, were relatively reliable, especially for the “weak” states.428 
What can these figures tell us? Firstly, they can demonstrate the relative strengths of these 
nations in the small and medium size arms trade in this period, although it must be noted that
426 Here also Czechoslovakia is included since it was perhaps the most important player among these 
“weak” states in the international armaments markets. This chapter is mostly based on Eloranta 2002a.
427 In the series the armaments included small arms (such as rifles, pistols, revolvers), artillery (heavy 
artillery, mountain artillery, mortars), explosives (dynamite, gunpowder, torpedoes etc.), as well as tanks 
and armored vehicles. See e.g. League o f Nations, Statistical Information on the Trade in Arms, 
Ammunition and Material of War. A. 30.1924. IX. Geneva 1924. Thus regular vehicles, even if intended 
for military purposes, were not included.
428 See Hauner 1973, 6; League of Nations, Statistical Information on the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and 
Material o f War. A. 30. 1924. IX. Geneva 1924. Here the figures used were also updated backwards in 
three-year intervals. Comparison between the League of Nations Armaments Year-Books’ figures and the 
figures collected here, same as was done in Eloranta 2000a for another set of figures, found statistical 
tests supporting the same median and same variance assumption in most of the cases. See also Chapter 1 
of this thesis for a similar approach.
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their aggregate role in the military trade was more meager due to their smaller share o f  th e  
heaviest equipment trade. Secondly, they enable us to arrive at guesstimates, since for m any o f  
these countries also quantities are listed, at how the unit prices o f these military goods may h a v e  
developed as a whole. Thirdly, they provide us with data to  test how much the military tra d e  
dependence of the selected states changed in the 1930s and whether this was due, for exam ple, 
to more extensive reliance on the domestic markets.
The military-economic inpacts and implications of the interwar period have rarely been s tud ied  
from  an arms trade perspective, let alone the military spending behavior of the European n a tio n s  
as a whole.429 Especially analysis o f the ”weak” European nations as arms exporters a n d  
importers has been missing thus far.430 W ith a European focus in this chapter, due mostly to  th e  
availability of reliable military spending and economic data, the selected "weak” s ta te s  
represented both the periphery (such as Portugal, Finland, and perhaps Spain431) and the c o re  
(for example, Belgium, the Netherlands) o f Europe, as well as different political systems. U s in g  
Angus M addison’s data (see also Chapter 1), it is possible to  divide them, albeit arbitrarily, in to  
low-income (Finland, Portugal, Spain), middle-income (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, N orw ay, 
Sweden), and high-income “weak” states (the Netherlands, Switzerland) 432
W hat exactly are “weak” states? As for example Olle Krantz has argued recently, there a r e  
several characteristics that separate the small countries from the larger, apparently m o re  
influential ones. For example, small countries possess fewer possibilities of influencing th e  
international system, their economies are often highly specialized and export-dependent, an d  
they suffer from diseconomies of scale in production. Conversely, they can also have potential 
advantages over their bigger rivals. Depending on international politics and trade rivalries, th ey  
may have room to maneuver between the bigger nations, possess comparative advantages in  
certain commodities, and have more flexible and unified domestic markets.433 Quite sim ilarly,
429 See e.g. Eloranta 1998 and Eloranta 2002a for further details.
430 On a foreign policy perspective of the small nations during the interwar period, see e.g. Paasivirta 
1987.
431 For a similar classification, see e.g. Myllyntaus 1998. Although by geographic size Spain was 
comparable to e.g. France or Italy, its economy was considerably smaller. Its real GDP level, based on 
Maddison 1995, was only 56 per cent of the Italian equivalent and less than 30 per cent of the British one 
in 1930. For example Denmark, a perfect candidate according to the criteria, is excluded due to the lack 
of uniform quantity data in the League of Nations records. On other selection and data concerns, see 
Chapter 1 of this thesis for details.
432 Based on Maddison 1995. Here the 1929 real GDP per capita figures were used to divide the countries 
into the three groups as follows (in 1990 Geary-Khamis USD): 1) 0—3000 USD; 2) 3000—5000 USD; 3) 
5000+ USD.
433 Krantz 2000.
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Patrick Salmon has argued in the Nordic interwar context that the small countries were 
constrained by their geographic position, their limited resource bases, the international 
environment, and the (lack of) diplomatic skill. While the Nordic countries clearly had some 
control over their respective “destinies” in this period, they were constrained especially by their 
export-dependence and the intense trade competition between the United Kingdom and 
Germany in the 1930s.434
As Michael Handel has pointed out, “small power” and “smaller state” can be misleading terms 
to describe such states. They usually embody the connotation of small geographic size. A more 
fitting definition can perhaps be found in the use of the term “weak state”. According to 
Handel, this concept can be applied not only to small, weak states but also to countries of 
considerable area (such as Spain in this period), which were nonetheless weak players in the 
international system.435 He has also presented an interesting “ideal type” of a weak state, which 
he admits to be an abstraction. This “ideal type” contains the following key characteristics: 1) a 
small population; 2) a small area; 3) a low GNP in absolute terms; 4) a high degree of 
specialization and small domestic market; 5) a high dependence on foreign military protection 
and military imports; 6) limited chances of influencing the international system. Handel thus 
uses a plethora of indicators to assess a  country’s power status. However, he also has strong 
reservations about the validity of the notion that weak states are merely passive and reactive 
participants in such a system, which raises equal doubts about the validity of the to m  weak 
state.436 Indeed, how “weak” were these states?
Based on Handel’s observations presented above, it is possible to construct some testable 
hypotheses to analyze the behavior of the ”weak” states in the international arms transfer system 
of this period. Firstly, there should be fewer domestic constraints on the foreign and trade policy 
decision-making of a “weak” state (=HYPOTHESIS 34), implying that external variables such 
as market prices or perceived threats ought to have primacy in explaining the military trade 
behavior of these nations 437 Secondly, “weak” states should be highly dependent on military 
trade and military imports in particular (=HYPOTHESIS 36). Thirdly, “weak” states should
434 Salmon 1997,4— 19.
435 Handel 1981,10—20. He divides states into super powers, great powers, middle powers, weak states, 
and mini-states. The three last-mentioned can be understood as weak states here. All definitions are, 
however, arbitrary by necessity. Based on the results achieved in Eloranta 2002a, I will utilize quotation 
marks on the word weak when referring to these states. See also Ray-Singer 1973.
436 Handel 1981,37-46,52—53.
437 This notion has been challenged by e.g. Patrick Salmon (1997) and this author as well. See e.g. 
Eloranta 1999.
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differ from one another mostly due to factors such as their geographic and/or strategic location , 
the level o f industrialization, the type of foreign policy tradition, and the size of the econom y (=  
HYPOTHESIS 37). Thus, for example, the military trade behavior of states either close to  th e  
center (such as Belgium and Czechoslovakia) or holding strategic importance to a Great P o w er 
(such as Finland) should differ, due to vulnerability, from the military trade behavior o f  
relatively safe and/or peripheral countries (such as Portugal, Switzerland, and Sw eden).438 
Fourthly, —  a point shared by Krantz, Salmon, and Handel —  “weak” states may be influential 
in the international system when a balance of power exists between the Great P ow ers 
(=HYPOTHESIS 38), especially in the bargaining game between trade blocs. A no th er 
possibility is that “weak” states are influential in the international system when the balance o f  
power is in flux; i.e., there is hegemonic competition among the Great Powers for econom ic 
and/or military leadership (=HYPOTHESIS 39). Here I will argue that this may indeed apply to  
the trading behavior of the European states. It may also be possible that the Great Powers w ere  
more influenced by the changes in  the balance of power in their military spending behav ior 
(=HYPOTHESIS 35), for which we have already gathered some sporadic evidence. Finally, th e  
military trade behavior of the ”weak” states should be affected by the various structural 
systemic shocks of the period, such as the Great Depression and the disarmament process 
featured in the preceding analysis.
The research on arms trade has largely ignored the “weak” states as players in the international 
system. Nonetheless, for example Robert E. Harkavy’s study The Arms Trade and International 
Systems (1975) focused also on the interwar period, with a comparative, systemic emphasis. 
Also, Keith Krause’s Arms and the State: Patterns o f Production and Trade (1992) had a 
similar emphasis.439 As Krause maintains, the so-called strong customers obtain and use the 
most modern weapons, and weak customers (=states) either obtain modem weapons without the 
ability to use them, or are unable to obtain them at all.440 In the interwar period, there were three 
kinds of states evident among the arms producers: the dominant producers of heavy armaments 
(such as the UK and France); the alternate producers of heavy armaments (Germany, the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and Italy); and the numerous “weak” states who were often dependent 
on the arms trade with the dominant group, but also established themselves as major producers 
of small and medium size arms, especially in the 1930s. These countries formed the players
438 Handel 1981,72—74.
439 Harkavy 1975; Harkavy 1994; Krause 1992.
440 Krause 1992, 26—32.
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(sellers» buyers, or a combination of the two) in the “game" for profits and national security*41, 
to be constrained by both formal (such as limitation efforts and sales zones) and informal (such 
as moral compulsions) regulations, both internationally and domestically. Yet, as Harkavy has 
argued, this was a period in which alliances were not stable and did not form significant 
obstacles for the arms trade. Arms trade was also mostly privatized and unregulated, at least up 
until the mid-TOOs.41 42
Although business historians have studied the interwar arms trade, they have mostly 
concentrated on the large countries and big firms of the period. Most efforts have focused on 
firms such as Armstrong Ltd., Vickers Ltd., Schneider, and Krupp, already well-established 
arms producers by the 1920s. One of the more prominent works in this field has been Clive 
Trebilcock’s The Vickers Brothers, Armaments and Enterprise 1854—1914 (1975).443 Another 
feature in the current scholarship seems to be the emphasis placed on the economic imperialism 
of the 1930s, especially by Great Britain and Germany. As for example Christian Leitz has 
pointed out in the German case, it seems that the big arms producers, especially Germany, 
exported weapons in vast amounts even to potentially hostile countries.444 These studies 
notwithstanding, the interwar arms trade as a whole or its implications for the countries selected 
here have not been analyzed in a comprehensive fashion.
As we have seen, many of the member states attempted to achieve disarmament measures in 
earnest at least until the mid-1930s under the auspices of the League of Nations and beyond it. 
Mostly these efforts took place between diplomats within the various structures of the League of 
Nations’ political machinery. Among the many difficulties in achieving concrete results were 
the heterogeneous expectations of the participants. These expectations made the arms trade 
limitation negotiations just as difficult as those concerning overall disarmament. Usually the 
agreements that were reached were very difficult to ratify in the individual countries' 
legislatures, which doomed for example the quite broad agreement following the Conference for 
the Supervision of the International Arms Trade in 1925. Interestingly enough, the participants, 
especially the smaller (military) import dependent states, attached various conditions to the 
ratification process, which effectively destroyed its chances of success. All in all, as emphasized 
by David Stone, these “weak” states, even proponents of general disarmament, were often the
441 See also Eloranta 1998 on the application of such a typology.
442 Harkavy 1994,16— 19.
443 Trebilcock 1975. For a narrative on the actions of these companies, see e.g. Collier 1980. A good 
analysis of the role of Vickers abroad (this case: Italy) can be found e.g. in Segreto 1997.
444 See especially Leitz 1997; Leitz 1998.
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most outspoken opponents of arms trade regulation efforts.445 For example, the Scandinavian 
states were not willing to support any forms of sanctions. Similarly, most of these states w ere 
less than enthusiastic about the plans to abolish private manufacture of arms, even though a lot 
of the “merchants of death” literature that emerged after the First World War blamed private 
profiteers directly for the mass onslaught of the war.446 Especially the domestic industries as an 
interest group were strongly against any regulation measures.447 The main accomplishment that 
emerged from the 1920s arms trade limitation negotiations was the establishment o f a licensing 
and statistics gathering system among the League members and other nations.448
O f course, as we have seen, the security policy strategies o f the “weak” states differed broadly. 
They did not form a uniform front in most foreign policy issues, albeit at a moral level. F o r 
example, the basic principles in the Swedish interwar foreign policy were the maintenance o f  
neutrality and non-commitment.449 Similarly, for example the Norwegian governments relied on 
the geographic proximity of Great Britain for protection, which limited their foreign policy 
interests to mainly trade issues.450 Finland, as indicated earlier, did not follow the example set 
by its Nordic neighbors, but instead followed the example o f certain Eastern European countries 
like Czechoslovakia in seeking alliances, due to geopolitical disadvantages.451 In the case o f  
Czechoslovakia, threatened both from the East and the West, its security policy was based on a 
bilateral treaty with France, similar to  other Eastern European countries. Consequently, an 
agreement with Romania and Yugoslavia concluded the so-called Little Entente in the 1920s, a 
loosely knit alliance aimed against Hungary. In addition to a pro-West foreign policy, 
Czechoslovakia experienced favorable economic performance and managed to  become a 
dominant producer of small arms in the 1930s.452 These factors exerted a strong incentive for the 
maintenance o f a high military burden, for both Finland and Czechoslovakia.
The real military spending o f these “weak” states increased slightly during the course o f the 
1930s, following the mainly flat spending curves of the 1920s. However, their respective 
military burdens, on the average, remained flat even for most of the 1930s, with active
445 Stone 2000.
446 See e.g. Harkavy 1975; Koistinen 1980, on the so-called Nye Committee in particular: 55—58; 
Sloutzki 1941; Jones 1939.
447 See Chapter 7 of this thesis, especially concerning the Swedish case.
448 Krause-MacDonald 1993,713—717. See also Krause 1992.
449 Trönnberg 1985; Paasivirta 1987,194— 195; see also Agoy 1996.
450 Agpy 1996, 478; Paasivirta 1987, 194— 195, 225—227. See also Handel 1981 on the geopolitical 
advantage of Portugal (and perhaps Spain).
451 Paasivirta 1984,256—258,262,265—267; Tervasmäki 1964,23—24. See also Paasivirta 1987.
452 See e.g. Hauner 1973; Teichova 1988.
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rearmament taking place during the last few years of the decade. Among these countries, 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, Portugal, and Spain maintained high military burdens (column C, 
Table 31), with the Czech and Portuguese shares being over five per cent in 1935. As seen in 
Table 31, many of these countries were highly dependent on foreign trade, especially in the 
1920s, yet most o f them relied increasingly on their domestic markets in the 1930s. Only 
Belgium’s trade dependence share (column B, Table 31) remained, and barely at that, over fifty 
per cent. The development of military trade, respective o f total foreign trade, world arms trade, 
and military spending, display that many “weak” states developed their arms trade very rapidly. 
In military exports, respective of almost any indicator, Czechoslovakia and Sweden, trailed by 
Belgium and Norway, emerged as the growing military exporters in the 1930s.
Table 31. Characteristics of the Aggregate Trade, Military Trade, and Military Spending 
for the Nine “Weak” European States (%): 1925,1935
A . B . C . D . E . F . G . H .
1 9 2 5
B E L 7 9 ,0 9 1 ,7 5 0 ,1 2 0 ,1 2 2 ,2 2 2 , 6 8 3 ,0 9 2 ,5 3
C Z E 5 4 ,5 4 4 ,2 8 0 ,1 6 0 ,1 6 1 ,8 7 1 ,6 7 1 ,5 4 1 ,41
F I N 5 1 ,1 3 2 ,8 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,1 5 0 ,0 0 0 , 4 3 0 ,0 0 1 ,3 6
N E D 7 5 ,5 5 1 ,6 3 0 ,0 5 0 ,1 5 0 ,7 3 4 , 8 6 3 ,9 1 0 ,9 5
N O R 4 3 ,0 9 0 ,8 6 0 ,1 8 0 ,1 5 2 ,1 5 0 , 7 3 3 ,8 0 4 ,1 5
P O R 2 9 ,7 0 3 ,2 6 0 ,0 1 0 ,1 5 0 ,0 1 0 , 4 9 0 ,0 2 1 ,0 0
S P A 1 7 ,7 2 3 ,1 5 1 ,0 2 0 ,0 4 7 ,0 0 3 ,6 7 2 ,3 3 0 ,1 4
S W E 3 3 ,9 5 2 ,1 4 0 ,7 3 0 ,2 4 3 ,2 4 1 ,1 1 5 ,6 5 1 ,9 8
S W I 5 2 ,5 7 0 ,9 6 0 ,3 1 0 ,0 4 2 ,5 2 0 , 4 7 7 ,3 2 1 ,3 8
1 9 3 5
B E L 5 0 ,9 1 1 ,7 7 0 ,8 3 0 ,3 1 5 ,7 5 5 , 5 6 1 2 ,3 8 4 ,2 3
C U E 3 1 ,8 0 5 ,3 4 5 ,3 6 0 ,3 5 2 4 ,4 6 2 ,7 3 1 5 ,8 2 0 ,8 7
P I N 4 2 ,0 9 3 ,1 8 0 ,1 2 0 ,1 4 0 ,2 3 0 , 4 6 0 ,8 7 0 ,8 7
N E D 3 4 ,8 3 1 ,5 7 0 ,1 7 0 ,1 3 1 ,4 3 6 , 8 6 1 ,7 2 1 ,6 1
N O R 3 2 ,7 8 0 ,8 6 0 ,8 0 0 ,1 8 1 ,6 4 1 ,0 6 1 2 ,7 9 4 ,0 5
P O R 2 1 ,5 1 5 ,2 0 0 ,0 2 0 ,7 2 0 ,0 1 2 , 2 3 0 ,0 3 2 ,1 2
S P A 1 3 ,2 1 2 ,2 3 0 ,0 9 0 ,0 2 0 ,5 8 0 , 5 4 0 ,1 7 0 ,0 7
S W E 2 9 ,3 5 1 ,4 5 1 ,6 9 0 ,3 0 7 ,6 7 3 ,1 3 1 4 ,6 2 2 ,9 2
S W I 2 6 ,3 2 1 ,2 2 0 ,2 8 0 ,0 8 1 ,0 3 0 , 9 0 2 ,4 1 1 ,0 3
S o u rc e s :  see  A ppend ices, A ppendix  2 fo r  de ta ils . A = c o u n try  and  year; B  =  T o ta l tra d e  (exports +  im p o rts) o f  G D P ; 
C  =  M ilita ry  bu rd en  (n o m in a l M E  (= m ilita ry  e x p e n d itu re s )  o f  nom inal G D P ); D  =  M ilita ry  e x p o rts  o f  to ta l o v e ra ll  
e x p o r ts  o f  th e  country , E  =  M ilita ry  im p o rts  o f  to ta l overall im ports o f  th e  c o u n try ;  F  =  M ilita ry  e x p o rts  o f  to ta l 
w o rld  arm s exports ; G  -  M ilita ry  im p o rts  o f  to ta l w o r ld  arm s im ports; H  =  M il ita ry  ex p o rts  o f nom ina] M E  o f  th e
co u n try , I  =  M ilita ry  im p o r ts  o f n o m in a l M E  o f  th e  co u n try .
Based on Table 32 below, it is possible to evaluate further the hypothesis of whether these 
countries were specifically dependent on their military imports. It seems that Finland, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal were clearly dependent on their military imports and had less 
developed military export industries respectively. Secondly, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Spain, 
and Switzerland were moderately dominated by the military exports in their military trade, with 
Czechoslovakia being poorly representative o f this group with its rapid emergence in the world
212
markets in the 1930s. Thirdly, Sweden and Norway were extremely dominated by m ilita ry  
exports in their military trade behavior (as measured by columns C and H). None o f t h e  
countries selected here could top the high British value for ratio 2 in Table 32 (see column D ) .  
Also, as seen in columns D, E, and F, for four countries (BEL, CZE, FIN, NED) this p e r io d  
seemed to amplify the role of military exports, for three countries this tendency d e a r ly  
decreased (POR, SPA, SWI), and for two (NOR, SWE) there was moderate evidence o f  
movement towards military export dominance. By and large, these groupings do not seem t o  
coincide with the income groupings presented earlier, nor can we say that these countries w e re  
particularly dependent on military imports rather than, in fact, on military exports.
Table 32. Structural Developments in the Military Trade of the Nine “Weak States”, 1925, 
1935
A. B. C. D . E. F . G. H.
1925 MILIMP a a A LESS LESS
BEL 1935 MILEXP T T T LESS LESS
1925 BALANCE a a a LESS LESS
CZE 1935 MILEXP T T T LESS MORE
1925 MILIMP A a A LESS LESS
FIN 1935 BALANCE T T T LESS LESS
1925 MILIMP a a A LESS LESS
NED 1935 M I L I M P T T T LESS LESS
1925 MILEXP a A i LESS MORE
NOR 1935 MILEXP T T 4 LESS MORE
1925 MILIMP 1 i 1 LESS LESS
POR 1935 MILIMP ♦ 4 4 LESS LESS
1925 MILEXP 1 i LESS MORE
SPA 1935 MILEXP 4 4 4 LESS LESS
1925 MILEXP a A 1 LESS MORE
SWE 1935 MILEXP T T 4 LESS MORE
1925 MILEXP 1 r LESS MORE
SWI 1935 MILEXP 4 4 4 LESS SAME
S o u rc e s :  se e  A p p e n d ice s , A p p e n d ix  2  fo r  d e ta i ls .  T h e  U K  c a lcu la tio n s  b a s e d  o n  th e  sam e so u rces a s  listed  th e re in . 
A = co u n try ; B = y e a r ; O d o m in a n c e  (o r  ro u g h ly  th e  ba lan ce  b e tw e e n  th e m )  o f  e ith e r  m ilita ry  e x p o rts  (MILE.XP) o r  
im p o rts  (M IL IM P ), c a lcu la ted  a s  th e  fo llo w in g  ra tio  (1): M IL E X P  o f  a  c o u n try  d iv id e d  by th e  M IL IM P  o f a  c o u n try ;  
D = c h a n g e  in  r a tio  (1), fro m  1925 to  1935; E x c h a n g e  in  th e  r a tio  (2): M IL E X P  o f  a co u n try  d iv id e d  by the to ta l  
d o m e s tic  ex p o rts , fro m  1925 to  1 9 3 5 ; F = c h a n g e  in  th e  ra tio  (3 ): M IL IM P  o f  a  c o u n try  d iv id ed  b y  th e  to ta l d o m e s tic  
e x p o rts , fro m  1925  to  1935; G = ra t io  (2) c o m p a re d  w ith  th e  B ritish  e q u iv a le n t;  H  = ra tio  (3 ) co m p ared  with t h e  
B ritish  eq u iv a len t.
The world arms exports, as seen in Figure 58 below, rebounded after the early 1920s’ saturated 
markets and economic adjustments to resume growth up until the beginning of the Great 
Depression era. However, comparatively, the world arms exports recovered much quicker from  
the depression than the aggregate world exports, with recovery taking place as early as 1931—
1932. This period of adjustment introduced more and more new exporting nations as worthy 
contenders in the international markets, which can also be seen in the decline of the European 
unit price of arms, both in nominal and real terms. However, this competition additionally took
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place in a trading environment dominated by Great Power competition for informal allies, which 
provided the smaller players more room to maneuver in the markets, thus these prices may not 
adequately reflect the military trade environment of the late 1930s. The traditional dominant 
producers (such as the U.K.), however, did maintain their hegemonic control in the trade of 
heavier equipment, for example naval armaments.453
Figure 58. Total World Exports (Nominal), World Arms and Ammunition Exports 
(Nominal), and European Armaments Unit Prices (Nominal and Real), 1920—1937, 
Volume Indices (1929=100)
VOL 1929=100
--------Total World Exports
-------- World Arms and Ammunition Exports
■ European Armaments Unit Price, Nominal
— ■—  European Armaments Unit Price. Real
Sources: The aggregate nominal unit prices calculated from Statistical Year-Books o f the Trade in Arms and 
Ammunition 1924—1938, with the combined arms trade data (=arms exports + arms imports, divided by the 
quantity in metric tons) of Belgium, Czechoslovakia (incl. until 1936), Finland (also France to make the data 
more robust), the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain (incl. until 1935), for which there was 
information on quantities; world arms exports also from this source. Real aggregate unit prices derived by 
deflating the aggregate nominal unit price series with a combined, weighted (by the real GDP shares among the 
nine, derived from Maddison 1995) average wholesale price index (individual country WPls derived from 
Mitchell 1992). Total world exports from League o f Nations, Statistical Year-Book o f the Trade in Arms and 
Ammunition. C. 263. M. 156. 1938. DC. Geneva 1938,206.
As we can observe in Figure 59, the market shares of the “weak” states increased dramatically 
from 1925 to 1935. Czechoslovakia even assumed the top position in the world (small and 
medium size) armaments markets with its 24,5 percent market share in 1935. According to 
Hauner, this figure is even understated. For the Skoda concern, an estimated 55,2 per cent o f its
453 K ra u s e  1 9 9 2 ,7 4 .
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entire armaments production between 1936— 1938 went abroad. The Czech government p o l ic y  
encouraged strongly the growth o f military exports, regardless of the destination.454 T h e  
importance o f Sweden also increased substantially in the 1930s, with Bofors as the la rg e s t  
Swedish arms trading company.455 In military imports, in terms of absolute volume, the b ig g e s t 
importers in this period were the Netherlands and Belgium, whereas the big military ex p o rte rs  
Czechoslovakia and Sweden were far behind these two in terms of volume of military im ports . 
The lowest military inporters in terms of absolute volume were consistently Spain and Finland.
Figure 59. Market Shares of the M ajor Arms Trading Countries in Small and M edium  
Size Armaments, 1925,1935
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2.
Czechoslovakia’s rise to become one o f the premier arms exporters of Europe really took p lace  
after 1932 following the League of Nations’ first signs of real weakness after the M anchurian 
Incident and the subsequent rise o f Hitler. In the 1920s, as seen in Figure 60, Czechoslovakia 
had enjoyed a brief but strong period o f growth, but all in all did not distinguish itself f ro m  
other “weak” nations. However, the tough trading climate o f the 1930s definitely produced 
winners and losers in the international arms trade, with Czechoslovakia and Sweden em erging 
as victors in these types of armaments. Spain and Norway, in  turn, were examples of countries 
whose armaments industries failed to “take o ff’ in the 1930s (see Figure 60).
454 Hauner 1973, e.g. 15.
455 For more, see Chapter 7.
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Figure 60. Small and Medium Size Arms Exports of Czechoslovakia, Norway, and Spain, 
1920—1937
Billions of USD
--------MILEXP in USD, CZE
------- MILEXP in USD, NOR
-------- MILEXP in USD, SPA
S o u rc e s : see  A p p e n d ice s , A p p en d ix  2.
As we can see in Figure 61, the overall military imports o f these nine “weak” states increased 
moderately in the 1920s only to decline again in the 1930s. The aggregate military exports, in 
turn, increased strongly until the Great Depression. This disruption in military trade lasted only 
until 1932, which is when a major resurgence in the arms exports of these nations ensued. The 
growth trend of the late 1930s was steeper than the one that surfaced in the 1920s. Can we 
explain the individual export and import patterns of these states by statistical means as was done 
in the previous chapters for the demand for military spending? W ere there differences between 
these states according to the criteria outlined earlier, for example due to geopolitical advantages 
and disadvantages? Let us first examine the development of military exports, especially as 
providing important externalities for the domestic market arms manufacturers and domestic 
armed forces.
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Figure 61. Small and Medium Size Arms Imports and Exports of the Nine “Weak” S tates, 
1920—1937
Billions of USD
----- Military Imports Total for Nine "Weak States"
------Military Exports Total for Nine "Weak States"
Sources: see Appendices. Appendix 2 for details.
6.2. Arms Exports and Imports o f the “ Weak” States
Were military exports an important determinant of military expenditures or vice versa? O r, 
consequently, can we measure the externality impacts o f military exports on military 
expenditures? In this section the ratios o f military exports of nominal military expenditures w ill 
be regressed against several variables in order to test whether this ratio was affected by external 
and/or internal factors, as explained below. This ratio should indicate whether the military 
exports of a country were developing differently from the military expenditures of the said 
country. Changes in this ratio should point towards either positive or negative externalities vis- 
à-vis domestic military spending, to  be reviewed in conjunction with the said country’s military 
importing behavior. Thus, the following equation was adapted from a standard equation used by 
defense economists to explain military spending patterns456, with an additional, military 
spending variable457 tested as an omitted variable:
456 M i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  o f t e n  e x p l a i n e d  b y  th e  a f o r e m e n t i o n e d  p r ic e ,  in c o m e , s p i l l i n ,  a n d  th r e a t  
v a r ia b le s  in  t h e  s im p le s t  a d a p ta t io n s .  S e e  S a n d le r - H a r t le y  1 9 9 5 . F o l lo w in g  S m ith  e t  a l .  1 9 8 5 ,  I w il l  
a t t e m p t  to  u n c o v e r  t h e  m i l i t a r y  s p e n d i n g  im p a c ts  u p o n  m i l i t a r y  e x p o r ts .  S m i th  e t  a l . ,  a c h ie v in g  
c o n t r a d ic to r y  r e s u l t s ,  e s t im a te d  w e a p o n s  e x p o r t s  o n  th e  b a s i s  o f  o i l  p r i c e s  (d u m m y ) ,  a g g r e g a te  w e a p o n s  
e x p o r ts ,  m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i tu r e s  o f  t h e  s a i d  c o u n t r y ,  a n d  t h e  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  m il i ta ry  e x p e n d i tu r e s  o f  t h e  s a id
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M tL E X P  
M E  k
= /?„ + pn E U R O P E  M E  P R I C E ,  +  p n G D P C A P ,  + P (ÌT H R E A  T ,  +  p i4T R A D E O F G D P u 
. . . ( + P iSD U M M Y k ) + e il
(15)
Here MILEXP/ME (log) equals the ratio of nominal military exports to nominal military 
expenditures in the said country i in year r; EUROPEPRICE corresponds to the real European 
unit price of military goods as presented in Figure 58 (log, external variable); GDPCAP equals 
the income variable in real terms (log, internal variable); THREAT (either 
COMBTHRT ^ combined threat; GERTHRT=German-weighted threat; or 
GERSOVTHRT=German-Soviet-weighted threat; as defined earlier) equals the threat faced by 
the country, expressed by a combined index (log, external variable); TRADEOFGDP (log) 
equals the ratio o f total exports and imports of GDP. DUMMY (DUMMY1=1 after 1929; 
DUMMY2=1 after 1933; DUMMY3=1 after 1935; DUMMY4=1 after 1932, added later as a 
potential dummy) variable indicates a structural change in the equation in a given year. An 
additional variable, MILBUR (log, internal variable), the military burden of the country, was 
tested with an omitted variable test in cases where specification errors were indicated by the 
regressions statistics. Before the regression was run, the variables were tested for unit roots and 
differenced if necessary.457 58 The results had to pass the Breusch-Godfrey LM serial correlation 
test to be accepted. The complete rundown of the results can be found in Table 33. Equally, 
since these individual country regressions suffered from small sample problems, the equation 
was also estimated as a pooled sample using the SUR method explained earlier (Table 34).459
The price variable was expected to have a positive coefficient, implying a rational supply- 
demand response. The income variable’s coefficient was more difficult to anticipate: if it was 
positive, the chosen country’s military exports coincided with economic development; if it was
country.
457 On the choice of possible explanatory variables, see especially Pearson 1989. Note that here the 
differences in productivity are largely ignored.
458 The results of the tests on the stationarity are available from the author by request. These tests on 
stationarity of the series (hampered by the sample size) were either ADF or, in case they indicated 
nonstationarity, Phillips-PeiTon. All regressions were adjusted with the Newey-West covariance 
estimator. Regression sample years were adjusted to fit the country data in question. Cointegration tests, 
equally problematic in small samples like the unit root tests, were not carried out here. Instead, the 
individual regression results were checked against the pooled sample results (undertaken with the 
nondifferenced series).
459 As mentioned before, the SXJR is a feasible GLS estimator when the residuals are both cross-section 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated, due to e.g. common shocks in the political system. 
Here the panel data was first estimated using OLS, yet the residual matrix indicated cross-section 
correlation.
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negative, the situation was reversed. The threat variable was expected to yield a  negative 
coefficient, meaning that the said country decreased military exports with rising threats 
(allocating limited military resources for domestic purposes).
Table 33. Military Export Patterns of the Nine “Weak” European States: Individual 
Country Regression Results, 1920—1937
A . B . C. D .
EUROFEMEFREE*** -231
GKCAFBEL*** 999
TRAEHDFLDPBEL*** -159
MHEXPBEL MILBURBEL* -137 R 2= 079
CDFCAFCZE* A76
ŒRSOVTHRT** -136
MLBURCZE*** -130
MJLEXPCZE DUMMY2*** 083 R 2=m
W P C A P E fV * 1075
MLBURHN*** -19A2
M L E X P m DUMMY1** 228 R 2=071
EUROreMffREE*** 106
GDPCATNED*** 428
MÏÏFXPNFD DUMMY!*** ■026 R 2-Q j66
ŒFCAINOR*** 641
CEKIHKI*** 105
M H EXFW R DUMMYl*** -055 R 2=055
MUJBURPCR** -1,49
MHEXPPOR DUMMY4** -045 R 2=Q31
EUROPEMEPRXIE*^
GDFCAPSPA* 449
MLBURSPA*** (t-1) 238
MILEXPSPA DUMMY2** -048 r  2=om
GDPCAPSWE^ 455
GERSOVTHRP** -153
TRADBOTCDPSWE*** -132
MHEXPSWE DUMMY4*** 010 R =085
G E K irtK P**(t-l) -U 8
MJLEXPSWI DÜMMY3*** 063 R 2=Q35
S o u rc e s :  s e e  A p p e n d ic e s , A p p e n d ix  2  for d e ta ils . A = d ep en d en t v a riab le ; B = in d e p en d e n t v a ria b le s ; G = c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  
th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le s ; D = reg re ss io n  f i t  A ll va riab le s  a re  in  lo g s . L ags in  p a re n th e s is . D iffe re n c in g : 
E U R O P E M E P R IC E , a ll th rea t in d ic e s , a n d  M IL E X P S W I are  7(1). O n  v a r ia b le  d efin itions , se e  th e  te x t  fo r  d e ta i ls .  
O n ly  s ta tis tic a lly  s ig n if ic a n t in d ep e n d en t v a r ia b le s  w ere  lis te d  in  th e  ta b le  (in te rcep ts  o m itte d  f ro m  th e  tab le ):  *  — 
s ig n if ic a n t a t  th e  te n  p e r  cen t le v e l;  **  -  s ig n if ic a n t  a t fiv e  p e r  c e n t  leve l; * * *  =  sign ifican t a t  th e  o n e  p e r  c e n t  le v e l.
The spillin variable, the aggregate trade share, was anticipated to exert a positive externality 
effect on the development o f military trade. The additional spillin variable, the military burden, 
could be expected to have a negative coefficient, since this would indicate domestic (or other 
military spending) preference in military spending increases in comparison with military 
exports. The possible dummies are analyzed briefly below. Furthermore, coefficients having 
different signs as the ones outlined above are offered alternative explanations.
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Table 34. Military Export Patterns of the Nine “Weak” European States: SUR Estimation
Results, 1920—1937
A. B. C . D.
EUROEM SRCE** <040
GDFCAPBEL*** 133
CEKTHRT^it-l) 086
TRADBDKM EL** 055
MLBURBEL*** -1,74
m iX P B E L DUMMY4** 006 SE=024
CDPCAPCZE*“** 210
MLBURCZE"* -1,74
M SIXPCZE DUMMY4** 006 S E  =056
CDFCAPFN** 1^ 49
M1LBURFW*** •174
MHEXPF1N DUMMY4** 006 S E = li5
GDFCAFNED*** USZ
MILEXPNED DUMMY** 006 SE  =027
EUROŒMEFREE** -040
CDKAFNOR*** 2 «
CCMBIHRP**(I-1) -1.71
TRADBOTCDiNaR** 055
MLEXFNOR DUMMY** 006 SE  =033
E U R 0radB :RCEw •040
QDPCAFPOR*** 1£4
O D M B IH R r«(l‘l) •1,71
Œ K IH R T ^Î-l) 086
TRAEBOROTCR** 055
AMIXPPOR MLBURFCK*** -1,74
DUMMY** 006 S£=QG?
GDFCAPSPA*** 255
C O M K IH B T^t-l) -1,71
MILEXPSPA DUMMY4** 006 S E  =052
EUROEMEPREE** •040
CDFCAPSWE*** 240
OOMKIHKP** (t-1) -1,71
G a m K r ^ ^ i ) 086
TRADB0P33PSWP* 055
MIUXPSWE DUMMY** 006 S E =023
HJRCHM EREE** •040
CDBCAPSWP* 123
GERIEFT*** (t-1) 086
TRADBORGDPSWF* 055
MHEXPSW! DUMMY** 006 S E =039
AT* 139 IrRtikeBhoodfuéftfted) =1315) R 2(unweizhted)=0,S 1 SE  agmvçcte (ifMBçHai) =Q46
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. A=dependent variable; B=independent variables; C=coefficients of 
the independent variables; D=individual country equation S.Es. Only statistically significant independent variables 
were listed in the table: * = significant at the ten per cent level; ** = significant at the five per cent level; *** =
significant at the one per cent level. Lags in parenthesis.
Note: common intercept or common AR(1) term not reported here. Residuals not exhibiting serial correlations up to 
three lags.
In the individual country regressions, the price variable was statistically significant only for 
three countries, implying that either the military export decisions of the others were not 
influenced by the European market prices or that these prices are not adequately captured by the 
data. These conclusions are supported by the negative common coefficient incurred in the 
respective SUR-system. Individually, the income variable was found to be relevant in all o f the 
cases except Portugal and Switzerland And in all cases, with the exception of Czechoslovakia,
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the coefficient of this variable was positive. Again, the pooled estimation results support th e  
conclusion that economic development exerted an externality effect upon the military exports. 
The threat variables appeared to be significant in four of the cases in the individual regressions, 
yet the signs conflicted with the pooled results. The SUR-system analysis, however, revealed a  
distinction: the German threat seemed to produce profit-seeking behavior, whilst a rise in th e  
aggregate threat decreased relative military exports.
The aggregate trade share turned out to be a significant variable for only two countries (B EL, 
SWE), with a negative coefficient. In the pooled sample, it produced the expected positive 
spillover effect for some of the countries. However, the military burden variable460 w as 
statistically significant in five of the individual cases, with only the Spanish regression incurring 
a positive coefficient. Especially in the case o f Finland, an import-dependent country, th e  
coefficient was strongly negative (-19,42). The negative coefficients were also strongly 
supported by the SUR-system for four countries (BEL, CZE, FIN, POR). Thus, a domestic 
preference effect, implicating a significant role for the Great Depression, seems to emerge from  
both the analysis o f the income and the military burden variables. This, however, needs to b e  
confirmed with the analysis of the military import behavior of these nations. Most of these 
nations also displayed some sensitivity to structural changes occurring in this period, especially 
after 1932 (DUMMY4).
It should also be noted that the destination countries and market “zones” of these countries 
differed broadly. For example Czechoslovakia, which experienced a tremendous growth of arms 
exports in the 1930s, exported 48 million USD worth of arms to foreign countries. The biggest 
destination countries in the 1930s were Romania (circa 10,9 million USD), China (circa 9,3 
million USD), Iran and Afghanistan (circa 5,4 million USD), Turkey (circa 3,9 million USD), 
and Yugoslavia (almost 3 million USD). Czechoslovakia even exported over two million USD 
worth of arms to the Soviet Union in 1938, signifying that the Czech military export industries 
attempted, quite successfully, to capture markets in possible troubled areas and regardless o f  
possible adverse consequences later.461 The military export destinations of Sweden and Finland, 
for example, illustrate the differences and similarities in their respective positions. Sweden's 
principal European destinations included Poland and Belgium, as well as China and Argentina
460 As discovered by e.g. Pearson 1989, military imports are often significantly related to military 
spending, not military exports. It seems, however, that military exports were also tied into efforts to boost 
domestic defense industries.
461 Sloutzki 1941, 76—77; Hauner 1986, e.g. 54, 58—67. As Hauner points out, other emerging arms 
producer nations, such as Poland, behaved similarly.
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outside Europe, displaying similarities to the Czech case. In the Finnish case, one has to point 
out that Finland barely had any military exports to speak of until the early 1930s. Military 
exports and imports did not reach approximately the same size until 1935. Finland’s primary 
arms export markets were the Baltic states. Nonetheless, both Finland and Sweden were drawn 
closer to the German orbit in their military imports in the late 1930s.462
Can we confirm or challenge the results presented in the previous section by analyzing military 
imports? In this section the ratios of military imports o f nominal military expenditures are 
regressed against the same variables as in the case of military exports, in order to test whether 
this ratio was affected by external or internal factors, as explained previously. Thus, we can 
analyze the impact and timing o f domestic preferences in military spending in a similar fashion 
as before (with MILBUR as the predicted source of spillins):
M I U M P
M E
=  f i n  +  f i n E U R O P E M E P R  l C E k  +  f i n G D P C A P k  +  f i t i T H R E A T k +  f i iA M I L B U R  k
( 16)
-.(+fit9DUMMYt He*
Here MILIMP/ME (log) equals the military import ratio o f nominal military expenditures in the 
said country i in year t\ the rest of the variables are the same as in the previous equation.
The European prices o f arms were expected to yield a negative coefficient, indicating rational 
market behavior for the said country. On the other hand, highly import-dependent countries 
might have been forced to ignore price developments, thus producing a positive sign. The 
income variable was, again, more problematic as far as the expected sign is concerned. If the 
sign was positive, the said country favored domestic production during an economic downturn, 
such as the Great Depression. If  it was negative, the situation was reversed. The threat variable 
was expected to be positive, indicating that military imports increased in the face of mounting 
threats. The expected sign of the military burden variable was perhaps more ambiguous (as a 
ratio), with a positive sign indicating increases in military spending inducing also an increase in 
military imports. In the opposite case, domestic military goods would be preferred. In addition, 
trade was again assumed to exert a positive spillover effect. Analyses of the regressions are 
carried out below. A complete presentation of the individual country results can be found in 
Table 35, whereas a rundown of the SUR-system can be found in Table 36.
462 Sloutzki 1941,93—95; Statistical Year-Book o f the Trade in Arms and Ammunition 1938.
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Table 35. Military Import Patterns of the Nine “Weak” European States: Individual
Country Regression Results, 1920—1937
A. B. C. D.
GDFCAH1EL** 425
GEKEHRT*** 0,71
AÎIUMPBEL ARC)* -039 R 2=055
B U R O F B M F * -275
CCPCAPCZE*** 5J06
m lburcze*** 138
MBMPCZE GERSOVniKT** 076 R 2=038
EUROTOdEHUCE** 033
GDFCAFEN*** 4192
CÜMBIHKT*** -047
MLBURFN*** -131
MRJMPFÎN DUMMYS** 015 R 2=093
OXCAHSED** 3,75
GEKIHKI*(t-I) -051
MJlIMTTvti) MLBURNED** -326 R 2=009
TRADBCfUDiNOR** UB
MRJMPNOR MmjRNOR** 121 R =034
EUROTOÆHUŒ*** 128
GEKIHKP** -127
mJMPPOR DUMMY4*** 049 R 2=023
EUFOiMEmCE* -105
GEFCAESPA*** -933
MLBURSPA*** -337
MEJMPSPA DUMMY1*** -037 R 2=060
CEKIHKT***(t-l) 042
MHJMPSWE MILBURSWE*** -121 R 2=Q60
GEKIHRI***(t-l) *057
TRADBCFGCPSWT*** -077
MUJMPSm DUMMY3*** 034 R 2=078
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. A=dependent variable; B=independent variables; C=independent
variable coefficients; D eg ression  fits. Differencing: as in Table 32. Addidonally, MILIMPNED and MILIMPSPA
are /(l) . Only statistically significant independent variables were listed in the table (intercepts omitted from the
table): * = significant at the ten per cent level; ** = significant at the five per cent level; *** = significant at the one
per cent level. Lags in parenthesis.
The European unit prices were found to be statistically significant in four individual regressions 
out o f nine. For the stronger (higher income and/or geographically larger) “weak” states, the 
coefficient was negative, whereas for Finland and Portugal the positive coefficient implied 
military-import dependence. The pooled analysis also indicated a common negative coefficient. 
It seems that the bilateral trade environment of the 1930s allowed most of these countries to 
make a rational adjustment in their military imports to changes in market prices, yet they did not 
have to do so in terms of their military exports as the Great Powers attempted to define their 
circles of influence. Nonetheless, in the Czech case for example, we should point out that the 
Czech arms production was primarily aimed for exports, and the domestic military forces were 
often faced w ith quite severe material shortages.463
463 See Hauner 1973 for details.
Table 36. Military Import Patterns of the Nine “Weak” European States: SUR Estimation
Results, 1920—1937
A. B. C D .
EU RO reFR EE"* ■033
GDPCAFBEL*** l í»
GEKIHRT** 013
MJUMPEEL DUMMY4*** 008 S £= 016
EUROPEFREE*** ■033
GDPCAFC2E*** l í»
GEKirar*** 013
MIUMPCZE DUMMY4*** 008 SE=Q 36
EURGPEFREE*** <133
GDPCAFFN*** l í»
M IUM PF1N DUMMY4*** 006 SE =010
EUROFHREE*** -033
CDPCAJNED*** l í»
GEKIHRT*** 013
M M M P N E D DUMMY4*** 006 S E = m
EUROPEFREE*** -033
GCPCAR90R*** l í»
M OURNOR* -022
MÜMPNOR DUMMY4*** 006 SE=Q24
EU RO H REE*** -033
GDPCtfTOR*** l í »
GEKIRRT"* 013
MLBURFCR* -022
mJM PPOR DUMMY4*** 006 SE=Q35
EUROEFRCE*** -033
CEFCAPSPA*** lí»
Œ K IH R P** 013
MLBURSPA* ■022
M I LIM PS PA DUMMY4*** 006 SE=Q26
EUROFEH^EE*** -033
GDFCAPSWE*** l í»
GERIHRP0** 013
MUBURSWE* -022
MHMPSWE DUMNfW** 006 SE=Q22
E U R O EIR E E «* -033
GDFCAPSWP** 106
MRJMPSWI DUMMY4*** 006 S E = a i8
N = 147 I/%Iiœlihocd(\*8f!ftafy=l 1191 R  2 (un w eightedMV79 S E  cfre^res^m firwä^hed^Q X^
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. A=dependent variable; B=independent variables; C=coefficients of 
the independent variables; D=individual country equation S.Es. Only statistically significant independent variables 
were listed in the table: * = significant at the ten per cent level; ** = significant at the five per cent level; *** = 
significant at the one per cent level. Lags in parenthesis.
N ote: common intercept or common AR(1) term not reported here. Residuals not exhibiting serial correlations up to 
three lags.
The income variable was positive in the individual regressions for Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
and the Netherlands. Only Spain and Finland formed marked exceptions. The pooled sample 
indicated a positive coefficient as a  whole for these countries, confirming that military inports 
declined during the Great Depression.
The threat variable was significant in six of the nine individual cases here, with both negative 
and positive coefficients. In the SUR-system, respectively, the German threat seemed to 
produce a positive coefficient for most countries, indicating a rational adjustment. The two
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significant trade variable coefficients in the individual cases were not supported by the panel 
results. The military burdens of the individual countries were found to be statistically significant 
for Czechoslovakia, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. For Finland, th e  
Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden this variable suggested domestic market preference during  
military spending increases. A reverse relationship was found instead for Czechoslovakia an d  
Norway. Moreover, the pooled sample suggested domestic market preference for four countries 
(NOR, POR, SPA, SWE) in the 1930s. Dummy variables produced somewhat conflicting 
results, yet DUMMY4 was again found significant in the pooled system.
All in all, the results of the equations warrant some conclusions. It seems that many of these 
states failed to respond to changes in the (real or nominal) European arms unit prices in their 
military exports, which may be explained both by the quality of the data as well as the altered 
trading environment of the 1930s. The opposite applied, for many of the countries, in their 
military imports. Also, it seems clear that they adopted a strong domestic military production 
preference in the 1930s, especially during the Great Depression, yet they also continued to  
expand their arms exports, with duality to be seen in the choice over externally or internally 
produced military goods. There also seem  to have been differences in the strategies adopted by  
these states, mostly relating to their different perceptions of increasing threats either as a market 
opportunity or as a reason to exercise caution. This coincided with an overall trend among these 
“weak*’ European nations to rely more extensively on the domestic markets during the downturn 
of the early 1930s.
One could argue, of course, that it was not the capital expenditures in the total military 
expenditures (^purchases of durable military goods) that drove down the military import share 
rather than for example the wage component. This, however, does not seem to be the case. For 
example, the Finnish and Belgian cases tell us that the share of capital expenditures in the total 
military expenditures increased strongly in the 1930s, coinciding with the phenomenon o f 
domestic preference described above. In Finland, nominal capital military expenditures 
increased 27 per cent from 1929 to 1937, whereas the military import share actually declined 
over ten per cent. In the Belgian case, the nominal capital military expenditures increased 247 
per cent in the same time period, whereas the military import share increased only circa seven 
per cent. Furthermore, the military spending of Great Powers such as the UK and France was
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also very capital intensive, and in both cases capital-intensive branches such as the Navy and the 
Air Force gained in shares of total military expenditures, especially in the 1930s.464
Figure 62. Small and Medium Size Arms Imports for the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Sweden, 1920—1937
Billions of USD
_______________________ Year_______
:------ MILIMP in USD, NED
-------MILIMP in USD, POR
--------MILIMP in USD, SWE
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2.
The turn towards domestic market preferences emerges quite distinctly for these “weak” states. 
As seen previously in Figure 61, the total military exports of these countries exceeded their 
military imports for almost all of the period and continued to grow after a short-lived depression 
impact. Their total military imports, on the contrary, declined for a longer time and recovered 
only modestly at the end of the 1930s. However, as seen in Figure 62, the individual 
experiences of these countries varied greatly. Portugal and Sweden, for example, did not alter 
their volume of military imports greatly throughout the period. The cases o f Sweden and 
Finland illustrate the diversities in the way these preferences surfaced. The impact and success 
of the domestic market interest groups varied greatly in these two countries, due to different 
historical and economic environments. As observed earlier, Finland was an import-dependent 
country and did not develop military exports until the 1930s, and even then only modestly.
464 See EIorantal998 for further details. For further sources, see Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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Figure 63. Small and Medium Size Arms Imports as a Percentage of Nominal M E f o r  
Finland and Sweden, 1920—1937
Sweden, in turn, developed into a major military exporter especially in the 1930s. S w e d en ’s
dependence on its military imports was more limited.465
%
Year
------ M1LIMPOFME, F I N ------MIL1MPOFME, SWE
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2.
Correspondingly, the Swedish military import share (see Figure 63) remained fairly steady, 
owing to the mature level o f Swedish arms production and the relatively fixed institutional 
“playing field”. Swedish military exports, however, increased steadily up until the m id-1930s 
and the beginning of the hectic international rearmament. Contrasts to the Finnish case a re  
copious. Finland was a newly independent country that had to develop many key organizations, 
such as the armed forces, from scratch during the interwar period. Thus it is initially quite 
surprising that the Finnish military import share declined up until the mid-1920s, leveled off, 
and then began to decrease again. The main reasons for this development include the unsettled 
institutional game situation between for example the domestic pressure groups, the large 
investments in domestic, government-owned military production, and certain trade policy 
constraints.465 66 The same features emerge from Figure 64 on the military burden levels. Whereas 
both Sweden and Finland maintained similar levels as other Western small states in the
465 Krantz 1995,91—99; Olsson 1982.
466 See Chapter 7 of this thesis for further discussion of the Swedish and Finnish cases.
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beginning of the period, the Finnish level was significantly higher for the rest o f the period than 
the ten-state average or the Swedish military burden. It is also noticeable that the Swedish 
military burden dropped considerably below the mean level in the 1930s, especially after the 
middle of the decade.
Figure 64. Military Burdens of Sweden, Finland, and Ten “Weak” States on the 
Aggregate, 1920—1938
Year
Finland 
--------Sweden
-------- Unweighted Average of 10 Countries
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. The ten countries: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain (“weak” state as defined in Eloranta 2002a), Sweden, and 
Switzerland
6.3, Conclusions
There were several competing forces that contributed to the disarmament framework, or rather 
its failure, mainly taking place under the auspices of the League of Nations: the abhorrence of 
war and the ensuing efforts at disarmament, including various efforts to regulate arms trade; the 
persistent continuation of the pre- First World War system of arms transfers and the market 
position defended by the key sellers; the distrust and broadly differing goals o f the negotiating 
countries, including the new suppliers of arms; the altered threat and trading framework 
emerging in the 1930s; and the strong resurgence of domestic market preferences in the 
production of military goods.
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Although there are no simple general historical laws to be found governing arms trade, t i m e -  
period specific insights can be discovered with the analysis o f individual states and/or s y s te m s  
of states.467 For the interwar period, we can say that the somewhat limited data on military t r a d e  
can be utilized in order to arrive at conclusions about, among others, the market p re fe ren ces  
perceived by these European states. As outlined in the introduction, consistent with most o f  t h e  
contemporary approaches in explaining military spending behavior, these attempts must t a k e  
into account both external and internal variables.
As such, the results of the quantitative tests suggest that these countries, by and large, reacted t o  
fluctuations in the European prices of arms only in their military imports. Three p ro x im ate  
groups of countries can perhaps be discerned from their midst, mostly based on their m ilita ry  
export behavior. The first group, including Belgium, Sweden, and Norway, were military e x p o r t  
dominated countries influenced by the rising incomes and the increasing German threat, even a s  
an opportunity to  increase military exports as a whole. The second group, Finland, and P ortugal, 
comprised countries that were mostly lower income states with a need to keep importing k e y  
military goods. The third and the most heterogeneous group, consisting of Czechoslovakia, th e  
Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland, were countries experiencing a rapid structural change in  
their military trade during this period. In military imports, it is even more difficult to d iv id e  
these countries into groups. It seems, though, that at least Czechoslovakia and Spain (and all o f  
the sample countries in the aggregate panel) responded with a negative adjustment to r is in g  
prices, and with a positive adjustment to increasing threats. Most of these countries seemed t o  
acquire their capital military goods increasingly from the domestic markets in the 1930s.
Thus, these "weak” states did not display clear differences in their military trade behavior in th e  
lines of, for example, strategic and/or geographic differences, as hypothesized in th e  
introduction, and only partially due to differing income levels (=HYPOTHESIS 37). They w ere, 
on the whole, dependent on their external trade (=HYPOTHESIS 36), although this dependence 
declined significantly during the 1930s. They were not, however, as dependent on m ilitary 
imports as seemingly suggested by this hypothesis, rather than on military exports. Mostly they  
attempted to extend their military export market shares, often successfully, by selling m ilitary 
goods even to  countries potentially hostile to them. Therefore, they did indeed, in addition to  
their dual role in the League of Nations, act assertively in the balance-of-power system of th e  
interwar period (^HYPOTHESIS 38), yet some of these states found the best opportunities fo r
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expanding their market shares during the 1930s, in the climate of intense competition for 
political and economic leadership in the system (=HYPOTHESIS 39). Here we must also 
acknowledge the limitations of this inquiry, such as failing to  take into account the complex 
ownership structures of the armaments industries in this period. The large arms-producing firms 
owned significant shares in the armaments industries of the “weak” states, and often licensed 
their products.467 68 Thus, the distinction between domestically or foreign-produced military goods 
became blurred in many instances. However, the results achieved here confirm that also the 
arms producers of the “weak” states had room to maneuver in the international markets without 
significant strategic constraints.
Nonetheless, these ”weak” states were constrained by the domestic actors, contrary to  the 
hypothesis of Michael Handel presented in the introduction, in their military trade behavior 
(=HYPOTHESIS 34). The results achieved here suggest that many o f these countries developed 
strong domestic military production in the 1930s, during the Great Depression in particular, or 
at least their military import shares grew slower than capital expenditures in general after the 
height of the depression. This coincided with a general trend o f more extensive reliance on the 
domestic markets among European nations, along with the trade dependence figures dropping 
drastically compared to the 1920s. The reasons for this behavior include efforts to support 
domestic production during the depression, the influence of domestic market interest groups, the 
changing trading climate, and perhaps an underestimation o f the new, emerging threats of the 
1930s.
467 See e.g. Maddock 1990,1—2.
468 A good example is the Swedish company Bofors and its extensive ties to the German Krupp until 
1935. See especially Nordlund 1989,173— 178.
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7. THE PO LITICA L ECONOM Y OF MILITARY SPENDING: The Cases of 
Sweden and Finland, 1920— 1938
7.1. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations in Comparing Sweden and Finland
The various theoretical variants of neoclassical economics and history have often led economic 
history explanations towards many competing directions. Among the more recent attempts at a 
’’dynamic” and comprehensive theory, the institutional framework introduced by Douglass C. 
North —  one of the key figures in the re-emergence of institutional economics in recent decades 
(NIE, New Institutional Economics) —  has proved persuasive in calling for a  greater 
recognition among economists of the institutional features of historical events and time periods. 
The analysis of historical constraints —  in addition to  the aforementioned public choice and 
NIE research —  has gained some momentum in economics in the 1980s and 1990s, especially 
in the context of re-evaluating technological development. Explaining technological change and 
its effects on economic development seems to be a crucial part of the new growth economics. 
An essential tool in this may be the path dependence hypothesis, advocated as an alternative 
framework in the recent years as a tool in explaining certain features of technological change, 
which should be understood, as North applies it, as the dependence of economic development 
on historical preconditions. Path dependence was developed into a research concept by W. 
Bryan Arthur and Paul David in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The first specific inquiry to 
utilize this hypothesis exclusively was Paul David’s study on the success of the QWERTY- 
keyboard system, which was regarded as inefficient, in the mid-1980s.469
Path dependence has also been applied to explaining the historical development of economies. 
In this respect, North’s interpretations of explaining economic development from  an 
institutional dependence on history are indeed interesting efforts.470 He, however, applies this 
concept at a rather general level, and he does not attempt to define exactly how it should be used 
in explaining economic progress. There are two important basic factors in North’s institutional 
framework, which are crucial for applying path dependence: increasing returns and inefficient 
markets (which embody large transaction costs). He assumes quite implicitly that institutions
469 Lamberg et al. 1997; North 1994, 93—94. On criticism of David’s conclusions, see Liebowitz- 
Margolis 1990. For David’s recent defense of the QWERTY-case as an example of path dependence, see 
David 1998. On applying path dependence into researching technological change, see Rosenberg 1994. 
On evolutionary framework similar to the idea of path dependence, see Mokyr 1990.
470 See North 1994, 93—95 — W. Brian Arthur’s research, published at the end of the 1980s, possesses a 
much more narrow and technologically oriented perspective than North’s does. North, however, fails to 
define path dependence as e.g. Liebowitz and Margolis have attempted; see Liebowitz-Margolis 1997; 
Eloranta 1997c.
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have no significance in economies in the absence of these factors. For example, he m a in ta in s  
that perfectly functioning markets explain economic growth perfectly. According to North, w i t h  
these factors in effect, organizations develop and function in order to attempt to increase t h e i r  
gains within an institutional framework.471 Institutional economic history, as represented b y  
North, offers us a chance of adopting a limited version causality, as in path dependence, i n t o  
economic explanations; within this framework, the interaction between organizations —  be t h e y  
a family, village, nation, corporation, and so on —  defines the development o f polities. T h e  
strength of the factors mentioned above, combined with historical ’’accidents”, define t h e  
strength o f the path dependence in a given situation, respectively.472
North used in his 1990 study Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance t h e  
different economic paths experienced by the Anglo-American and the Spanish-Latin w o r ld s  
from the M iddle Ages to the present as an example of path dependence. As far as institutions a r e  
concerned, he considered the centralization and decentralization of power as crucial pieces o f  
the puzzle: for England, he emphasized the role o f the Parliament and the strong property r ig h ts ;  
in the Spanish case, the birth of a strong governmental bureaucracy was highlighted. In N o rth ’s  
opinion it was essential for the functioning of organizations that the English banking s y s te m  
became stable, due to for example the creation of the Bank of England and prudent s ta te  
finances, whereas Spain experienced numerous state bankruptcies as well as bureaucratic  
favoritism of certain groups —  for example the military, the clergy, the judiciary. His ex am p le  
could be criticized for many reasons, but how does he define path dependence in practice in  h is  
example? He is somewhat cautious in applying path dependence into these types of cases, a n d  
he does not attempt to analyze what kind of concrete evidence could be found to  support th is  
hypothesis. He is well aware of the weaknesses of such conclusions:473
’To make the contrasting brief stories convincing illustrations of path dependence would entail an  
account of the political, economic, and judicial systems of each society as a web of interconnected 
formal rules and informal constraints that together made up the institutional matrix and led th e  
economies down different paths.”
Here path dependence is utilized as a conceptual tool in order to complement the perspective 
offered by the systemic and state-centered approaches. Path dependence is also closely re la ted  
to the analysis of various groups in the formation of military budgets and the allocation o f
471 North 1994 (reprint of the 1990 study), 94—96. See also Eloranta 1998.
472 Of course, like in public choice, the difficulty in NJE is how to measure, especially quantitatively, this
interaction. Also, it is practically impossible to recognize all of the multiple constraints in a historical 
process. On empirical applications, mainly focusing on property rights, see for example Alston et al. 
1996.
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military expenditures in Sweden and Finland. As more empirical applications emerge, the 
significance of path dependence is likely to increase as a common tool for economic historians 
and economists. However, the application of these quite different theoretical frameworks poses 
a problem for the researcher: How can we reconcile the different theoretical premises in order to 
create a more comprehensive explanation of a phenomenon? The approach adopted here 
consists of complementing the quantitative findings achieved through comparisons of military 
expenditures among the Great Powers as well as the “weaker” democracies with qualitative 
analysis —  employing the tools prompted by Olson’s group behavior analysis as well as path 
dependence —  of a country’s decision-making structures and the impact of the ’’political 
markets”. Also, the somewhat incoherent body of research developed within the NIE offers us a 
possibility of explaining phenomena from the perspective of formal and informal constraints. 
Thus, I will approach the research problem from different angles, which should yield more 
convincing results in return.
Thus, here path dependence should be understood as a way of analyzing structural development, 
which is constrained by the economic factors and historical continuities, as well as 
discontinuities, o f the initial observation year and its institutional framework. In economics path 
dependence is centered around the idea that even small changes in initial conditions may have a 
significant impact on the outcome of a process. The end result is intricately related to the events 
leading up to it. I would argue that in terms of time series analysis, the conditions in the 
beginning of a “process” may result in a linear or a non-linear development path for a particular 
variable. Essentially, however, this process may be incomprehensible or at least difficult to 
explain without the analysis o f the initial conditions, which continue to exert their influence 
over time. Another interesting aspect of this concept relates to  the idea that static equilibrium 
analysis may be inadequate in certain kinds of economic analysis. Path dependence, as applied 
in this chapter, consists of two essential parts: 1) Historical constraints created by the different 
institutional development, for example cultural constraints affecting the decision-makers’ 
disposition towards military establishments; 2) Organizations* activities in order to maximize 
their utility. Different types o f historical conditions and structures create different types of 
preconditions for the actions of the various organizations. The interaction of organizations and 
institutions, formal and informal, shape the evolution of economic polities/74 Paul David also 
refers to the dynamic properties of an allocative process, and as such the path dependent 473
473 North 1994,113— 116.
474 Eloranta 1998; North 1994, 93—94; North 1996. For applications of path dependence in historical 
sociology, see Isaac 1997. See also Griffin el al. 1997. On military power application, see Isaac-Leicht
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qualities o f an economic phenomenon are sometimes studied from a purely quantitative a n g le ,  
emphasizing the non-linear statistical qualities of time series.* 475 Here I will in v e s tig a te  
quantitatively, in the short term, only the possibility o f linear path dependence in m il i ta ry  
spending, as well as the underlying decision-making structures in such development “paths”.
In economics the path dependence hypothesis has mainly been applied to e x p la in in g  
technological development.476 It has been aptly characterized by the phrase ”lock-in b y  
historical events”. The processes in question can usually be termed as self-enforcing or s e lf - re ­
enforcing, cumulative events. In such processes small differences in initial conditions, such  a s  
the formal or informal institutions or the pool of players involved in the game, b e c o m e  
magnified in  time, producing multiple stable equilibria.477
Recent research in economics has defined three stages o f path dependence in techno log ica l 
development. In the first degree, the initial conditions in the observation point influence t h e  
development, but actual inefficiency cannot be found. In the second degree of path dependence, 
information in the initial observation point is incomplete, and once the inferiority o f the c h o s e n  
"path” is revealed, the required change would be too great to undertake. Due to incom ple te  
information the choice, however, cannot be "judged” as inefficient. For example, i f  a  c e rta in  
country decides to manufacture all the rifles its armed forces need domestically, perhaps even  in  
government-owned facilities, and later they discover this to be economically unsound, we m ig h t 
refer to this as an example of second degree path dependence. The third degree involves a g a in  
choosing the inefficient option, even though there would have been a more efficient and rea d ily  
apparent alternative available in the initial observation point. These degrees of path dependence 
also mean that the dependence on the chosen path strengthens from the first to the third degree. 
Only the third degree path dependence —  according to Stanley Liebowitz and Stephen M argolis 
almost impossible to pinpoint —  when a conscious, inefficient choice is made as a  result o f  
political pressure action, to protect domestic production for example, differs from the rationality  
expectation o f the neoclassical economic theory.478
1997.
475 David 1998,7—8. David defines stochastic processes as possessing a quality to be able "eventually to 
shake free from the influence of their past state(s)". On nonlinear econometrics, a good introduction can 
be found in Granger-Teràsvirta 1993 (see e.g. Chapter 5). A good effort in this direction can be found in 
Durlauf 1991, which discusses many aspects of technological path dependence and economywide shocks 
in a quantitative manner.
476 See e.g. Rosenberg 1994. See also Eloranta 1998.
477 David 1993, e.g. 19.
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North has been the first to attempt to apply this concept to economic history on a broader scale 
by performing comparisons between two, differing development paths. He does not, however, 
attempt to define what path dependence might actually mean and how it could be applied to 
historical research, for example as I have previously undertaken as a sum of the ’’game”, or 
interaction, between historical constraints and organizational utility-maximization.478 79 However, 
path dependence is not necessarily merely a long-term research tool; it may consist o f small 
events or shocks that can lead to ’’smaller paths”, or they may simply not have long-term 
economic (or political) consequences. Also, it is important to analyze such factors in a path 
dependent process which re-enforce the process or, respectively, weaken the path dependence in 
a particular historical process. As I have defined path dependence here, it relates especially to 
the study of groups, as well as continuities and discontinuities in processes over time.480
How can we apply this concept into explaining a particular historical problem? One of the most 
difficult aspects of applying path dependence is the problem of quantification, which is common 
for most institutional applications. For example, the measurement and quantification of 
transaction costs may indeed be impossible on a larger scale.481 What other problems does the 
researcher face? It is difficult to make a value judgment on the efficiency or perhaps even the 
irrationality —  if there indeed can be any irrational acts in the analysis due to the acceptance of 
the comprehensive bounded rationality —  of different kinds of historical choices. For example, 
a certain nation’s defense acquisitions may be consciously directed towards significantly more 
expensive domestic production in a certain year, which would make it tempting to classify this 
situation and its consequences as the third degree path dependence. The analysis must, on the 
other hand, take into account the personal motives of the decision-makers (which form  the 
collective whole), the social and political incentives created by the group dynamics, as well as 
other ideological and cultural constraints.482 Most likely the outcome is a combination of several 
causal factors, which are often inseparable. For example, favoring domestic production may 
also be positive for the entire economy, even though at first it might appear to be economically 
inefficient. Thus, path dependence should first and foremost be considered as a research tool, a 
way of rationalizing the research problem with the help o f institutional theory.
478 Liebowitz-Margolis 1997. On rationality contemplations, see Lamberg et al. 1997.
479 North attempts to avoid defining path dependence in a specific manner. See also Lamberg et al. 1997.
480 See e.g. Eloranta 1998. In addition, Olson 1982.
481 See e.g, Ojala 1997; Menard 1997. On quantitative empirical solutions, see especially Alston et al. 
1996.
482 The application of different degrees of path dependence to e.g. political and economic phenomena 
should include an element of caution. The starting point for the analysis must be the different views of 
the world by the individuals and their effect on the group, however large, behavior and dynamics.
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Another way to  rationalize the study of the security interests and needs of a nation would b e  t o  
re-evaluate the term security policy, as for example Juhani Mylly has done. He has a p p ro a c h e d  
the study o f security needs, similar to this thesis, by conceptualizing the security of a nation a s  a  
result of the internal and external constraints, or security factors, as he refers to them. M ylly h a s  
divided the internal constraints further into defense policy and domestic policy factors, and  t h e  
external constraints into foreign relations and the effect of the international system 483 In  t h i s  
study path dependence relates essentially to the developments within the fields o f defense p o l ic y  
and domestic politics, as well as their complex interaction processes. The path d e p e n d e n t 
aspects o f Swedish and Finnish military spending should emerge clearly, for example, from  t h e  
analysis o f the internal division in both the public political sphere as well as from  within t h e  
military establishment. As such, the term power politics here relates to the power struggle a n d  
balance o f power between the political parties and the interest groups in these two so c ie tie s , 
which is an important part of any explanation of a country’s security needs.484 Thus, fo llo w in g  
the preceding interpretation of path dependence, I will attempt to analyze the political e c o n o m y  
of military spending in these two countries on the basis of: 1) The relevant institutional, fo rm a l  
and informal, constraints and opportunities affecting their military spending decision-making; 2 )  
The composition and role of the relevant players in the military budgeting and m ilita ry  
contracting processes.
However, in order to analyze the impact of organizational interplay in the formation a n d  
allocation o f military expenditures we need to identify the ’’players”. As Hans Sjögren h a s  
noted, the impact of institutions such as state policies and capital structures can not take a w a y  
altogether the responsibility of the actors in the outcome, as rules also evolve during th e  
game.485 Furthermore, one should also distinguish between the players that are part o f  th e  
“public sphere” —  Le., that belong to  a  public organ and, at least claim to, act in their interest —  
and those who are trying to  influence public sector decisions. The different formal p o litica l 
organizations capable of influencing the size and the nature of military expenditures were th e  
military establishment and the Ministry of Defense, the cabinet, and the parliament in th e  
Nordic context.486 The parliament o f course had the ultimate power in budgetary matters. It is  
also important to analyze the armed forces’ internal disputes and power struggles, since th e y  
also formed an interest group as defined in Chapter 2, in order to comprehend the military’s ro le
483 Mylly 1978, 16— 18.
484 See Mylly 1978,16. Also, see Eloranta 1997c.
485 Sjogren 1999.
486 The Swedish King and the Finnish Presidents would have been able to influence military budgets, but 
in practice usually did not choose to do so.
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in funding decisions. Therefore we need to  inspect the functions of the official political organs, 
from the issue o f budget suggestions by the Ministry of Defense to the parliamentary decision­
making. A key question is, following the application of path dependence, how much it was 
actually possible to fundamentally change the level of military expenditures. For example, did 
the bureaucrats attempt to maximize their discretionary budgets, with or without the influence of 
the armed forces (=HYPOTHESIS 44)? Also, how effective were the activities of the various 
factions and individuals in the military budgeting process and by what means did they achieve 
their goals?
In addition, as I discussed in Chapter 2, there were also quite a few political and economic 
interest groups that had a stake in the allocation of public goods. The most important of these in 
the case of Nordic interwar military funding were the federations of industries and the various 
naval lobbies. The ideas presented in Chapter 2 on the behavior of groups are directly applicable 
into analyzing the actions of these groups and individuals. In the political markets —  which is 
how I would define the fairly abstract sphere in which such decision-making processes take 
place —  access means everything, and it is easier for organized groups to get their voices heard 
than for a single voter. Accordingly, there are many kinds o f interest groups: social and 
apolitical (weak participation rate in political decision-making), potential groups (which have 
not yet organized themselves systematically), as well as political (usually to further someone’s 
economic interests) interest groups. As such, they are separate entities from those organs that 
are mandated to make decisions in a polity, although I will argue here that both will attempt to 
maximize their own complex utility and that their roles often get blurred in the context of 
various forms o f public-private interaction.487
Membership in an interest group may offer an individual or a sub-level organization three kinds 
of benefits: 1) Material, advancing one’s own economic activities; 2) Benefits related to a 
certain purpose or ideology, namely concerning some of the aims of the group; 3) Solidarity 
benefits, such as rewards, honorary titles, as well as other awards aimed at raising one’s self­
esteem. The selective incentives offered by these groups are also commonly matched by a 
punishment system, which will make the option of not joining costly to maintain. The pressure 
strategies of interest groups include campaign funding, offering voluntary assistance, direct 
pressure, using the media either directly (via the group’s own information agency) or indirectly, 
as well direct involvement in the decision-making sphere. In such pressure activities, as M ancur 
Olson has shown, small, homogeneous groups are more effective than large, heterogeneous
1
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groups, for example due to their greater ability to exert social control. As Jonathan P in cu s  
(1977) has emphasized, the size o f aggregate economic interests of a group may be a poor g u id e  
to  the strength of its action. He postulates, firstly, that the fewer the individuals who enjoy th e  
benefits and, for any group size, the more concentrated the benefits. Secondly, the intensity o f  
the pressure-group activity also depends on the dispersion, physical or otherwise, o f  th e  
individuals as well as the costs of acquiring information.487 88
In modem societies economic interest groups have been almost without exceptions 
organizations dominated by elites. For example, firms attempt to anticipate and benefit f ro m  
institutional changes, therefore they form complex cooperative networks and coalitions. T h e  
goal of influencing decision-making puts these interest groups in a competitive situation, in  
which the so-called insider groups are able to participate in various public-private forms o f  
cooperation, such as different types o f committees. These cooperative networks between th e  
public and the private spheres, especially the representatives o f the elites, are formed a lso  
because the public sector needs the expertise o f the private sector (especially during crisis 
situations) as well as its political support.489 This activity, however, is not considered crim inal 
activity, so-called white collar crime, if: 1) The justice system does not recognize it as crime; 2 ) 
The perpetrators are not brought to justice; i.e., they are not caught or are not convicted due to  
their personal networks.490 Why would this interaction between the public and private sectors 
increase? The concept of corruptive contact surface describes this collision of interests. It refers 
specifically to the increase in corruptive opportunities due to increasing contacts between th e  
economic life and the political-administrative organs, for example due to mutual interests. T he 
widening of this corruptive surface can occur, for example, due to institutional crises and/or 
abrupt economic changes (see HYPOTHESIS 47). As emphasized in Chapter 2, rent-seeking 
behavior is said to occur when the profits exceed the opportunity costs for the owners o f  
resources in the political markets, with the costs of these actions entailing a waste of social 
resources. Here it will be hypothesized that most of this rent seeking by economic interest 
groups should target capital ME, due to the tangible benefits available from the military 
contracts (=HYPOTHESIS 41).491
487 See e.g. Lamberg et al. 2002; Wilson 1990, 8—9.
488 Hrebenar-Scott 1982,4—5, 18—19; Lamberg 1997, 150; Olson 1965; Pincus 1977, e.g. 2—3..
489 Colli-Rose 1999,27—28; Smith 1993,4—7, 60—61; Grani 2000,19—20.
490 Cf. Isaksson 1997,31.
491 North 1994; Hrebenar-Scott 1982,9— 12; Isaksson 1997,130; Tullock 1967; Lamberg et al. 2002.
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It is essential to make a distinction between different forms o f rent seeking (entailing profit 
maximization) and actual collusion between the agents involved. Collusion entails that this 
contact surface has provided extensive opportunities for rent seeking and that the interests of 
certain economic and public sphere groups have coincided. Collusion can also take place not 
only between the public and private organizations, but also between various state agencies such 
as the Ministry o f Defense and the armed forces. If  the agent in the military contracting 
relationship is a domestic market industry, repeated transactions are likely to occur in countries 
with less developed armaments production capabilities and/or military trade constraints. This 
relationship also reflects the scarcity of information and the ensuing transaction costs. In short, 
the government as the principal has to choose the contractor or agent, and to ensure that the 
agent pursues the goals of the principal. O f the two countries, Sweden had a mature military 
industrial base, whereas Finland had barely any military industrial capabilities in the beginning 
of this period. Thus, the Finnish military acquisition policy should have been more prone to 
collusion among the actors involved, leading to price disadvantages and social waste (see 
HYPOTHESIS 47). The Swedish case, in turn, should turn up evidence of “regular”, albeit 
specifically constrained rent-seeking behavior by the private agents. Will, for example, 
industries attempt to maximize the level o f ME in times o f economic hardship (=HYPOTHESIS 
45), as the quantitative evidence presented before suggests, or will their rent seeking be more 
qualified, for example to focus on maximizing the benefits arising from advantageous military 
procurement policy by attempting to formalize such procurement rules (^HYPOTHESIS 46)?
How would the Nordic federations o f industries attempt to pursue their goals? How can we 
ascertain their effectiveness? As Lamberg et al. (2002) have argued, it is somewhat difficult to 
actually measure this influence or gauge its effectiveness. Interest groups often favor targeted 
public goods, which either benefit the interest group via direct investments or by lowering their 
taxes. Thus, they wish to: 1) Minimize their costs, namely specific taxes, and also usually lower 
the level of government spending in general; 2) Maximize their share of the targeted public 
goods, such as military acquisitions. Interest groups favor the introduction of goods into the 
public budget inasmuch some of the benefits will be targeted to their members.492 A change in 
the relative importance and influence o f an interest group in a polity will thus have an effect on 
its taxes and subsidies, as well as those experienced by other groups, subsequently increasing 
the deadweight costs (=tax distortions) in the said polity. It should also be noted that sunk costs, 
indicating path dependence, are also important in the political sector and reduce the short-run 
elasticity of supply o f human and/or physical capital. An investment in the political markets by
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a firm is thereby contingent on various preconditions, such as its previous success in p r e s s u r e  
activities, the relative importance o f the pressure organization (for example, the national p e a k  
association), the phase o f its industrial life cycle, the availability and composition of p u b l i c  
goods decided upon in the past, and so on.492 93
In this chapter we will also link the formal (i.e., political actions) and informal (i.e., p r iv a te  
sector interest groups) spheres o f influence by analyzing not only their direct functions b u t  
including also analysis of their contact surfaces in different kinds of committees. T h i s  
perspective in this thesis is analyzed through a review of the workings of various co m m ittees , 
for example the Defense Revision committees, designed to alter the premises o f the e n t i r e  
military establishment, both funding and organization, in these two countries. It is e q u a lly  
beneficial to analyze the workings o f more permanent committees, especially relating to  t h e  
allocation o f military outlays.
Thus, next I will attempt to analyze and recognize the institutional factors that might h a v e  
contributed to the formation of path dependent processes in the Swedish and Finnish in te rw a r  
military spending. Also, I will assess the economic factors that instigated constraints, i n  
connection with the institutional framework, for their military spending. Finally I will re v ie w  
the actions o f certain economic interest organizations, as well as committees, in the creation o f  
specific military spending development ’’paths”. In this thesis I will follow quite explicitly t h e  
public choice notion that central government decisions, thus the formal legislative structure, a r e  
the sum o f actions taken by both the large (for example, Parliament) and the small (for exam ple, 
committees) organizations as well as private sector actors in the political markets. Therefore, 
governmental bodies and bureaucracies are also considered as possible ’’players” in the p o litica l 
markets. Informal constraints and opportunities, referring to moral standards and other su c h  
factors, are also the results of this pluralistic game structure, yet their evolution or change 
usually takes a  longer time than in the case of formal rules.494
Here I will first want to evaluate certain hypotheses concerning simple, linear path dependence 
in military spending. As discussed in the previous chapter, the military spending of th e  
European states in the sample that we have information on became more capital intensive during 
the interwar period. How could we relate the division between consumption and capital M E to
492 Lamberg et al. 2002; Mueller-Murrell 1985,13— 17.
493 Becker 1983,372—382; Lamberg et al. 2002.
494 See Johnson 1991, e.g. A— 13. On the basic principles in public choice research, see Buchanan 1990
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the notion of path dependence? First, we can hypothesize that consumption ME should be more 
path dependent than capital ME due to  the difficulties in changing the laws concerning 
conscription. Moreover, this path dependence may influence the level of military expenditures 
themselves (=HYPOTHESIS 40). As I have already discovered earlier, lagged (by one year) 
military spending exerted a consistent, positive growth influence on the military spending of the 
selected eleven European states, so the latter half of this hypothesis seems to hold. Secondly, 
partly also supported by some of the previous findings, military expenditures as a whole may be 
path dependent, yet more so in terms o f central government spending patterns —  measured by 
the percentage o f central government expenditures to GDP —  in general (^HYPOTHESIS 42).
Table 37. GLS Estimates on the Short-Run Linear Path Dependence Imposed by 
Consumption ME on the Aggregate ME of Five European Countries, 1920—193$
A. B. C D.
CONSME CONSME (t-1) 1,30** N=55
CONSME (t-2) -0,07 S.E.=0,05
CONSME (t-3) 0,07 DW=1,97
CONSME (t-4) -0,32 F=18333
CONSME (t-5) 0,18
CONSME (t-6) -0,30
CONSME (t-7) 0,11
DFSHARE CONSME (t-1) 0,10 N=60
CONSME (t-2) 0,07 S.E.=0,06
CONSME (t-3) -0,45** DW=1,69
CONSME (t-4) -0,49*** F=767,74
CONSME (t-5) 0,43
CONSME (t-6) -0,21
CONSME (t-7) -0,11
MILBUR CONSME (t-1) -0,08 N=55
CONSME (t-2) 0,19 S.E.=0,05
CONSME (t-3) -0,22 DW=ri,95
CONSME (t-4) -0,23 F=102,01
CONSME (t-5) -0,29
CONSME (t-6) -0,15
CONSME (t-7) -0,56***
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2. A=dependent variable for the GLS (with cross-section weights);
B=independent variables (with lags indicated in parenthesis) for the GLS; C=coeffrcients for the independent
variables; D=GLS regression statistics. * = null hypothesis rejected at 10 per cent level; ** -  null rejected at 5 per
cent level; *** = null rejected at 1 per cent level. All variables in logs. Differencing as in Table 16; in addition, FRA
CONSME is /(l). CONSME=consumption military expenditures.
Note\ AR(1) term included in the GLS equations, as well as fixed effect intercepts, yet they are not reported in the 
table. Details on these available from the author by request. For details on the countries included, see the text
I will test the first notion by regressing the lagged values of consumption ME for the five states 
(BEL, FIN, FRA, SWE, UK) that I have this data on consumption M E at t. Then I will test the
statistical significance of the lagged consumption ME in explaining the military spending
for details. On formal and informal rules, see especially North 1994; Lamberg et al. 1997.
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variables (defense shares, military burdens) for the same five countries. Finally, relating to  th e  
second hypothesis, I will test this notion by regressing the lagged central government sp en d in g  
on the M E variables of the selected eleven European states. Thus, non-linear forms o f  p a th  
dependence are not pursued here. As argued later, these linear forms will mainly represent th e  
first and second degrees of path dependence, since the inefficiency evaluation m ay be d ifficu lt 
to undertake. The method of analysis is once again cross-section weighted GLS in the p o o led  
samples, and lags are tested up to seven years.
The results concerning the path dependence of consumption ME (see Table 37) seem  q u ite  
consistent. Within an equation, the signs of the statistically significant variables rem ained th e  
same. Previous year’s consumption M E had a large, positive impact on the current year M E . 
The impact o f consumption ME on the military spending variables was negative, which w o u ld  
suggest that as this share decreased during the 1930s, the overall spending levels increased d u e  
to intensive capital investments. Consumption M E was clearly path dependent in the lin ea r 
sense in this time period.
Table 38. GLS Estimates on the Short-Run Linear Path Dependence Imposed by the  
Central Government Expenditures (=CGE) on the Aggregate ME of the Selected Eleven 
European States, 1920—1938
A. B. C D.
DFSHARE CGE (t-1) -0,26*** N=119
CGE (t-2) 0,07 S.E.=0,06
CGE (t-3) -0,09 DW=2,19
CGE (t-4) -0,05 F=7027,l
CGE (t-5) 0,16***
CGE (t-6) 0,14**
CGE (t-7) 0,09**
MILBUR CGE (t-1) 0,07 N=119
CGE (t-2) 0,18*** S.E.=0,05
CGE (t-3) 0,02 DW=2,09
CGE (t-4) -0,00 F=369,29
CGE (t-5) 0,11*
CGE (t-6) 0,09
CGE (t-7) -0,04
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2. A=dependent variable for the GLS (with cross-section weights); 
Brindependent variables (with lags indicated in parenthesis) for the GLS; C=coefficients for the independent 
variables; D=GLS regression statistics. * = null hypothesis rejected at 10 per cent level; ** = null rejected at 5 per 
cent level; *** = null rejected at 1 per cent level. All variables in logs. Differencing as in Table 16. CGE=central 
government expenditures to GDP, percentage.
Note'. AR(1) term included in the GLS equations, as well as fixed effect intercepts, yet they are not reported in the 
table. Details on these available from the author by request.
In terms of linear budgetary path dependence, this notion seems supported by the data for these 
eleven European states as well. For both military spending variables the lagged impact o f 
central government spending share was positive and consistent. Thus, linear path dependence
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certainly emerged through both exercises. HYPOTHESES 40 and 42 were, in addition to  the 
results achieved already earlier, therefore confirmed This type of simplistic approach, however, 
does not address the reasons behind this phenomenon or other possible cumulative equilibria via 
non-linear econometric analysis. The “stickiness” of certain types of institutions, namely 
conscription laws, will be addressed in the following sections. The argument here is that unless 
the political field is dominated by a single party — i.e., a significant consensus exists between 
the parties, or a minority party holds the balance in the parliament —  it is difficult to introduce 
changes to existing legislation. The turbulence of the interwar politics has already been 
discussed in this thesis, and the vote-maximizing behavior of political parties (see Chapter S) 
exerted a clear downward bias on military spending. This tendency was counterbalanced only 
partially by the economic interest groups, since they were not in favor of rising central 
government spending levels and, respectively, higher taxes. And, respectively, these tendencies 
should once again be viewed neutrally from the complex utility-maximization perspective of the 
historical actors, which makes the inefficiency determination practically impossible.
Table 39. Structure of Finnish and Swedish Industry, Percentage, by Branches, 1920— 
1940
A. B. G D. E. F. G. H. I.
Ì 920 FIN 15,5 5,1 17,6 22,3 15,9 16,7 1,6 5,4
1920 SWE 24,7 5,1 12,3 14,5 12,6 23,3 5,1 2,5
1930 FIN 16,5 3,4 12,9 22,1 16,0 17,1 1,7 10,4
1930 SWE 31,2 5,8 9,3 12,5 13,3 19,6 3,3 5,0
1940 FIN 29,6 3,9 8,5 12,1 16,3 20,3 2,1 7,1
1940 SWE 40,4 3,9 7,1 8,4 11,4 19,0 3.9 5,9
Sources: Hjerppe et al. 1976; Heikkinen-Hjerppe 1986; Schön 1988. For details on methods, see Eloranta 1997b. 
A=year; B-F1N: mining, metal, and other industry, SWE: mining and metal industry; C=FIN: clay, glass, and rock 
refinement, SWE: earth and rock industry; EMFIN: wood, furniture, and construction carp, industry, SWE: wood 
industry; E=FIN: paper and graphic industry, SWE: paper and graphic industry; F=FTN: foodstuffs industry, SWE: 
foodstuffs industry; G=F1N: textile, footwear, clothing, leather, and rubber industry, SWE: textile, clothing, leather, 
bristle, and rubber industry; H=FIN: chemical industry, SWE: chemical industry; I=FIN: electricity, gas, and water 
main industry, SWE: power, lighting, and water depts. SWE=Sweden; FIN»Fmland.
Before moving onto the analysis of the Swedish and Finnish political economies, we should 
discuss the historical differences and similarities between these two polities. As seen in Table 
39, they were first o f all quite different as far as the structure of their economies was concerned. 
As Riitta Hjerppe, among others, has stressed, Finland was still largely an agriculturally 
dominated country during the interwar period, even though services became for the first time 
the largest productive sector at the end of the 1920s. This slow structural change was halted by 
the Great Depression. The 1930s was characterized by an increased dominance of the domestic 
markets, especially due to the tightening protectionism, as well as greater government
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involvement in, for example, military production.495 The Swedish situation was quite d iffe re n t. 
The fairly rapid industrialization in the late 19th century had produced a mature industrial b a s e  
by the interwar period. Did the different ownership structures yet similar tendencies t o  
concentrate on domestic production affect the structure of their industrial production? I n  
general, the performance of the Finnish industry was more than adequate during the in te rw a r  
years. The textile, metal, and engineering industries, which had suffered from the loss o f e x p o r t  
markets in Russia (see Table 39), reoriented their production to the domestic markets in  t h e  
beginning o f the independence. For example, the metal industries in Finland grew strongly i n  
the 1930s, especially due to  the large acquisition programs and new capital investments. A lso , 
as Riitta Hjerppe has pointed out, the 1930s was a time of concentration and growth am ong th e  
Finnish industries, partly due to  government acquisitions.496 In Sweden, the situation w a s  
largely similar. Metal industries grew even faster than in Finland during the depression decade.
The archival sources include various public and private archives in Sweden and Finland. T h e s e  
will be utilized critically in conjunction with the existing literature and earlier efforts by th is  
author. A great deal of this material has not been used in linking the military spending d ecision ­
making with interest group influences, which will provide a fresh outlook on the processes m o re  
traditionally covered by political and military historians.497 Moreover, the private archives o f  
federations of industries in these tw o countries have not been utilized previously, exclud ing  
efforts by this author, to study military expenditure decision-making. These two sam p le  
countries, Sweden and Finland, offer both commonalities and dissimilarities for the analysis o f  
their political economies. Similarities between these nations arise from a joint political heritage, 
institutions, and similarly structured economies. Dissimilarities are equally abundant: w hereas 
Finland perceived itself to be severely threatened by the Soviet Union, the Swedish position w as 
geographically more advantageous. Also, Sweden’s industrial base by the 1920s was w ell 
developed, whereas Finland was a newly independent, agrarian nation with a need to develop 
key armaments industries and the armed forces in general. These factors had a profound in p a c t  
on their respective military spending decisions and especially for the game between the different 
actors. Finally, it is noteworthy that parliamentary ffactionalization seemed to be an im portant 
explanatory variable in the Finnish case, yet not so in the Swedish context. Next I will first 
discuss the overall features of the Swedish “path”, and then I will move towards analyzing the 
public and private spheres, and their interaction in the political markets, in Swedish m ilitary
495 Hjerppe 1988; Korpela 1967. On domestic industries, see also Vehvilainen 1967.
496 Hjerppe 1979.
497 See especially Eloranta 1998 on the historiographical trends of (Finnish) military history.
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spending decision-making. Section 7.3 will feature similar discussion on the Finnish case, and 
this chapter will be concluded with a set o f conclusions.
7.2. The Swedish Path: Disarmament Compromises and Persistent Private Military 
Production
The impact and success of the domestic market economic interest groups varied greatly in these 
two countries, due to the described different historical and economic environments. As observed 
earlier, Finland was an import-dependent country and did not develop military exports until the 
1930s, and even then only modestly. Sweden, in turn, developed into a major military exporter 
especially in the 1930s. Sweden, nevertheless, like Finland was dependent on military imports 
as well. Firstly, it must be emphasized that Sweden had a long tradition of producing arms 
domestically, and Bofors was a large company even by international standards. Secondly, in 
Sweden the industrial breakthrough took place significantly earlier than for example in Finland, 
thus providing the country with a functioning industrial base. Especially the engineering 
industry was quite advanced and versatile in Sweden by the 1920s.498 Equally, even though the 
industries had potential to expand their production volume and content, there were significant 
hindrances to such developments. For example, the role of the state in armaments production 
remained ambiguous. The industrial interest groups were strong enough to resist Social 
Democrats in order to change the ownership status of this type of production. Only in a case like 
the aircraft production, and even that just before the war, the government and the interest groups 
managed to come to an agreement. The ratio of state to privately-owned armaments production 
remained at ten percent throughout the 1930s. Further difficulties to efficient rearmament were 
caused by disagreements between the Armed Forces and the domestic producers in armaments 
acquisition policy.499
The most important bodies in determining the Swedish military expenditures were the 
governments and related organizations that prepared the budgets and the Riksdag (=Parliament) 
that ultimately made the budget decisions. As far as material funding was concerned, the 
Defense Plans of the 1920s and 1930s set a fixed plan for defense expenditures: every year the 
Riksdag could either accept it, reduce it, or increase it. Moreover, the minority governments 
during 1925— 1935 were reluctant to increase military funding and the Social Democrats 
wanted the level of funding established in the 1925 plan to be maintained or reduced (which had 
not included all items of expenditure and had been measured in fixed prices). This resulted in a
498 Krantz 1995,91—99; Olsson 1982.
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compromise that provided the military establishment with steady funding; a declining m il i ta ry  
burden yet a higher per capita share o f military expenditures than in most “weak” states.49 500
The Parliament was fundamentally dominated by two “political equilibria” in this period: 1) T h e  
equilibrium of the 1920s, when minority governments had to walk a tightrope in m il i ta ry  
spending policy; 2) The equilibrium of the 1930s, when the Social Democrats assumed c o n tro l  
of government policy, yet they had to  adapt to the prevailing political practices by giving up  t h e  
notion o f comprehensive nationalization. Social Democrats were continuously in power e i th e r  
alone or in a coalition with other parties from 1932 to 1976. Since the 19th century, the p r im a ry  
division in the Swedish party system was between the Conservatives on the right, the l a r g e  
Liberal Party, and the growing Social Democratic Party on the left. In the 1920s in p a rticu la r, 
the Liberal Party held the balance, since the Conservatives wanted higher defense spending a n d  
the Socialists better social services. As a balancing force, the Liberals were able to h o l d  
government spending at bay.501 The two new parties that emerged after the electoral re fo rm s  
undertaken during and after the F irst World W ar, similar to  those undertaken in other W e ste rn  
European states, were the Agrarian Union and the Communists. By the interwar period a s ta b le  
committee system had also emerged in Swedish politics, although often appointed at ad h o c  
basis, which placed the important party politicians and the various experts in c o m m o n  
committees.502
The Depression of the early 1920s and the enlargement of the franchise produced n in e  
governments in 1920— 1933. In the election of 1921, for example, the Conservatives w e re  
supported by approximately 25 per cent o f the vote, and the main themes in their campaign w e re  
the economy, defense, and warnings o f the dangers of socialism. The Social Democrats also d id  
well, gathering 36 per cent o f the vote, only to increase it up to 40 per cent in the next elections. 
The leader o f the Social Democrats, Hjalmar Branting, was an ardent supporter o f the League o f  
Nations. Though the Social Democrats made important headway in the parliamentary elections 
in the 1920s, the minority governments formed by the Social Democrats were not very effective 
in pushing through their ideas in the Parliament. Usually, due to the aforementioned p o w er 
balance, agreements and compromises were made in the numerous parliamentary committees. 
One of the most controversial issues debated at the level o f  governments and in the Parliam ent 
was the issue of reorganizing national defense. For example, the Edén Government of the ea rly
499 Olsson 1982, 63—64; Mánsson 1976.
500 Bóhme 1988,46—47; Eloranta 1998.
501 Eichengreen 1992,96.
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1920s found it necessary and natural to attempt a reduction in military spending» yet difficulties 
arose when it came to  making a decision what to cut. As usual, this question was mulled over in 
the Defense Commission in the Parliament, which was dominated by the Liberals’ Carl Gustaf 
Ekman in the 1920s. His ability to play both the right and the left usually turned out to be 
decisive. Ekman began to support the left in making cuts in military spending as the decade 
wore on, wanting to keep government spending in check. The defense question first speeded the 
fall of the Branting Government in 1923 and then the Trygger Government in 1924, following 
tactical battles in the Parliament. In the end, the 1924 elections did not really bring much clarity 
to the issue of defense, which was featured prominently in the major party platforms.502 03
The next Prime Minister, Social Democrat Rickard Sandler wanted to resolve the issue o f 
reforming the military, but he also needed the support o f the Liberal Party in order to achieve 
this aim. As many towns faced the loss o f an active regiment and a source of income, and other 
interest groups were also actively involved in the process, the Liberals were not interested in 
backing down from their demands. Thus, the Social Democrats had to reign in their demands for 
greater social spending, for example, and the new Defense Policy o f 1925 was decided in the 
way that the Liberals and Ekman preferred. This resolution came to  be known as a  disarmament 
decision, although it did not go nearly as far as the Social Democrats would have wanted it to 
go. It also met with the indignation of the Conservatives. This plan was based on the proposals 
put forth by various parties in 1923— 1924, and it for example shortened the conscription period 
to 140 days. Spending cuts hit all sectors of the armed forces, yet relatively speaking the cavalry 
was the hardest hit. These cuts were meant to bring the Swedish military spending down to 
107,6 million SEK within a few years time, yet Swedish ME was still at 143,4 million SEK in
1933. The reforms were meant to be carried out by the end of 1927.504
The Defense Policy of 1925 was based on the work of the first post-war Defense Committee, 
which was appointed in 1919 to solve the structural problems facing Sweden in the new security
502 Stemquist 1987,223—245.
503 Stemquist 1987,253—256; Trijnnberg 1985. See also the following failed disarmament motions in the 
Parliament: Parliamentary Protocols (protokoll med bihang), First Chamber motion 89, handled in the 
First Chamber 12:59d, 1922, concerning Scandinavian, Baltic, or general disarmament; First Chamber 
motion 90, handled in the First Chamber I2:66d, 1922, limited international disarmament. The heated 
parliamentary debate in 1924 focused on many aspects of defense reform, such as new the conscription 
law and the acquisition policy, not just disarmament per se; see e.g. Parliamentary Documents, His Royal 
Majesty’s proposals or letters 20, 21; First Chamber motions 175— 177,205—206,224— 225,227—251; 
Second Chamber motions 4,347—356,361—400.
504 Bohme 1988, 14; Stemquist 1987, 257; TrOnnberg 1985, 34—37; Lundkvist 2000, 10—11. See also 
Parliamentary Protocols, His Royal Majesty’s proposal 50, 51; First Chamber motions 201, 202, 205— 
209,211—221,225—248; Second Chamber motions 279—280,283—297, 300—319, 326—368.
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environment. The work was completed finally on 15.3.1923. The members o f the com m ittee  
comprised many important politicians of the time and several future stars, such as Ekman, P e r  
Albin Hansson, and Ernst Wigforss, as well as many representatives of the armed forces. I ts  
work was centered on: 1) bringing forth motions to reduce the length of time of military se rv ice ; 
2) “ ...to  produce a study and give a proposal on the revision of Sweden’s m ilita ry  
establishment”.503 According to the committee, Sweden could easily be drawn into a conflict in  
the Baltic region, between the south (Germany) and the east (the Soviet Russia). Nonetheless, i t  
considered the introduction of new states such as Finland and the Baltic states, the League o f  
Nations, as well as Germany’s weakening as factors that would make military spending c u ts  
plausible. It also reminded its readers that military budgets had exceeded all estimates s in c e  
1914, and that it now recommended a yearly spending level o f circa 194,4 million SEK. One o f  
the reasons behind the cuts was the need to economize in a difficult economic situation.50 06
The political environment in which the Defense Committee of 1919 had to submit i ts  
recommendations was difficult to say the least, and it faced criticism from many fronts. T h e  
Social Democrats, quite naturally, did not consider the proposals extensive enough. T h e  
committee also did not want to meddle with the inner organization of the Army or the Navy, d u e  
to effective opposition from  within the armed forces. Thus, it tended to make its sav ing  
proposals in more general terms.507 The Air Force was also made an independent arm o f th e  
armed forces by these reforms from 1.7.1926 onwards; nonetheless, the Air Force rem ained 
largely an auxiliary service in the Swedish defense structure. All in all, the Defense Policy o f  
1925 fixed the Swedish military expenditure for a ten-year period, and it was based on the ra th e r 
untenable assumption of fixed prices. The politicians followed the very loose calculations of th e  
military experts and usually had no real knowledge of how the budgets were structured.508 A s 
we have seen, even Swedish consumption ME and military spending in general tended to b e  
path dependent The reasons include the long time frame it takes to implement any changes
505 Betänkande och förslag rörande revision av Sveriges jforsvarsväsende, avgivet den 15 mars 1923 av  
den av Kungl. Maj:t den 12 november 1919 tiüsatta forsvarsrevisionen. I-III. Stockholm 1923. SOU 
1923:15,40. See also Wedin 1983,11. For more details, see National Archive (Riksarkivet), Committee 
concerning the revision of Sweden’s military establishment. Defense Revision 1919. Case documents. 
Registries. Protocols {Kommittin ang revisionen av Sveriges forsvarsväsende. Forsvarsrevisionen 1919. 
Diarium. Registratur. Protokoll). YK 167, Vol. 1—5, see especially Protocols 10.1.1920, 21.2.1920, 
1.11.1921, 2.11.1921, and 2.12.1922 on the issue of conscription; on proposals to reduce the time of 
service, see Forsvarsrevisionen 1919. Inkomna handlingar 1920, 1921, Vol 3.
506 SOU 1923:15,70—73, 87—91,98— 100.
507 See e.g. Wedin 1983 regarding the Navy. In general, see National Archives, Kommitten ang revisionen 
av Sveriges forsvarsväsende. Försvarsrevisionen 1919. Diarium. Registratur. Protokoll. YK 167, Vol. 
1—5, especially Protocols in 1922.
508 Böhme 1988,25,46.
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(such as the reductions in the number of Swedish active troops and garrisons), the resistance of 
the military establishment to spending cuts, the limited information that the MPs possessed on 
the actual structure of the military budget, and the underestimation of the real costs of defense in 
the period 1925— 1935. The resistance of the economic interest groups to changes in acquisition 
practices, as discussed later, will also be of importance. Also, as seen in Figure 65, the spending 
shares of the different branches of the armed forces remained fairly steady, the brief increases in 
administrative costs in the beginning of the 1920s and the late 1930s notwithstanding.
Figure 65. Swedish Military Spending by Branches, Percentage, 1920—1938
______________ ________ Year____
■  M inistry  o f Defense o f Total M E
□  C om bined Expenditures (Arm y, Navy) o f Total ME
□  A ir F orce Expenditures o f T ota l ME
□  Navy Expenditures o f  Total M E
□  A rm y Expenditures o f Total M E________________
Sources: S ta tis tisk  Â rsb o k  fö r Sverige 1919— 1941.
No significant changes were introduced to the spending practices in the period 1925— 1935, 
despite numerous efforts. For example, in 1927 Carl Ekman’s Liberal coalition government put 
together an extensive disarmament program together with economic and military experts. The 
following Conservative government that came to power in 1928 kept this proposal, which was 
meant to be introduced at the League of Nations Disarmament Conference, more or less intact. 
The proposed reductions were meant to apply to all branches, to limit the number of personnel 
and the stock of armaments alike. The Swedish reaction to the lack of progress and concrete 
proposals on the eve of the Disarmament Conference in 1930— 1931 was a pessimistic one. All 
the major parties were brought together to make these proposals to ensure their success, and to
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incorporate them into the work o f the new Defense Committee that was appointed in 1930. T h i s  
Committee came into being as a result of an agreement between the Liberals under Ekm an a n d  
the Social Democrats under Hansson. Its purpose was to preserve the results achieved in  t h e  
1925 Defense Policy, and to perhaps introduce even a reallocation of priorities w i t h i n  
expenditure categories.509
The working environment o f the new committee was also influenced by a major shift in p o l i t ic a l  
power as the Social Democrats regained their momentum in the parliamentary e le c tio n s . 
Although they had increased their percentage o f votes to 41,1 per cent in 1924, their tally h a d  
decreased to 37,0 per cent in 1928. In 1932, however, their share of the votes increased to  4 1 , 7  
per cent, only to grow further to 45,9 per cent in 1936. Finally, in 1940, they garnered a n  
outright majority of the votes cast in the parliamentary elections (53,8 per cent). A lso t h e  
Agrarian Party increased its share o f the votes from 10,8 per cent in 1924 to 14,1 in 1932.510 
Thus, the Social Democrats and the Agrarian Party began to  cooperate with one another, w h ic h  
created a formidable force in the Parliament. The first formal coalition government was f o rm e d  
in 1936. With Hansson as the Prime Minister, the Social Democrats were now able to  p u s h  
through some of their social equality principles, although the actual creation of the welfare s t a t e  
only saw its beginnings in the 1930s. The new policies included state employment c re a tio n  
programs, subsidies to voluntary trade union unemployment benefit societies, a h o u s in g  
program for families with many children, maternity benefits, and so on. Spending on p u b lic  
works, due to the impact of the Great Depression, was also increased. Social Democrats in tu r n  
abandoned their support o f free agricultural trade to placate the Agrarian Party. W ith t h e  
Agrarian Party’s fiscal caution and the Social Democrats’ pacifism, the stage was set for an o th e r  
adjustment in the Swedish military spending. This adjustment came to be based on the w ork o f  
the 1930 Defense Committee, which finally (after heavy criticism from the press for the de lays) 
submitted its report on July 30, 1935. This report was preceded by numerous disarm am ent 
(often suggesting unilateral disarmament) proposals submitted especially by the S o c ia l 
Democrats in the Parliament, which were steadily defeated.511 .
509 Tronnberg 1985, 38—45; Bohme 1988, 17—18; Betankande med forslag till ordnande av Sveriges 
forsvarsvàsende, avgivet den 30 juli 1935 av 1930 &rs fôrsvarskommission. Stockholm 1935. SOU 1935: 
38—43; National Archives, 1930 Year’s Defense Commission (1930 àrs Fôrsvarskommission). YK 933, 
BU: 1. See also the previous committee on the organization of the economic defense plans, including the 
organization of the industries on war footing, which consisted of representatives of various interest groups 
(such as the Federation of Swedish Industries): Betankande fôrande den ekonomiska
forsvarsberedskapens organisation, avgivet den 28 okt. 1926 av sàrskilt tillkallade sakkunrtige, uisedda 
p& grund av Kungl Matits beslut den 16 april 1926. Stockholm 1926. SOU 1926: 22.
^10 Flora 1983,143.
511 Stemquist 1987, 260—262; Olson 1986, 5; SOU 1935: 38— 43; Parliamentary Protocols, defeated
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As the Defense Committee noted in its report, the goals of the Defense Policy of 1925 were 
realized only partially, and a new effort was required to reach those goals. The goals o f the 
committee included: 1) to strengthen the legislation concerning the military establishment; 2) to 
reorganize the military establishment within the proposed reduced spending framework; 3) to 
make a separate proposal for the disarmament process pursued under the auspices of the League 
of Nations. The committee expressed some doubts about the League’s ability to preserve the 
peace and the status quo, and once again emphasized the volatile nature of the Baltic area as a 
threat to Swedish security. In comparing the military spending figures for the period 1925—  
1933, it also underlined the disparity between the spending totals aspired in the 1925 decision 
and the real figures. According to the figures provided by the committee, however, the Swedish 
defense share declined from circa 25,8 per cent in 1925 to 17, 6 per cent in 1933.512 The 
committee also wanted to introduce organizational changes in the Swedish military 
establishment, especially in the high command, to improve the cooperation between the 
branches. The keyword characterizing the changes was centralization, even beyond what the 
committee had recommended.513 This tendency was undoubtedly strengthened by the Social 
Democrats’ electoral success in the late 1930s. At the outbreak o f the Second World W ar in 
1939, the Social Democratic/Agrarian Government was replaced by a broad coalition 
government, with the Social Democrats and Per Albin Hansson in charge nonetheless. The late 
1930s was also characterized by a greater recognition o f the new threat environment, especially 
Germany’s hectic rearmament, and subsequently two increases of 70 million SEK were 
introduced into the defense budgets before the war.514
In Sweden, the rearmament in fact began in the middle o f the 1930s. The new Defense Plan of 
1936 increased Swedish military expenditures considerably. The emphasis in the rearmament
motions (First Chamber motion 189, Second Chamber motion 242, First Chamber 6:4d, 13:4d, Second 
Chamber 13:3d) on the assistance from the Swedish side regarding Soviet government disarmament 
proposal in the League of Nations, 1931; defeated motion (First Chamber motion 217, First Chamber 
ll:15d, Second Chamber 13:16) on a referendum on disarmament question, 1932; defeats the motion of 
entirely separate disarmament, (First Chamber motion 214, First Chamber 14:37d), 1932; motions 
relating to the disarmament “question" (First Chamber motion 211, First Chamber 33:27d, Second 
Chamber 36:19d), 1933. On Swedish policy in the League of Nations, see Trönnberg 1985.
512 SOU 1935:38,36—37,56,65—81,177— 178; National Archives, 1930 &rs Försvarskommission. YK 
933, BII:1. P.M. rörande Sveriges forsvarspolitiska läge ur ekonomisk synpunkt, utarbetad inom 
Rikskommissionens fo r  ekonomisk försvarsberedskap kansli. Del l  och Del 11, Maj 1930, hemlig. The 
committee also performed extensive comparisons between European countries, their military spending, 
conscription practices, and their political structures; see National Archives, 1930 ärs 
Försvarskommission. YK 933, BII: 1,11—63
513 See e.g. Wedin 1983, 34—37.
514 Olson 1986,5—6; 1988,20; Trönnberg 1985.
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was on the acquisition of more modem and more mechanized equipment, as U lf Olsson h a s  
pointed out. He regards the mid-1930s as a ’’qualitative turning point in the history of S w e d ish  
rearmament”. The rearmament drive was mainly met with domestic production, which w as a n  
important trend among the other Nordic countries as well. The biggest arms m anufacturer in  
Sweden at the time, Bofors, was placed almost entirely to  serve the purposes o f the S w e d ish  
rearmament. The most important importers, focusing on heavy armaments, before the o u tb re a k  
of the Second World War were the continental European countries (Great Britain, F ra n ce , 
Holland, Belgium), and afterwards, Germany.515
The Swedish interwar military establishment, however, maintained quite a high m ate ria l 
readiness by European standards, even with the disarmament measures in place. For exam ple, 
the fixed limits set by the Defense Plan of 1925 did not prove too much of a hindrance fo r th e  
short-term material development plans of the Swedish military establishment. Due to  s ta te -  
owned small arms and ammunition production and the availability of a strong supply o f  
privately produced military goods, the material status of the Swedish defense forces rem ained  
adequate at least in the 1920s.516 Also, in the early 1920s Sweden could be characterized even a s  
being one o f the key naval powers in the Baltic Sea with her three battleships, four b a tt le  
cruisers, seven torpedo boats, and 16——18 U-boats.517 Even though these armaments acquired in  
the 1920s aged quickly, they still provided a solid basis for the Swedish defense. Its fleet a g e d  
mainly in terms of credible offensive potential, namely in terms of its battleships that were sm all 
by international standards anyway.518
However, the continuity in the naval buildup was seriously dampened by the new austerity 
measures of the 1920s. For example, based on the new plans introduced in 1919, only one new  
defensive vessel (a U-boat) was constructed. As seen in Figure 66, the total depreciated tonnage 
of Sweden declined drastically in the early 1920s, even in comparison with the rather slow ly 
developing Finnish case, only to recover in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This was partially 
due to successful efforts by the Navy Department chief to argue that the building of new  
destroyers domestically would have beneficial economic repercussions. Two more destroyers 
and a couple of U-boats were in fact commissioned in 1928— 1931, on the basis of the new
515 Olsson 1982, 59—62; Olsson 1973. For comparative figures on the Swedish military expenditures just 
before and during the war, see Olsson 1973, e.g. 21—23. On the Swedish economic defense readiness, 
see Mdnsson 1976.
516 Bohme 1988,25; Olsson 1982,59—61.
517 Niklander 1996, 33.
518 See the database included with this thesis on the naval tonnages. See also Appendices, Appendix 2 on 
the sources used.
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1927 naval building plan. The steadily declining funding in the 1930s also began to have an 
effect on the naval readiness. The building of a fourth battleship was debated throughout the 
1930s, yet concrete results were not forthcoming due to disagreements on the type of ship to  be 
built. For example, the Defense Committee of 1930 chose not to  support the government’s 
proposal issued in 1934.519 Thus, the tenuous political equilibrium provided by the Liberal 
Party’s position as the balancing influence in the political markets, despite the prevailing 
disarmament tendencies, seemed to foster greater military capital investments, even though at 
the same time the number of troops was being reduced.
Figure 66. Total Depreciated Tonnages of Finland and Sweden, 1920—1938
Billions of tons
Year
-------FIN, TO TAL DEPRECIATED TO N N A G E
------ SWE, TOTAL DEPRECIATED TO NNA GE
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2.
The Swedish private aircraft industry practically disappeared after the First World War. 
Attempts were made to initiate state production as well as state-supported private production, 
but no real results were achieved in this sector in the 1920s. Finally, in 1930, an agreement was 
concluded to start the manufacture of aircraft in Linköping, Stockholm, and Gothenburg by 
various producers. However, these efforts still met with only modest successes. As a result of 
the collaboration between the political leaders and the leading financial groups, the aircraft 
industry began to expand after the 1936 rearmament measures. Svenska Aeroplanaktiebolaget
519 See especially Wedin 1983,47—59.
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(SAAB) was established with the government’s cooperation, and thus a monopoly of a irc ra f t  
production came into existence in Sweden just before the Second World War.520 T h e  
organizational disputes and a well-established political system with considerable interest g ro u p  
influence, as well as a political compromise between the most influential parties, p ro v id ed  
Sweden with its distinct armaments production ’’path”: strong privately-owned dom estic  
armaments production, based on the robust industrialization of the 19th century, and a s te a d y  
flow of government funding. M oreover, the Social Democrats were not able to achieve th e i r  
goals regarding the nationalization o f  certain industries, and had to accept the path dependence 
evident in  the military acquisition policy. In return, the rent seeking of the economic in te res t 
groups was curtailed in other respects.
The organization of trade unions and respective employers’ groups in Sweden dates back to t h e  
end of the 19th century, when the rapid industrialization and the changes it brought began t o  
shape the political institutions and organizations. The first modem trade unions emerged in t h e  
1880s, and the Social Democratic Party was the central organization of the labor m ovem ent 
until founding o f the Landsorganisationen  (LO) in 1898. For example in 1920, the LO had 31  
member unions and circa 280 000 members, whereas by 1940 it had grown to encompass 4 6  
unions and circa 971 000 members.521 There were similar developments on the employers’ s ide , 
although somewhat later. Verkstadsforeningen  and Svenska arbetsgivareföreningen came in to  
existence in 1902, and they united as SAF in 1919. The labor market conflicts of the inter w a r  
period were often violent encounters in Sweden, and the rapprochement that took place betw een 
the LO and the SAF in Saltsjöbaden on 20.12.1938 created the basis for the future corporatist, 
three-way negotiations between the two and the government. The foundation for this w as 
created already in the late 1920s.522
In the Swedish case, the role and the impact of the domestic producers and their representatives 
were constrained by the Swedish “path” mentioned earlier. The Federation of Swedish 
Industries (Sveriges Industriforbundet, FSI), one of the Swedish national peak interest 
associations, was established in 1910 to represent the interests of domestic producers and export 
industries in “areas which were not represented by the employers’ federations”.523 The members 
of the board o f the Federation participated actively during the First World W ar years in 
managing government acquisitions, especially the imports of war materials. Thus, a basis for
520 Böhme 1988,63—64,116— 118; Olsson 1982,62—63.
521 Johansson-Magnusson 1998,29—31.
522 Johansson-Magnusson 1998,17—21,31; Stemquist 1987. See also Olson 1986.
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government-industry cooperation was established during the critical war years.523 24 The structure 
of the Federation was, similar to the SAF, based on sub-organizations and member 
organizations, and it held one general meeting as well as several board and working committee 
meetings a year. The most important industries were represented by this organization, and it was 
influential, to say the least, also politically. Whereas in 1910 it represented only 234 industrial 
firms, comprising 72 000 workers, by 1920 it had grown to cover 1376 industrial firms that 
employed circa 240 000 employees. Its appeal declined somewhat in the late 1920s, and the 
number o f its member organizations dropped to 1100, comprising 218 000 workers. The Great 
Depression taxed the membership further as the membership fees turned out to be too heavy, 
especially for some of the smaller firms. In 1934, the Federation consisted of 964 industrial 
firms that employed 197 000 workers respectively. The reintegration of the economic life that 
paced the concentration of political power in the 1930s fared well for the FSI, since they had 
1044 firms with 260 000 workers as their members in 1937.525
The FSI took an active role in promoting government acquisitions to domestic producers for the 
first time in 1921, which eventually resulted in a Royal Circular Letter to the government 
authorities stating that Swedish products should be awarded preference in government 
acquisitions. After that, the Federation insisted upon its renewal yearly and also obtained it until 
1935. In the interim, they made numerous proposals in order to improve the preferential status 
of domestic producers. These attempts, however, failed. Subsequently, the Federation pursued 
the establishment o f more permanent acquisition rules throughout the depression years 
(consistent with HYPOTHESIS 46), but in vain. In the absence of more encompassing 
acquisition rules, one of the main ideas of this interest group was to tie the domestic preference 
-rule to the aggregate performance of the economy — thus, in the event of an economic 
downturn, stronger measures of domestic preferences would be introduced. Therefore, the 
Federation attempted the restoration of the Royal Circular Letter after 1935 perhaps with less 
enthusiasm than before; after all, business was booming anyhow.526
523 Sveriges Industriforbund 1910—1920, 8—9,42; Ullenhag 2000.
524 Sveriges Industriforbund 1910—1920,43—47; Sveriges Industri 1948,76—79.
525 Industrihuset (Infocenter), Archive of Sveriges Industriforbundet, Board Protocols 1920, general 
meeting 20.4.1920; Board Protocols 1929, general meeting 23.4.1929; Board Protocols 1935, general 
meeting 7.5.1935; Board Protocols 1938, general meeting 264.1938.
526 Industrihuset, Archive of Sveriges Industrifbrbundet, Board Protocols 1923, work commission 
8.3.1923 and its appendices; Protocols 1928, board meeting 28.2.1928; Protocols 1929, work commission 
23.2.1929 and its appendices; board meeting 18.12.1929 and its appendices; Protocols 1930, work 
commission 23.1.1930 and its appendices; Protocols 1933, work commission 19.10.1933 and its 
appendices; Protocols 1936, work commission 28.2.1936 and its appendices; Protocols 1937, work
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As the Federation pointed out in the meeting of its working committee on February 23, 1 9 2 9 , 
the preferential treatment given to the Swedish domestic market producers was not an u n u s u a l 
arrangement considering other European countries. Preferences awarded to domestic p ro d u ce rs  
were common, and only the extent and the formality o f these arrangements varied. T h e  
investigations of the Federation produced the following, albeit seemingly biased e v id e n c e  
considering its source: 1) A  price advantage of up to 15 per cent on domestic goods in G r e a t  
Britain; 2) A  price advantage of up to  25 per cent in government acquisitions in Germany; 3) N o  
specific price advantages in government acquisitions in Denmark, although similar preferen tia l 
treatment was utilized in principle as in the Swedish case; 4) No specific price advantages in t h e  
French case, although similar preferential principle was in use as in Sweden; 5) A p r ic e  
advantage o f up to 20 per cent in the Finnish case. The Finnish price advantages were in d e e d  
real and are discussed in the next section. In fact, the data contained in these confidential 
minutes could be considered quite reliable. Thus, in certain countries there were actual fo rm a l 
arrangements to award price advantages to  domestic producers, whereas in other countries o n ly  
vague principles existed.527
A  study by the Swedish Commerce Department that the Federation commented upon in i t s  
board meeting on 18.12.1929 provided actual data on the Swedish government’s m ilita ry  
acquisitions. Foreign purchases represented circa 14,1 per cent of the total Army acquisitions i n  
1927— 1928, whereas this share increased to 20,1 per cent in 1928— 1929. The actual c o s t  
increase paid by the government for Army’s capital goods can be calculated to have been c irc a  
0,2 per cent in the former budget year and 0,5 per cent in the latter. The Navy’s figures were, a s  
the Department acknowledged, less comprehensive and thus less representative. In the fo rm er 
budget year the Navy supposedly had no foreign purchases, whereas the foreign acquisitions 
amounted to 53,1 per cent in the latter. In 1927— 1928, the additional cost incurred by the N a v y  
due to domestic purchases was circa 7,9 per cent, whereas it dropped to 0,7 per cent during th e  
next budget year.528 Thus, the argument o f the Federation was that the cost increase incurred b y  
the domestic purchases was small and that the tendency towards more foreign purchases during  
the ongoing economic difficulties was harmful for the Swedish economy.529
commission and its appendices.
527 See Industrihuset, Archive of Sveriges Industriforbundet, Board Protocols 1929, work commission
23.2.1929. On the Finnish case, see also Eloranta 1998. On Norway, see Espelin 2000.
528 Industrihuset, Archive of Sveriges IndustrifSrbundet, Board Protocols 1923, board meeting
18.12.1929, appendices. The percentages calculated from the data in the protocol appendix.
529 Idem.
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In order to assess the structure and the significance Swedish system, we should compare it to, 
for example, the British equivalent. The organization that evolved in 1927 in Great Britain (see 
Figure 67) was the result of intra-service struggles to reach a compromise on the matter after the 
First World War. The organization was headed by the Committee o f Imperial Defense (CID) and 
supported by the Principal Supply Officers Committee (PSOC), which had been established in 
1924 for the formidable task of coordinating inter-service acquisitions.330 The Contracts 
Coordinating Committee (CCC), which had been founded as early as December 1920, is 
perhaps the best comparative reference as far as the influence of the interest groups is concerned 
due to the confusion in the British acquisition organization in the early 1920s. The purpose of 
the CCC was: 1) to  view comprehensively markets and sources of supply as well as maintain 
up-to-date data on national production capacities; 2) to prepare the productive resources of 
government-owned and private factories in the case of sudden crisis; 3) to coordinate methods 
of purchase and contract policies; 4) to develop contract mobilization arrangements for a tim e of 
crisis. In short, the CCC was aimed at ’’securing by agreement economy on purchases”.331
Figure 67. Organization of the British Supply Decision-making in 1927
SUPPLY COMMITTEES
■ It III iv v VI VH
ArmamanM Engifttahng Shipbuilding (tael. a .  n»r»l Sto r»» S«iantlio S lant Araraft. Tank», Foodatuflt and
(Aa* Dir. (non Marina) Marina (£>*_ of Sloraa. (Air Commodor.) and Aoad Madieal
Ordnanea (Dir. of Worka. Enginaarlnv) Adminly) Tnrwport (War CHBea) (toduathaiai)
Faeloiiaa, WarOlfict) (Engmaanin-CMal (Air Cemmodora)
War Offica) of tha F M ,
Admiraly)
Saugaa
(Induatria««)
Machina Tool»
Note! Committee Chairmen in Brackets.
Source: Gordon 1988. 5301
530 Gordon 1988, e.g. 19—47,61—64.
531 PRO (Public Records Office), War Office, WO 221/1: Proceedings of the Contracts Coordinating 
Committee, Meetings 1—9,1921.
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The most significant difference compared to for example the Finnish case was the absence o f  
significant domestic industries’ involvement in acquisition matters, for example directly in th e  
CCC, in the 1920s and early 1930s. The Federation o f British Industries (FBI) and the CCC h a d  
several disagreements over acquisition issues. The British producers* position in the B ritish  
political economy was already well established by this time, which coincides with the Sw edish  
case also.532 However, the continuance of contracts and connections established already earlie r 
was secured in the CCC. Especially after the mid-1920s, the committee even took a tigh ter 
attitude towards domestically produced goods that were based on foreign materials. The on ly  
noticeable, clear opposition emerged on the issue of monopolies, or ’’rings”, which also displays 
the high level of organization among the British defense suppliers.533 The price advantages 
alluded to by the FSI in 1929 in the British case were a result of institutional path dependence 
from the pre- First World W ar era. Interestingly enough, similar to the Finnish case, there w ere 
complaints issued by the Treasury in the early 1920s that officers sometimes acted in dual ro les 
in the military acquisitions, which did not surface in the Swedish case.534
Another aspect of military acquisition matters in which the FSI was active concerned private 
production and its protection. For example, the Federation was strongly opposed to the less than  
competitive nature of the Army Barracks Administration {Armens Kasembyggnadsnamnd), a  
government-owned unit, which in the Federation’s opinion was favored in the government 
contracts concerning the Armed Forces’ building projects. In the early 1920s, they opposed the 
activities o f this Administration by accusing them of sub-standard workmanship and quality.535 
Another example of the Federation’s ardent support of private production surfaced in 1925—  
1926, when they were asked for their opinion concerning the League Nation’s efforts to ban the 
private manufacture of arms and ammunition. At first, the Federation simply viewed this 
disarmament measure as impossible to  accept before assurances were given by the bigger
532 PRO, War Office, WO 221/1: Proceedings of the Contracts Coordinating Committee, Meetings 1—9, 
1921: 2.5.1921,14.7.1921,20.2.1921; WO 221/3: Proceedings of the Contracts Coordinating Committee, 
Meetings 16— 22, 1923: 22.1.1923; WO 221/4: Proceedings of the Contracts Coordinating Committee, 
Meetings 23—28, 1924: 10.7.1924, 6.10.1924. FBI was actually against protective tariffs in order to 
protect domestic production in the 1920s, which in turn made the domestic production interests somewhat 
weaker in e.g. military acquisitions. The situation was not altered until the onset of the Great Depression. 
See Rooth 1997, e.g. 192—195.
533 PRO, War Office, WO 221/5: Proceedings of the Contracts Coordinating Committee, Meetings 29— 
33, 1925: 11.2.1925, 22.6.1925; WO 221/6: Proceedings of the Contracts Coordinating Committee, 
Meetings 34— 38, 1926: 22.2.1926, 18.10.1926; WO 221/7: Proceedings of the Contracts Coordinating 
Committee, Meetings 39^3,1927:24.1.1927,19.7.1927.
534 PRO, War Office, WO 221/1: Proceedings of the Contracts Coordinating Committee, Meetings 1—9, 
1921,6.1.1921.
533 Industrihuset, Archive of Sveriges Industriforbundet, Protocols 1922, work commission 10.8.1922; 
Protocols 1923, work commission 13.2,1923 and its appendices.
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armaments producing countries on ratification. When asked for their opinion, the member 
export firms complained that such measures would hurt the activities of Swedish firms, 
especially in terms of relative competitiveness with the large countries and more versatile big 
firms. In 1926, the Federation took a stronger, opposing stance in the matter: They viewed such 
restrictions on private entrepreneurship as “alien” for Sweden and Swedish laws. As in other 
matters, the Federation acted in cooperation with other organizations to block such measures, 
especially in the Parliament. Eventually this measure, similar to other attempts of controlling the 
arms trade in the interwar period, failed in the League of Nations.536
The main official access to the political sphere, besides various forms of pressure activity, for 
the FSI were the various committees. As we have seen, however, the Defense Committees were 
mainly dominated by the major political parties and military experts, which forced the economic 
interest groups to pursue other avenues as well. They were, for example, amply represented in 
the Rikskommissionen for ekonomisk forsvarsberedskap (=RoyaI Commission for Economic 
Defensive Readiness), which functioned from 1915 to 1946. The aim  of this commission was to 
make sure that the Swedish economic life would be ready for the possibility of mobilization o f 
resources for a war. The major private armaments companies such as Bofors were prominently 
featured in the crisis plans, which displays the importance of these companies in the Swedish 
military supply schemes. The Social Democrats, for example, could not extend the public sphere 
to take over the industries in the 1930s or voice very loud support for the regulation of the arms 
trade, since the country was essentially dependent on these companies for its wartime needs. 
The issues discussed in this commission included the need for centralization in economic 
mobilization, the need for information on the productive capabilities of Swedish industries, and 
the need for information on which companies would form the core of the Swedish crisis 
management potential. The importance of viable domestic production capability also came up in 
the discussions more and more frequently in the 1930s, and the commission’s secret files 
indicate that the members recognized well the dangers of relying too much on foreign imports 
when a crisis occurred.537
536 See especially Industrihuset, Archive of Sveriges Industriforbundet, Protocols 1925, work commission 
15.10.1925 and its appendices; Protocols 1926, work commission 9.6.1926 and its appendices.
537 Military Archive, (Stockholm) Royal Commission for Economic Defensive Readiness 
(Rikskommissionen fd r  ekonomisk forsvarsberedskap) 1915-1946, Protocols AI. Vol. 1, 1929-1939. 
Protokoll m.m.fr&n sammantraden med representanter for de militara forvaltningsmyndighetema 1930- 
1938, meeting 8.11.1930, meeting 29.11.1930, meeting 25.7.1931, meeting 26.3.1934, meeting 
23.4.1934, 14.5.1934, Hemliga handlingar till sammantrSde 1937-1939, meeting 8.6.1937, see also 
Rikskommisssionen: P6/1937, (Rikskommissionen for ekonomisk forsvarsberedskap; und:st, ang.
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In the Parliament in particular, the success of the FSI was limited in promoting direct m e a s u re s , 
such as the domestic purchasing quotas. The pressure activities of this group met with a d i f f ic u l t  
political climate for most o f this period. Even in the 1930s, despite the depression —  or i n d e e d  
because the depression had been relatively mild in the Swedish case —  the Federation w a s  
unable to push through its agenda on domestic purchases. For example, the Parliament d e fe a te d  
a motion, which would have given an advantage in all government purchases of fuel to d o m e s tic  
producers in 1931. Another motion aimed at giving preferential treatment was again t u r n e d  
down in the Parliament in 1936.538 And, as seen earlier, the Swedish military import s h a r e  
remained fairly steady, underlining the earlier observations on the mature level of Swedish a r m s  
production and the relatively unremarkable performance o f the FSI in its activities in this a r e a .  
Swedish military exports, however, increased steadily up until the mid-1930s and the b e g in n in g  
o f the hectic international rearmament.539 Therefore, the Swedish path was distinguished b y  a  
duality in the rent seeking for military contracts: 1) The political climate and the m a tu re  
economic base left comparatively little room for extensive rent seeking in the d w ind ling  
military contracts (although military spending as a whole was dwindling much faster); 2) T h e  
same political climate and the compromises that were necessary between the political p a r t ie s  
ensured that the Swedish industries were not nationalized and that they were able to pressure t h e  
governments on protecting their viability in the international armaments markets. In add ition , 
Swedish capital ME decreased much slower than the consumption component in the aggregate  
ME. Differences with the Finnish case were, as discussed in the next section, abundant
7.3. The Finnish Path: Domestic Political Divisions and Early Institutional Rent-seeking 
Opportunities
The material status of the Finnish armed forces before the W inter War has been criticized q u ite  
often. The answers to possible material shortcomings must, however, be sought beyond th e  
choices o f the political decision-makers and the demands o f  the armed forces: mainly, in th e  
decision-making structure behind the military expenditures, as well as how these funds w ere  
actually spent. Are there historical/institutional constraints to  be found behind the development 
o f the Finnish military expenditures? Can a specific "path” be detected in the military spending 
of Finland in the 1920s and 1930s? And what was the role of the various types of organizations
âîgàrder fo r  anordnande av reservlager av vissa xaror).
538 Parliamentary Protocols, First Chamber motion 149, Second Chamber motion 238, First Chamber 
16:84d, Second Chamber 16:10d, 1931; Second Chamber motion 195, Second Chamber 20:85,1936.
539 See also Eloranta 2002a.
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in this process? First we should take a closer look at the development of military legislation and 
the ensuing political constraints.
The years 1924— 1931 represented a time of particularly restless domestic politics as well as 
social and political division in Finland. The Civil War of 1918 divided the country sharply, both 
politically and socially, which had its impact especially on the Diets of the 1920s. Parliamentary 
politics involved often deliberation on military issues throughout the decade. A typical feature 
of the 1920s was a kind of a ’’power balance”, which resulted in dissension and 
indecisiveness.540 The disquiet o f domestic politics also resulted in  rapid succession of cabinets 
in this period. M ost of these cabinets also faced difficult military issues, and some even had to 
resign due to some of these issues, and defense was one of the most explosive political issues, 
same as in the Swedish case, in the 1920s.
The amount of military establishment’s consumption expenditures was more difficult to change 
through legislation than the capital component, because the consumption ME was based on 
statutes on wages and conscription. During the interwar period, the length of military service 
was particularly hard to alter in the Parliament. The size of capital military allocations, on the 
other hand, was also affected by the deadlock in domestic politics between the major parties: 
Laws concerning the military establishment were often stuck in the Diet for several years. A 
descriptive example of this was the process of allocating funds for establishing an effective 
Navy in the 1920s. The delays in military legislation were mainly caused by the deep division of 
the political field into the right and the left due to the Civil War o f  1918.541
For example, the most difficult problem dealt with by Cajander’s II Cabinet in 1924 was the so- 
called officer-conflict542. The State Council did not wish to take a stance in the military 
personnel issue, yet other reform plans were executed quickly.543 The attempt to solve the 
personnel crises within the military establishment centered around a quicker pace of reforms,
540 On the division of political parties in relation to national defense issues, see e.g. TervasmSki 1964, i.e. 
275—279; Mylly 1978. This division can be seen especially well in the functions of the Military Affairs 
Committee of the Diet (sotilasasiainvaliokunta, from 1926 on it was called the Defense Affairs 
Committee of the Diet, (puolustusasiainvaliokunta). See e.g. PA (Parliamentary Archive, Eduskunnan 
arkisto), The Military Committee of the Diet, MF 1 (1928— 1927); MF 2, i.e. 14.9., 15.9., 16.9.1927.
541 The purpose of this thesis is not to attempt to describe the entire development of military legislation or 
political debates on military issues, merely the decisive and central features corresponding to the military 
funding. On adequate, comprehensive narratives of the policy developments, see e.g. Tervasmaki 1964; 
Juottonen 1997. On the formation of the so-called spirit of Winter War, see e.g. Soikkanen 1984; Mylly 
1989.
542 This issue will be reviewed in more detail later in this chapter.
543 Jaaskelainen 1977,363—365.
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although the actual personnel changes were left to future cabinets. Subsequently, T u lenheim o’ s  
Cabinet ended up in difficulties in 1925 over the issue o f establishing a Navy and was fo rced  t o  
resign after a loss of credibility.544 Kallio’s II Cabinet had clear aims of at least attem pting t o  
improve the military establishment’s financial status, since the international political c l im a te  
was not yet favorable for peace efforts. This Cabinet’s ran into difficulties over the issues o f  t h e  
Swedish language in the Army as well as the unveiling o f certain inconsistencies in m il i ta ry  
acquisitions in 1926.545
Tanner’s Social Democratic minority Cabinet in 1926— 1927 formed, at least in principle, a  
new episode in the politics of the 1920s dominated by the Agrarian Union and the rig h t-w in g  
parties. Tanner’s Cabinet aimed at reducing military expenditures by, among other m e a n s , 
shortening the military service and decreasing the size o f the active forces. The C a b in e t 
nonetheless recognized the necessity of a  functioning national defense due to external threats.546 
It also pursued an active participation in the League of Nations and continued the policies o f  t h e  
previous bourgeois cabinets: The Diet of 1927 approved the laws on the establishment o f  a  
coastal Navy, the posts in the Ministry of Defense and the military establishment were lega lized  
on a permanent basis, and the position of the Civic Guards was made official by law.547 T h e  
Social Democrats had changed their views gradually to a more moderate stance towards m ilita ry  
issues, which became even more evident in the handling o f the large basic acquisition program s 
in the 1930s.548
544 Jaaskelainen 1977, 403—405; Jaaskelainen 1973. The Navy issue caused difficulties and internal 
conflicts for the previous Cabinets as well, see e.g. MA (Military Archive, Sota-arkisto), Archive of th e  
Ministry of Defense, minutes of the State Council, introduced by the Ministry of Defense 
(Valtioneuvoston pdytakirjat puolustusministeriostd tapahtuneista esittelyista), Ca 11. Minutes 1923, 25 
November; Ca 12. Minutes 1924, 22 April. These internal disagreements within the Cabinet worsened 
during Tulenheimo’s Cabinet, see e.g. MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, minutes of the State 
Council, introduced by the Ministry of Defense, Ca 13. Minutes 1925,26 February, 9 March.
545 MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, minutes of the State Council, introduced by the Ministry o f  
Defense, Ca 13. Minutes 1925, 26 May; 11 June — an indication of other problems in die military came 
to fore when the Diet actually told the Cabinet to investigate the mistreatments ’’which had emerged in the 
military establishment in relation to the staffs treatment of the personnel”. There had been other instances 
of the Diet’s concern, e.g. concerning spending malpractices, see MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense 
(JPuolustusmimsteridn arkisto\ the Minister and Adjutancy (Ministeri ja adjutantuuri) 1918—1937. 
Other documents arranged by their content 1920—1923. He 3. See also Jaaskelainen 1977, 407, 409, 
414— 416; Jaaskelainen 1973, 67—69. Kallio’s II Cabinet ended the cooperation between the Agrarian 
Union and the National Coalition. For details, refer to Mylly 1978. On the issue of Swedish language, see 
also Mylly 1978, 191—197.
546 Jaaskelainen 1977, 424. On the functioning of the Social Democratic minority Cabinet, see e.g. MA, 
Archive of the Ministry of Defense, minutes of the State Council, introduced by the Ministry of Defense, 
Ca 15. Minutes 1927.
547 Jaaskelainen 1977,427—428,432; Jaaskelainen 1973, 81; Statute Collection (Asetuskokoelma) 1927.
548 Tervasmaki 1964, 275—279; Soikkanen 1984, e.g. 8— 11, 16—23. On the ideologies of the political 
parties on national defense, see Tervasmaki 1964 for details. The basic acquisition programs will be
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Conscription was one of the most avidly debated laws in the 1920s. The only Diet between 1919 
and 1932 not to debate on this Act or factors relating to its execution was the Diet of 1923.549 
The Diet of 1922 approved, after the provisional arrangements of the first years of 
independence, the previous years* motion on the conscription.550 The Conscription Act was 
complemented in 1924 with MP Manner’s proposal, yet the essence of the law was kept 
intact.551 The conscription issue was debated again in the Diet o f 1926, when the members of 
several parties suggested shortening the length of the military service. Most o f these proposals 
supported 6—9 months length for the service. The justifications for these measures included 
savings on military expenditures, the significance of consumption expenditure cuts for basic 
acquisitions and employment, as well as other economic reasons.552 The suggestions were 
unsuccessful, but the Cabinet was instructed to issue a proposal on the matter553. Yet, 
conscription was not dealt upon next until the year 1929, when the left-wing parties made some 
futile attempts to achieve results. A concrete solution was not forthcoming until 1931, when the 
Diet accepted the Cabinet’s proposal for a new Conscription Act with only minor 
amendments.554
The different political parties made so many proposals concerning the shortening of the military 
service during 1926— 1932 that even a majority of the parties —  especially the Agrarian Union 
and the left-wing parties —  seemed to  support the notion, although they could not agree as to 
how long the period of service should be. According to  Vilho Tervasmaki, the reasons for the 
failure of these proposals include also the gradual change towards a more favorable attitude on 
military issues among the parties, as well as the weakened status of the military
reviewed in more detail later. See also Tera-Tervasmaki 1973.
549 Parliamentary Minutes (Valtiopaivien pdytcikirjat)\9l9— 1932; PA, The Military Affairs Committee 
of the Diet, MF 1 (1918—1927).
550 Jaaskelainen 1973, 136—137. On the provisional conscription measures and their handling, see e.g. 
Parliamentary Minutes n/1919,1976; Parliamentary Documents 1:1/1921; Parliamentary Minutes 11/1920, 
e.g. 1739—1775. On the Cabinet’s proposal, see MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Minutes of the 
State Council, introduced by the Ministry of Defense, Ca 7. Minutes 1921, 18 March. The general length 
of military service was defined to be one year, except for the Special Forces, officers in the Reserve, and 
the noncommissioned officers it amounted to 15 months. On divisions between parties, see PA, The 
Military Affairs Committee of the Diet, MF 1 (1918—1927), e.g. 21.11., 22.11., 26.11., 27.11., and 
13.12.1918, as well as 9.2.1920,25.2.1920.
551 Parliamentary Appendices/1924,585, Diet’s proposal n:o 52, Parliamentary Documents. V: 1/1924.
552 Parliamentary Appendices /1926 X: 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 . See also Jaaskelainen 1973,137.
553 Parliamentary Documents V: 1/1926; Jaaskelainen 1973, 137. The Cabinet, however, did not issue a 
proposal on the matter to the parliament.
54 Jaaskelainen 1971, 37, 351. The legislation proposal defined the length of service as 350 and 440 
days.
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establishment.355 Equally, the division in the domestic politics and the ensuing difficulties in  
formal decision-making must have been influential factors. The right-wing radicalism of the la te  
1920s and the yearly 1930s, and the potential threat to the democratic system changed  
especially the Social Democrats* security policy principles. Moreover, the new Conscription 
Act of 1931 did not differ in the end from the minimum service length of one year defined b y  
the earlier Defense Revision committee; thus, ’’the ability to wage war was not weakened”.356
In order to analyze the different ways that the contemporaries assessed the national defense 
needs, it is enlightening to take a closer look at one key political party’s, the Agrarian U nion, 
security policy orientations. A basic assumption in the Agrarian Union’s security policy stance  
was that the Soviet Union formed a continuous and, in fact, the only external threat to Finland. 
The Social Democrats, for example, felt that the Soviet threat was overrated and demanded 
friendly relations to be the basis for a lasting peace. However, the Agrarian Union, which w as 
the second largest political party in interwar Finland and strengthened its position especially in  
the 1920s, was also a strong advocate of the idea of thrift in government finances as well as th e  
fact that a small nation's defense capabilities were not going to hold against a  Great Power. 
Thus, the party favored forming some sort of an alliance with other nations to compensate fo r  
this. The disappointments in foreign policy prepared the party for a more favorable disposition 
towards increased military spending in the mid-1930s. Also, the great influence of the younger 
Jaeger officers within the party kept the admiration of an armed response in crises intact.5 657 T he 
path dependence observed quantitatively earlier was strongly influenced by the political forces 
described above. The division o f the political field did not make it possible to make 
compromises, even to be carried out slowly, such as in the Swedish case. However, the 
dominance o f the Agrarians did further spending cuts in central government finances. Thus, the 
path dependence in consumption M E in the Finnish case was even stronger and persisted at a  
longer time lag.
How coherent then was the Finnish military establishment during the interwar period? Did it 
contribute to the political standoff o f the period? The Finnish military was established on the 
basis of the so-called White Army, almost out of nothing. The problems and debates within the 
military establishment received, compared to other political issues, a great deal o f attention in
555 Tervasmaki 1964, 146—147, 149, 150— 151; PA, The Military Affairs Committee of the Diet, MF 1 
(1918— 1927), e.g. 8.10.1924. See also Mylly 1978.
556 MA, DRArch (Puolustusrevisionin arkisto), roll 2, folder 13: Puolustusrevisiomn mietinto, sections I 
and II, 1. part, 6. chapter, 122, 133— 137. This committee will be reviewed in detail later.
557 Mylly 1978, 154—156,207—210, 223—227,252—269.
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the newspapers. Especially the power struggle of between the so-called Czar’s officers, 
educated in the imperial Russia’s Army, and the German-trained Jaeger officers drew a lot of 
public attention to the problems in the armed forces.558 This officer-conflict led to a change in 
leadership in the Finnish interwar armed forces: From the mid-1920s on, officers holding the 
highest posts were only Jaeger officers.
The impact o f the new Jaeger dominance was noticeable in the high command, especially in the 
strategic thinking. The Jaeger officers initiated a change from the more defensive plans o f  Major 
General Carl Enckell towards clearly offensive thinking in the Finnish defense planning. The 
first sign of this was the new Defense Plan of 1927 (the so-called Russian Concentration 27), 
which was based on the idea of defeating the superior Soviet forces with a quick, decisive 
strike.559 This defense plan was later admitted to be confusing and ostentatious, and the new, 
amended plan of 1931 already represented a more cautious effort in the Finnish defense 
planning. In the 1930s, the Finnish military strategists slowly began to realize that the Soviet 
Union possessed almost infinite reserves of fighting units which could not be defeated 
decisively or at least easily.560
An actual fully functional defense plan was not achieved until the new mobilization system, the 
Regional System (aluejarjestelma), was introduced in 1934. The Cadre System of the 1920s 
was centered on the idea that the peacetime armed forces were to  assist in the mobilization in a 
few key cities —  thus they would have to travel to their mobilization locations —  which caused 
this system to be extremely slow and tie the peacetime forces to  this process. The new Regional 
System was based on utilizing the Civic Guards in the regional mobilization, which enabled the 
peacetime forces to concentrate on their function as a protective force on the border.561 The 
Jaeger high command actually returned in the 1930s to the defensive thinking and plans already 
created by Enckell in the 1920s.562
Yet, how were the threats to the national security assessed by the military experts? What kind of 
threat scenarios were felt to be plausible? As we discovered in earlier chapters, the Finnish 
foreign policy relied —after the failure of the border states treaty —  on the League of Nations in
Arimo 1986/1987, part 1,4 ,3 6 -^2 ,1 4 5 — 149; Paasivirta 1984,238—239.
559 Kronlund 1990,288—290; MA, DRArch, roll 2, folder 13,1. part, 5. chapter, 73—74,77,79—81.
560 MA, Document T 2861/27, 40; Document T 2861/34, 1—2. See also Kronlund 1990, 289—292; 
Arimo 1986/1987, partm , 374— 375.
561 Seldn 1980,31—34.
See e.g. Mikola 1989,233. For more details on the defense planning, see Arimo 1986/1987, part HI.
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the 1920s, although a well-organized national defense was considered to  be necessary. T h e  
military-geographic location o f Finland placed it in the middle of a possible conflict in  th e  
Baltic Sea. The primary aggressor was predicted to be, from the beginning of the independence, 
the Soviet Union. Also, the geography of the border suggested that the primary path o f  th e  
enemy would be via the Karelian Isthmus due to the favorable terrain and the proxim ity o f  
Leningrad.563 As the Jaeger-dominated high command became more cautious, also the th r e a t  
assessment on the Soviet troops was re-evaluated. In the 1930s, the Soviet Union was e s tim a te d  
to be able to concentrate 15— 17 divisions (14 000 men each) against Finland, whereas F in la n d  
would be able to gather nine divisions (instead of the thirteen suggested, for example, b y  t h e  
Defense Revision committee in the 1920s).564 In the beginning of the Winter War (1939), t h e  
Soviets began their attack with 28 divisions against the nine Finnish divisions.565
As Toivo Nygard has pointed out, the Jaegers formed a coherent group or a society w h ic h  
influenced both the political and the military development of Finland during the interwar y e a r s .  
They pursued their own interests, for example the altering of the command structure, a c tiv e ly  
and were in general not satisfied with the political developments in the country. The J a e g e r s  
were also closely connected to the emerging right-wing radicalism, which gained s tre n g th  
especially at the end o f the 1920s. Their foreign policy interests, as perhaps the change in  t h e  
defense plans indicates, were related to the idea o f a  ’’Greater Finland” {Suur-Suomi), a n  
expansion of the Finnish territory to the neighboring, kindred areas. The opposition, however, o f  
the Jaegers towards the Soviet Union was not only based on its communist system, but a lso  o n  
the bitter memories of the last decades of the Period o f Autonomy.566
How do the Jaegers fit to the theoretical framework o f Anthony Downs introduced earlier? T h e  
Jaegers are a typical example o f how real actors rarely match ideal types of any kind, a lthough  
the analysis of a person or a group by using such tools can be highly descriptive. Jaegers w e re  
both self-interested and exhibited more complex motives in their actions. They were essentially 
climbers, since they actively sought promotions as well as the prestige and power associated 
with the new status. Moreover, they were also zealots for wanting to promote certain k e y
563 MA, DRArch, roll 2, folder 13,1. part, 1—18; Tervasmaki 1964,26—31; Soikkanen 1989,32.
564 Kronlund 1990,398; Tervasmaki 1964.
565 Manninen 1989,88.
566 NygSrd 1982, 30—45. However, as Vesa Saarikoski has pointed out, the Jaegers were also divided 
within due to differences in language orientations, political affiliations etc. See Saarikoski 1997 for 
details. On Finnish right-wing radicalism, see also Jaaskelainen 1977; on military aspects, see Kronlund 
1990. On group behavior, see Olson 1965 — the homogenous nature of the Jaegers was indeed a key 
aspect in their ascendancy to power.
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policies —  such as a change in the defense plans —  aggressively in order to achieve changes. 
Finally, they also saw themselves as statesmen, which by Downs’ definition are loyal to the 
society as a whole. Their ideological disposition strongly emphasized the ’’needs” of the nation; 
yet, these needs were of course in their opinion met best by the changing of the structure of the 
officer corps and the high command.567
This change in the high command had thus both positive and negative implications for the 
Finnish ’’military preparedness”. Even though the Jaegers brought with them new ideas and 
initiatives to the strategic thinking, the overall impact was perhaps negative after all. The level 
of education and competence among the new officers was still quite poor, and the entire 
organization o f the Finnish high command was compromised by the introduction o f new 
disagreements on top of the old ones.568 The absence of educated officers strengthened the 
internal divisions of the military establishment and the Ministry of Defense. The lack of 
planning also slowed down material acquisitions. The division of the civil-militaiy profession 
made possible the strong influence o f small groups within the military establishment (for 
example in the naval acquisitions) as well as the exertion of the interests of the private economic 
groups (for example in the allocation o f acquisitions) in the military acquisition policy.
These disputes, including also the struggle to re-organize the high command569, had significant 
consequences for the material status o f the Finnish military establishment. The Finnish armed 
forces were created almost out of nothing on the basis of war booty material after the Civil War 
of 1918. Mostly this material was confiscated from the occupying Russian troops during and 
immediately after the Civil War. They consisted of solid defense barriers, forts and barracks, 
artillery, rifles, and other basic equipment. These materials were either adapted to use by the 
peacetime armed forces or stored in mobilization storage depots. The handling of the storage 
and issues relating to the worth of the war booty materials caused many disagreements between 
the Ministry o f War and the Diet in the 1920s. Also, these materials aged quite quickly and were 
less valuable than the contemporary politicians thought them to be.570
567 For further description of these ideal types, see Downs 1967 for details.
568 Grandell 1963, 55—56; Kronlund 1990, 288—289; Arimo 1986/1987, part m , 174— 175. The view 
of some researchers that the impact of the ascendancy of the Jaegers was mainly positive is most likely 
correct for the late 1930s, but not for the 1920s and the confusion that ensued. See e.g. Turtola 1988, 
103—104.
569 For more, see Eloranta 1998.
570 Tera-Tervasmaki 1973, 72—76; Hietanen 1989, 82; Tirronen-Huhtaniemi 1979,238.
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The M inistry of War, from 1922 onwards the Ministry o f Defense, was created after the Civil 
War on the basis of German example in order to deal with the military establishment’s funding 
needs as well as matters relating to the organization and the means of supplying the arm ed 
forces. The organizational problems of the interwar armed forces reflected the fact that the h igh 
command structure was not defined strictly to begin with. This situation was similar to the  
organization of foreign trade during and after the Civil War. The official public machinery 
needed to  undertake military decision-making and administrative tasks was relatively divided, 
which in turn left room for other organizational influences. For example, in the case of foreign 
trade such Civil War organizations as The Staff of Engineers created a natural continuum for 
private groups’ involvement in decision-making.571
The Finnish military budget proposals were based on the requests of the specific units and  
departments, which in turn informed the Central Section of the Ministry o f Defense of their 
needs. These requests by the specific sections o f the military establishment needed to be quite  
detailed. For example, the different material acquisition proposals had to  include precise 
quantities and estimated price levels in current prices, as well as whether they would b e  
purchased from Finnish producers or foreign suppliers. The different production facilities of the  
military establishment were required to issue their own budgets. The Ministry of Finances 
ultimately controlled, especially during the Great Depression, the funding requests of the arm ed 
forces by, for example in 1929, ’’urging economy in financial matters”.572 Finnish military 
expenditures during the interwar period consisted of roughly consumption expenditures and 
capital expenditures. Consumption expenditures included, among other things, the expenses 
from the maintenance of conscripts and the wage expenditures of the officers. Capital 
expenditures consisted mainly o f basic acquisition expenditures. They also included the 
expenses for the construction and maintenance of barracks, fortification expenses, and the costs 
resulting from the business activities of the military establishment.573
The military establishment’s consumption expenditures (see Table 40 below) formed nearly 
three fourths o f the total military expenditures in 1920— 1938. For example, the aims of the 
Defense Revision committee, which performed detailed calculations on the personnel and
571 T erà-T ervasmàki 1973; Kronlund 1990; Lamberg 1999.
572 MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, The Central Section, General Letters 1929, F 107. 51. The 
compilation of the budget. See also MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, The Minister and Adjutancy 
1918— 1937. Documents relating to the budgets 1922— 1923, 1934. He 4; MA, Archive of the Ministry 
of Defense, The Central Section, General Letters 1930, F 114. 51. The compilation of the budget; 52. The 
regular budget; 55. Special budgetary items; 56. Budget proposals to the Diet; 57. The issuing of funds.
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material needs concerning national defense, for 1927— 1936 were exceeded considerably. 
Consumption military expenditures were 1,4 times as large in 1936 as in 1927. The growth in 
capital military expenditures was even more rapid during 1927— 1936: They were 2,2 times 
larger in 1936 compared to 1927. Thus, the growth in the capital military expenditures was both 
relatively and absolutely stronger than in consumption military expenditures: The growth in 
capital expenditures was 193 million FIM  whereas the growth in consumption expenditures was 
164 million FIM .573 74 If consumption M E in the Finnish case had clear path dependent tendencies 
due to the political situation, what about the capital ME and the underlying supply system?
Table 40. Structural Composition of the Finnish Military Expenditures, 1920—1938, 
Millions of FIM in Current Prices
A. B. C. D. E. F.
1920—1924 1652 81,1 386 18,9 2038
1925—1929 2157 72,6 815 27,4 2972
1930—1934 2400 70,3 1012 29,7 3412
1935—1938 2454 58,3 1757 41,7 4211
Total/Average
1920—1938
8663 71,5 3970 28,5 12633
Source: Terâ-TervasmâJd 1973, 202. A=year; B=consumption ME; C=percentage share, consumption ME to total 
ME; D=capital ME; E=percentage share, capital ME to total ME; F=total M E
As a matter o f fact, one of the most significant aspects in this respect was the establishment of 
state-owned production units, at high cost. Several government defense factories, despite the 
reigning laissez faire ideology, were established in the 1920s and 1930s. The ordnance section 
of the Ministry o f War estimated as early as 1918 that the most important supplies and materials 
for military readiness should be manufactured mainly domestically. The first plans to be 
realized concerned the idea o f a gunpowder factory. The required machinery for the factory 
were acquired from Germany in 1920, but soon enough the costs were discovered to rise too 
high to  receive the Diet’s blessing. Private factories offered to  establish the factory with the 
condition that the government would support the enterprise. The Cabinet issued a proposal to 
the Diet in order to establish a gunpowder factor on March 21, 1922. One important aspect of 
the proposal changed in the Diet: The military committee of the Diet supported the founding of 
the factory as a government venture. The Diet followed the advice of the committee and decided 
on May 29, 1922 to justify the State Council to proceed in the matter of establishing the State 
Gunpowder Factory. The factory commenced its production at Vihtavuori in 1926.575
573 Tervasmaki 1964; Terâ-Tervasmüki 1973,140—142,200—203.
574 Eloranta 1998.'
575 Terâ-Tervasmâki 1973, 126— 129; MA, The Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Minutes of the State
1
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Next, a private cartridge factory — Oy Suomen Ampumatekdas Ab (SAT), w hich w a s  
established in 1918 —  ended up technical and financial difficulties in the beginning o f  t h e  
1920s. The Ministry of Defense proposed an entirely new and solely g o v ern m en t-o w n ed  
cartridge factory to be established at the end of 1922. The Cabinet issued a proposal o n  t h e  
matter on February 9, 1923. Within the Diet, a majority of Social Democrats supported t h e  
founding of another government factory and funds were granted during 1923— 1925. T h e  
production of cartridges started in Lapua in 1924.576 In the establishment of d o m e s t i c  
governmental production the Social Democrats, in fact, held the key position in the Diet. T h e y  
favored domestic defense production to be initiated by the government, even though they w e r e  
in general opposed to laws relating to military acquisitions.577
The next step in this rather spontaneous program of establishing government-owned m i l i t a r y  
production came when the Cabinet proposed the founding of a State Rifle Factory. T he  D i e t  
granted the required funds in 1925. The bulk of the production in the factory consisted o f  t h e  
light machine guns designed by a Finnish gunsmith A.J. Lahti. The last of the interwar m i l i t a r y  
production efforts by the government occurred in 1938, when the State Cannon Factory f i n a l l y  
started its production in Jyvâskyla. The cannon factory, in addition to private factories, w a s  
aimed at fulfilling the needs o f the large basic acquisition programs of the 1930s.578 579T h e s e  
factories, as well as other business costs, actually caused quite a strain on the Finnish m i l i t a r y  
establishment: 881 million FIM were directed for this purpose in 1932— 1939, which w as o v e r  
25 percent o f the capital military expenditures of these years. The founding of d o m e s t ic ,  
government-owned defense factories also caused most o f the military acquisitions t o  b e  
concentrated in these facilities. As the international tensions heightened towards the end o f  t h e  
1930s, war materials were more and more difficult to come by in the international markets; t h u s  
some of the funds reserved for this purpose were actually not even spent before the W in te r  
War.379
Council, introduced by the Ministry of Defense, Ca 1—9; on these, see years 1919— 1923, e .g . 
21.3.1922. See also Parliamentary Documents 111/1921:1; on the discussion, Parliamentary M inu tes 
m /1921, 2288—2311.
576 Tera-Tervasmàki 1973, 131— 132; Tervasmaki 1964; M A Archive of the Ministry of D efense, 
Minutes of the State Council, introduced by the Ministry of Defense, Ca 11. Minutes 1923, e .g . 
25.1.1923,9.1.1923; Parliamentary Documents 1/1923.
577 See e.g. Tervasmaki 1964;Tiihonen-Tiihonen 1984,181. See also Mylly 1978.
578 Kronlund 1990; Tera-Tervasmaki 1973, 192—193. Of the private production facilities especially 
Tampereen Pellava- ja Rautateollisuus Oy, Oy Sytytin, and Lokomo Oy need to be mentioned. The naval 
construction concentrated mainly on facilities of Crichton-Vulcan and Hietalahden Telakka ja Konepaja.
579 Tera-Tervasmàki 1973, e.g. 200—203. See also Nummela 1993.
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The depression of the early 1930s reflected on the funding of the Finnish military establishment 
as well. The material deficiencies in the armed forces were attempted to be compensated with 
the first of the so-called Emergency Programs (hataohjelma) in 1930. The Diet appropriated 
only a portion of the funds that were asked —  75 million FIM for 1931, and 125 million FIM 
for the next five years. These aims were not even met in the following years. However, it must 
be noted that, as Minister of Defense Lahdensuo emphasized, two thirds of the acquisitions in 
1931 were directed to domestic producers. Equally, a great deal of the funding during the 
depression years was directed to various domestic private and public production facilities in the 
form o f military procurement.580 The deficits in the first Emergency Program created by the 
more stringent budgets of the early 1930s were finally compensated in the additional budget of
1934, which was accepted by the Diet.581
The changed nature of international politics as well as the more favorable views of the Social 
Democrats were behind the next compensational measure of 1934. The Diet even urged the 
Cabinet to construct a new basic acquisition program. This significant change in the political 
backing for military funding led to the appointment o f a large basic acquisitions committee in
1935. The recommendations o f this committee were largely adopted as the basis for the military 
expenditures before 193S. The additional basic acquisition measures in 1936 and 1937 
amounted to 210 million FIM each year. In 1938, this sum was increased to 460 million FIM 
annually. However, as Kari Selen has noted, ’’the acquisition funds could not be spent in the 
same increasing pace as they were granted”.582 The comment of Einar W. Juva, in the biography 
of Finnish General and businessman Rudolf Walden, is equally descriptive: ’T h e  long time of 
completion [in these acquisitions] was also influenced by the fact that everything that could be 
produced domestically had to be acquired from here. When there were no ready factories, they 
had to be established first”.583 Thus, the capital ME and the investments in the domestic supply 
system in the Finnish case exerted also an element o f continuity into the military spending as 
whole, re-enforcing the path dependent elements in the Finnish case.
380 Tera-Tervasmaki 1973, 173— 180; MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, The Central Section, 
General Letters 1930, F 114. 51. The compilation of the budget; 52. The regular budget; 56. Funding 
proposals to the Diet; MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, The Central Section, General Letters 
1931, F 123. 51. The Compilation of the budget; MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, The Central 
Section, General Letters 1932, F 131.52. The regular budget. See also Selin 1980.
581 Tera-Tervasmaki 1973; Selin 1980,119.
582 Selin 1980, 119—131; Tera-Tervasmaki 1973, 185—200. See also Nummela 1993. On the changing 
views of Social Democrats, see e.g. Tervasmaki 1964; Soikkanen 1984; Mylly 1978; as well as Nevakivi 
1992, 81—86, and Juva 1957,431—434*
583 Juva 1957,434.
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As Douglass C. North has emphasized, organizations attempt to maximize their gains within th e  
constraints of the institutional framework. Profit-maximization, or more complex forms o f  
utility-maximization, can emerge equally well in the form  of influencing military acquisitions to  
be directed to the domestic producers or the changing of the leadership structure within th e  
military establishment, for example as in the case of the Jaeger officers. Organizations, large o r  
small, have a central role, in addition to historical preconditions, in the development o f p a th  
dependence. Mancur Olson has pointed out that small, homogeneous groups are often the m o s t 
effective ones in their profit-maximization, which should be extended to cover other aims a s  
well. The reasons for this include the fact that in small groups the internal social pressures 
(selective incentives) as well as common goals and interests lead to greater efficiency than in  
large, internally divided groups. The coercion potential o f the group is of course relevant a lso . 
This meant in the Finnish case that the smaller committees and interest groups were o f te n  
poised to make significant gains when a window of opportunity presented itself.584 58
A historical situation in which the institutional factors make it possible for smaller groups to  
participate in political decision-making also explains the organizations’ interests in investing in  
political action. In the case of interwar Finland, both the division of the political field as well a s  
the internal conflicts of the military establishment left room for smaller groups and pow erfu l 
individuals to act out their own interests. Moreover, the Finnish political and economic elite s ti l l  
consisted of the same powerful families that had occupied the highest social and political s tra ta  
since the Period of Autonomy. Thus, the process of independence did not create an ab ru p t 
change in the Finnish leadership structure; at best we may refer to the slow process of change  
among the public servants towards the middle-class in the Finnish society.5SS
Committees were an integral part o f the Finnish decision-making system, aside from the ac tu a l 
government agencies, in the 1920s and 1930s. Similarities to the Swedish system are profuse. 
Committees were reserved for preparing specific legal and political issues for a  larger legislative 
or political body. Committees, sub-committees, and commissions were in abundance among th e  
different fields of administration: In 1930, there were 72 committees, and in 1939 as many a s  
117. The committee system, which was disintegrated and spread around the different fields o f
584 See Olson 1965, e.g. 53—65. See also North 1994; North 1996; North 1997. On institutional 
trajectories and exchange relationships, see Greif 2000.
585 Noponen 1964. On the development of public servants’ ideologies etc., see Tiihonen-Ylikangas 1992. 
On historical review of Finnish interest group research, see e.g. Lamberg 1997. See also Kuisma 1993.
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administration especially in the 1920s, served particularly the interests of the political elites and 
the various interest groups.586
The roles of these different committees are sometimes quite difficult to assess. For example, as 
Ilkka Nummela has emphasized, the Economic Defense Council (Taloudellinen 
Puolustusneuvosto), which was established in 1929, was mainly aimed at planning for the 
functioning of national defense, civilian consumption, and economic life in crises situations. In 
1930 the Council distinctly expressed that the planning of peacetime acquisitions was not part of 
its domain.587 However, if we analyze the membership of the committee, one notices that all the 
key interest groups, for example the Federation of Finnish Industries, wanted to participate in its 
functions. Also, it is to be noted that at the same time the domestic producers were able to push 
through their ideas on favoring more expensive domestic production in the respective Economic 
Board {Taloudellinen Neuvottelukunta) regarding the issue of government acquisitions. Thus, 
the key interest groups on the one hand did not have raise the issue of peacetime acquisitions in 
the Economic Defense Council, whereas on the other they wanted to make sure their interests 
continued to be secured —  as well as ensuring the functioning o f war-time economy at the sane  
time —  in crises conditions.588 The different committees possessed a great deal of influence in 
the still sporadic system of governance, particularly in determining how defense contracts were 
to be allocated.
The Defense Revision committee, which attempted to influence both the size of military 
expenditures as well as their allocation, was an attempt to achieve very large organizational 
changes within the military decision-making system, as well as introduce far-reaching plans for 
the military spending needs of the nation. It is also an example of a temporary committee 
established to serve a specific function. Additionally, it is an example of both the volatile nature 
of military expenditures in public discussion as well as the division of the political field. 
Additionally, I will analyze the actions o f the Board of Acquisitions, which influenced the 
budgetary and acquisition processes directly within the Ministry of Defense. This Board was a 
permanent part of the Ministry’s organization throughout the interwar period. The Board of 
Acquisitions is also an example of the direct influence of the interest groups in governmental
586 Tiihonen-Tiihonen 1984, 172—182.
587 Nummela 1984,307—309.
588 Nummela 1984; MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Minutes of the State Council, introduced by 
the Ministry of Defense, Ca 16 (1928) — Ca 24 (1936); Federation of Finnish Industries, Annual report 
1930, Appendix 1.
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activities. As we will see later, these groups, especially the Federation o f Finnish In d u s tr ie s , 
played a significant role in the development of certain key pieces of military legislation as w e l l .
The Defense Revision —  officially appointed on November 26, 1923 "to inspect the r a t io n a l i ty  
of the defense arrangements in this country as well as to issue proposals to re-organize t h e  
military establishment, if such need should arise"589 —  assembled all in all thirteen times d u r i n g  
the period 1923— 1926. It included both civilian members —  among other, several members o f  
parliament —  and military personnel.590 Jaeger officers and their military thinking d o m in a te d  
the work of the Defense Revision591. In between the joint meetings, the work was continued i n  
the two sub-sections: the military section and the cost estimation review section. The role o f  t h e  
military section and its members was central in the functions of the entire committee.592 T h e  
Defense Revision also utilized both domestic and foreign experts on specific issues. The m o s t  
important influence, cited by the committee itself, was the English expert commission, w h o s e  
work concentrated mainly on innproving the sea and air defense systems593 594.
The Defense Revision was unanimous on the question o f the size of the armed forces and t h e  
length o f the military service: The number of conscripts was not to be decreased and the l e n g t h  
not to be less than one year. In the annual number of conscripts (23 500), the Army w a s  
overwhelmingly awarded the largest numbers in the Defense Revision calculations.59* All in  a l l ,
MA, document T 2858/2, Minute of the Council of War 5 — 6.11.1923; Kronlund 1990, 286; M A , 
DRArch, roll 1, folder 11: Puolustusrevisionin osamietinto "Maamme puolustuslaitoksen ylin j o h t o "  
1924. See also MA, DRArch, roll 9, folder 26: Maàràvahvuuskomitean mietintô, and DRArch, roll 8 ,  
folder 24: Rannikkopuolustuskomitean mietintô v. 1922. See also Elfvengren 1987, 34. The D efense 
Revision was inspired by similar efforts in Sweden, see Trdnnberg 1985 for details.
590
MA, DRArch, roll 2, folder 13: Puolustusrevisionin mietintô, parts I and n , 2—3. Of the members o f  
the committee many ascended to significant posts both within the civilian administration and m ilitary  
command during the interwar period. See e.g. Turtola 1988 (Erik Heinrichs’ career), Nummela 1 9 8 4  
(Leonard Grandell’s rise to the top of economic-military planning), and Niukkanen 1951 (on J u h o
Niukkanen’s political career from the 1920s to the 1940s).
591 Many of the committee’s members had a Jaeger background, e.g. Eirik Homborg and Niukkanen; s e e  
Kronlund 1990,286 and Niukkanen 1951, 9—11. The only actual representative of the ’’old guard” in th e  
committee was Major General Martin Wetzer, who was, however, in favor of the changes that the Jaegers 
proposed -— the other Czar’s officers felt in fact threatened by Wetzer’s participation in the committee, 
see Turtola 1988, 102 and DRArch, roll 4, folder 16: Làhetettyjà salaisia ja  yleisia kirjeita, (roll p a g e
number) 63.
592 DRArch, roll 2, folder 13: Puolustusrevisionin mietintô, parts I and H, 4. The military section included 
in addition to the chairman (Hornborg) the military members of the committee (Wetzer, Lauri Malmberg, 
Harald Ohqvist, and Armas Martola; later, the military personnel that replaced them, see Eloranta 1998 
for details. The military section largely prepared the different parts of the Defense Revision’s report. 
Kronlund 1990,286.
593 DRArch, roll 2, folder 13, 5—7. Especially in the question of naval armaments, the Finnish naval
officers attempted to influence the work of the committee, succeeding however better in the Diet.
594 MA, DRArch, roll 2, folder 13: Puolustusrevisionin mietintô, parts I and II, 9—II; DRArch, roll 2 ,
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the Defense Revision emphasized the importance of the needs of the Army in dividing the 
military funding: The available funds were recommended to be used in the “right” proportion 
between the different service branches595. The Army’s share of the recommended basic 
acquisition expenditures in the committee’s report was to be over half, which was a conscious 
effort to improve the poor material status of this branch596.
In turn, the Finnish Navy was based on the war booty confiscated from the Russians after the 
Civil War. This Navy consisted of six gunboats, three S-class torpedo boats, mineship M l, and 
two motorized torpedo boats.597 Compared to the other nations in the Baltic area, the Finnish 
Navy was modest at best. The Finnish naval officers and shipbuilders were also greatly 
influenced by the Nordic Navies, especially in their design.598 The question of establishing a 
Navy and the content of naval acquisitions were especially difficult for the Defense Revision. 
The committee was aided in this dilemma by the English expert commission, despite strenuous 
opposition from the Finnish General Staff.599 The Defense Revision did not fully endorse the 
recommendations of the English commission yet approved the main points in their proposals. 
The Finnish naval officers and experts in charge of naval defense matters in the Ministry of 
Defense also attempted to influence the views of the committee without achieving the results 
they had hoped for. Their aim was to achieve a broader and differently structured naval building 
program.600
Obtaining funding for the naval building program was one of the biggest sources of conflict in 
the Finnish interwar politics. Funding was provided, in spite o f the fierce resistance o f the 
Social Democrats, in the additional budgetary measures in the mid-1920s. At the same time, for 
example Tanner’s Social Democratic minority Cabinet o f 1927 was tied to the earlier
folder 13,1. part, 6. chapter, 122,133—137; DRArch, roll 3, folder 13,2. part, 13. chapter, 396,430.
595 MA, DRArch, roll 2, folder 13,1. part, 4. chapter, 55—57.
596 MA, DRArch, roll 2, folder 13,1. part, 4. chapter, 56. See also Eloranta 1998.
597 Turtola 1972,7; Niklander 1996,15— 17. Even though Niklander’s book is not a historical study and 
there are several ahistorical attempts of applying hindsight, it is still a very comprehensive account of the 
process of building the Finnish Navy.
598 Niklander 1996,32—3 3 ,4 2 ^ 7 .<OQ
MA, DRArch, roll 1, folder 7: Poytakirjoja — Sotilasjaosto, meetings 11.1.1924 and 12.1.1924. 
Turtola 1988, 120. Heinrichs’ appointment as the Chief of Staff made it possible to carry out the request 
of the Jaeger-dominated committee.
600 MA, DRArch, roll 1, folder 7, meetings 2.10.1924, 9.10. 1924, 31.10.1924, and 6.11.1924. MA, 
DRArch, roll 1, folder 6: Poyttikirjojen luonnoksia, meeting 14.2.1925; this suggestion was largely based 
on the English experts’ proposals. MA, DRArch, roll 1, folder 6, meeting 17.2.1925, the Ministry of 
Defense also presented its counter proposal to the committee. See also MA, DRArch, roll 2, folder 13, 5, 
and 1. part, 7. chapter, 156—158; also MA, document T 2857/1 — Ministry of Defense continued to 
disagree with the committee on the issue of Navy in the latter part of the 1920s.
acquisitions by the terms o f the previous acquisition agreement. If the decision to continue naval 
acquisitions had not been made quickly in the beginning of 1927, the prices would have 
multiplied in the future acquisitions. Needless to say, the Social Democrats were not 
enthusiastic about this arrangement. The Navy Act was finally approved in the Diet of 1927.601 
The 1924 Cabinet’s proposal, 520 million FIM, was trimmed down significantly. The final 
amount was 215 million FIM 602. The Defense Revision had suggested a 591 million mark naval 
building program in its report, although the condition for such spending was the approval of the 
entire acquisition program recommended by the committee. The committee’s proposals would 
have increased the Army’s acquisition share to over fifty percent.603 The founding of an 
effective Navy was, however, the only part of this acquisition program that was realized at least 
in some form.
The reasons for the said form of the naval building program included the strong naval 
propaganda issued in the Diet, the influence of the naval experts in the M inistry o f Defense, and 
the shortened version of the Defense Revision’s report, which provided a distorted perspective 
on the needs o f the armed forces. As a result, the share o f the Navy in the basic acquisitions 
increased above fifty percent during 1926— 1930. Thus, the structure o f the acquisitions 
changed exactly as the Defense Revision had not intended it.604 As a matter of fact, the issue of 
establishing a Navy developed in stages. The first stage (1919— 1924) was characterized by 
more or less detailed plans made mostly by naval officers. The second stage (1924— 1927) 
centered on the development of the designs for the ships, especially the coastal defense vessels. 
The domestic naval officers and the shipyards were very active in ensuring mostly domestically 
produced and as-large-as-possible coastal defense vessels. The third stage, from 1927 onwards, 
was a continuation of the second stage: The Ministry of Defense and the shipyards were able to 
extend the limits of the Navy Act of 1927 even further than originally intended. The final 
construction costs for one coastal defense vessel alone605 has been estimated to have been circa 
210 million FIM.606
601 MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Ca 15. The State Council’s minutes, Introduced by the 
Ministry of Defense 1927,27.1.1927; Tuitola 1972; Jääskeläinen 1973,139—140.
602 Statute Collection 1927,1015;Enkiö 1968,147.
603 Eloranta 1996.
604 Niukkanen 1951, 29—30; Tervasmäki 1964, 241; Kronlund 1990, 315; Mannerheim 1952, 12; 
Tirronen-Huhtaniemi 1979, 239.
605 The two that were introduced to service in the 1930s were called Väinämöinen and ILmarinen.
606 Niklander 1996; Turtola 1972; Eloranta 1998.
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The naval lobbying involved in the finalization of the Navy Act o f 1927 deserves a closer look. 
The main lobbying organizations were the various Finnish naval associations (for example, the 
Finnish Naval Association), the Navy Magazine (Laivastolehti), and the Naval Officers* 
Association. In addition, the naval officers in the Ministry o f Defense were also very active 
promoters of the Navy Act. These persons and organizations issued active propaganda by 
’’turning to influential persons and turning them favorable towards the cause” and directly 
handed out propaganda materials during the Diet proceedings, as well as supported these actions 
within the pages of the Navy Magazine (founded in 1926).607 Their subjective criticism o f the 
naval programs was centered on the program’s too limited size. They also emphasized the 
program’s absolute necessity for the national defense: ”Why don’t we directly proceed to create 
and acquire the kind of Navy that, without overburdening the solvency of our nation’s 
inhabitants, we can build for ourselves and which by its very existence alone will make the 
invasion plans o f our enemy uncertain and, above all, will provide ourselves the faith in the 
continuance of our independence.”608 The ties of this propaganda to the economic and political 
elites in  Finland were strong. For example V.M. J. Viljanen, the managing director of Federation 
of Finnish Industries and a MP, was a member of the board o f the Finnish Naval Federation as 
well. He even attempted to include a requirement in the Navy Act that the ships must be built in 
Finnish shipyards. In addition, a ”Navy Men’s Club” was established in 1929 to ensure the 
preservation of naval interests in Finland; this club included key figures from both sciences and 
industrial circles.609 This was perhaps the most blatant example o f collusion between specific, 
small groups in the Finnish interwar case, although the aims of the agents did not always match 
exactly.
How did the Defense Revision committee’s recommendations on the whole fare in the political 
debate? The committee’s report in 1926 was naturally a continuation of the work undertaken in 
many sub-reports and preparatory proposals, which were almost solely the responsibility o f the 
committee chairman Homborg and the military section610. The committee’s work received some 
cautious criticism as early as the end of 1925, thus before the actual completion of the report on 
January 21, 1926, in for example the Progressive Party’s mouthpiece Helsingin Sanomat. The
607 Turtola 1972, 131—132; Ainamo 1948,20—22; Eloranta 1997c.
608 Laivastokysymyksemme 1926.
609 Turtola 1972, 132—133; Ainamo 1948; Eloranta 1998.
610 Kronlund 1990, 286. E.g. MA, DRArch, roll 1, folder 7: Poytakirjoja — Sotilasjaosto, 4.2.1924 
Homborg was assigned to prepare a statement on the military-political position of Finland; DRArch, roll 
1, folder 5: Poytakirjoja, 1923—1924, 8.11.1924 the same statement was approved as part of the overall 
report. See also MA, DRArch, roll 1, folder 11: Puolustusrevisionin osamietinto "Maamme 
puolustuslaitoksen ylin johto" 1924,3—4.
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criticism centered around the issues of ignoring the opinions of the former Chief of S t a f f  
Enckell, the suggested increases in the military expenditures, and the idea that the forthcom ing  
proposals could not be carried out in parts (”the proposal is a whole that breaks down, if o n e  o f  
its parts is taken apart”).611
Overall, the right-wing newspapers were positively disposed towards issues relating to  t h e  
national defense612. The detailed writings of the chairman o f  the committee, Eirik Homborg, a t  
the time of the completion of the committee’s work altered this situation drastically: M o s t  
newspapers actually demanded him  to be indicted for treason. His motive m ight have been t o  
emphasize the needs of the military establishment to the public at large. The failure o f  t h i s  
approach became even more pronounced when Homborg was at last actually indicted, by t h e  
order of the State Council, for disclosing classified information. Even though he was cleared o f  
all charges in the trial, the damage to the "cause” was irreversible.613 The public image o f  t h e  
Defense Revision’s work became negative right from the beginning.
The shortened version of the Defense Revision’s 1926 report was essentially prepared for t h e  
Diet by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. It did not, for example, contain t h e  
classified details on the mobilization plans as well as the extensive explanatory 
memorandums.614 It was not, even though such claims have been made, too brief of an a c c o u n t 
rather than a structurally disproportionate representation o f the national defense needs. E v e n  
though the key role of the Army is brought forth in a few sentences, the overall im pression 
arising from the shortened version must be that it favored the Navy.615 The highest p o litica l 
circles had been briefed on the entire report616, yet the members of the parliament, com bined  
with the active naval propaganda, were undoubtedly given a naval-dominated view o f t h e  
Finnish defense needs. The negative publicity o f the Defense Revision also had a significant
611 MA, DRArch, roll 10, folder 29: Sanomalehtileikkeita  —  puolustusrevisionia koskevia  1925— 19 2 6 , 
see e.g. Helsingin Sanomat 6.10.1925 and 8.10.1925 as well as Uusi Suomi (the National Coalition’s 
supporter) 4.10.1925 — Utisi Suomi acted as sort of a ’’organ” for the committee. See Salokangas 1987,
262,278.
612 MA, DRArch, roll 10, folder 29, e.g. Uusi Suomi and Uusi Aura. On the general party ties of th e  
newspapers, see Salokangas 1987 for details.
613 MA, DRArch, roll 10, folder 29: Sanomalehtileikkeita — puolustusrevisionia koskevia 1925—19 2 6 , 
see e.g. Turun Sanomat’s, Lalli’s, Tampereen Sanomat’s, and Hdmeen Sanomat’s views on the matter —  
the entire Defense Revision was seen as receiving bad publicity due to the Homborg case. Only some o f  
the right-wing newspapers, e.g. lltalehtU clearly defended Homborg.. See also Jaaskelainen 1977,413.
614 Defense Revision 1926. Cf. MA, DRArch, rolls 2,3, and 4 as well as folders 13 and 14.
615 Defense Revision 1926, 8.; Arimo 1986/1987, part HI, 81; Tera-Tervasmaki 1973, 124— 125. Cf. also  
the table of contents in Defense Revision 1926 to MA, DRArch, roll 2, folder 13.
616 Defense Revision 1926,8.
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impact on the opinions of the members o f parliament, at least as far as the military funding was 
concerned in the 1920s. The committee’s acquisition plans were never brought to the Diet in 
their entirety to be debated. The failure o f the Defense Revision was also influenced by the fact 
that all the major groups in the society, especially the economic interest groups, were not 
represented in the committee. Whereas in the Swedish case the political economy enabled the 
decisions to be made on the basis such proposals, the Finnish political economy provided fewer 
similar possibilities.
An example of real influence by the smaller organizations, contrary to the case of the Defense 
Revision, can be seen in the case o f the Board of Acquisitions, appointed by the State Council 
on May 22, 1919 to make a statement on all the acquisitions of the military establishment. 
Additionally, it had the right of initiative ”in matters improving the economy of the military 
establishment”. The aim to emphasize economy was an additional incentive in the creation of 
the Board. Appointments to the Board o f Acquisitions consisted almost exclusively of the 
representatives o f the domestic economic elites and industries. Thus, this committee formed a 
natural continuum to for example the S taff of Engineers, which had functioned during the Civil 
War. In the Staff Engineers, as in the case of the Board of Acquisitions, the representatives of 
private businesses took care o f the economic needs of the armed forces. The role of the Board 
became decisive in the acquisitions o f the Ministry of Defense: All acquisitions required the 
approval of the Board before their completion. The different departments of the Ministry of 
Defense followed this principle quite strictly.617
The Board of Acquisitions employed from  the very beginning the principle of competition in the 
acceptance of contracts in order to enhance efficiency. In the first years of the 1920s, this 
competition principle functioned quite proficiently, but during the course of the decade more 
and more orders were given to domestic producers. Competition became in many cases a  mere 
formality. This was instigated by the general improvement of economic conditions — the nation 
was not considered to be in peril —  as well as the increased demands of the domestic industries. 
The regulations o f the Board of Acquisitions in 1924 serve as a good example of this change: 
’’...when the interests of the military establishment do not require otherwise, the order will be 
favored to be given to a domestic producer of a good or service.” In 1925 the Board was divided 
into two sections: the metal and engineering industry, and the commissariat sections. Both were
617 MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Ca 2. State Council’s minutes, introduced by the Ministry of 
Defense 1919, 22.5.1919; MA, The Board of Acquisitions (Hankinta-asiain neuvottelukunta), minutes 
1919— 1926; the minutes of the Board are missing after 1926. The first meeting of the Board took place
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almost exclusively filled with the representatives of the respective industries in the F e d e ra tio n  
of Finnish Industries.618
Was the involvement of domestic producer’s interests in the Board of Acquisitions in F in lan d  a  
case of profit-maximization or are there other factors (or motives) to be found behind t h e  
phenomenon? The Board’s favorable disposition towards domestic production indeed b e c a m e  
more pronounced in the mid-1920s. However, the members were in general a g a in s t  
government-owned armaments production and the monopolizing of the military acqu isitions. 
For example, in the case of the gunpowder factory the Board made specific remarks that ’’t h e  
state should not itself start to establish a gunpowder factory rather than leave it to a p r iv a te  
company”.619 However, the support of the Social Democrats enabled the creation of g o v ern m en t 
armaments factories in the 1920s and 1930s.620 On this issue, the domestic production in te re s ts  
represented in Board clearly failed to have an impact. The attitude of the Board on acqu isitions 
changed significantly after the first years of independence. Some of the aspects o f this c h a n g e  
included a more lenient opinion o f the Ministry of Defense’s acquisitions in their own righ t a s  
well as providing more long-term contracts for the Finnish producers.621 A key issue in  t h i s  
change was the fact that Finland was not actively threatened anymore after the First World W a r  
and its immediate aftermath It is also significant that the interests of the Finnish d o m e s tic  
producers were already secure by the mid-1920s. This situation was not altered until the r i s i n g  
threats o f the 1930s.
Many o f the key Finnish economic interest groups, national peak associations, were fo u n d e d  
during the early years of the independence, 1917— 1921: the Central Federation of A gricu ltu ra l 
Producers (Maataloustuottajien Keskusliitto) in 1917; the Central Federation of F in n is h  
Woodrefining Industries (Suomen Puunjcdostusteollisuuden Keskusliitto) in 1918; and F in land’ s  
Import Federation {Suomen Tuontiteollisuusliitto\ which changed its name later to  t h e
2.12.1919. See also Lamberg 1999.
618 MA, Board of Acquisitions, Minutes 1919—1926, minutes 1924 (SArk 2138/9), 28.5.1924; m inutes 
1925, (MA 2138/10), 3.6.1925. Even though only some of the members of the Board appear at first to b e  
connected to the Federation of Finnish Industries (Feiring, Lavonius), a closer evaluation of the archive o f  
the Federation of Finnish Industries reveals more connections (Hovilainen, O. Nikander, Niklander); 
ACFI (Archive of the Central Federation of Industries), Minutes of the Federation of Finnish Industries 
{Suomen Teollisuusliiion pôytàkiTjat) 1920—1936. Additionally, the positions of the other members 
provided them with connections to the same circles. As Reino Arimo has described: ’The members w ere  
known leaders of economic life”; Arimo 1981,46.
619 MA, Board of Acquisitions, Minutes 1919—1926, minutes 1919 (SArk 2137/8), 18.6, 11.9.1919; 
minutes 1920 (SArk 2137/9), 23.4.1920; minutes 1921 (SArk 2137/10), 31.5.1921; minutes 1921 (SA rk 
2137/11), 16.12.1921,20.12.1921; minutes 1924 (SArk 2138/9), 13.8.1924,24.9.1924.
620 E.g. Tervasmâki 1964; Mylly 1978.
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Federation of Finnish Industries (Suomen Teollisuusliitto), in 1921. As Juha-Antti Lamberg has 
shown, the political weight possessed by the agricultural producers was the most extensive. The 
representative o f the domestic market industries, the Federation of Finnish Industries, in turn 
had only limited successes in its pressure activities, such as lobbying for government 
acquisitions.621 22 The beginning years o f the independence were a time of political disorder and 
division, during which the various interest groups attempted to assert themselves in the struggle 
for political “market shares”. This game, especially in the context of military contracts, was 
influenced by the fact that many administrative units such as the Ministry of Defense were 
created out of nothing, which increased individual and group opportunities to influence 
decision-making and pursue rents. In addition, many groups within the government, such as the 
officers and the bureaucrats were hardly passive players in the game for impurely public defense 
contributions.623
The Federation of Finnish Import Industries (from 1924 onwards the Federation of Finnish 
Industries, FFI) was established on January 28, 1921 to protect the interests of the domestic 
industries. Some of the central principles in the activities of the Federation included, in addition 
to tariff questions, to influence trade agreements and protect the viability of the domestic market 
industries in Finland. Thus, the interests of the FFI were intricately linked to the allocation of 
defense contracts. Moreover, the State Council appointed a separate Board of Experts in 
Government Acquisitions in 1921. The Federation was able to  push through a principle in the 
Board, which naturally affected the Board of Acquisitions in the Ministry of Defense as well, 
that even twenty percent more expensive domestic products were to be favored in government 
acquisitions compared to foreign products. The Federation attempted to push through this 
principle as early as 1921, but failed a t first. This principle was adopted a few years later. The 
Federation’s strong grip on government contracts was temporarily lost at the end of the 1920s, 
but with the coming depression the same principle was adopted again. During the depression 
years the more lenient attitude of the State Council and the Ministry of Finances solidified the 
practice of favoring domestic producers. In the 1930s, the interests of the FFI emerged not only 
through the Board of Acquisitions, but through the Economic Defense Council as well.624
621 MA, Board of Acquisitions, Minutes 1919— 1926.
622 Lamberg 1999.
623 See Eloranta 2001b.
624 ACFI, minutes of the Federation of Finnish Industries 1920—1925, 11.12.1920,28*1.1921,28.5.1921, 
9.11.1921; minutes 1926—1929, 7.2.1928; minutes 1934, 2.11.1934; Federation of Finnish Industries, 
annual report 1930; Pesonen 1992, 9—10,14; Finlands industriforbund 1946,85—88; Lamberg 1997. On 
the Economic Defense Council, see Nummela 1984 for details.
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The influence of the Federation was thus extended to the actual decision-making on the military 
acquisitions. The members o f the Board of Acquisitions, which continued to function 
throughout the interwar period, consisted of the representatives of the different industries w ithin 
the Federation of Finnish Industries. Of, for example, the chairmen of the Federation, F inn  
Feiring and R obo t Lavonius acted also as the chairmen o f the Board of Acquisitions in th e  
1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, the FFI was engaged in an active propaganda campaign, in th e  
newspapers for example, in order to achieve its various goals during the interwar period.625 T h e  
Federation’s activities were characterized by a right-wing ideological base, which fit well w ith 
the idea o f emphasizing domestic self-sufficiency in the development of military resources. 
Thus, this was a case of ambivalence of sorts in dealing with the military establishment: on the  
one hand, the Federation tried to maximize the profits of its members; on the other, they wanted 
to secure the self-sufficiency of the defense industries during a possible crisis. The latter 
dimension of the actions of the Federation became more pronounced in the 1930s.626 T h e  
Federation o f Finnish Industries was also, similar to the Board of Acquisitions, against 
government-owned military production.
The person who acted as a  liaison between the members o f the parliament and the Federation 
was the managing director of the Federation, V.M,J. Viljanen. Viljanen himself was a member 
of parliament, representing the Progressive Party, during 1924— 1926. He also held many 
distinguished positions in other organizations, for example in the Finnish Navy Federation. 
Consequently, another issue that the Federation got involved with in the 1920s was to support 
the Finnish shipyards in obtaining the new Navy contracts. Three Finnish shipyards —  Maskin 
& Brobyggnads AB, AB Crichton-Vulcan OY, and AB Sandvikens Skeppsdocka & Mek Verkst 
—  contacted the Federation in 1926 out of fear due to the ’’intentions to give the orders out o f 
the country”. The Federation decided to pressure the Cabinet in order to obtain the orders to 
domestic producers, which subsequently did occur.627
The position of Viljanen and the entire FFI were not, however, very stable as the 1930s would 
prove. The issue of the Federation’s own propaganda company (Suomen llmoituskeskus), 
headed by Viljanen, and the resulting deficits led to demands among the representatives of the 
metal industries that Viljanen’s tenure as a managing director should be terminated. Viljanen
625 MA, Board of Acquisitions, Minutes 1919—1926; Pesonen 1992,14— 15.
626 See Lamberg 1997 for further details.
627 ACFI, Minutes of the Federation of Finnish Industries, 1920— 1925, 8.2.1923, 20.9.1924,19.10.1925; 
Minutes of the Federation of Finnish Industries, 1926— 1929, 1.7.1926, cf. 28.2.1926; 7.8.1928; Eloranta 
1998.
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and his friends on the board of the Federation were only barely able to manage to secure his 
continuation in this post.628 Another difficulty in the Federation’s activities was the division 
between the agrarian producers, the export industries, and the domestic industries (represented 
by the Federation). The Federation tried actively to  achieve cooperation with the export 
industries in the 1920s, but without any concrete results at first. These efforts were repeated in 
the aftermath of the Great Depression.629
The efforts towards reconciliation between the Central Federation of Agricultural Producers 
(CFAP) and the Federation of Finnish Industries started to bear fruit before the mid-1930s. The 
cooperation began in a more concrete form in 1934 with a joint committee. These two 
organizations were both aimed at protecting the domestic production from foreign competition. 
The issues they shared an interest in comprised tariffs, supporting domestic production, and 
government acquisitions. As Juha-Antti Lamberg has pointed out, in 1935 the joining of forces 
led to, for example, support for the same candidates in the elections with the export industries 
(represented by the Central Federation o f Finnish Woodrefining Industries, CFFWI), as well as 
continued support for the Agrarian Union and the main national platform of the agrarian 
producers, CFAP. The official cooperation of CFFWI and the FFI began also in 1935. The 
industrialists and the agrarian producers were both concerned about the tightening of 
international tensions and the ’’growing influence” o f socialism. Accordingly, their actions 
cannot accurately be described as pure profit-maximization alone.630
The continuous organizational and administrative turmoil of the 1920s, the absence of control 
on the use of government resources, and the high rates o f return from the rent seeking targeting 
new contracts were pre-requisites for the group and individual rent seeking in Finland. Yet, did 
actual corruption occur? Did the corruptive contact surface widen due to the institutional shocks 
brought on by the independence? And, did the rent seeking turn into actual collusion among the 
agents as the case of the Navy act already suggested? I will address these questions by 
reviewing the allegations concerning the mismanagement of funds and other cases of potential 
criminal behavior that were documented and debated in the early 1920s. I will focus especially
628 ACFI, Minutes of the Federation of Finnish Industries, 1932, 20.1.1932, 27.1.1932, 19.4.1932, 
9.5.1932, 16.6.1932 — this issue caused great division among the members of the Federation; Lamberg 
1997. On metal industries, see e.g. Olin 1938.
629 ACFI, Minutes of the Federation of Finnish Industries, 1920— 1925, e.g. 10.5.1922, 5.12.1924; 
Minutes of the Federation of Finnish Industries, 1935, 23.1.1935.
630 ACFI, Minutes of the Federation of Finnish Industries, 1934, e.g. separate minute 1.2.1934,26.4.1934; 
Minutes of the Federation of Finnish Industries, 1935, 6.2.1935, 4.12.1935, 18.12.1935; Lamberg 1999; 
Lamberg 1997; Juva 1957,420—423.
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on the fortification process, which will amply portray the conflicts of interest and the w in d o w s  
of opportunity that were available in such a political economy.
The first instance of negligence that was debated in the 1920s was the case o f the war b o o ty  
materials, especially issues concerning their valuation and storage. Apparently the value o f  th e s e  
materials was overrated in 1918, in addition to which the storage process was riddled w i th  
inconsistencies. The material that was deemed worth storing was placed into storage depo ts.631 
A committee that was appointed to review the rumors of malfeasance later in the 1920s f o u n d  
out that these materials had been overvalued, which had created a false impression of their t r u e  
value. In addition, a number of accounting mistakes had taken place during the s to ra g e  
process.632 The condemnation of the Diet for this process was decisive. For example, M P J o o n a s  
J. Laherma delivered a brutal speech, which doubted the integrity of the government o ffic ia ls  
and accountants. The chairman of the committee investigating the matter criticized e sp ec ia lly  
the actions o f the Accounting Office in the Ministry o f  Defense in his remarks. According t o  
him, this kind of negligence had in fact been common during the years 1918— 1919. In ad d itio n , 
he proclaimed that “there have been rather many cases which prove that war booty m ate ria ls  
have been outright stolen”. For example, war booty vehicles had apparently been sold, as th e  
detective agency that had been hired to investigate the matter found out, below market prices t o  
private persons and organizations. He maintained that the reasons for these acts included th e  
unorganized nature of the military establishment, the exceptional conditions after the Civil W a r  
o f 1918, and the resignation o f many qualified persons from the armed forces after the w a r . 
Despite the moral condemnation, the MPs in general were not willing to pursue this m a tte r  
further.633
The assessment of the state accountants, issued in 1925, on the financial practices of the m ilita ry  
establishment in 1918— 1920 was at least as negative as the previous comments uttered in th e  
Diet. Their report mentioned, for example, “certain large write-offs and outright fraud”. T h ey  
estimated criminal activity to have formed circa 5 per cent of the write-offs worth nearly 2 ,3  
million FIM. They also suggested an independent investigation of these instances.634 The rep ly  
of the M inistry of Defense was a strong counterattack leveled against this criticism. T h e  
Ministry officials considered the negligence to have been fairly minor, and that the funds w ere  
more often than not spent simply from the wrong accounts. They also accused the accountants
631 Tera-Tervasmaki 1973,72—76; Kronlund 1990.
632 Kronlund 1990,168.
633 Parliamentary Minutes, IH/1919, 2662—2671.
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of superficiality.634 35 In the mid-1920st the criticism on the use of funds by the military 
establishment had lost its edge, especially since a more pressing crisis concerning the military, 
the officer conflict, claimed the attention of the public. The press hardly devoted any more 
space for this issue in the late 1920s.636
Another issue that attracted at least as much attention as the war booty issue (mainly in the 
newspapers) was the issue of fortifications and the ensuing construction activity in the 
beginning of the 1920s. In 1919, based on a signed contract, the Ministry of Defense gave a 
company called Oy Granit an exclusive on the fortification construction work in the Carelian 
Isthmus. These fortifications were considered essential in order to repel a possible Soviet 
attack.637 The actual construction of the fortification structures began in the fall of 1919, when 
the matter was reviewed for the first time in the Board of Acquisitions that functioned within the 
Ministry of War. The head of the Engineering Department in the Ministry, Engineer A. 
Lonnroth, maintained that the Ministry had attempted to acquire qualified workers for these 
construction efforts, but that they had had no luck due to the pay being lower than in the private 
sector. He also recommended Oy Granit to be awarded the contract He considered the company 
to have the expertise and equipment required to carry out this contract, in addition to which the 
company could hire a military expert who would devise the said construction plans. LOnnroth 
had earlier in his career acted as the managing director of Oy Granit and promised to  resign 
from the Ministry if the company was awarded the contract After a bidding competition, the 
Board recommended Oy Granit to be chosen as the construction company, which in practice 
tied the Ministry to this decision. Lonnroth resigned from the Ministry shortly thereafter and 
started to run Oy Granit. At the same time, yet another person, who had been intimately 
involved in the fortification planning in the Ministry and had resigned as well, joined the ranks 
of Oy Granit.638
The exclusive obtained by Oy Granit raised numerous objections, especially in the press. The 
Board of Acquisitions had to stave off the attacks with articles of their own in the major 
newspapers, which emphasized the low price of Oy Granit’s bid and the secretive nature o f the
634 Parliamentary Appendices 1924/IV—V, 3—5; Eloranta 2000b.
635 MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Defense. The Minister and Adjutancy 1918- 
1937. Other documents organized according to their contait 1920-1923. He 3; MA, Archive of the 
Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Defense. The Minister and Adjutancy 1918—1937. Documents 
pertaining to the budgets 1922-1923,1934. He 4.
°36 On e.g. the Jaegers’ relationship with the press, see Saarikoski 1997.
637 Tera-Tervasmaki 1973,90—91; Arimo 1981,22,25—26.
638 MA, Board of Acquisitions, SArk 2137/8, minutes 1919, in particular 15.8.1919, 19.8.1919,
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construction works.639 Also, the MPs of different parties criticized this solution du rin g  th e  
budget round of 1919. According to representative Juho P. Kokko, cases like this rep resen ted  a  
waste of the people’s tax money:640
”If it is true that the company gets 10 % of the gross costs, it is wholly impossible. No wonder i f  
the works become as expensive as they will. Will this kind of hoax be successful? It is told that th e  
contractor of the works is an official of the military establishment who also awarded the contract, 
received it, and also acted as the highest overseer of the works. Those who will review the pub lic  
accounts of the government will undoubtedly pay attention to this kind of thing, so that there w ill 
be no chance of wasting the people’s money this way and raise the tax burden so great that it w ill 
transform the payment of taxes into hammer markets.”
The state accountants did indeed review this process as well due to a  request o f  the Diet. T h e  
criticism that ensued led to  the dissolution o f the contract and another bidding round, in  
particular since four other persons were found to have transferred from the M inistry to  t h e  
employment o f this company.641 In 1921, during a new bidding round, four companies in  a l l  
made a bid on the contract. The Board once again recommended Oy Granit to  be g iven  th e  
contract due to its expertise and the hurried nature of the project. Another company, h o w ev er, 
named Oy Pyramid had made a cheaper bid, which resulted in a compromise: both O y G ra n it  
and Oy Pyramid were awarded the contract on 8.7.1921. The contract was less favourable f o r  
the companies than the one offered to Oy Granit in 1919, since their profit share w as n o w  
assigned to be ten per cent of the work wages instead o f the twenty offered in 1919. E a c h  
company was given its own separate work assignments. As Reino Arimo has estimated, th e s e  
two companies were thus able to secure themselves a monopoly position on the future con trac ts  
in fortifications, especially in the 1930s.642
Did Oy Granit benefit from the connections and the exchange of personnel in such an obv ious 
way? Does this process reflect collusion between the public and private spheres? A pparently  
this is not as clear-cut a case as it may seem initially. Firstly, the bidding practices that th e  
Board carried out in the 1920s did, at least nominally, give opportunities for other contractors to  
obtain the future contracts.643 Secondly, the projects did not always go according to the p lans,
26.8.1919,28.8.1919; Arimo 1981,46.
639 MA, Board of Acquisitions, SArk 2137/9, minutes 1920,20.2.1920.
640 Parliamentary Minutes 11/1919,1695— 1697.
641 Parliamentary Documents IV-V/1923. Helsinki 1924. Valtiontilintarkastajcdn kertomus vuodelta 1920. 
(Helsinki 1922); MA, Archive of the Ministry of Defense, The Minister and Adjutancy 1918— 1937. 
Other documents organized according to their content 1920— 1923. He 3.
642 MA, Board of Acquisitions, SArk 2137/10, minutes January-June 1921, 27.5.1921, 31.5.1921; Arimo 
1981,47.
643 Arimo 1981, 55—60; MA, Board of Acquisitions, SArk 2137/10, minutes January-June 1921, 
17.5.1921; M A  Board of Acquisitions, SArk 2137/11, minutes 1.7.—31.12.1921, 23.8.1921. See also
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because there were big disputes between the Ministry and the construction companies at times. 
Based on Reino Arimo’s assessment, it seems that the tough debates that took place between the 
principal and the agent in this case complicated their interaction: For example, one o f the 
companies was banned for a while from the construction site due to “unsuitable behavior“.644 
Thus, the networks between the Ministry officials and the companies did not make it much 
easier for these actors to engage, for example, in negotiations over the profit margin.
Oy Granit and the former officials of the Ministry of W ar that joined it apparently benefited 
from their personal networks mainly in the beginning of this process, during the bidding 
competitions. However, this was a case of merely unethical conduct that was not criminalized 
by the law, because most of the persons did not function in multiple roles. Only the actions of 
Engineer Lonnroth were clearly questionable, but not illegal. His actions were most likely based 
on individual rent seeking motives, which indeed produced a good economic payoff.645 The 
element of collusion was definitely present and resulted in the widening of the contact surfaces 
in this case, although outright corruption is difficult to prove in retrospect. The personal 
networks between the key actors clearly fuddled the principal-agent relationship, yet the 
collusion between the persons was far from unproblematic and its duration was mainly limited 
to the early 1920s in the Finnish case. It can also be argued that for example Oy Granit 
represented rare expertise in this matter, a monopoly of talent in a  way, which made it possible 
for these infractions to occur. Moreover, the military establishment was in its formative stages, 
and it had to rely on outside experts. The more extensive forms o f public-private interaction 
widened the corruptive contact surface and enabled much more extensive rent seeking, and even 
occasional collusion, in the Finnish case compared to the Swedish case.
Most of the researchers agree, at least to some degree, that there were some material 
deficiencies evident in the Finnish armed forces before the Winter War of 1939. The 
explanations for this state o f affairs have thus far almost without exception referred to the 
“insufficient” level of the military expenditures. There have also frequently been references to 
the ’’shortsightedness” of the politicians in denying the larger appropriations.646 However, if we 
compare the Finnish military expenditures to the developments within other, small or large, 
democracies, we find that the Finnish military expenditures, to say the least, developed quite 
favorably during the interwar period. If the military spending in Finland was comparatively
Eloranta 2000b.
644 Arimo 1981,50.
645 See e.g. Arimo 1981.
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quite adequate, why were there such material deficiencies to be found before the W inter W ar?  
The path dependence defined earlier developed in this case as a combination o f several factors. 
Firstly, the Finnish military establishment was not able to apply comprehensive planning in its 
military acquisitions (for example, the plans prepared by the Defense Revision). This w as 
brought about by the division of the officer corps and their inexperience in the 1920s, as well a s  
certain political considerations. Secondly, the Finnish military establishment had to  be crea ted  
almost out o f nothing on the basis o f the war booty materials. Thirdly, the military acquisitions 
in Finland were largely, due to the influence of domestic industrial interests, based on dom estic 
production, which also led to the founding of government-owned production units.
The role played by the smaller organizations, such as committees and interest groups, in the  
allocation o f military funding was central in interwar Finland. The organizational activities o f  
these groups were made possible by the internal power struggles within the larger political 
entities as well as in the military establishment itself. For example, the Board o f Acquisitions in 
the Ministry of Defense, which maintained a tight control o f military acquisitions, consisted o f  
members o f the economic elites and interest groups, such as the Federation of F innish  
Industries. The influence o f the domestic interests in the decision-making led to an emphasis on 
domestic military production, which ’’path” was further strengthened by the establishm ent o f  
government-owned military production facilities supported by the Social Democrats, otherw ise 
averse to military spending.
The fourth important point as far as the development path of military spending in Finland is 
concerned relates to the fact that Finland upheld, in relative terms, quite large arm ed forces 
compared to many other European states during the interwar period. The armed forces, 
however, were divided internally in the high command due to the power struggles between the 
Czar’s officers and the Jaeger officers. Additionally, the Finnish naval officers, both working in 
the Ministry o f Defense and through the various pressure organizations, were able to push 
through a large naval building program  in the late 1920s. The acquisition plans o f the other 
branches were largely ignored. Still, the Finnish military spending in 1927— 1936 was hardly 
insufficient as such: The Defense Revision Committee’s estimates, considered to be too 
expensive for the state at the time o f their completion, were exceeded clearly, especially during 
the depression years. The most decisive factor in the military spending in Finland was the 
allocation o f defense contracts to the domestic, private and public, industries, which often had to 
be created out of nothing. These facilities were also awarded significant price advantages
646 Seee.g. Juottonen 1997.
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compared to the foreign producers. Furthermore, the lack of planning in acquisitions made it 
difficult to monitor the development o f the material status of the armed forces. W e can, 
however, confirm the view of the ’’shortsightedness of the politicians”.
There are distinctly path dependent features in the development of military spending in interwar 
Finland. However, it may be too ahistorical to make a value judgment whether it was first, 
second, or third degree path dependence, as research on technological development sometimes 
attempts to do. It is difficult to assess if  the actors —  in this case, the members of the elites and 
the interest groups —  were aware of the ’’inefficiency” of the choice that they made. Their 
interests were also often very complex and intertwined —  for example, the members o f  the 
Federation o f Industries wanted to further their own economic interests as well as maintain 
Finland’s preparedness during a time of crisis, namely with domestic production. Thus, it is 
questionable whether these choices were clearly inefficient inasmuch the survival in the Second 
World W ar is concerned. In fact, such an interpretation would essentially accept the myopic bias 
often plaguing the contemporary decision-makers. Also, it may be impossible to separate the 
right-wing ideological thinking, mostly the fear of the spread o f socialism, from the profit- 
maximization o f these actors. I would prefer to label their actions as complex utility- 
maximization, o f which 1 have presented an abstraction. Thus, the concept of path dependence 
should here be considered merely a tool in providing more comprehensive explanation, not as a 
breakthrough in the aggregate theoretical framework.
7.4. Conclusions
The interest groups that operated in the political markets for public goods, defined loosely, 
consisted of political parties, state bureaucracies, and economic (namely producers) interest 
groups. It seems evident from the quantitative analysis that a stronger consensus, implying 
declining party fragmentation, among the political parties fostered higher relative military 
spending. Although in the Swedish case, on the rare occasion that the major parties agreed on 
the necessity o f disarmament, such decisions were reached after lengthy negotiations. State 
bureaucracies had only limited opportunities to maximize their budgets, especially in the 
Finnish context o f newly created organizations. Yet, in both countries the military spending 
shares seemed to  indicate budgetary immobility on the aggregate. This implies that the military 
bureaucrats were able to maintain the spending levels relatively unchanged despite changes in 
the economy as a whole or the central government spending. The opportunities of influencing 
military spending policy-making by both the political parties and the bureaucrats were severely
290
limited by the division between the parties in the political field and the difficulty o f  
fundamentally changing the existing laws on the consumption component in the aggregate M E , 
especially concerning conscription.
However, there were more opportunities available for the economic interest groups to achieve 
their goals in this game in the Finnish case. These groups, representing the producing sectors, 
were primarily interested in the level of military capital expenditures and to whom th e  
respective contracts would be awarded. Often these groups even favored lower public a n d  
military spending on the aggregate. The industrial federations in these two countries, 
representing domestic market interests, were particularly active in soliciting concrete benefits 
and price advantages as well as participating in the various public-private sector forms o f  
cooperation. They had more opportunities available in the Finnish case, as the Finnish system o f  
governance was still in its formative stage. Thus, the Federation of Finnish Industries obtained 
specific, binding price advantages in their fight for more contracts to be given to dom estic 
producers. Furthermore, the military import share of Finland declined in the 1930s, despite its  
extreme dependence on foreign military goods. The Federation of Swedish Industries was m ore 
constrained in its rent-seeking, since the more established Swedish political markets did no t 
provide room  for similar successes as in the Finnish case. They were not able to obtain fixed  
contract rules on state military acquisitions, only a loosely drafted recommendation. 
Nonetheless, the Swedish armaments industries were equally able to resist efforts to nationalize 
this production branch in the 1930s. Also, the active participation of the Swedish armaments 
industries in the international markets ensured the survival and growth of these industries. 
Sweden, along with Czechoslovakia, became one of the leaders in the production and exporting 
of small and medium size arms in the 1930s.
The military spending of both countries was path dependent, similar to most European cases, in  
the linear sense. Yet, in the Swedish case the consumption M E was path dependent only in the  
short run, since compromises altering their level were possible only in increments, and a  
successful committee round preceded these compromises. Moreover, the impacts of the 
disarmament decisions were spaced out over several years. The Swedish capital M E was also 
somewhat path dependent inasmuch it was difficult to undermine the strong position occupied 
by the private armaments manufacturers in the Swedish society. Nonetheless, the window o f 
opportunity available for private sector gains to be made was smaller than in Finland. In the 
Finnish case, the consumption ME was more path dependent than in the Swedish case, since it 
was very difficult to change the laws altering the conscription. Also, the private sector had more
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opportunities available in the Finnish case, even resulting in occasional collusion, which 
maintained strong capital ME levels especially due to the extensive naval investments. These 
elements introduced mostly short-term path dependence in the Swedish case, and longer-term 
path dependence in the Finnish case. A ll the political market hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2 
and Section 7.1 received support by the findings here. Of course, the threat scenarios under 
which the agents functioned in these two countries differed as well. Finland was perhaps more 
concretely threatened due to its long land border with the Soviet Union, which was considered 
to be a hostile country due to the historical circumstances and its socialist system. All these 
factors contributed to the reality that the Finnish relative military spending was higher than the 
Swedish equivalent.
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH CHALLENGES
”In order to ascertain the real scale of the means which we must put forth for War, we must think 
over the political object both on our own side and on the enemy’s side; we must consider the 
power and position of the enemy’s State as well as of our own, the character of his Government 
and of his people, and the capacities of both, and all that again on our own side, and the political 
connexions of other States, and the effect which the War will produce on those States. That the 
determination of these diverse circumstances and their diverse connexions with each other is an 
immense problem, that it is the true flash of genius which discovers here in a moment what is 
right, and that it would be quite out of the question to become master of the complexity merely by 
a methodical study, it is easy to conceive.”
Carl von Clausewitz 1832647
As Clausewitz, one of the most famed military minds of our time, put it, the task of analyzing 
the complexities of military capacity and its accruement is a daunting one. The main goal of this 
thesis has been to explain an individual country’s demand for military spending based on 
influences arising from four different, yet intractably linked explanatory levels: 1) International 
system; 2) Alliance (with the League o f Nations serving as an example of a failed alliance); 3) 
State; 4) Within state. The main question pursued here has been to  find out what determines the 
demand for military spending in a European democratic nation or a nation (i.e., only semi- 
autocratic) that behaves similarly in the interwar period? The selected eleven European nations, 
with other larger samples investigated at various points in the thesis, analyzed in this thesis 
include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom The answers provided in this thesis, both 
theoretically and empirically, suggest that military spending was an impure public good, 
implying a combination of both public and private benefits, in this period. The impurely public 
benefits were linked to the actions o f the domestic players in a complex evaluation of the 
international factors and domestic “needs”. This thesis is based on the pluralist notion that 
domestic choices are the sum of the game that takes place within a particular political economy, 
not discounting such factors as cultural elements and ideological developments that are 
primarily excluded from the macro-level perspective adopted here.
On the whole, it is possible to distinguish certain key features in the military spending patterns 
outlined mostly in Chapter 3. Firstly, it seems that the military burdens of most states in the 
interwar period remained similar to those that had existed before the First World War, whereas 
the defense shares usually decreased due to their more limited central government budget role.
647 Clausewitz 1982 (reprint), 375.
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Secondly, the military burdens and defense shares of the eleven selected European states w e re , 
on the average, quite stable in this period, suggesting budgetary path dependence and b u d g e ta ry  
immobility for the post- First W orld W ar military spending. The Great Depression did not h a v e  
too big an impact, at least on the aggregate, perhaps due to the domestic market su p p o rt  
strategies adopted by many governments that provided a counter-balance. Nonetheless, t h e  
military spending of the “authoritarian challengers” increased quite clearly from 1930 o n w ard s . 
Thirdly, the eleven European states seemed to initiate their rearmament quite late in the 1 9 3 0 s , 
certainly much later than the centralized nondemocratic regimes. This might have b e e n  
influenced by their inability to adjust quickly to threats, which is often cited as a characteristic 
of a democracy, or their prolonged trust in the lea g u e  o f Nations and/or in each other. It is a l s o  
possible that other impurely public benefits affected their military spending demand functions, 
as uncovered in Chapter 5. Fourthly, the individual solutions of these countries differed g rea tly . 
Fifthly, it seems that the interwar international political climate did not offer much inducem ent 
for common security guarantees. As discussed in connection with the League of Nations a n d  
economic development, the international “system” lacked leadership and credible com m itm ent 
to cooperation. Respectively, the disparity between the French and the Germans —  first in f a v o r  
o f the French until the early 1930s, then in favor o f the Germans in the 1930s —  was surely  a  
destabilizing force in the international system. These disparities were reflected on to  t h e  
international diplomatic scene. Sixthly, it seems that the Great Powers, in general “h ig h ”  
military spenders, usually differed somewhat from the military spending practices of the “w e a k ”  
states, a term which implies limited political and economic influence in the international system .
At the level of the international system, this thesis investigated the impacts of systemic changes 
—  namely, balance of power, the democratic peace argument, as well as systemic leadership (o r  
the lack o f it) —  on an individual country’s military spending. On the basis o f the statistical 
exercises undertaken in Chapters 4  and 5, it is possible to assess the success o f the theoretical 
framework in explaining the demand for military spending as an impure public good, especially  
within the sample of selected eleven European states. Firstly, it seems that systemic forces —  
with the systemic analyses based on a 17-country system covering the key states in  th e  
international economy —  indeed played an important role in determining the demand fo r  
military spending among the said states. Whereas often the exact inpact of these forces w as 
difficult to ascertain precisely, for example the concentration of military resources to few er 
hands seemed to lower military spending among these states. Yet, as we have seen in this thesis, 
this concentration did not occur in the same lines in the 1930s compared to  the imm ediate
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period following the First World War. Usually the systemic forces represented a destabilizing 
force in the international system.
Clearly the democracies as a whole behaved different than the autocracies. They seemed to 
spend less for military purposes, and an increase in the level of democracy seemed to decrease 
the impulse to spend on defense. At the level of the system, the new authoritarian challengers 
represented a systemic threat in the 1930s, to which the democracies on the aggregate responded 
slowly. International security leadership, in turn, was not forthcoming from the League of 
Nations, which was unable to act as the guardian of the status quo sealed in Versailles or 
advance its main goal: widespread disarmament. Thus the selected eleven European states did 
not consider military spending as a public good in such an alliance framework. In fact, it is here 
argued that alliances providing a pure public good in the form of deterrence were extremely 
rare, since the military technology did not provide such characteristics for the pre-NATO 
alliances. Also, other interwar military alliances beyond the League failed to inspire any more 
confidence. In general, the decision-making systems embodied by the various types of interwar 
democracies seemed to provide support for the idea of democratic peace even at the level o f 
military spending. Moreover, the interwar democracies as a whole clearly spent less for military 
purposes than the authoritarian regimes, and it seems that the level of authoritarian rule was 
important in determining the level of military spending in relative terms. Finally, the leadership 
vacuum caused by the passive foreign (and economic) policy stance of the two leading 
democracies, the United States and the United Kingdom, destabilized the international system  
even further, thereby rendering disarmament almost impossible to achieve. These factors 
contributed to the strengthening of impurely public tendencies, especially within states, in the 
military spending decision-making of these European democracies.
Thus, it seems that the demand for military spending was certainly impurely public, which 
includes nested pure public characteristics, influenced by forces arising from the four 
explanatory levels discussed throughout this thesis. Military spending also yielded joint 
products at the level of state and within state. Military expenditures were not an income-normal 
good at level of state, and in fact the level of economic development seemed to exert a 
downward pressure on the military spending of these states. Rising prices o f “defense” in 
general decreased their relative military spending. There were quite contradictory spillover 
effects felt by these states, yet they responded to increasing threats by increasing their military 
spending at a lag (usually one year). As far as the interaction between military spending and 
economic growth was concerned, the short-run dynamics of the comparisons suggest that: 1)
1
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military spending was Granger-caused by economic development rather than vice versa; 2) t h e  
short-run impact of military spending on economic growth was almost negligible due to  
offsetting tendencies.
The domestic political markets are clearly more important in the analysis of military spending in  
any time period than most earlier studies have indicated. One of the problems in such efforts h a s  
been to  come across quantifiable, credible proxies measuring the impact of, for exam ple, 
domestic market interest groups. The results achieved in this thesis suggest that: 1) Increased  
political competition in the legislatures tended to decrease military spending, as predicted; 2 )  
Election years seemed to  have a downward effect on military expenditures, yet this impact d id  
not emerge statistically significant in the pooled sample as a whole; 3) Military expenditures 
tended to be quite path dependent in terms of previous year’s spending levels; 4) Industries a s  a  
whole, due to their strong, established position in the political markets, were able to in c rease  
military spending during times of industrial slowdown in order to compensate for their lo sses . 
Finally, it seems that there are a plethora of indications that the Great Powers and the “w eak ”  
states differed in certain respects in their military spending behavior, yet the differences w e re  
rather small. Why were there not more apparent distinctions between these groups of states?
The focus on the “weak” states as actors, especially in Chapter 6, revealed that the so -ca lled  
“weak” states were not quite so weak as expected. Were, for example, they dependent on th e ir  
military trade? In fact, these “weak” states did not display clear differences in their m ilita ry  
trade behavior in terms of, for example, strategic and/or geographic differences, as th e  
hegemonic literature would suggest, and only in a limited sense due to differing income levels. 
They were, on the whole, dependent on their external trade, although this dependence declined 
significantly during the 1930s. They were not, however, as dependent on military imports a s  
seemingly suggested by the hypotheses pursued here, rather than on military exports. T hese  
“weak” states actually emerged as some of the most dominant sellers o f arms in the small a n d  
medium size armaments markets in the 1930s. They attempted to extend their military export 
market shares quite aggressively, often successfully, by selling military goods to even countries 
potentially hostile to them. Therefore, they did indeed, in addition to their dualistic disarmament 
role in the League of Nations, act assertively in the balance-of-power system of the interwar 
period. These states actually discovered the best opportunities for expanding their market shares 
in the 1930s, in the climate of intense competition for political and economic leadership in the  
system. By and large, the results achieved in this thesis confirm  that also the arms producers o f
d
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the “weak” states had room to maneuver in the international markets without significant 
strategic constraints.
These ’’weak” states were also constrained by the domestic actors, which parallels the results of 
the systemic estimations quite well. The results achieved here suggest that many of these 
countries developed strong domestic military production in the 1930s, especially during the 
Great Depression, or at least their military import shares grew slower than military capital 
expenditures in general after the height o f  the depression. This coincided with a general trend of 
more extensive reliance on the domestic markets among the European nations.
The interest groups that operated in the European interwar political markets for public goods, 
defined loosely, consisted o f political parties, state bureaucracies, and economic (namely 
producers) interest groups. The quantitative findings suggest that a stronger consensus leading 
to less competition, implying declining party fragmentation, among the political parties fostered 
higher relative military spending. The focus in this thesis was on two polities in particular, 
Sweden and Finland, in this period. They offered both similarities and dissimilarities in 
perspective and historical contingencies that enriched the comparisons. Finland was an 
agriculturally dominated economy, significantly behind its Nordic neighbors in 
industrialization, that had just become independent. The challenges the Finns faced included the 
creation of a new administrative infrastructure. Sweden, respectively, had a mature industrial 
base and established political markets.
In the Swedish case, on the rare occasion that the major parties agreed on the necessity of 
disarmament after an extensive committee phase, decisions imposing subsequent military 
spending cuts were undertaken only after lengthy negotiations and implemented slowly. State 
bureaucracies had only limited opportunities to maximize their budgets, especially since these 
bureaucracies were quite undeveloped in the Finnish context. Yet, in both countries the military 
spending shares seemed to behave opposite to central government spending trends, thus 
indicating budgetary immobility once again. Therefore, the military bureaucrats, usually 
officials of the Ministries of Defense, and the certain interest groups were able to maintain the 
spending levels relatively unchanged, either in the short or the longer run, despite changes in the 
economy or the central government spending practices. The opportunities of influencing 
military spending policy-making by the political parties and the bureaucrats were severely 
limited by the division in the political field and the difficulty o f fundamentally changing the 
existing laws on the consumption ME, especially governing conscription in the Finnish case.
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Therefore, there were more opportunities available for the economic interest groups to a c h ie v e  
their goals in the game for impurely public benefits arising from the military spending in  t h e  
Finnish case. These groups, mainly representing the producing sectors, were primarily in terested  
in the level o f military capital expenditures and the awarding of the ensuing contracts. O f te n  
these groups favored lower public and military spending on the aggregate, meaning lower le v e ls  
of taxation, which coincided with the political philosophy o f many center and right-wing p a rtie s  
in Sweden and Finland. The industrial federations in these two countries, representing dom estic  
market interests, were particularly active in soliciting concrete benefits and price advantages a s  
well as participating in the various public-private sector forms of cooperation. They had m o re  
opportunities available in the Finnish case, as the Finnish system of governance was still in  a  
state of flux. Thus, the Federation o f Finnish Industries obtained specific price advantages o f  u p  
to twenty per cent to the domestic producers in government acquisitions. Furthermore, th e  
military import share of Finland declined in the 1930s, despite its extreme dependence o n  
foreign military goods. This had obvious adverse effects on the material status o f the F in n ish  
military establishment. Also, the long process of establishing state-owned production u n its  
contributed to this predicament. The Federation o f  Swedish Industries was more constrained in  
its rent-seeking, since the more established Swedish political markets did not provide room  f o r  
similar measures as in the Finnish case. They were able to obtain only a loosely d rafted  
recommendation on state military acquisitions. Nonetheless, the Swedish armaments industries 
were able to resist efforts to nationalize military production in the 1930s, which was the resu lt 
of their established position in the Swedish supply framework. Also, the active participation o f  
the Swedish armaments industries in the international markets, in addition to  key dom estic 
committees, ensured the survival and even growth of these industries. Bofors, one of the k e y  
suppliers o f Swedish armed forces, became an important exporter of small and medium s iz e  
arms along with its Czech competitors.
The military spending of both countries was clearly path dependent in the linear sense, w hich 
applied to most of these eleven European states in the interwar period. Nonetheless, there w ere  
significant differences in such tendencies in the Swedish and Finnish cases. In the Swedish case, 
the military consumption expenditures were path dependent only in the short run, since 
compromises altering their level were eventually possible, yet the impacts were smoothed over 
several years. The Swedish military establishment’s capital spending was also path dependent, 
since the strong position occupied by the private armaments manufacturers in the Swedish 
society made it difficult to  constrain their rent seeking altogether. Nonetheless, the window o f  
opportunity available for private sector gains was smaller in Sweden than in Finland. In the
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Finnish case, the military consumption expenditures were more path dependent than in the 
Swedish case, since it was very difficult to change the laws on conscription. Moreover, the 
private sector had other opportunities available in the Finnish case, even resulting in occasional 
collusion, which kept the capital component in military spending (especially naval investments) 
high. These elements introduced mostly short-term path dependence in the Swedish case, and 
longer term path dependence in the Finnish case. Yet, the threats and the international position 
of these two states differed greatly, which affected the behavior of the agents as well. For 
example, the actions of the private sector representatives were not motivated by pure profit 
maximization in the 1930s rather than a complex set of priorities including nationalism and 
hatred of the socialist system. Finland was perhaps more concretely threatened due to its long 
land border with the Soviet Union, whereas Sweden seemed to feel somewhat less threatened 
from both the east and the south. Nonetheless, Sweden did consider the emergence of Finland 
and the Baltic states as an additional security instrument in the Baltic region, which contributed 
to its willingness to  disarm.
\
In the following I will reproduce the list of hypotheses that were pursued in this thesis, and a 
summary of how they fared in the various analyses carried out in this thesis. The following list 
includes the number of the hypothesis, the relevance (relevant, uncertain, not relevant) o f the 
possible quantitative indicator in the estimations, whether it received weak or strong support (or 
in fact support at all or support to the contrary, and the means by which this support was 
gathered. These hypotheses should be cross-referenced with the list of hypotheses presented at 
the end of Chapter 2.
LIST OF HYPOTHESES 1— 50:
1. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: (HYPOTHESES 1— 11)
1.1. BALANCE OF POWER: (HYPOTHESES 1— 4)
© HYPOTHESIS 1. Relevance: relevant Support: uncertain. Analysis: quantitative. 
© HYPOTHESIS 2. Relevance: relevant Support: uncertain. Analysis: quantitative. 
© HYPOTHESIS 3. Relevance: relevant Support: uncertain. Analysis: quantitative. 
©  HYPOTHESIS 4. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
1.2. DEMOCRATIC PEACE: (HYPOTHESES 5—8)
© HYPOTHESIS 5. Relevant: irrelevant Support: none. Analysis: quantitative.
© HYPOTHESIS 6. Relevance: relevant Support: uncertain. Analysis: quantitative. 
© HYPOTHESIS 7. Relevance: relevant Support: uncertain. Analysis: quantitative. 
© HYPOTHESIS 8. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
1.3. SYSTEMIC LEADERSHIP: (HYPOTHESES 9— 11)
© HYPOTHESIS 9. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
© HYPOTHESIS 10. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative. 
© HYPOTHESIS 11. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
2. ALLIANCE: (HYPOTHESES 12— 18)
2.1. ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP: (HYPOTHESES 12— 13)
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&  HYPOTHESIS 12. Relevance: irrelevant. Support: none. Analysis: quantitative.
^  HYPOTHESIS 13. Relevance: uncertain. Support: none. Analysis: quantitative.
2.2. PURE PUBLIC GOOD: (HYPOTHESES 14— 16)
^  HYPOTHESIS 14. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong, opposite. Analysis: quantitative.
®  HYPOTHESIS 15. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong, opposite. Analysis: quantitative.
O' HYPOTHESIS 16. Relevance: relevant Support: uncertain. Analysis: quantitative.
O  2.3. JOINT PRODUCTS (^IMPURE PUBLIC GOOD WITHIN AN A LLIA N C ES: 
(HYPOTHESES 17— 18)
O  HYPOTHESIS 17. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 18. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
3. STATE: (HYPOTHESES 19— 39)
3.1. PURE PUBLIC GOOD CHARACTERISTICS: (HYPOTHESES 19—23)
O' HYPOTHESIS 19. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong, opposite. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 20. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 21. Relevance: relevant Support: weak. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 22. Relevance: relevant. Support: weak. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 23. Relevance: uncertain. Support: none. Analysis: quantitative.
3.2. DEMOCRATIC PEACE: (HYPOTHESES 24—29)
O  HYPOTHESIS 24. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 25. Relevance: uncertain. Support: none. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 26. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
HYPOTHESIS 27. Relevance: uncertain. Support: none. Analysis: quantitative.
HYPOTHESIS 28. Relevance: relevant. Support: weak. Analysis: quantitative.
HYPOTHESIS 29. Relevance: relevant. Support: weak. Analysis: quantitative.
3.3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - MILITARY SPENDING: (HYPOTHESES 30—33) 
HYPOTHESIS 30. Relevance: relevant Support: weak. Analysis: quantitative.
©■ HYPOTHESIS 31. Relevance: irrelevant. Support: none. Analysis: quantitative.
O' HYPOTHESIS 32. Relevance: relevant Support: weak. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 33. Relevance: relevant. Support: weak. Analysis: quantitative.
3.4. “WEAK” STATES VS. GREAT POWERS: (HYPOTHESES 34—)
O  HYPOTHESIS 34. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 35. Relevance: uncertain. Support: uncertain. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 36. Relevance: relevant Support: weak, also for military exports. Analysis: 
quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 37. Relevance: relevant Support: weak. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 38. Relevance: relevant. Support: weak. Analysis: quantitative.
O  HYPOTHESIS 39. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative, qualitative.
4. W ITH IN  STATE: (HYPOTHESES 40—50)
4.1. IMPURE PUBLIC GOOD: (HYPOTHESES 40—50) (*=evidence only from the Sw edish- 
Finnish interwar context)
©■ HYPOTHESIS 40. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative, qualitative.*
® HYPOTHESIS 41. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative, qualitative.*
<&■ HYPOTHESIS 42. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative, qualitative.
HYPOTHESIS 43. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative.
@ HYPOTHESIS 44. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative, qualitative.
© HYPOTHESIS 45. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative, qualitative.
@ HYPOTHESIS 46. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: qualitative.*
HYPOTHESIS 47. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: qualitative.*
@ HYPOTHESIS 48. Relevance: relevant Support: strong. Analysis: qualitative.*
® HYPOTHESIS 49. Relevance: relevant. Support: strong. Analysis: quantitative, qualitative.
® HYPOTHESIS 50. Relevance: relevant Support: uncertain. Analysis: quantitative.
This study also suggests further challenges for the study o f military spending during the 
interwar period. Firstly, it should prove helpful if the sample could be widened and some of the
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data problems involving the Eastern European states could be resolved. Secondly» we need more 
concrete ways of measuring supply and demand side developments at the same time. An 
application of supply side models, if data could be gathered for these purposes, would give a 
more accurate picture of the incentives facing the military producers, for example. Thirdly, the 
supply and demand factors should also include the impact of domestic power structures and 
allocation patterns, as well as competition within the political markets in a comprehensive 
manner. A concise game theoretical analysis of the interaction patterns between the agents 
would improve the relative weight of many of the claims made in this thesis. Therefore, this 
thesis is merely a step in the right direction. Also, a similar framework as developed here could 
be applied to other time periods and samples of countries as well. After all, military 
expenditures greatly reflect the values of the societies in question. Fourthly, the application of 
factor analysis might be necessary to distinguish between the systemic forces in the kinds of 
demand analyses carried out in this thesis. Fifthly, one should also attempt to study military 
expenditures more closely in connection with the central government spending practices as a 
whole and the development of public debt. Military expenditures were and are often funded in 
arrears, and public debt seems to have been an important explanatory variable in  the 
development of military spending in the long run.648 All these challenges, if met, would surely 
increase our understanding of the demand for military spending in any time period. In any case, 
military spending is very likely to be an impure public good in most instances, with influences 
originating from the four levels of analysis explored in this thesis.
648 This was originally suggested to me by Avner Offer. See also Clark 2001 for a similar argument and 
application. In the long run, the significance of credit can hardly be disputed. See also The Rise o f the 
Fiscal State in Europe c. 1200—1815. Edited by Richard Bonney. Oxford University Press. Oxford 1999.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1. Details on the Abbreviations and Statistical Tests
Table 1A, A bbreviations Used in the  Thesis, in Alphabetical O rder
2SLS Two-Stage Least Squares
3SLS Three-Stage Least Squares
ADF Augmented Dickey Fuller
ALUANCEDUM Alliance dummy
AR Autoregressive (term)
ATOP Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions
AUT Austria
AUTOC Autocracy
AUTOCCINC CINCs of autocracies, system
AUTOCDUM Autocracy dummy
AUTOCTOTME Total ME by autocracies, system
BEL Belgium
BF Belgian francs
C Constant
CAPME Military capital expenditures
CCC Contracts Coordinating Committee
CFAP Central Federation of Agricultural Producers 
(Finland)
CFFWI Central Federation of Finnish Woodrefining 
Industries
CGE Central government expenditures
CID Committee of Imperial Defence
CINC Composite Index of National Capabilities
CINCCONC Concentration of CINCs, system
COMBTHRT Aggregate threat index
CONSME Military consumption expenditures
COW Correlates of War
CZE Czechoslovakia
DEMDUM Democracy dummy
DEMOC Democracy
DEMOCCINC CINCs of democracies, system
DEMOCTOTME Total ME by democracies, system
DEN Denmark
DFSHARE Defense share
DKR Danish kronas
DS Difference-stationary
DSP Difference-stationary process
ECONCINC Economic resources in CINC, system
ELECTIONDUM Election year dummy
ESP Spanish pesetas
EUROPEMEPRICE European market price of arms
FBI Federation of British Industries
FFI Federation of Finnish Industries
FIM Finnish markkas
FIN Finland
FRA France
FRF French francs
FSl Federation of Swedish Industries
GBP British pounds sterling
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDPCAP Real GDP per capita
GDPSHARE Real GDP share, system
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GER
GERSOVTHRT
GERTHRT
GLS
GNP
ÏTA
JAP
LO
LOG
MA
MAD
ME
MESHARE
MF
MIC
MILBUR
MILCINC
MILCINCCONC
MILEXP
MIUMP
MIUMPOFME
MP
NATO
NED
NLG
NOK
NOR
OLS
PAC
POP
POR
PPP
PSOC
PTE
RUS/USSR
S.E.
SAAB
SAF
SAT
SEK
SFR
SIPRI
SNA
SPA
SUR
SWE
SWI
SYSTOTME
SYSTOTMECV
TRADEOFGDP
TS
UKCINC
UKME
UKMILCINC
USA
USACINC
USAME
Germany
German-Soviet-weighted threat index
German-weighted threat index
Generalized Least Squares
Gross National Product
Italy
Japan
Landsorganisationen
Logarithm
Moving average (tom)
Mutually Assured Destruction 
Military expenditures 
Real military spending share, system 
Microfilm
Military-industrial complex 
Military burden
Military resources in CENC, system
Concentration of MILCINCs, system
Military exports
Military imports
Military imports of ME
Military personnel or member of parliament,
depending on context
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The Netherlands
Dutch guldens
Norwegian kronas
Norway
Ordinary Least Squares 
Political action committee 
Population 
Portugal
Purchasing power parity 
Principal Supply Officers Committee 
Portuguese escudos 
Soviet Union 
Standard error
Svenska Aeroplanaktiebolaget 
Svenska arbetsgivareforeningen 
Suomen Ampumatehdas Ab 
Swedish kronas 
Swiss francs
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
System of National Accounts
Spain
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
Sweden
Switzerland
Total system ME
Coefficient of variation on the total system ME
Percentage, trade of GDP
Trend-stationary
CINC of the United Kingdom
ME of the United Kingdom
MILCINC of the United Kingdom
The United States
CINC of the United States
ME of the United States
3 2 9
USAMILCINC
USD
VOL
MILCINC of the United Sues
U.S. dollars
Volume
Appendix IB. Details on the Parametric and Nonparamctric Statistical Tests Utilized in 
Tables 4 and 11
Note! All tests reported in this section have the same mean, median, or variance as the null hypothesis 
Details can be found in Gujarati 1995 and EViews 3.1 manual.
Mean Equality Test:
Carries out the test of the null hypothesis that the mean of the series x is equal to a specified value » 
against the two-sided alternative that it is not equal to y.
Median Equality Tests:
*Mann-Whitney U-test ranks the series from smallest value (rank 1) to largest, and to compare the sum of 
the ranks from the first subgroup to the sum of the ranks second subgroup. If the groups hast the same 
median, the values should be similar.
*Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA by ranks, which is a generalization of the Mann-Whitney test to more 
than two subgroups. The test is based on a one-way analysis of variance using only ranks of the data 
*van der Waerden (normal scores) test, which is similar to the Krmkal-Wallis test, except that the ranks 
are smoothed by converting them into normal quantiles.
* Chi-square test for the median, which is a rank-based ANOVA test, based on the comparison of the 
number of observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup.
*Adjusted Chi-square test for the median, same as above but the so-called Yates' continuity corrected 
statistic.
Variance Equality Tests:
*Standard F-test
*Siegel-Tukey test, which assumes the two subgroups are independent and have an equal median The lot 
statistic is computed using the same steps as the Mann-Whitney U test for median equality, however with 
a different assignment of ranks. Here the ranking far the Siegel-Tukey test alternates from the lowest to 
the highest value for every other rank.
*Bartlett test, which compares the logarithm of the weighted average variance with the weighted turn of 
the logarithms of the variances.
*Levene test, which is based on an analysis of variance of the absolute difference from the mean. 
*Brown-Forsythe, a modified Levene test. This is a modification of the Levene test in which the absolute 
mean difference is substituted with the absolute median difference.
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APPENDIX 2. Details on the Data Sources and Adopted Solutions 
CO M M O N  DATA:
*=part of the core sample of eleven European states 
n=part of the larger sample of 17 European states
Note! Many, but not all, of the series mentioned here can be found in the enclosed CD-ROM database. 
1920— 1938*)*:
Military personnel data (thousands) from Singer-Small 1993. Iron and steel production (thousands o f 
tons) from Singer-Small 1993. Urban population (population living in cities with population greater than 
100,000 — in thousands) figures from Singer-Small 1993. Levels o f democracy and autocracy (separate 
indices, scale from 0—10, with the score 6 or higher in the democracy index taken as indicating a 
democracy, with the score 3 or higher in the autocracy index taken as indicating an autocracy; these 
indices are constructed on the basis of the following variables: competitive participation in politics, 
regulation of participation, executive recruitment regulation, executive recruitment competition, executive 
recruitment openness, and executive constraints), used to divide the military threat into either democratic 
or authoritarian (neutral countries were excluded) aggregates, taken from Polity 3D 2000. Alliances 
(defined very broadly as including any defensive, offensive, neutrality, nonaggression, or consultation 
obligations), used to construct alliance dummies for each country, by year from ATOP 2000. Exchange 
rates used in various conversions from Global Financial Data 2000 (only partially for France, Germany, 
the UK, the USA), otherwise from Währungen der Welt 1991,1997 and Autio 1992. Data on battleships 
as well as nominal and depreciated tonnages were found in Modelski-Thompson 1988, complemented
with data from the League of Nations, Armaments Year-Books 1924— 1940 and League of Nations, 
Statistical Enquiry into National Peace-time Armaments. A20. 1923. IX.
1920—1938*:
Definitions of military expenditures can be found in Chapter 1 of this diesis as well as in Eloranta 1998, 
Appendices. In addition to the ME series indicated on country-basis, three other series are often used as a  
point of reference in this thesis: Banks (1976) figures; National Capabilities (Singer-Small 1993) figures; 
and the figures collected by the League of Nations (League of Nations, Armaments Year-Books 1924—  
1940; League of Nations, Budget expenditure on national defence: 1913 and 1920—7922. A.38(a). 1922. 
DC; League of Nations, Statistical Enquiry 1923). Additionally, a general reference to the data on the 
capital goods prices can be found in Collins-Williamson 2001. Data on these countries* military imports 
and experts can be found in the League of Nations, Statistical Year-Books of the Trade in Arms and 
Ammunition 1924— 1938, as well as other sources listed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC DATA:
AUSTRIA**
1920—1938:
Nominal ME from Singer-Small 1993, converted using the exchange rates listed above. Nomind GDP 
obtained by deflating the real GNP found in Kausel et al. 1965 for 1920— 1923 by the combined price 
index described below, otherwise nominal GDP from Mitchell 1998b. Real GDP from Maddison 1995, 
adjusted according to 1929 indirect PPP-level differences calculated in Prados de la Escosura 2000. Total 
population from Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE for 1923— 1937 (1920—1923 defense share [=ME of 
CGE] extrapolated using the military burden [=ME of GDP) trend, 1938 defense share, for systemic 
purposes, assumed to be the same as in 1937) from Mitchell 1998b. Regarding price data, the consumer
As indicated in Section 3.3 of this thesis, only benchmark years (1923, 1928, 1933, 1938) were 
utilized to come up with the depreciated tonnage figures, due to the enormous amount of work involved. 
Interpolation to come up with the series individually was performed using a combined index of naval 
spending and battleships found in Modelski-Thompson 1988, backwards from each observation point 
Following the specifications laid by the League of Nations (Statistical Enquiry 1923, 3), the depreciation 
times were set as: 20 years for battleships, battle cruisers, coastal defense ships, destroyers, monitors, 
aircraft carriers and miscellaneous craft; 17 years for cruisers and light cruisers; 12 years for torpedo craft 
and submarines.
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price index (CPI) for 1920—1938 and WPI for 1922—1938 taken from Mitchell 1998b, and combined 
with equal weighting (for 1920—1921 only CPI taken) to come up with a deflator for ME. Nominal ME 
was then converted to 1929 prices and adjusted with the indirect PPP-converters found in Prados de la 
Escosura 2000 and the exchange rates mentioned above to come up with real ME in 1929 (quasi)-USD.
BELGIUM*»
1920—1938:
Nominal ME from Clement 2000 (including the breakdown of the components). Nominal GDP from 
Buyst 1997. Real GDP from Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population from 
Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE from Clement 2000. Regarding price data, WPI (year 1920 missing) and 
CPI from Mitchell 1998b, combined with equal weighting (for 1920 only CPI taken) to come up with a 
deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Austria.
BULGARIA
1925. 1930. 1935:
Nominal ME from Singer-Small 1993, using the exchange rates described above. Nominal NNP from 
Mitchell 1998b. Nominal CGE from Mitchell 1998b. Real GDP per capita from Maddison 1995.
DENMARK*»
1920—1938:
Nominal ME from Johansen 1985. Nominal GDP from Johansen 1985. Real GDP from Maddison 1995, 
adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population from Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE from Johansen 
1985. Danish WPI and CPI from Mitchell 1998b, combined with equal weighting to come up with a 
deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Austria. Capital goods price index from Bjerke 1955. 
Real industrial value added from Hansen 1974.
FINLAND*»
1920— 1938:
Nominal ME from Tervasmaki 1964 (including the breakdown of the components). Nominal GDP from 
Hjerppe 1988. Real GDP from Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population from 
Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE obtained from Taimio 1986. Finnish WPI and CPI from Hjerppe 1996, 
combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of 
Austria. Capital goods price index from Hjerppe 1988. Real industrial value added from Hjerppe 1988.
FRANCE*»
1920— 1938:
Nominal ME from Frankenstein 1982 (including details on the military capital expenditures). Nominal 
GDP from Mitchell 1998b. Real GDP from Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the Austrian case. Total 
population from Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE from Maddison 1998b. French WPI from Mitchell 1998b 
and French CPI from Global Financial Data 2000, combined with equal weighting to come up with a 
deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Austria. Capital goods price index from Chadeau 1989 
(1920— 1921 extrapolated with French WPI). Real industrial product from Chadeau 1989.
GREECE 
1925. 1930. 1935:
Nominal ME as an average of Singer-Small 1993, using the exchange rates described above, and League 
of Nations, Armaments Year-Books 1924— 1940. Nominal GDP from Kostelenos 1995. Nominal CGE 
from Mitchell 1998b. Real GDP per capita for 1929 onwards from Maddison 1995, extrapolated 
backwards using the 1929 ratio between the Maddison figures and Kostelenos 1995 real GDP data.
GERMANY»
1920—1938:
Nominal ME for 1920—1923 from Singer-Small 1993, converted by using the exchange rates described 
above, for 1924— 1931 from League of Nations Armaments Year-Books 1924— 1934, and for 1932— 
1938 from Abelshauser 1998. Nominal NNP from Mitchell 1998b (1920—1924 missing, military burden 
extrapolated by using defense share trend, see CGE below). Real GDP from Maddison 1995, adjusted as 
in the case of Austria. Total population from Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE for 1920—1921, 1924— 
1934 from Mitchell 1998b (1922—1923 defense shares from Banks 1976), for 1935— 1938 from Klein
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1959. German WPI and CPI from Mitchell 1998b, combined with equal weighting to come up with a 
deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Austria.
HUNGARY
1925. 1930. 1935:
Nominal ME as an average of Singer-Small 1993, using the exchange rates described above, and League 
of Nations, Armaments Year-Books 1924— 1940. Nominal NNP from Mitchell 1998b. Nominal CG E  
from Mitchell 1998b. Real GDP per capita from Maddison 1995.
ITALYn
1920—1938:
Nominal ME for 1920—1922 from D bilancio dello Stato 1969, for 1923—1932 from Sullivan 1984, an d  
for 1933— 1938 from Zamagni 1998.650 Nominal GDP from Rossi et al. 1993. Real GDP from Maddison 
1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population from Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE from  
Ercolani 1975. Italian WPI and CPI from Mitchell 1998b, combined with equal weighting to come up  
with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Austria.
JAPANn
1920—1938:
Nominal ME (with extraordinary ME included, see Eloranta 2000a for details on the argument favoring 
their inclusion) from Emi-Shionoya 1966. Nominal GNP from Ohkawa et al. 1974. Real GDP from  
Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population from Maddison 1995. Nominal CG E  
(general government expenditures) from Emi-Shionoya 1966. Japanese WPI from Mitchell 1998c, and  
Japanese CPI from Global Financial Data 2000, combined with equal weighting to come up with a  
deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Austria.
THE NETHERLANDS*^
1920—1938:
Nominal ME from Central Bureau voor de Statistiek 1979 (without extraordinary ME). Nominal GDP  
from Bakker et al. 1990 (1920 figure is nominal NNP from Central Bureau voor de Statistiek 1979 raised 
by 8,4 per cent). Real GDP from Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population 
from Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE from Mitchell 1998b. Dutch WPI and CPI from Mitchell 1998b, 
combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case o f  
Austria. Capital goods price index from de Jong 1999. Real industrial value added from de Jong 1999.
NORWAY***
1920—1938:
Nominal ME from Historisk Statistikk 1978. Nominal GDP from Historisk Statistikk 1978. Real GDP  
from Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population from Maddison 1995. Nominal 
CGE from Historisk Statistikk 1978. Norwegian WPI and CPI from Mitchell 1998b, combined with equal 
weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Austria. Capital goods 
price index from NOS XII 1969 and Nasjonalregnskap 1968. See also Bjerke 1966. Real product o f  
mining, manufacturing and gas supply from Nasjonalregnskap 1968.
POLAND
1925.1930.1935:
Nominal ME from Singer-Small 1993, using the exchange rates described above. Nominal GNP from 
Lethbridge 1985 (the Klamer estimates), missing for the period 1920—1928. Nominal CGE from 
Mitchell 1998b. Real GDP per capita from Maddison 1995, missing for the period 1920—1928.
PORTUGAL**!
1920-1938:
Nominal ME from Valerio 1994. Nominal GDP from Batista et al. 1997. Real GDP from Batista et al. 
1997, adjusted to 1929 prices using the indirect PPP-converters found in Prados de la Escosura 2000.
0 It is argued here that this combination ME (colonial ME excluded) will represent the best choice 
according to the definition put forth in the introduction. On other sources of Italian ME and their time 
series qualities, see e.g. Eloranta 2000a.
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Total population from Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE from Valerio 1994. Regarding price data, 
Portuguese WPI taken from Valerio 1994, and Portuguese CPI for 1929—1938 from Mitchell 1998b, 
combined with equal weighting (only WPI for 1920—1928) to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME 
derived as in the case of Austria. Capital goods price index from Batista et al. 1997. Real industrial value 
added from Batista et al. 1997.
RUMANIA
1925.1930.1935:
Nominal ME from Singer-Small 1993, using the exchange rates described above. Nominal GDP from 
Lethbridge 1985, missing for the period 1920—1926. Nominal CGE from Mitchell 1998b. Real GDP per 
capita from Maddison 1995, missing for the period 1920—1926.
RUSSIA/SOVIET UNIONa 
1920—1938:
Nominal ME for 1920—1927 from Davies 1958, for 1928—1938 from Hanison-Davies 1997. Nominal 
GNP for 1928— 1938 from Mitchell 1992651 (for 1920—1927 military burden derived by using the 
defense share trend). Real GDP for 1928— 1938 from Maddison 1995, for 1920—1928 using a combined 
trend of the sum of nominal exports and nominal imports (found in Soviet Economic Facts 1983) and the 
trend of population increase (see below) (with year 1928 marked as 100 for the trend index); this real 
GDP was then adjusted with the 1913 (as 1929 comparison was not available) Prados de la Escosura 
indirect PPP-conversion. Total population from Singer-Small 1993. Nominal CGE for 1920—1927 from 
Davies 1958, for 1928—1938 from Hanison-Davies 1997. Regarding price data, the retail price index 
(RPI) used hare was constructed by combining the various RPIs found in Soviet Economic Facts 1983 (p. 
217, with 1930 value interpolated in a linear fashion) for the years 1928—1938, for the period 1920— 
1928 by utilizing the reverse combined trend of nominal exports and imports652 outlined above; the RPI 
for the period 1920—1927 was then extrapolated using this index. Real ME was derived by converting 
the nominal ME to 1929 (quasi)-prices, and then converted to 1929 USD by using the exchange rates 
(using the so-called Tscherwontzy ruble conversion) outlined above.653
SPAIN*!!
1920—1938:
Nominal ME for 1920—1935 from Carreras et al. 1989, and for 1936—1938 taken from Singer-Small 
1993 (converted using the exchange rates described above). Nominal GDP from Prados de la Escosura 
1993. Real GDP from Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population from 
Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE from Carreras et al. 1989. The Spanish WPI and CPI both taken from 
Maddison 1998b, combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as 
in the case of Austria. Capital goods price index from Prados de la Escosura 1993. Real industrial value 
added from Prados de la Escosura 1993.
SWEDEN*!!
1920—1938:
Nominal ME from Krantz 1987 (including the breakdown of the components). Nominal GDP from Krantz 
1997. Real GDP from Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population from 
Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE in two-year intervals from Hodk 1962, interpolated for the rest of the 
years using the nominal CGE levels obtained from Statistisk Arsbok 1919—1941. Swedish WPI and CPI
651 This data is here deemed highly dubious due to the lack of source documentation and existing 
discrepancies in comparison with e.g. Bergson 1961.
The argument here is that the more difficult it was to obtain goods from abroad (in addition to the 
chaotic domestic political and economic situation), the higher the prices must have been in the Soviet
domestic markets.
653 The Soviet real ME was not adjusted according to the indirect PPPs, since this would have increased 
the Soviet total ME share in the 16-country system substantially. It is argued here that this adjustment 
may be more appropriate in the case of the real GDP, the total economic resources of the Soviet Union, 
rather than for military spending (especially procurement), benefiting exclusively the (at least in 
principle) price-controlled domestic government production facilities. For details on the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of Soviet defense spending and procurement, see especially Hanison-Davies 1997.
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from Mitchell 1998b, combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real M E  
derived as in the case of Austria. Capital goods price index from Johanssen 1967. Real industrial value 
added from Krantz 1997.
SWITZERLAND***
1920—1938:
Nominal ME from Vogler 1965. Nominal GDP from Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer-David 2000. Real GDP  
from Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total population from Maddison 1995, Nominal 
CGE from Mitchell 1998b. Swiss WPI and CPI from Mitchell 1998b, combined with equal weighting to  
come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Austria.
THE UNITED KINGDOM***
1920—1938:
Nominal ME from Sefton-Weale 1995 (data on the military wages from Chapman-Knight 1954). Nominal 
GDP from Sefton-Weale 1995. Real GDP from Maddison 1995, adjusted as in the case of Austria. Total 
population from Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE from Mitchell 1998b. British WPI and CPI both from  
Mitchell 1998b, combined with equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived a s  
in the case of Austria. Capital goods price index from Feinstein 1972. Real industrial value added from  
Feinstein 1972.
THE UNITED STATES**
1920—1938:
Nominal ME from Historical Statistics 1975. Nominal GNP from Historical Statistics 1975. Real G D P  
from Maddison 1995. Total population from Maddison 1995. Nominal CGE from Historical Statistics 
1975 (federal government outlays). American WPI and CPI both from Mitchell 1998a, combined w ith  
equal weighting to come up with a deflator for ME. Real ME derived as in the case of Austria.
YUGOSLAVIA
1925.1930.1935:
Nominal ME from Singer-Small 1993, using the exchange rates described above. Nominal GDP from  
Mitchell 1998b. Nominal CGE from Mitchell 1998b. Real GDP per capita from Maddison 1995.
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APPENDIX 3. Additional Data Tables
Table 1. The Number of Battleships, Nominal and Depreciated Naval Tonnages, and 
Aggregate Percentage Shares for 17 Nations
Year A. B. C D. E. F- G. H. L J. K. L. M. N. O.
1923 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0 0,081 0,058 36,7190,000 0 0,727 0,433 30,4350,000
1928 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0 0,635 0,218 15,4290,000
1933 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0 0,351 0,178 16,6760,000
1938 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0 0,216 0,072 13,6580,000
Year p. Q- R. S. T. u. V. w. X. Y. z. AA. AB. A C AD.
1923 0 0,049 0,020 20,4820,000 6 10,1588,011 40,31752,400 0 3,082 0,502 8,320 48,841
1928 0 0,093 0,059 28,8100,000 6 11,5349,066 35,41026,949 0 3,374 1,427 19,0510,000
1933 0 0,196 0,486 82,0110,000 5 13,43419,31647,4198,492 1 3,521 3,400 31,84552,797
1938 0 0,154 0,218 58,0560,000 7 10,24411,86247,463 34,334 4 5,616 10,20074,44653.038
Year AE. AF. AG. AH. AI. AJ. AK. AL. AM. AN. AO. AP. AO. AR. AS.
1923 5 7,218 6,062 42,93242,925 10 11,99314,79263,05861,661 0 0,989 0,652 33,6890,000
1928 4 6,594 11,35477,56029,779 10 15,53317,26750,07439,371 0 1,359 1,261 41,8120,000
1933 4 9,104 11,78142,6770,000 9 18,16713,69624,86416,330 0 1,278 1,470 37,9450,000
1938 4 8,951 10,87149,77825,499 9 14,9559,283 25,4412,061 0 1,008 0,853 34,6790,000
Year AT. AU. AV. AW. AX. AY. AZ. BA. BB. B C BD. BE. BF. BG. BH.
1923 0 0,588 0,074 6,452 0,000 0 0,245 0,116 24,1950,000 3 2,757 1,644 30,48561,528
1928 0 0,578 0,071 5,550 0,000 0 0,408 0,185 20,4360,000 3 3,884 2,265 26,27265,736
1933 0 0,474 0,069 4,825 0,000 0 0,519 1,043 66,2660,000 3 4,031 0,379 3,104 0,000
1938 0 0,495 0,143 11,8140,000 0 0,343 0,570 68,0800,000 3 5,329 4,146 31,8890,000
Year BL BJ. BK. BL. BM. BN. BO. BP. BO. BR. BS. BT. BU. BV. BW.
1923 3 2,662 1,908 36,64469,558 0 1,716 0,905 26,9530,000 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
1928 2 2,823 2,860 45,63529,128 0 1,540 0,610 17,8300,000 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
1933 2 2,606 3,519 44,5330,000 0 1,731 1,369 26,0880,000 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
1938 1 1,598 1,214 31,1320,000 0 1,316 0,709 22,0820,000 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Year BX. BY. BZ. CA. CB. cc. CD. CE. CF. CG. CH. Cl. CJ.
1923 24 25,50831,02462,17848,612 21 32,227 33,800 53,617 36,991 0,0050,002 72
1928 20 26,009 25,57344,292 50,882 17 25,63527,78448,82342,111 0,0050,002 62
1933 15 22,576 20,145 29,429 25,447 15 22,013 23,148 34,68023,202 0,0050,002 54
1938 15 26,977 28,96144,003 26,747 15 22,798 20,900 37,57416,045 0,0060,003 58
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. A=Austria, number of battleships; B=Austria, percentage of the 
total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; C=Au$tria, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; D=Austria, 
percentage of its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; E=Austria, percentage of its depreciated battleship 
tonnage to its nominal depreciated total tonnage; F=Belgium, number of battleships; G=Belgium, percentage of the 
total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; H=Belgium, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; 
I=BeIgium, percentage of its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; J=  Belgium, percentage of its depredated 
battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total tonnage; K=Denmark, number of battleships; L=Denmark, 
percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; M=Denmaik, percentage of the total depredated tonnage of 
17 nations; N=Denmark, percentage of its depredated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; 0=* Denmark, percentage of its 
depredated battleship tonnage to its nominal depredated total tonnage; P=Finland, number of battleships; 
Q=Finland, percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; R= Fini and, percentage of the total depredated 
tonnage of 17 nations; S=Finland, percentage of its depredated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; T=Finland, 
percentage of its depredated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total tonnage; U=Ffance, number of 
battleships; V=France, percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; W=France, percentage of the total
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depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; X=France, percentage of its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; 
Y=Fiance, percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total tonnage; Z=Germany, 
number of battleships; AA=Germany, percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; AB=Germany, 
percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; AOGerm any, percentage of its depreciated tonnage to  its 
nominal tonnage; AD=Germany, percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total 
tonnage; AE=Italy, number of battleships; AF=Italy, percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; 
AG=Italy, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; AH=Italy, percentage of its depreciated tannage 
to its nominal tonnage; AI=Italy, percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total 
tonnage; AJ=Japan, number of battleships; AK=Japan, percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; 
AL=Japan, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; AM=Japan, percentage of its depreciated 
tonnage to its nominal tonnage; AN=Japan, percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated 
total tonnage; AO=Netherlands, number of battleships; AP=Netherlands, percentage of the total nominal tonnage o f 
17 nations; AQ=Netherlands, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; AR=Netherlands, percentage 
of its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; AS=Netherlands, percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to  
its nominal depreciated total tonnage; AT=Norway, number of battleships; AU=Norway, percentage of the total 
nominal tonnage of 17 nations; AV=Norway, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; 
AW=Norway, percentage of its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; AX=Norway, percentage of its  
depreciated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total tonnage; AY=Portugal, number of battleships; 
AZ=Portugal, percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; BA=Portugal, percentage of the total 
depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; BB=Portugal, percentage of its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; 
BO Portugal, percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total tonnage; 
BD=Russia/USS R, number o f battleships; BE=Russia/USSR, percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; 
BF=Russi a/U S S R, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; BG=Russia/USSR, percentage of its  
depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; BH=Russi a/U S S R, percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to  its  
nominal depreciated total tonnage; BI=Spain, number of battleships; BJ=$pain, percentage of the total nominal 
tonnage of 17 nations; BK=Spain, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; BL=Spain, percentage o f  
its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; BM=Spain, percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to  its  
nominal depreciated total tonnage; BN=Sweden, number of battleships; BO=Sweden, percentage o f the total nominal 
tonnage of 17 nations; BP=Sweden, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; BQ=Sweden, 
percentage of its depreciated tonnage to  its nominal tonnage; BR=Sweden, percentage of its depreciated battleship 
tonnage to  its nominal depreciated total tonnage; BS=Switzerland, number of battleships; BT=Switier! and, 
percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; BU=Switzerland, percentage of the total depreciated tonnage 
of 17 nations; BV=Switzerland, percentage of its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; BW=Switzerland, 
percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total tonnage; BX=UK, number o f  
battleships; BY-UK, percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; BZ=UK, percentage of the total 
depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; CA=UK, percentage of its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; CB=UK, 
percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total tonnage; C O U SA , number o f  
battleships; CD=USA, percentage of the total nominal tonnage of 17 nations; CE=USA, percentage of the total 
depreciated tonnage of 17 nations; CF=USA, percentage of its depreciated tonnage to its nominal tonnage; 
CG=USA, percentage of its depreciated battleship tonnage to its nominal depreciated total tonnage; CH=17-country 
total nominal tonnage; Q =  17-country total depredated tonnage; CJ=17-country total number of battleships.
Table 2. Granger Non-causality Relationships for 17 Countries, 1920—1938
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE
NUMBER OF LAGS (FOR 
BEST p)
BEST
P-VÀLUE
1. AUTi 
Defense share Real GDP per capita 3t - 0,013
Real GDP per capita Defense share 3t 0,015
Military burden Real GDP per capita 3 0,106
Real GDP per capita Military burden 3+ 0,016
Country ME of tôt. ME Country GDP of tôt. GDP 3 0,002
Country GDP of tôt. GDP Country ME of tôt. ME 2t 0,027
2. BEL:
Defense share Real GDP per capita 3 0,138
Real GDP per capita Defense share 2 0,129
Military burden Real GDP per capita 3 0,121
Real GDP per capita Military burden 5 0,265
Country ME of tôt. ME Country GDP of tôt. GDP 2t 0,000
Country GDP of tôt. GDP Country ME of tôt. ME 5 0,242
3, DEN: 
Defense share Real GDP per capita 3 0,216
Real GDP per capita Defense share 3 0,189
Military burden Real GDP per capita 5t 0,007
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Real GDP per capita Military burden 1 0,038
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 4 0,052
Country GDP of tot. GDP 
4. FIN:
Country ME of tot. ME 4t 0,005
Defense share Real GDP per capita 2t 0,010
Real GDP per capita Defense share 4t 0,019
Military burden Real GDP per capita I t 0,004
Real GDP per capita Military burden 2t 0,000
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 2t 0,000
Country GDP of tot. GDP 
5. FRA:
Country ME of tot. ME 4 0,664
Defense share Real GDP per capita 2t 0,015
Real GDP per capita Defense share 2 0,148
Military burden Real GDP per capita 3t 0,028
Real GDP per capita Military burden 4 0,773
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 2 0,373
Country GDP of tot. GDP 
6. GER:
Country ME of tot. ME 3 0,197
Defense share Real GDP per capita 4 0,250
Real GDP per capita Defense share 3 0,087
Military burden Real GDP per capita 4 0,201
Real GDP per capita Military burden 3 0,088
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 5t 0,006
Country GDP of tot. GDP 
7. ITA:
Country ME of tot. ME 1 0,016
Defense share Real GDP per capita I t 0,000
Real GDP per capita Defense share 5 0,049
Military burden Real GDP per capita I t 0,001
Real GDP per capita Military burden 3 0,386
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 5 0,394
Country GDP of tot. GDP 
8. JAP:
Country ME of tot. ME 5 0,102
Defense share Real GDP per capita 3 0,299
Real GDP per capita Defense share 1 0,168
Military burden Real GDP per capita 5 0,188
Real GDP per capita Military burden 2t 0,021
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 4 0,055
Country GDP of tot. GDP 
9. NED:
Country ME of tot. ME 5 0,127
Defense share Real GDP per capita 3t 0,004
Real GDP per capita Defense share 1 0,278
Military burden Real GDP per capita 5 0,135
Real GDP per capita Military burden 2 0,583
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 1 0,082
Country GDP of tot. GDP 
10. NOR:
Country ME of tot. ME 3 0,230
Defense share Real GDP per capita 4 0,076
Real GDP per capita Defense share 3 0,178
Military burden Real GDP per capita I t 0,031
Real GDP per capita Military burden 1 0,175
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 1 0,064
Country GDP of tot. GDP 
11. POR:
Country ME of tot. ME 4 0,351
Defense share Real GDP per capita 1 0,128
Real GDP per capita Defense share 2 0,729
Military burden Real GDP per capita I t 0,001
Real GDP per capita Military burden 5 0,379
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 5 0,115
Country GDP of tot. GDP 
12. RUS/USSR:
Country ME of tot. ME 3 0,127
Defense share Real GDP per capita 4t 0,059
Real GDP per capita Defense share 2 0,107
Military burden Real GDP per capita 1 0,176
Real GDP per capita Military burden 2 0,109
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 2 0,001
Country GDP of tot. GDP Country ME of tot. ME St 0,010
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13. SPA: 
Defense share Real GDP per capita 1 0 ,1 1 3
Real GDP per capita Defense share 4 0 ,1 0 5
Military burden Real GDP per capita 3 0 , 4 2 0
Real GDP per capita Military burden 3 0 ,2 3 3
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 1 0 , 0 4 4
Country GDP of tot. GDP Country ME of tot. ME 4 0 , 0 3 2
14. SWE: 
Defense share Real GDP per capita 2 t 0 , 0 3 4
Real GDP per capita Defense share 2 t 0 , 0 3 7
Military burden Real GDP per capita 3T 0 ,0 0 1
Real GDP per capita Military burden 2 0 , 0 2 9
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 3 0 , 3 7 3
Country GDP of tot. GDP Country ME of tot. ME 4 0 , 2 0 6
15. SWI:
Defense share Real GDP per capita I t 0 ,0 1 1
Real GDP per capita Defense share 1 0 , 3 4 9
Military burden Real GDP per capita 2 0 , 4 4 8
Real GDP per capita Military burden 1 0 , 0 2 8
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 1 0 , 1 8 5
Country GDP of tot. GDP Country ME of tot. ME 1 0 , 1 1 2
16. UK:
Defense share Real GDP per capita 2 t 0 , 0 0 2
Real GDP per capita Defense share 1 0 , 1 5 6
Military burden Real GDP per capita 4 0 , 0 0 7
Real GDP per capita Military burden 4 0 , 0 8 2
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 2 0 , 0 2 2
Country GDP of tot. GDP Country ME of tot. ME 4 0 , 0 2 6
17. USA: 
Defense share Real GDP per capita 3 t 0 , 0 0 0
Real GDP per capita Defense share 2 0 , 3 0 4
Military burden Real GDP per capita 2 0 ,6 1 3
Real GDP per capita Military burden 4 0 , 3 1 8
Country ME of tot. ME Country GDP of tot. GDP 1 0 ,1 9 1
Country GDP of tot. GDP Country ME of tot. ME 4 t 0 , 0 2 7
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2.
Note: All variables are in logarithmic fonn. FRA real GDP of total (16 countries) real GDP, GER defense share, GER 
military burden, JAP defense share, JAP real GDP per capita, SPA military burden, SWI real GDP of total (16 
countries) real GDP, and UK defense share are 1(1). NED military burden and UK military burden are /(2). t  = null 
rejected at more than one lag.
339
APPENDIX 4. Additional Figures
Figure 1. Belgian ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1938
Billions, BF
Year
-" M E  nom, League of Nations 
■—  ME nom, National Capabilities database 
— * ME nom, Banks
---- ME nom. preferred series____________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Figure 2. Danish ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1938
Billions, DKR
Year
^ " M E  nom, preferred series 
-*—  ME nom, League of Nations
---- ME nom, National Capabilities database
-----ME nom. Banks____________________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
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Figure 3. Finnish ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1938
Billions, FIM
Year
■ME nom, preferred series
--------- ME, nom, Banks
---------ME nom, League of Nations
■ ME nom, National Capabilities database
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Figure 4. French ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1938
Billions, FFR
Year
ME nom, preferred series 
— *—  ME nom, League of Nations
--------ME nom, National Capabilities database
ME nom. Banks_______________ _____
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
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Figure 5. Norwegian ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1938
Billions, NOK
Year
—1,1 —ME nom, preferred series
-------- ME nom, National Capabilities database
— *—  ME nom, Banks
--------ME nom, League of Nations____________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Figure 6. Portuguese ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1938
Year
™ " —ME nom, preferred series 
— ■—  ME nom, Banks
--------ME nom, National Capabilities database
-------- ME nom. League of Nations__________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
i
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Figure 7. Spanish ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1936
Billions, ESP
Year
* ■ ME nom, preferred series
— ■—  ME nom League of Nations
--------ME nom, National Capabilities database
ME nom, Banks____________________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Figure 8. Swedish ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1938
1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Year
1 ME nom, preferred series 
— ■—  ME nom League of Nations 
--------ME nom, Banks
-------- ME nom, National Capabilities database
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
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Figure 9. Swiss ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1938
1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Year
ME nom, preferred series 
— *—  ME nom League of Nations
--------ME nom, National Capabilities database
ME nom, Banks____________________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
Figure 10. British ME Data in Comparisons, 1920—1938
Year
^ “ ME nom, preferred series 
*—  ME nom, National Capabilities database
---- ME nom, League of Nations
-----ME nom, Banks____________________
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details.
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Figure 11. M ilitary Burdens of the Selected Eleven European States Regressed Against 
Their Respective Real GDP per Capita (in 1929 Quasi-USD), 1930
Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values -  0.0000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r = .85216
Regression 
95% confid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Details on the countries can be found in Figures 29—32 in the
text. Model: piecewise linear regression with breakpoint.
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Figure 12. Defense Shares of the Selected Eleven European States Regressed Against Their 
Respective Real GDP per Capita (in 1929 Quasi-USD), 1930
Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = -.0000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r  = .90234
' X  Regression 
95% coofid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Details on the countries can be found in Figures 29— 32 in the
text. Model: piecewise linear regression with breakpoint.
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Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = .00000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r = .80374
Figure 13. Military Burdens of Twenty-four Countries Regressed Against Their
Respective Levels of Democracy, 1925
Q£
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"Ck. Regression 
95% confid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Details on the countries can be found in ^4—45 in the
text. Model: piecewise linear regression with breakpoint.
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Figure 14. Military Burdens of Twenty-four Countries Regressed Against Their
Respective Levels of Democracy, 1930
Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = 0.0000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r -  .84326
Regression 
95% confid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Details on the countries can be found in Figures 44—45 in the
text. Model: piecewise linear regression with breakpoint.
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Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = .00000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r  = .83651
Figure 15. Defense Shares of Twenty-four Countries Regressed Against Their Respective
Levels of Democracy, 1925
Predicted Values (DFSHARE)
Regression 
95% confid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Details on the countries can be found in figures I t  15 in the
text. Model: piecewise linear regression with breakpoint.
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Observed versus Predicted Values 
Observed Values = -.0000 +1.0000 * Predicted Values 
Correlation: r  = .93390
Figure 16. Defense Shares of Twenty-four Countries Regressed Against Their Respective
Levels of Democracy, 1930
Regression 
95% confid.
Sources: see Appendices, Appendix 2 for details. Details on the countries can be found in Figures 44—45 in the
text. Model: piecewise linear regression with breakpoint.
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